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PREFACE 
It is, no doubt, a truism that in the relations of 
states treaties are matters of importance and frequent 
occurrence. The law of treaties, therefore, rightly 
occupies a central position in international law. Within 
this branch of the law, three large categories of rules 
may easily be distinguished relating, respectively, to the 
conclusion, to the interpretation, and to the termination 
of treaties. It is with some aspects of the first of these 
categories that the present study is exclusively concerned. 
In order that a treaty may be validly concluded on 
behalf of a state, two requirements are of fundamental 
importance: the first is that expressions of consent must 
have occurred; the second, that these expressions shall 
emanate from persons who are competent to give them. 
The original plan of the present study envisaged a 
full treatment of the rules of international law governing 
the two requirements referred to above. As the work proceeded, 
however, it became clear that no more than one of the topics 
could be treated within the framework of a thesis. Accord-
ingly, the writer decided not to discuss the rules of 
international law relating to what constitutes an expression 
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of consent to a treaty. The result of the writer's inquiry into the question whether, in cases of doubt, the signature 
of a treaty constitutes an irrevocable expression of consent, 
or ratification is required, is found in a published article, 
appended to the present study as Annex I. An inquiry into 
a cognate problem, namely, the need for unanimity in the 
revision of multilateral treaties, is also attached to this 
thesis as Annex II. 
Consequently, the present study is restricted to a 
systematic examination of those rules of international law 
which relate to the identification of those authorities 
in the state who are competent to express the final consent 
of the state to a treaty. The questions of the representa-
tion in contractual and treaty matters of subjects other 
than states, however, is not discussed. 
The present work deals with two distinct but interrelated problems. The first is that of the conditions under which 
the expressions of consent to a treaty of an authority or person are imputed to the state on whose behalf the authority 
or person purports to act. This is the question of identifying the competent treaty-making organ. The other problem is 
that of the conditions under which the expression of consent given to a treaty by an individual may be imputed to the 
treaty-making organ whose agent the individual purports to be. Both problems are of considerable dif'ficul ty. In the case 
l 
j 
l: -
'I 
c ,t.., 
,( 
• j 
' 
,J 
xxviii 
of the second problem, the competence of agents, the 
difficulties are caused, chiefly, by the scant attention 
which the question has attracted. Material relevant to it 
has not been easily accessible, and the doctrinal discussion,' 
of the matter has hitherto been so limited that the present 
study may probably claim to be the first :full treatment of 
the topic. 
By contrast, many of the difficulties relating to the 
problem of the competence of treaty-making organs, have been 
caused by the prolific treatment which it has been accorded 
at ' the hands of publicists. In order, therefore, to make some 
fresh contribution to this subject, the emphasis of this 
study has been placed on the investigation and discussion 
of the practice of states and the decisions of tribunals, 
both municipal and international. One consequence of this 
approach is to expose to criticism many of the views hitherto 
expressed on this subject; and it has, therefore, become 
necessary to attempt the formulation of a theory that is less 
contradicted by the practice of states than most existing 
theories seem to be. 
The study falls into three parts. Part I contains an 
examination of the problem of the competence of agents of 
treaty-making organs. Part II takes up the question of the 
competence of treaty-making organs generally. In Part III 
the same question is examined with spe.cial reference to 
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states possessing constitutional regulations governing 
their treaty-making activities 0 
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PART I 
THE COMPETENCE OF AGENTS TO BIND TREATY-MAKING ORGANS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The use of agen te and the legal problem 
The use of agents to enter into agreements is a universal 
practice. The need for it and its constant exercise have given 
rise to governing legal standards,. which may vary with the 
character of the agency and the context in which it is carried 
out. 
An agent always represents and acts in the place of 
another. 1 The problem of' ensuring that the acts of an agent 
approximate as closely as possible the hypothetical behaviour 
of his principal is universal, but the means used to solve that 
problem may vary: for example, the agent may be threatened with 
punishment for a breach of faith, 2 or the other party may be 
given clear indications of the outer limits of the agent's 
authority. The legal effect of acts which deviate from the 
desired hypo-:thetical behaviour may also differ with the commun-
ity ~d the sphere of action in question. 
• I' 
I 
fI ' 
r 
I-. 
I 
2 
2. The problem in the light of history 
Competence of agents of absolute monarchs 
The use of agents to conclude treaties between the res-
pective communities of their rulers and principals may be pre-
sumed to be almost as old as the very practice of aaking treaties.3 
Like the latter practice, the former must al·ways have rested 
upon the existence of legal standards sanctioning the device. 
Yet, although the practice of states in the matter can be traced 
long before the 17th century, a developed theory concerning the 
legal position of agents in the conclusion of treaties cannot be 
found until that time.4 This was the era of sovereign monarchs, 
of the kings Dei gratiae, and in the matte~ of conclusion of 
treaties the power of kings suffered no legal limitat1ono5 The 
treaties they concluded, as indeed the state authorities they 
headed, were of . a quasi-personal character. 6 Agents negotiating 
on their behalf were regarded as personal representatives, and 
the . relation between the monarch and the agent was thought to 
be similar in some respects to that existing between principal 
and agent under private lawo7 One author cites Vattel as saying 
that, at the end of the 18th century: .. Full Powers are nothing 
else than an unlimited power of attorney". 8 Vattel was well 
aware, however, of the difference between the case of a private 
individual using an agent for the making of an agreement, and 
that of the sovereign of a state commissioning an agent to 
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conclude a treaty. Were the agent of the private individual 
to be disavowed, the agent himself might be obligated to per-
form what he promised on behalf of his principal. With regard 
to the agent of the sovereign, such a rule evidently would be 
impractical, for the promised action might be, as Vattel put 
it, "infinitely beyond the power of the promisor to dispose of, 
things which he cannot carry out himself or cause to be carried 
out, and for which he can offer neither an equivalent nor ade-
quate compensation".9 
It may be that the doctrine of the 17th century tried to 
apply the civil law theory of agency to the relationship be-
tween the negotiating diplomat and the sovereign. The realities 
of the two situations were very different, however, and there 
is indeed evidence, in the procedure that was used, that this 
difference was apprecia ted9 In the :full powers which the 
sovereign issued to his agent, the latter was granted wide 
authority to negotiate and the sovereign promised to ratify 
whatever the agent agreed to. 10 On the surface, it thus looked 
like a definite ad hoe delegation of part of the treaty-malting 
power. Some protection against the dangers of misrepresentation 
was offered, however, not only by the threat of disciplinary 
action, but also by the procedure of ratification. The doctrine 
taught that the sovereign was under a strict obligation to 
ratify a treaty provided that his agent had remained within his 
''authority". 11 The precise extent of the "au thori ty"of the agent 
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accordingly became a question of' the highest juridical moment • 
By keeping obscure the limits of' his authority, the sovereign 
might well manage to retain a measure of' discretion with 
regard to ratif'ication. 12 At one stage we find the authority 
of' the agent indicated in some detail in his f'ull powers. Al-
though this method obviously offered some guarantees against 
misrepresentation, it had the disadvantage of narrowing the 
area of' neggtiation and bargaining, of' constricting the room for 
manoeuvre. The practice was discontinued in the 18th century. 13 
During the whole period in which ratification was regarded a 
duty, sovereigns used the argument that their agents had 
exceeded their "authority" in order to justify a refusal to 
ratify. 14 It is understandable that, at a time when the means 
of' communicating fresh instructions were poor, violations of 
instructions occurred with some frequency. · Considering, how-
ever, that the precise extent of' the authority of an agent could 
not be known to the opposite party, since the limits of the 
agent's authority in fact were drawn not only by his :full powers 
but also by secret instructions, 15 and considering the importance 
of the matters settled by agreements concluded by agents, it is 
not surprising that, in order to justify a refusal to ratify 
an unpalatable agreement, sovereigns sometimes argued in bad 
faith that an agent had exceeded his authority. 
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competence of agents of early constitutional governments. Ratification as a safeguard 
If it was only with difficulty that the absolute monarchs 
of the 17th century had granted real f'ull powers - delegated 
authority - to agents acting on their behalf, and almost always 
retained as an ultimate s afeguard the possibility of refusing 
to ra tif'y, the age of consti tuti onalism made it completely 
impossible in many states to promise ~atification at all. For 
a politically and constitutionally required legislative assent 
was often diff'icul t to pr.edict with any certainty. Al though 
the process of change required a good deal of time, constitu-
tionalism had a profound impact upon the legal rules regarding 
the position of agents. The outcome of the process was that 
ratification came to be regarded as legally discretionary. Just-
ifications were no longer legally required f'or a retusal to 
ratify an agreement. With this development, the precise deter-
mination of the extent of an agent's authority, to negotiate and 
sign, and excesses of that authority became of' less legal rele-
vance.16 If' an agent actually misrepresented his principal, 
the latt~r could now legally simply refrain from ratifying, 
without even disclosing that the agent had violated his instruct-
ions. This option might have been found advantageous in cases 
where the admission of an error of' a high officer would have 
caused embarrassment. On occasion it might of' course still be 
politically desirable to justify a re:f'u.sal to ratify. A number 
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of instances will be cited below, in which ratification, 
although discretionary, was withheld with the express declara-
tion that an agent had exceeded his authority. 
3. Instances of excess of authority by agents concluding 
treaties subject to ratification 
Incident of 1809 between the United States and Great Britain 
On 18 April 1809 the United States Government entered into 
an agreement with the British minister to Washington, Mr Erskine, 
concerning the settlement of various matters. The British 
Government repudiated the agreement on the ground that Mr Erskine. 
had exceeded his instructions, and ref'used to ratify. Moreover, 
Mr Erskine was recalled. 
A correspondence concerning the agreement ensued between 
Mr Erskine's successor, Mr Jackson, and the Department of State. 
In a note of 11 October 1809, Mr Jackson insinuated, in defeD.ce 
of the British repudiation, that the United States Government 
had been aware of the British minister's exceeding his instruct-
ions. This insinuation was repeated in a subsequent note. In 
reply, the United States Secretary of State, Mr Smith, denied 
categorically that his Government had had any knowledge of the 
violation of instructions, and declared that had hie Government 
had such knowledge the arrangement would not have been entered 
into. He stated that the repeated insinuation of bad faith 
could not be tolerated and that, therefore, no further 
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communication would be received from Mr Jacksono The British 
government reluctantly recalled a second minister. 17 
Incident :from the 1820s, between Persia and Great Britain 
The second case concerns a treaty :figuring in the back-
ground of the still unsettled British-Iranian dispute con cern-
ing sovereignty over the island of Bahrein. 18 
In 1822, a Captain William Bruce who had been appointed 
a British agent at Bushire on the Persian Gulf, without any 
instructions or authorisation negotiated and signed an agree-
ment with a Persian minister, making it, however, expressly sub-
ject to the approval of the two Governments. The reaction of 
the British authorities has been described as follows: 
"Having fundamental objections to the entire treaty, 
'every article' of which was 'opposed to the views and intention of the Government', the Bombay Government 
expressed its surpr~se that Bruce should have entered 
.into negotiations with Persia 'which were never contem-plated' by Britain, and for which he had been 'neither 
:furnished with instructions nor power'. The Government 
of Bombay 'in the most explicit terms' disavowed the treaty, which was considered inconsistent with the 
'obligations of the public faith' and which would 'com-promise the dignity of the British Government and over-turn every part of the policy which it had adopted in 
relation to the powers of the Persian Gulf.' 11 1 ~ 
Bruce was removed from his post. The Persian Government 
was infopmed that Bruce had exceeded his powers in entering 
into negotiations, and that the treaty merely was his own act. 
8 
It was accordingly repudiated and the desire was expressed 
that it should be considered exactly as if it had never been 
written. Captain Bt'llce's successor was instructed, furthermore, 
to express regret that no proof of Bruce's authority to conclude 
an agreement had been requested before he was allowed to enter 
into negotiations. In a later dispute between Persia and Great 
Britain regarding sovereignty over the island of Bahrein, the 
Persian Government attached importance to the treaty as an 
historical document, but apparently never asserted that it was 
valid. 20 
Russo-Chinese incidents of f858 and 1880 
Two cases may also be cited from the foreign relations of 
China during the 19th century. One of these concerns the 
treaty of Aigun, concluded in 1858 between Russia and China. 
It appears that the Russian governor general of Eastern Siberia, 
Count Muraview, taking advantage of the weakness in which China 
found itself as a result of wars with Great Britain and France 
and the rebellion at Taiping, on 16 May 1858, induced the chief 
of the Chinese forces on the river Amur, Prince Yishan, to sign 
a treaty by which. Muraview secured for the Czar a territory 
almost as large as France. 21 While for this service the Russian 
agent was granted the title of Count Amuriski by the Czar, the 
Chinese prince was not similarly rewarded. His government was 
not disposed to ratify the treaty, and ·he was dismissed for his 
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ineptitude and for overstepping his authority. 22 A petition 
sent by the prince to the throne following this event is 
characterized by one writer as one of the most humiliating 
documents in Chinese history. 23 Another writer states that 
the emperor evidenced his displeasure at the treaty "by expos-
ing the ·second in command in a wooden collar on the banks of 
the .Amur for three days and nights". 24 Apparently the treaty 
remained unratified for some time. In the autumn of 1860, 
however, when French and English troops had occupied Peking, a 
Russian diplomat named Ignatiev promised the Chinese ruler, 
Prince Kung, that he would exert his influence on the occupiers 
to bring about the withdrawal of their troops - which, unknown 
to the Prince, was to take place anyway - if the Chinese 
recognized the treaty of Aigun. To this promise he added others 
and coupled them with threats in case of Chinese non-compliance. 
The allied troops were withdrawn, and by a treaty of 14 November 
1860 with Russia, China confirmed the treaty of Aigun. 25 
The other Chinese case concerns the treaty of Livadia of 
1879 and is still more extraordinary. In 1879 at Livadia, the 
residence of the Russian Czar, a Chinese Minister Plenipotentiary, 
Chung How, carried on negotiations concerning the return to 
China of the province of 111. 26 As a result of these negotiations 
he signed a treaty on 2 October 1879. It appears to have been 
unfavourable to China, 27 but contained a clause expressly mak-
ing it subject to ratification. 28 The Chinese plenipotentiary 
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thereupon returned to China without awaiting an authorizing 29 imperial edict. One writer suggests that Chung How suf'fered 
ttnot only from complete ignorance of the geography of Kashgaria, 
but from acute nostalgia; his one and only idea was to get back 
to China as quickly as possible".30 Whether or not this state-
ment is correct, 31 a council appointed after the diplomat's 
return to China charged with examining his acts in Russia 
unanimously found that he had disobeyed his instructions and 
exceeded his powers.32 A Chinese scholar who submitted a 
memorial to the throne argued in favour of the ultimate penalty. 
He is reported to have written as follows: 
"••• According to international law, any disobed-ience shown to the orders of the Emperor is regarded as exceeding the powers conferred by his Majesty, and all the powers of such ministers are, point by point, made out by the government. Chung How's crime is the disregard he had for the secret instruct-ions and for the imperial will. His case is similar to the one which brought Ki-ying to prison. The final decision is clear, and I therefore say, let Chung How be executed ••• u3., 
As to the validity of the treaty, this scholar submitted: 
"Altbough the ambassador has signed the treaty, still he did not receive the imperial assent to it, and the treaty cannot therefore be considered as ratified. The case is precisely the same as des-cribed in old books, where no treaty concluded could come into force unless the blood of a sacrifice was sipped by the contracting parties ••• u34 
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On 3 March 1880 an imperial edict condemned : ·-.. , Chung 
How to "decapitation after incarceration". The Russian govern-
ment appears to have lodged a protest against this decision, 
requesting the release of Chung How and referring to "the 
international practice that no government has the right to 
punish an Envoy for the failure of' negotiations".35 The situ-
ation was tense, and it even was feared that war might break 
out if Chung How were to be beheaded. Appeals by Queen Victoria 
to the Chinese Empress Dowager proved successful. A new Chinese 
negotiator was sent to Petersburg with the task of renegotiating 
the treaty. His misgivings, expressed in a persona1·1etter are 
instructive with respect to the political, if not the legal, 
diff'iculties entailed in disavowing an agent and discarding 
the result of his negotiations. He wrote: 
11A treaty entered into by the Minister Plenipotentiary of' one country directly with the sovereign of' another country is a solemn contract. Even a small and weak country will not submit to the complete revocation of such a treaty on the demand of' another, to say nothing of a nation like Russia ••• 1136 
The fears he harboured were justified. The Russiansf'irst 
took the stand that no new negotiations were needed and that 
ratification was the only thing required. After some time, 
they agreed to modifications, however, and a new treaty was 
drawn up, signed and eventually ratified.37 
It is of interest to see how this incident was reflected 
in the contemporary American diplomatic reports. In a dispatch 
J . 
of 12 January 1880, an older Chinese incident is cited in 
which one Ki Ying, having signed the ''Cushing treaty" on behalf 
of China, was condemned to death for an offene e similar to 
Chung How's. In the same dispatch, Chung How is described as 
one of the ablest members of the Chinese foreign af'fice, and 
doubts are expressed that he really had acted without author-
ization. He is said to have been a very cautious man and to 
have been in constant communication with his own foreign office 
by telegraph. The conclusion is drawn that although it took 
this form, the disavowal was perhaps one that perta.ined to the 
whole foreign office, and issued from the ultra-conservative 
party.38 A note addressed by the American representative in 
Peking to Prince Kung on the punishment of Chung How is of 
particular interest with respect to the position of negotiat-
ing agents. It casts light on the dangers of using harsh 
disciplinary measures against departure :f'rom instructions, or 
of relying upon allegations of acts ultra vires as subterfuges 
for political changes of course: 
11 This case is not without concern to foreign govern-
ments when viewed from the one or the other standpoint. They have invited you to establish missions abroad because they have desired to avert the recurrence of 
difficulties and to draw more closely the bonds of 
friendship. But what high officer will care here-
after to go abroad when the duty before him is so 
perilous? What boldness or vigor can be expected of 
a minister who has to direct his steps to avert not 
only disaster from his state, but also disaster of the gravest sort for himself ••• ?"39 
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United States incident of 1908 
An incident in which an American diplomat signed treaties 
in violation of instructions is cited by Hackworth. In 1908, 
the United States Government declined to submit to the Senate 
two conventions signed by the American minister to Roumania. 
In the case of one of these conventions, the minister had had 
no authority whatsoever; in the case of the other, he had 
obtained :f'ull powers under representations to sign a wholly 
different document.40 
Swedish incident of 1951 
By way of contrast a recent case may be cited, in which a 
treaty, signed by a person without any authority whatsoever, 
was nevertheless confirmed by the government on whose behalf 
he purported to act. At a conference held at Stresa in 1951, 
a convention was drafted concerning the "appelations d ' 1origine 
et denominations de fromages 0 • It was signed on 1 June and 
provided expressly for ratification. The list of signatures 
reveals that one Inge Mork signed on behalf of Sweden as well 
as Norway~41 It appears certain that Mr Mork was authorized 
to sign on behalf of Norway and it appears equally certain that 
he was not authorized to sign on behalf of Sweden. The Swedish 
Government did not, however, disavow his signature, but on the 
contrary subsequently expressed final consent to the convention.42 
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It is submitted that the foregoing cases tend to show 
that, while it may sometimes be politically difficult to dis-
avow an agent who has signed a treaty in excess of his powers, 
the rule that ratification, when reserved, is discretio·nary, 
renders a signature in excess of authority of relatively little 
legal or practical importance. 
4. Present possibilities of excess of authority by agents per-forming acts by which treaties become irrevocable 
It might be thought that if all or most treaties were to 
enter into force by ratification, the problem of the legal 
bounds of the competence of agents would be eliminated. The 
problem of the effect of an excess of authority on the part 
of an agent will remain, however, as long as the act that 
makes a treaty irrevocable under international law is not 
undertaken by the treaty-making organ itselfo There is general 
agreement that a treaty made to enter into force upon "ratifi-
cation", becomes irrevocable internationally by the exchange of . 
the instruments of ratification.43 While it is common that 
treaty-making organs themselves sign the instruments of ratifi-
cation,44 it happens rarely, if ever, that they carry out the 
internationally relevant exchange of the documents. This 
task again is performed by an agent, and the question of his 
competence might arise if he proceeded to exchange instruments 
of ratification without being authorized to do so, or in spite 
. j' 
. j 
, n 
J 
15 
ot instructions to refrain f'rom an exchange for a certain 
time . It is clear, therefore, that the procedure of ratifi-
cation does not completely do away wi tb. the problem of excess 
of authority by agents.45 
While the conclusion must be drawn that not even when 
treaties are made by what has been termed ' the complex 
procedure•46 - i.e. comprising the trinity of full powers, 
signature and ratification - is it possible completely to 
diaregard the problem of the competence of agents, it is obvious 
that this problem is of much greater importance with regard 
to treaties (including exchanges of notes) entering into force 
upon the signature of agents. 47 At the present tl.me this mode 
of bringing treaties into force is predominant.48 The question 
of the legal effect of a signature appended to a treaty by an 
agent who lacks the requisite authority or who acts in violation 
of instructions might therefore again arise in acute form.49 
It might perhaps have been expected - and it is expressly 
suggested by Basdevant50 - that if treaties were to enter into 
force by the signature of agents, :full powers indicating the 
competence -of the agents would be of primary importance. Con-
trary to this expectation it appears, however, that the use of 
the traditional type of full powers has continuously decreased 
during this century. What is even more surprising, full powers 
are more commonly used for the conclusion of treaties requiring 
ratification than for agreements which become binding upon the 
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signature of agents. An explanation will be sought below for 
these seemingly paradoxical facts.51 
The chief problem to be examined concerns the extent of 
authority possessed under international law by various agents 
signing agreement that enter into force upon signature, and 
the modes of establishing the existence of such authority. In 
other words, when is an agreement made in excess of the compet-
ence possessed by an agent under international law? What is the 
effect under international law of such an agreement? Some sub~ 
sidiary problems may be distinguished as well. It may be asked, 
for instance, whether the internal position of an agent is of 
any importance to his international competence to sign a 
treaty. Is there a difference in this respect between a foreign 
minister, an ambassador, and a charg~ d'affaires? 
The problems posed are similar to those concerning the 
effect under international law of a ratification made by the 
constitutionally indicated treaty-making authority in viola-
tion of constitutional limitations upon its power. There are 
important differences between the two questions, however, and 
accordingly they merit separate treatment. The limits upon the 
constitutional competence of the treaty-making power to ratify 
are supposed to be altogether apparent from the public order 
of the state. The limits upon the authority of an agent, if 
at all expressly indicated, are in the form of full powers 
which merely declare the topic of the treaty to be concluded 
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and the name of the Power with which it is to be concluded, 
and from which the possible relevance of secret instructions 
do not appear.52 In order to keep the two problems apart 
it may, unless the contrary is indicated, be assumed through-
out the following discussion of the competence of agents that 
all the treaties they sign as binding upon their signatures 
are such that fall within the exclusive constitutional compet-
ence of the executive branch of the government concerned, and 
that therefore the problem cannot be :f'urther complicated by a 
required constitutional assent.53 
Despite the vast increase in the number of agreements 
which today are made to enter into force upon signature, incid-
ents concerning the competence of agents who sign them -have 
arisen relatively rarely. This may perhaps account for the 
scant attention paid to the problem by writers.54 There may 
be several reasons for the apparent paucity of acute conflicts 
on this matter. One may be that, because of the facilities of 
modern communications, negotiating agents need not often act 
without express instructions from their principals. Another 
reason may be found in the practice of initialling an agreement 
at the end of negotiations and of submitting the final draft 
for the approval of the treaty-making power before signature is 
appended.55 Reference may also be made to the practice of 
leaving multilateral instruments open for signature. This 
procedure enables states to scrutinize the . instruments in question 
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and to take a definite position before they authorize an 
agent to sign, when, as at times is the case, the instrument 
becomes binding upon signature.56 While the circumstances 
mentioned may serve partially to explain the scarcity of 
cases, it may be surmised that in fact the problem has arisen 
many times without causing public incidents. A government 
might find it embarrassing to disavow an agent,57 and, 
regardless of the legal position, it may be thought politically 
difficult to do so. In this case, and perhaps others, the 
problem will not come to the surface • 
II. DO THEORIES EXPLAINING THE GENERAL VALIDITY OF AGREE-
ME!'ITS ENTERING INTO FORCE BY SIGNATURE OF AGENTS 
19 
ALLOW ANY CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE AGENTS? 
1. Validity of agreements in guestion is not expressly 
envisaged by constitutions 
The public order of most states attributes to the head 
of state or some other supreme organ the !'unction of making 
treaties on behalf of the state - the treaty-making power~ 
normally with the proviso that certain categories of treaties 
require legislative approval. Few constitutions expressly 
authorize the treaty-making power to delegate any of its 
functions to other bodies or persons.58 The circumstance that 
so many modern treaties become binding merely by being signed 
by persons not mentioned in the constitution accordingly may 
seem puzzling, and has caused doctrinal debate.59 
It is beyond any doubt that, by a rule of international 
law, binding force may be accorded to such agreements, and it 
is equally -certain that they may be valid under the municipal 
law of states. Indeed, the rule that may be deduced from 
international practice, and that practice itself, would never 
have come into existence, had the device been vitiated by 
constitutional invalidity at its inception. Against this 
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background it might seem of little use to cite the views of 
some writers who attempt to explatn the constitutional and 
60 the international validity of these agreements. Yet, by 
finding out why, generally, these agreements are valid, one 
may hope also to discover when they are invalid. 
2. Bittner's theory: "BeUBkundungsauftragtt 
According to Bittner, the treaty-making power of states 
is expressed in their public legal order, and he found that, 
at the time of his writing, ail constitutions made the head 
of state the treaty-making authority. 61 He concludes that 
under international law, the head of state, and he alone, is 
competent to make treaties on behalf of the state0 The sign-
ing of agreements with binding effect by foreign ministers or 
diplomatic representatives, Bittner explains, does not in 
reality amount to an exercise of any part of the treaty-making 
power. He maintains that while by constitutional law - upon 
which the international norms rest in this respect - the form-
ing of the "will" of the state is the function of the head of 
the state, ·there is no obstacle to this will being declared by 
somebody else.62 This, he asserts, is the function fulfilled 
by the foreign ministers and diplomats. An examination of a 
large number of treaties revealed to him that in 95% of the 
compacts the persons signing purported to do so in virtue of 
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an authorization, 63 and he maintains that this "Beurkundungs-
auftrag0 - an authorization and at the same time an instruct-
ion to sign64 - gives to the agents no latitude of power. In 
signing and thereby expressing, but not forming, the "will" 
of the state, they merely act as proxies. According to Bittner, 
a competence to act as proxies, uurkundepersonen mit voller 
GlaubwClrdigkeit im v5lkerrechtlichen Verkehr", 65 is possessed 
only by the most senior officials of foreign offices, and of 
diplomatic representatives accredited abroad. It rests nation-
ally upon customary administrative law; internationally it has 
acquired general recognition and become part of customary 
international law. 
Bittner admits that a real delegation of treaty-making 
power takes place to governors of colonies and border areas,66 
but he denies the treaty character of agreements between govern-
ment departments. He asserts that the subjects of these agree-
ments are the departments and not states. 67 He :f'urther main-
tains that formal full powers are issued for the negotiation 
and signing of treaties which. are to be ratified, but not for 
agreements concluded in simplified form. 68 The authoriza-
tions, the '~Beurkundungsauftr!ge", are internal acts, and no 
evidence of them is required in the intercourse between states, 
with the exception of the mentioning of them in the agreements. 69 
The holding of the office of foreign minister or of an accredited 
diplomatic representative is deemed sufficient to allow another 
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party to feel conf'ident that a "Beurkundungsauf'trag" in f'act 
has been given, when such an official purports to act upon 
one. The issuer of the final document is responsible, accord-
ing to Bittner, under international law as well as under con-
stitutional law, for assuring that all constitutional condi-
tions are fulfilled for the declaration of will. Should this 
in fact not be the case, the issuer has committed an infract-
ion of both constitutional and international law since he has 
abused his position as 0 glaubwf1rdige Urkundspersonn. The 
state, however, must recognize the binding force of the agree-
ment just as it is responsible f'or other infractions of inter-
national law committed by its organs.7 'P 
3. Chailley's theory: "tacit delegation" 
Chailley, like Bittner, makes a distinction between treat-
ies concluded with the formal intervention of the head of state 
and those in simplified f'orm. In criticizing Bittner's theory 
on the validity of the latter category of agreements, he con-
tends, however, that diplomats do not act merely as notaries 
of the treaty-making power, when they sign treaties, but poss-
ess by delegation some latitude of power. He finds support for 
this view in the circumstance that, in some treaties, the agents 
themselves purport to 11 sont convenus".71 He further maintains 
that Bittner's explanation does not cover agreements signed by 
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technical officials, heads of public services and others, 
and suggests the concept of a tacit delegation from the 
treaty-making organ as a common explanation of the validity 
of all agreements in simplified form. Chailley seeks to 
adduce :further support for this theory in the assertion that 
agreements in simplified form only regulate matters falling 
within the exclusive competence of the executive power of 
states. The absence of agreements in simplified form on 
other matters, he suggests must be explained by the inability 
of the executive power to delegate power which it does not 
72 possess,. Chailley does not, as Bittner, consider it necess-
ary to derive in each case the competence of the agents from 
an authorization by the head of state as the only interna-
tionally competent treaty-making power. He contends that the 
delegation takes place on the basis, not of international law, 
but of the public law of the signatory states, and that this 
delegation is directly effective externally.73 He reaches 
the view that the international validity of an agreement in 
simplified form depends directly upon its internal validity. 
The agreements are valid, Chailley maintains, because the agents 
have remained within the limits of the delegationo 74 Although 
Chailley himself does not make it explicit, the conclusion 
presumably may be drawn that an agreement concluded by an agent 
in excess of this "tacit delegation" would be an infraction 
of the municipal public law, and void or voidable internally as 
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well as internationally. It does not appear, however, if the 
tacit delegation is thought to be dependent upon secret 
ins true tions. 
4. Interdepartmental agreements 
It is not necessary at this stage to cite writers other 
than Bittner and Chailley, who represent two extreme viewpoints. 
But it may be convenient to narrow ~he discussion somewhat. As 
pointed out above, Chailley criticizes Bittner's theory of a 
"Beurkundungsaurtragu and proposes that of a "tacit delegation", 
i 1 a. for the reason that heads of public services of states among 
other officials, when concluding treaties have a broader author-
ity than that of ~ere notaries. Chailley does not discuss 
Bittner's theory that agreements between postal administrations 
and the like are not treaties between states. Bittner found 
support for this view in the circumstance that the parties to 
this kind of agreements often style themselves not states or 
governments, but depa.rtments.75 Since the formal subjects of 
the agreements were departments there was - the reader is led 
to infer - no longer a need to establish a link with the treaty-
making authority of the head of state. It is submitted that 
this theory cannot be sustained. If, for example, an interna-
tional tribunal were to award damages on the basis of a postal 
agreement, it is presumably beyond dispute that the state as a 
juridical person would be responsible in the last resort for the 
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payment of the damages. The conclusion would seem inevitable, 
therefore, that the obligations contained in the agreement, 
though undertaken by the postal authority, rest upon the state. 
Indeed, they may be presumed to rest upon the state just as 
much as an agreement concluded by the government rests upon the 
state rather than upon the government.76 
~ith respect to so-called interdepartmental agreements, 
the following should also be noted. In mqdern states many 
internal :f'u.nctions have become decentralized, i.e. distributed 
by the central government among separate authorities, such as 
postal administrations. It merely amounts to a completion of 
the decentralizing measures when these authorities are clothed 
with the competence to enter into international agreements by 
which they promis~ conduct, the achievement of which lies within 
their ordinary national functions. If this distribution of 
power should occur in the form of constitutional provision or 
practice, there would be no need or possibility to trace the 
treaty-making competence to the central _treaty-making orga.n. 
It appears, however, that such treaty-making power is frequently 
delegated to services and administrations by revocable governments 
dec~ees,77 sometimes expressly authorized and contemplated by 
constitutional provisiona.78 Such delegation, like the delega-
tion of legislative power, may often be achieved only with 
difficulty under existing constitutionso7~ 
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50 Generic delegation and ad hoe limited delegation 
Bittner admits that a delegation of treaty-making power 
occurs to governors of border areas and colonies, 80 and the 
above should be enough to demonstrate that, as Chailley 
suggests, the same may be true also of administrative services 
"" and similar authorities. They - and perhaps the other contract-
ing parties - find evidence of their treaty-making competence 
in laws, treaties, decrees, permanent :f'Ull powers or practices 
which enable them generally to conclude binding agreements 
whenever they deem it opportune, and within the narrow spheres 
inside which they are able to :fulfil, themselves, what they . -
undertake. Chailley does not, however, distinguish these 
agreements which become binding upon the signatures of the 
heads of the organs to which authority has been delegated from 
agreements designed to come into force upon the signatures of 
diplomats or similar agents, but explains that the validity 
of the latter, too, is due to a ttdelegation" of power from the 
head of state. 81 
No doubt the word "delegation" may be defined in different 
ways. Critic.ising B;i.ttner, Chailley contends that diplomatic . 
agents signing treaties possess "au moins par d.§l~gation, le 
pouvoir de conclure" the same treaties. 82 If the word "delega-
tion" is accepted for the conferral of power by a treaty-making 
organ upon a diplomatic agent, it is clear that this "delegation" 
differs substantially - in degree if not in kind - from the 
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delegation by which administrative authorities are given 
slices of the treaty-making power. 83 These agents are never 
granted competence - like administrative authorities - to con-
clude agreements whenever they find it opportune, and they 
have no sphere of activity within which they are able to fulfil, 
themselves, what they undertake. No general f'ull powers are 
given to them; 84 on the contrary, at least internally, they 
need specific authority for the signing of each treaty. They 
cannot in their turn "delegate" their power to sign to another 
agent as might perhaps be feasible for a postmaster general. 
The granting of authority to them does not often seem to encounter 
constitutional ~fficulties, 85 as do delegations of treaty-mak-
ing power to administrative bodies. As Chailley himself admits, 
their competence is "limi tee A la conclusion d 'un accord deter-
mine portant sur un object determine". 86 While the questions 
concerning the derivation and the extent of the competence poss-
essed by heads of various administrative bodies and similar 
officers to bind their states by agreements would seem to be 
easily distinguishable, and will not be treated here, the follow-
ing· discussion will deal with the problems of the competence 
of agents - appointed by central treaty-making organs or, 
indeed by treaty-making administrative officers87 - who need 
specific municipal authority for each treaty they sign on 
behalf of their principals. 
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Even when the field of inquiry is thus limited, the views 
of the two authorities cited above differ widely. Bittner 
explains that the constitutional treaty-making authority, the 
head of state, has not abdicated any of its power: the agents 
merely express as notaries the will formed by the head of 
state. Chailley declares similarly that the head of state 
has not alienated. any of his constitutional power, but maintains 
that, by delegation, the agents are granted competence to con-
clude a specific agreement on a specific subject, or at least 
to proceed to sign an agreement "de leur propre initiative 
et en toute libert~ 11 0 88 While Bittner suggests: that, under 
customary international law, foreign ministers and senior 
officers of foreign offices and accredited diplomatic representa-
tives have the competence to sign agreements which, with signa-
ture, become binding upon their states, Chailley believes that 
the competence of the agent is determined directly by domestic 
law - and that no rule of international law comes into play -
and that under that law, the delegation described above takes 
place. When Bittner maintains that an agreement signed by an 
agent without "Beurkundungsauftrag" is binding nevertheless 
under international law, no conflict can arise, according to 
Chailley, between domestic and international validity since, in 
his opinion, only national rules on competence exist. 
- . 
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Is a separate rule of international law governing the issue possible theoretically? Rationale of such 1rule? 
The first point that must be resolved is whether a differ-
ence is conceivable between the competence of an agent under 
municipal law and under international law. The answer would 
seem to be that there is no theoretical reason why a separate 
rule of international law should not have developed concerning 
the competence of agents. 89 Rules concerning agents af'f'ect not 
only the interests of the principals who are represented but 
also those of the third parties with whom the agentstreat.9° 
In any community, national or international, the accumulated 
third party interest will exert its influence upon the nascent 
rules, just as the accumulated interest of the principals will 
exert its inf'luence.91 No doubt, the fundamental interest of 
both the principal and the third parties is that the agent should 
correctly represent the principal, for only then may a genuine 
"meeting of the minds" be possible. In order to satisfy this 
common interest, principals and third parties may each for 
their part be found to have accustomed themselves to make a 
reasonable effort, e.g. to examine full powers or make sure that 
the person purporting to be an agent is an accredited diplomat 
or has some other official status, or threaten with sanctions 
agents who deviate from secret instructions. 
The relation between the principal and his agent - a matter 
falling exclusively under municipal law and determinative of 
30 
the internal competence of the agent - is governed by f'ull 
powers and instructions, of which the latter may be largely 
secret. Agreements entered into by an agent that deviate from 
full powers or instructions are presumably municipally ultra 
vires and will not be municipally valid unless the principal 
make them his own, expressly, or implicitly by not revealing 
the exc~s de pouvoir. A third party may not, however, be will-
ing to negotiate with an agent if it must bear the risk that the 
resultant agreement may be disavowed solely because the agent 
has disobeyed secret instructions,92 which limit his competence 
under national law. 9n the other hand, principals could 
adapt themselves to sustaining this risk,93 which, were it to 
materialize, would force them to accept as their own an agree-
ment they do not desire, or to pay damages for refusing to 
abide by it. Such an accommodation between principal and third 
party, if in fact found to be an international practice, might 
have matured .into a rule of international lawo Conversely, 
alleged principals may be presumed never to accommodate themselves 
to running the risk that whoever purports, with a minimal 
plausibility, to represent them, actually and faithfully does 
so; and third parties may be forced to sustain the burden of 
establishing that persona who purport to be agents actually have 
been commissioned, or at least have af'ficial status, or to run 
.the corresponding risk of a repudiation of an agreement should 
they have neglected so to assure themselves~ This alternative 
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adjustment between the interests of the parties might equally 
in practice have translated itself into a rule of international 
law. 
In summary, it would seem clear that the international 
competence of an agent need not necessarily equate with his 
domestic competence. As, it is submitted, the analysis of 
the relevant practice which follows demonstrates, the interests 
of principals as well as of third parties have asserted them-
selves vigorously, and governments have had no difficulty -
theoretical or other - in concluding that a difference between 
external and internal competence is possible. A holding of a 
United States Circuit Court of Appeal is in point: 
"While specific powers and duties of a secretary or minister for foreign affairs of a nation are generally prescribed and regulated by the municipal law of that nation at home, international law defines . his position regarding intercourse with other nations. 1194 
A memorandum submitted by the Government of Luxemburg to 
the United Nations is also of interest: 
" ••• les pouvoirs reconnus dans les relations inter-nationales au Chef d'Etat et au Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res pour reprt!senter .et pour engager l'ttat, sont bien plus etendus que ceux que le droit luxembourgeois reconnaS:t au Grand-Due et au Gouvernement."95 
The rules of positive international law which govern 
and reflect the process of accommodation between principals and 
third parties are to be found not in theory · but in the practice 
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of statea. 96 A first section of the following discussion 
of practice will be devoted to the competence of foreign 
ministers, who seem to occupy a special position; a second 
section will deal with the competence of diplomats, and a 
third will discuss the competence of other persons employed 
as agents. 
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III. THE COMPETENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 
1. The growing internal competence of foreign ministers 
Before evidence of the external competence of foreign 
ministers - i.e. their competence under international law 
is discussed, it should be noted that their internal competence 
is always wider than that of the diplomatic representatives 
who are subordinated them. It appears tha~ in several states 
the foreign minister has express and standing authority of a 
general kind to enter into agreements falling within the power 
of the executive branch of the government. Thus .in Belgium, 
it seems power to enter into certain agreements is permanently 
delegaDed from the head of state to the foreign minister.97 
Similarly in England, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
are respectively reported to hold a general full power f .rom the 
monarch, authorizing either of them to negotiate and conclude 
"any treaty- in respect of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate mem-
bers of the League of Nations 11 .98 In the United States, like-
wise, the Secretary of State seems to have wide powers in the 
negotiation and conclusion of executive ag~ee~ents.99 This 
internal authority which may possibly exist in other countries 
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as well, is the result of a real delegation of part of the 
treaty-making power, and enables the foreign minister to con-
clude certain treaties directly rather than as an agent. 100 
such internal competence is certainly not granted in all 
states, 101 and it cannot be said, therefore, that the municipal 
order of states universally holds out foreign ministers as 
competent to bind their states by agreements falling within 
the power of the executive branch of government. A number of 
circumstances may nevertheless have combined to bring into 
existence such a competence under international law. 102 
It may be expected, in the first place, that the awareness 
of such internal competence of the foreign ministers of some 
states (especially of influential states like Britain and the 
United States) - and of the po~sible possession of the same 
competence i n many other states - may have contributed toward 
a general tendency to regard foreign ministers as competent 
under international law to bind irrevocably the executive govern-
ments of which they arenembers, and of identifying foreign 
ministers with the exercise of the treaty-making power of states 
to such a d~gree that often no clear border line is drawn in 
this respect between th~ formal treaty-making organ and the 
minister. This seems to be the import of a statement made in 
a recent official memorandum of the gover~ment of Luxemburg: 
·I:) 
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••• les Etats ~trangers et les organisations internationales attachent toujours foi A l'acte fait par le Chef d'Etat et le Ministre des Arfaires Etrang~res, sans controler si cet acte est r~gulier au regard du droi t interne de 1 'Etat en cause. 11103 · 
2. Foreign ministers are not, generally. requested to exhibit full powers 
It seems to be a settled international practice, further-
more, that a foreign minister signing an agreement not subject 
to ratification, 104 in his own capital, is never requested to 
exhibit a full power or other evidence of authority given to 
him. 105 It is doubtful, on the other hand, if even comity 
precludes a party from making inquiries as to the competence 
of the minister. 106 The reason for waiving full powers for 1 
foreign ministers may perhaps have been that the risk · has been 
thought negligible that a foreign minister should act without a 
required authorization in a place where he can presumably 
easily procure one, or exceed his authority where he is able to 
receive ample advice as to its extent. What the precise pract-
ice is regarding foreign ministers concluding agreenents abroad 
is not so easy to ascertain. It seemsprobable, however that 
also on these occasions full powers generally are not requeated, 107 
especially in view of the fact that it is common for foreign 
ministers to issue instruments of full powers and ratification. 108 
There would, of course, be little point in requesting a foreign 
minister to issue a full power for himself. 1.09 . Presumably 
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evidence of authority as a rule is exhibited at the request 
of, and - it accordingly may be inferred - for the. protection 
of the third parties, and negligence in this respect must 
therefore be taken to occur at the risk of the third party. 
When such "negligence" assumes the character of a consistent 
practice, however, it can hardly be explained as an ad hoe 
reliance ad hominem, as a demonstration of confidence in the 
particular foreign minister in g_uestion, but rather must rest 
upon the conviction that evidence of this kind is not needed 
to obtain the protection of the law. 
3. Judicial practice 
Judicial practice confirms the impression gained f'rom 
the practice of states that under international law a foreign 
minister by his very position possesses a certain competence 
to conclude treaties. Two municipal judgments, as well as 
one of the Permanent Court of international Justice, are of 
principal interest. 
The Litvinoff assignment 
In the case of the State of Russia v. National City Bank 
of New York et a1., 1~0 the defendant contended that the so-
called Litvinoff assignment was invalid. This assignment, 
Which was an incident of the United States. recognition of the 
Soviet Government, was made in the form of a letter of 16 
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November 1933, signed by the foreign minister of the Soviet 
Union, Maxim Litvinoff, and addressed to the President of the 
United States. · Litvinoff there declared that the Soviet 
Government assigned to the Government of the United States 
amounts found to be due or admitted to be due the former as 
the successor of prior governments of Russia, or otherwise, 
from American nationals, and agreed not to object to the settle-
ments made by the United States with respect to obligations of 
Russian governments. 111 It does not appear from the letter 
if Mr Li tvinoff carried a full power or any other documentary 
evidence of having been authorized to write the letter on be-
half of the Soviet Government. The letter was acknowledged 
by the President of the United States. 11 e With respect to 
the authority of Litvinoff the United States second Circuit 
Court of Appeal held: 
"While specific powers and duties of a secretary 
or minister for foreign affairs of a nation are generally prescribed and regulated by the municipal law of' that nation at home, international law defines his position regarding intercourse with other nations 
••• The Minister of foreign affairs in his public 
character is t~e regular political intermediary between 
the state and foreign affairs in his public character is the -regular political intermedia~y between the state 
and foreign government. He has plenary authority to 
represent his state at conference and diplomatic nego-
tiations ••• If the minister is commissioned to under-
take special negotiations of a public character which 
require his presence in a foreign !urisdiction, he 
must and _usually is furnished with powers to negotiate. The powers may be embodied either in an ordinary letter 
of credence or in special letters patent. These powers 
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within reasonable limits define the authority for his acts, which acts will be binding upon his government ••• 
"As to the authority of Foreign Commissar Litvinoff to make the assignment on behalf of his government, there is a presumption of author-ity in his designation, recognition, and the President's acceptance of the assignment. It is 
a matter -of political action in foreign affairs, 
and the question of who represents and acts for 
a sovereign or nation in its relation to the United States is determined, not by the Judicial Department, but exclusivel~ by the political branch of the government. 11 1j · 
Though the last sentence quoted seems to imply that anyone 
whose authority might have been found satisfactory by the 
State Department would also have been considered competent by 
the court, and, that, therefore, the discussion of the court of 
the competence of a foreign minister is obiter dicta, the views 
of this high tribunal nevertheless are of course entitled to 
respect. The first point that emerges is the opinion of the 
court that a foreign minister negotiating abroad needs special 
authorization for the purpose. Second, if his authorization 
should be laid down in a document ( "the powers may be embodied 11 ) , 
the formulation of this instrument determines the competence 
under international law of the minister. The interesting quali-
fication "within reasonable limi ta" may presumably refer to 
limits resulting from an application of the principle of good 
faith. Third, acts falling within his competence thus deter-
mined are binding upon his state under international law. 
Finally, without citing any documentary evidence of the authority 
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of the minister concerned - letter of credence or special 
letters patent - the court found that his designation, his 
recognition and the American acceptance of the assignment 
raised a pre£umption of authority. 
Philippine case 
39 
A similar tendency may be seen in the judgment of a 
Philippine court in the case of USAFFE (United States Army 
Forces Far East) Veterans Association, Inc. v. The Treasurer of 
the Philippines. 11 4 The plaintiffs had contended that an agree-
ment signed at Washington on 6 November 195011 5 by Carlos 
Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on be-
half of the Philippines, and John Snyder, United States Secre-
tary of the Treasury, on ·behalf of the United States, did not 
have the character of an executive agreement, among other 
reasons because Secretary Romulo had had no written authority 
from the President to sign the agreement. Rejecting this argu-
ment and holding the compact to be a valid and binding executive 
agreement, the court said i.,!.: 
"••o the court knows of no law, international or municipal, which requires that the representatives of a State negotiating and signing an international agreement must have the written authority to negotiate and sign. There is even authority holding that an international agreement to be binding need not be written 
"If an intern.a tional agreement to be binding need not be reduced to writing, with stronger reason the authority of the agent who negotiates or signs an international agreement need not be in writing to render that agree-ment binding. u 116 
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In the case before it, the court found that. Secretary 
Romulo, although lacking written authority, had had sufficient 
powers. The court stated specifically that there was a pre-
sumption - which the plaintiffs had not even attempted to 
overcome - that Secretary Romulo had been authorized to sign. 
This presumption arose under Sec. _69 ( 1), Rule 123, Rules of 
Court, reading: 
"Disputable Presumptions. - The following pre-sumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: 
( a) • • • 
(1) 
(m) 
That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; 
That official duty has been regularly performed; 11 .11 ?Z 
In addition, the court found it proved - by exhibits -
that President Quirino of the Philippines had cabled Secretary 
Romulo full powers to sign the agreement. 
It should be noted, with respect to the presumptions 
referred to that in neither of the foregoing cases did a con-
tracting state contest the authority of its representative. 
The disputes arose under the domestic ·laws of the United 
States and the Philippines, and in both cases the presumption 
probably was primarily conceived of as operating between private 
parties. In such cases, it is no doubt reasonable that the party 
asserting that an act by an official is ultra vires should bear 
the burden of proof in establishing that contention. It is not 
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impossible that the presumption - at least in the State of 
Russia case - was equally designed to operate vis-a-vis 
foreign governments, more particularly between the parties to 
the agreements. To be meaningful in this connection, however, 
and to afford protection against disavowals made in bad faith 
by other party, the evidence permitted in rebuttal of the pre-
sumption must be limited to such circumstances as were percept-
ible to both parties at the time when the presumption arose. 
That is to say, unless special evidence reveals the lack of 
competence of a foreign minister, who purports to be authorized 
to bind his state, the representatives of other states may feel 
confident that international law accords binding force to an 
agreement signed by a foreign minister. 118 
Eastern Greenland case 
The third, and most important, case is that of Eastern 
Greenland, decided by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1933. 11 9 One of the issues before the court in this 
famous case turned upon the legal effect of an oral declaration 
made by the _Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr Ihlen. The circum-
stances were as follows: In 1919, the Danish government was 
anxious that the sover~ignty of Denmark over Greenland should 
be universally recognized. Several foreign governments accord-
ingly were approache·d by Danish diplomatic agents. 120 Thus is 
was that on 14 July 1919 the Danish minister to Oslo called on 
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the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr Ihlen, and assured him that 
at a forthcoming conference Denmark would raise no objections 
to the Norwegian claims to sovereignty over Spitzbergen. He 
equally expressed the hope that Norway would make no di:f'ficulty 
with regard to the Danish claim to Eastern Greenland. On this 
occasion Mr Ihlen merely replied that the question would be 
.d d 121 consi ere. Eight days later, on 22 July, after having 
informed his colleagues in the Norwegian cabinet of his con-
versation, Mr Ihlen told the Danish minister that "the Norweg-
ian Government would not make any difficulties in the settle-
ment of this question", and this statement was recorded in 
minutes. 122 
The Norwegian Government contended before the court that, 
to conform with Norwegian constitutional law and standing 
instructions for the Government, the declaration - if binding -
ought to have been deliberated by the King in Councii. 123 
Since this formality had not been observed, the declaration was 
one made in excess of the constitutional authority of the 
minister, and invalid internationally. The Danish Government 
maintained that ''Mr Ihlen was invested with the necessary consti-
tutional authority to give the said declaration of recognition, 
and that he, even if this had not been so, had the necessary 
powers in international law: 124 In an oft quoted passage the 
court said: 
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"The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply Qf this nature given by the Minister for 
43 
Foreign Affairs on behalf of his government in res-ponse to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs."125 
A passage in the dissenting opinton of Judge Anzilotti is 
quoted almost as often: 
" ••• it must be recognized that the constant and general practice of States has been to invest the Minister for Foreign Affairs - the direct agent of the Chief of the State - .with authority to make statements on current affairs to foreign diplomatic representatives, and in particular to inform them as to the attitude which the government, in whose name he speaks, will adopt in a given question. 6neclarations of.' this kind are binding upon the State. 11 12 
The court thus declared that, in its view, the question 
was "beyond all dispute". If its view was advanced as a render-
ing of the law of the matter, it was an exaggerated one. Not 
even the decision of the court, unfortunately, put the matter 
beyond dispute. In fact, widely differing interpretations 
have been given to this holding of the courto 127 On the one 
hand, it has been used as authority for the view that a foreign 
minister has unlimited authority to bind his state. 128 On the 
other, its formulation has been thought to be so qualified that 
the value of the case has been seen not in the decision, but 
in Denmark's accepting the contention that constitutional 
requirements are relevant internationallyo 129 
t 
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The first question to determine is whether the decision 
is at all relevant in the law of treaties. S:ince the majority 
spoke of "a reply of this nature", and Anzilotti referred to 
"declarations of this kind", it may be possible to suggest -
130 as Dr Mervyn Jones does that t.he answer to this question is 
in the negative. In view of the circumstances, however, such 
an interpretation seems unnecessarily restrained. The parties 
had devoted lengthy arguments to the matter, and though 
~ ther of them admitted the declaration to be a treaty, both 
of them seem to have assumed ·that the law of treaties was rele-
vant to it. It seems likely that the court intended to settle 
the question by its decision. 1 ~t The borderline between tta 
reply of this nature" - so formal as to be embodied in minutes 
and given with the knowledge that a quid pro guo would follow -
and some treaties in simplified form, like exchQI18es of notes, 
or agreed minutes, if at all existent, is very difficult to 
establish, and rules applying to one category may with good 
reason apply to the other. Finally, it would be strange if 
international law enabled a foreign minister to do by "a reply 
of this nature" what he could not do by an informal agreement 
such as an exchange of notes. For these reasons, it is not 
farfetched to assume that the pronouncements of the majority 
of the court and of Judge Anzilotti are relevant to the law con-
cerning treaties in simplified form. 
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It is not believed, on the other hand, that the court 
took any position in the doctrinal controversy over the poss-
ible need under international law of a constitutionally required 
parliameritary assent. That controversy was simply not at issue 
in the case. 13·2 It was not contended on behalf' or Norway that 
the consent of the Norwegian 11Storting0 would have been 
required, and it was indeed expressly recognized by Denmark 
that such constitutional provisions as require the assent or a 
legislature ror the conclusion of a treaty are relevant under 
international law. 133 It may be concluded, therefore, that 
the decision does not provide any authority on this question. 
The error which Norway submitted had been made under Norwegian 
law - if the declaration had been designed to be binding -
merely concerned a formality. Mr lhlen had "informed" his 
colleagues in the cabinet of the matter, but he had not sub-
mitted the question to the formal decision of the King in 
Council. Though Denmark attempted to prove that that procedure 
had not been required even under the internal Norwegian regula-
tions, itasserted emphatically that such a formality was irrel-
evant internationally. 134 The decision of the court would seem 
to have sustained the Danish argument. 
Though it is true, as Fairman remarks, 135 that the court 
did not indicate what it meant by "a question falling within 
his provinceu, it has been demonstrated that it could hardly 
have been just any matter concerning foreign affairs, for such · 
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matters as were subjected to the assent of the "Storting" 
were not issue. On the other hand, however, the court 
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could not verry well have referred only to matters which under 
Norwegian law and standing instructions the foreign minister 
was entitled to settle without a formal decision by the King 
in Council. In the proceedings before the court, the parties 
discussed in great detail, and disagreed, on the interpretation 
of various internal provisions regulating Mr Ihlen's competence. 
It seems inconceivable that by the expression "within his 
province" the court could have intended to settle the arguments 
of the parties on this point, whereas the interpretation is 
perfectly plausible that the court sought to avoid taking any 
position on an extremely subtle question of municipal law, 
and decided that, whether or not Mr Ihlen had been acting in 
conformity with the Norwegian provisions, he was at any rate 
acting within his competence under international law. 136 
It is submitted that the court supplied an excellent 
description of the most important channel for the informal 
settlement of matters arising between states, and that the court 
wanted to protect the reliability of that channelo In accord-
ance with the above discussion, it is f'urther submitted that the 
decision is authority for the proposition that by his position 
a foreign minister is competent under international law to bind 
his state by agreements concerning matters "generally settled 
by arrangement between foreign secretary and diplomatic agent,111 37 
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but that the court took no position in the controversy over 
the international relevance of constitutional provisions 
requiring legislative assent, or countersignature or forbidd-
ing the conclusion of certain types of treaties. 
4. Opinions of writers 
Few writers have dealt specifically with the question 
of the competence of foreign ministers to conclude treaties 
on behalf of the governments to which they belong. Referring 
to non-ratified "inter-governmental agreements", by which he 
means agreements whose formal parties are not heads of states, 138 
Dr Mervyn Jones s ta tes, however, that "the val i di ty of such 
agreements depends entirely on the authority of the person by 
whom they were signed. If they are signed by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs their validity is indisputable". 139 In another 
context, the same writer maintains that foreign secretaries 
"must certainly be regarded as having the necessary authority 
ipso jure to bind their governments by international agree-
ments11.140 Since Dr Jones does not believe that agreements 
entered into by a head of state in violation of a constitution 
are valid under international law, 141 it may be assumed that 
hie statements are not intended to suggest that a foreign 
minister has the power to bind his state in violation of the 
constituion. 
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Guggenheim maintains that there exists a rebuttable 
presumption in f'avour of' tb.e competence of' the head of state 
and the f'oreign minister to conclude treaties, and that, 
theref'ore, other parties need not closely scrutinise their 
authority. 142 Though Guggenheim has in mind constitutional 
competence, his statement must apply with even greater force 
to the competence of' the foreign minister in relation to the 
treaty-making organ of the state. 
After a careful study of the problem, Fairman reached the 
following cautious conclusion: 
"The position, [then], with regard to agreements made by f'oreign ministers and diplomatic agents seems to be as follows: In principle, international law leaves it to each state to f'ix the competence of these representatives. An undertaking given in disregard of limitations disclosed or otherwise kno.i does not bindo Limitations found to have been notor-ious might be deemed to have been known. In practice, certain matters are so generally settled by arrangement between f'oreign secretary and diploma tic agent that for a state to constitute such officers would seem to amount to a representation (in the absence of' notice to the contrary) that they are authorized to dispose of matters customarily settled by that channel. 11 143 
Reference may also be made to Cohn, who held that an 
agreement concluded by a foreign minister without authoriza-
tion or in excess of an authorization binds his state, provided 
that his act does not amount to an infraction of the constitu-
tion, especially provisions regarding the competence of the 
head of state. 144 
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Conclusion 
It is fortunate, of course, that net more diplomatic 
incidents or court cases have arisen over the matter under 
discussion, but the paucity of accessible material bearing on 
the question makes it somewhat difficult to deduce an author-
itative rule. The practice and cases compiled and analysed 
above nevertheless seem to reflect a definite tendency, a 
tendency which has been translated into an outline of a rule 
by the writers discussed. This tendency and i'tB ·· present effects 
seem to be the following: With respect to the conclusion of 
treaties, the internal competence of the foreign minister is 
increasingly identified with that of the head of state (as the 
presumed constitutional executive treaty-making organ). This 
development cannot be said, however, to have led to the creation 
of a rule of international law to the effect that binding force 
is accorded to any agreement entered into by a foreign minister, 
provided only that it would have been binding if concluded by 
the head of state (or other treaty-making organ). The rule 
seems to have emerged in practice, however, and to have received 
the support of some writers, that at present, by his very posi-
tion, in which no f'ull power is required, a foreign minister is 
competent under international law - unless there is evidence 
in the particular case to the effect that municipally he is n.Q! 
competent, or this is known to the other party - to bind his 
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state by an agreement falling within the treaty-making power 
of the executive branch of the government, and especially thus 
to bind his state by an agreement reached in his own capital 
with the accredited representative of a foreign state on a 
matter customarily settled through diplomatic channel. It 
seems justified, finally, to suggest that the scope of this 
rule extends to acting foreign ministers and assistant foreign 
ministers as well. 145 
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' IVo THE COMPETENCE OF DIPLOMATS: PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
While the increasing domestic competence of foreign min-
isters in the conclusion of treaties has been found above to 
have contributed to giving them a relatively wide treaty-
making competence under international law by their ve-ry posi-
tion, the same circumstance does not influence the international 
competence of diplomatic agents. It has been shown that there 
is disagreement among writers as to the latitude of the munici-
pal competence of diplomatic envoys who sign treaties which 
become binding upon their signature. While Bittner contended 
that they merely act as notaries, as proxies for the treaty-
making organ, and sign instruments which have already been 
approved in each and every detail by their principals, Chailley 
maintained that they possessed by delegation some latitude of 
power. 146 It suffices to say that it seems probable that, with 
respect to the negotiation of the draft of an agreement, the 
instructions of diplomats generally afford some latitude of 
power: the . negotiators are informed of the aim of the negotia-
tions, and perhaps of a minimum result which might be acceptable. 147 
Authority to negotiate, however, is not the same as authority 
to express the binding consent of the state. 148 It may be 
Presumed that normally authorization to sign or otherwise to 
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express final consent contains much less leeway, if any, than 
authorization to negotiate. However , that may be - and the 
matter will be discussed later in this section149 - it is 
certain that under the municipal law of all states, diplomats 
need express authorization from their governments in order to 
give the final consent of the state to an international agree-
ment.150 There does not seem to be any disagreement on this 
point, though Bittner chooses to speak of a "Beurkundungsauftrag" 
and Chailley, somewhat loosely, refers to a delegation. 
It is true that in the past some diplomats have been 
supplied with very wide powers for the conclusion of treaties 
in various contingencies, and some diplomats have had the 
power under general instructions issued in their country to 
conclude treaties in emergencies, 151 but in both of these 
cases the powers were conferred subject to ratification. To 
the extent that real delegation of a general and standing 
character, to conclude binding agreements within some specific 
area, as distinguished f'rom ad hoe delegation in a particular 
case, has taken or talces place the matter should be treated 
in connexion· with a discussion of interdepartmental agreements. 152 
The latitude of power that agreement subject to approval may 
entail is not under discussion here, but a possible latitude of 
Pow.er, e.g 0 that of giving an authoritative interpretation o:f' 
some da.use or of consenting to an additiona~ protocol, in 
connexion with an authorization to express the final consent 
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of a state by exchanging instruments of ratification or notes 
of approval, is germane to the topic under discussion. 
As it is certain that, but for exceptional circumstances, a 
diplomat needs a special authorization in the case of each 
agreement to be municipally competent to express the consent of 
his state, it may well be asked if such authorization - or 
rather evidence of it - is required also to make him competent 
under international law. It will be considered first if under 
international law the very existence of such authorization is 
relevant, and, then, if the precise extent of the authorization 
is relevant. 153 To put it differently, the first part of the 
inquiry will concern the question what is the effect, if any, 
under international law of an agreement concluded by a diplomat 
who has no internal authorization to sign any agreement what-
ever, or, only to sign an agreement with a different party or 
on another topic than that which he has chosen. Should it be 
found that such agreement would be voidable, a second part of 
the inquiry will deal with the effect, if any, under interna-
tional law, of an agreement - or part of an agreement - con-
cluded by a ~iplomat who has been municipally authorized to 
express consent to an agreement of the type in question, but who 
has acted in violation of instructions in some consequential 
respect. 
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V. THE COMPETENCE OF DIPLOMATS: IS THE EXISTENCE OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORIZATION INTERNATIONALLY RELEVANT? 
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References in agreements to municipal authorization 
While it is rare that agreements binding upon signature 
make any ex:press reference to full powers having been exchanged, most agreements in simplified form refer to the agents signing 
as "duly authorized" or "duly empowered" 15~nd exchange3 of notes 
often refer to the issuer as acting upon instructions. 155 Undoubt-edly this practice demonstratea at least what has already been 
stated above, namely, that those who sign need municipal author-ization from their principals. It may be asked, however, why these expressions are included in the texts of treaties, and, 
more particularly, if their inclusion is evidence of any need 
under international law of the authorizations referred to. There does not seem to be any simple answer to these questions. On the one hand, the recording in an agreement that the person 
signing has authority to do so must indicate at least that the parties have i:mown some concern for the question. If the 
authorizations were a matter exclusively of domestic interest to either party it would be difficult to understand why such express-ions appear. On the other hand, they do not - as does the phrase 
"the plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers", 
often used in treaties subject to ratification - demonstrate 
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that the parties have been so concerned that they have con-
firmed the evidence of the other's authority. The expressions 
used do indicate, of course, just like the signatures of the 
agents, that the agents have purported to be authorized. It 
is logically inconceivable, however, that the agents should 
become internationally competent by the insertion of these 
words, if they did not possess the same competence without the 
inclusion of the phrase. 156 If, as Bittner maintains, 157 their 
international competence is independent of any documentary 
evidence, it must flow, as he consistently concludes, from 
their position as accredited representatives. It does not 
seem safe, on the other hand, to conclude - as does Basdevant - 158 
that the absence in a few agreements of any reference to 
authorization or :t'ull powers indicates that the persons sign-
ing have possessed the power by their position to sign. 159 
Even if these phrases were lacking in all these agreements, 
the above conclusion would not follow, were the parties in fact 
to exchange or exhibit evidence of authorization. 
2. Consistent actual use of evidence of municipal authoriza-tion would indicate international relevance of such authorization, and vice versa 
While it must be admitted that the phraseology of agree-
ments in simplified form gives no sure indication of the inter-
national competence of the agents, it may be expected that an 
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inquiry into the use of evidence of authorization for these 
agreements would prove more conclusive. If it could be shown, 
indeed, that before or when the final consent of a state to 
an agreement is expressed by~ accredited diplomat, the 
other party always or almost invariably requests the foreign 
envoy to prove that he has been authorized by his government, 
this would be a strong indication that a party neglecting to 
demand evidence of municipal authorization would do so in 
response to considerations of politics or personality rather 
than law. If an envoy whose powers have not been examined 
should be disavowed, the agreement would not be binding. Could 
it be demonstrated, on the other hand, that accredited diplo-
mats are hardly ever required to give evidence of their having 
been municipally authorized to consent to an agreement, this 
would tend to support the conclusion that - like foreign 
ministers - their position, as Bittner holds, 160 is enough to 
enable the other party to assume that the agreement is valid 
under international law, whatever was the competence of the 
agent under his domestic law. 
An extensive and authoritative inquiry which would esta-
blish whether or not it is a practice to demand evidence of 
special authority, such as full powers or letters of author-
ization,161 for the conclusion of agreements in simplified 
form, is very difficult to make . and it will, for our purposes., 
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be necessary to limit examination to evidence given by writers 
and various other sources as to what is the practice of states 
in this regar.-d. 
To start with, there is the contention made by Bittner 
that it is even a customary rule that diplomats are not required 
to give evidence of their "Beurkundungsauftrag": 
"Die Vollmachten werden dem Vertragsgegner stets vollinhaltlich mitgeteilt und ihre PrUfung und Austausch in den Unterhlndlerurkunden eigens festgestellt. Beim Beurkundungsauftrag findet etwas derartiges nicht statt. Er wird als rein interner Akt behandel t, von dem der Vertragsgegner entweder gar nicht oder eben nur durch eine Erwlhnung in der Urkunde des Ministers Kenntnis in beglaubigter Form erhltlt."162 
In another context, the same writer states: 
"Es ist gewohnheitsrechtlich festgestellt, dass die Vertragspartei.en bei derartigen Vertragsschliessungen 
~oneinander keinen Nachweis uber den Beurkundungsauftrag verlangen, wie etwa bei der F'Clhrung von Vertragsverhandlungen durch bevollmlchtigte Unterh§ndler die Vorlage der Vollmachten verlangt wird. 11 163 
It appears certain that if the above statements were apt 
at the time they were made, which is doubt:f'ul, the practice of 
states no longer justifies such categorical conclusions. A 
rigid distinction between :f'u.11 powers which are issued and 
exhibited or exchanged at the conclusion of treaties which are 
to be ratified, and, "authorizations" which constitute national 
instructions to sign, is simply not upheld in practice. While 
Bittner maintained that special documents embodying full powers 
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. \ were always or practically always issued for treaties requir-
i ng ratification, other writers have cited a sufficient number 
of instances in which full powers have been dispensed with to 
permit the conclusion that the practice of states is not con-
sistent on this point. Thus, both Dunn and Satow refer to 
multilateral conventions, drafted and signed at conferences, 
at which the diplomats participating and accredited at the place 
of the conference were not requested to exhibit full powera. 164 
It is no doubt still frequently true, on the other hand, that 
t reaties providing for ratification have also been signed by 
r e.presentatives who have exchanged or exhibited full powers. 165 
For treaties concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, 
t he Secretariat of the Organization seems to assure the mainten-
ance of this practice. 166 
It is tempting in the case of many treaties167 to explain 
. 
. t he use of the procedure of ratification, and of formal full 
powers as well, by reference to a desire for solemnity. When 
fo rmal full powers are dispensed with at the conclusion of a 
treaty requiring ratification, the reason may simply be that the 
parties did not.trouble to include this element of solemnity. 
It should be .noted, however, that while the large volume of 
international transactions has given rise to a general tendency 
toward simplification of procedure, treaties which are still 
concluded in solemn form are often, though by no means always, 
such that the parties attach great importance to them 0 Solemnity 
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may in these cases be considered as another aspect of elaborate 
and cautious procedure. Formal fUll powers issued for the 
signature of a treaty which is to be ratified need not, there-
fore, be purely ceremonial, although it is difficult to see how 
they could be of any profound importance. 
For the conclusion of agreements not subject to ratifica-
tion, there is no reason why fUll powers should be used to 
augment the element of solemnity, but here caution could be 
expected to induce states to use and re~uest full powers or 
letters of authorization unless they feel absolutely confident 
that they are not needed to obtain the protection of the law. 
Bittner, who possessed an impressive knowledge of the practice 
of states, maintained firmly that full powers were never used 
in these cases. Though it is possible that a good many, perhaps 
even a majority, of these agreements become binding by the acts 
of agents exhibiting no evidence of their authorization, it is 
impossible to subscribe to the contention that the practice of 
states is consistent in this matter. On the basis of a careful 
study of the practice of states, especially that of the United 
Kingdom, Dr Mervyn Jones states, with reference to inter-govern-
mental agreements, by which he means agreements the formal sub-
jects of which are governments rather than heads of states, and 
Which may be subject to ratification but frequently enter into 
force by signature: 
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"The practice relating to inter-governmental agreements is certainly less formal than that adopted with regard to agreements taking the form of the traditional treaty between heads of States. They may recite the issue of 'Full Powers', they may refer to 
'due authorization', or they may be merely made 'in the name of the respective governments', and • as a temporary arrangement• without any reference to authorization. But, as a rule, evidence of authority is required in accordance with the traditional standards, though the form of such evidence may dif'f'er from that customarily used in the negotiation of the traditional type o'f' treaty. 11 168 
Judge Read who gained the impression from Canadian practice 
that, when agreements were concluded in the form of exchanges 
of notes, f'ull powers were usually dispensed with, reached a 
conclusion similar to that of Dr Jones with regard to other 
intergovernmental agreements: 
"When an international agreement has been negotiated, in point of form, between governments, the Full Power is a much simpler matter. The only formal requirement is a written authority, signed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. It may, but need not necessarily, include his seal or the seal of the department. 11 169 
A member of the legal department of the United Nations 
significantly has reported that the importance of f'ull powers 
is appreciated at the United Nations in connexion with the con-
clusion of treaties to which states may become parties by signa-
ture without reserving subsequent "acceptance". With ref'erence 
to this procedure, he states: 
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"Elle signifie tout d' abord que le plenipoten tiaire muni de pouvoirs A cet effet va pouvoir lier d&rinitive-ment son gouvernement en signant l'accord sans reserve d'acceptation ult~rieur. Cela permet de mesurer !'import-ance des pleins pouvoirs en une telle hyphot~se. Ils deviennent un ,1~ment juridique de la validite du traite. C'est un retour apparent A la pratique du pouvoir mandat. 11170 
Further on Mr Leriche reports on the practical consequences: 
"Lore de la ceremonie de la signature, le Sec1reetaire g~neral verifie si lea pleins pouvoirs des plenipoten-tiaires sont en bonne et due forme, notamment s'ils emanent d •·une au tori te competente, s' ils ae ref'~rent A 1 'Accord interesae, s'ils contiennent une clause _prevoyant une ratif'ication ult~rieure, etc. Ce dernier point est d'autant plus important aujourd'hui que nous avons vu que certains Accords permettent aux Gouvernements de se lier definitivement par la signature et que certains autres n' admettent meme pas une signature ad referendum. 11 171 
An examination undertaken of a number of agreements con-
eluded by the Swedish Government with various other governments, 
and entering into force upon signature by agents, revealed 
instances where formal instruments described as "full powers" 
had been used. 172 It also appeared that the Swedish Government 
made extensive use of telegraphic full powers, or authoriza-
tions (it not being possible to distinguish between the two) • 
In contrast with ordinary internal instructions, which were 
addressed to "svensk", written in Swedish, and signed "cabinet", 
J these cables - never sent without a prior approval of the com-
I.. j plete draft text of the agreement by the King in Council -
were addressed personally to the emissary empowered to sign, 
Written in a foreign language and signed with the name of the 
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cables were intended to serve as internal authorizations, and, 
equally, as documents to be exhibited to the other party at 
its request. There were no traces in the files of the Swedish 
Government of similar cables sent to agents of other govern-
ments, a circumstance which need not be taken to mean that the 
practice is an isolated Swedish phenomenon. It rather would 
seem to indicate that such cables are not exchanged but merely 
exhibited upon request. There is no doubt, indeed, that similar 
cables are sent in the practice of other stateso Thus, in the 
United States: 
"Informal authorization f'rom the Department of State is regarded as sufficient authority for the head of a delegation to an international conference 
or an Ambassador to sign an international agreement for which a full power is not to be issued. Thus, the authority of the United States representa~ives to sign the agreement for the prosecution and punish-
ment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
was contained in a telegram to London on June 30, 1945, signed by the Acting Secretary of State, which 
states that: 
Justice Jackson is authorized to sign agreement 
regarding prosecution European Axis leaders and assoc-iates: which conforms with general principles already 
enunciated by him. 11 174 
The agreement in question was signed in London on 8 August 
1945 and contained an express clause providing that it would 
enter into force upon signature. 175 Other states as well, 
perhaps most states, send informal authorizations in the same 
or in a similar manner. 176 
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Evidence in the form of cables of authority to sign 
treaties has a considerable tradition. 177 No difficulties 
appear to have sprung from this method, though it might be 
thought less impeccable than a formal instrument signed by 
the head of state or other treaty-making organ. 178 In fact, practice would seem to have established that a party, having 
requested a diplomatic agent to exhibit evidence of authority 
to sign, and having examined a cable of the type described 
above, may rest assured that under international law its 
position is the same as if he had requested and inspected a 
formal full power. 
The foregoing account may perhaps suffice for the conclu-
sion that, in the practice of states, diplomatic agents signing 
agreements binding upon their signatures are sometimes, but 
not consistentl..y, requested to exhibit evidence of their being 
authorized to sign; or, at least, that envoys are expected to be equipped with such evidence in case a request should be made. This being so, it is logically impossible to deduce from this practice alone any rule of international law. Either the full powers are requested ex abundanta cautela or, when evidence of 
authority is not required, there is a reliance upon the integrity 
and ability of the foreign envoy and upon the particular surround-ing circumstances rather than upon the law of the matter. 
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Full powers no longer required for the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification 
It should be noted in this connexion, however, that there 
is one situation in which diplomats convey the final and bind-
ing expression of the consent of states without normally being 
requested to exhibit any evidence of authority. This is when 
they exchange or deposit instruments of ratification or accession 
issued by the head of state, the foreign minister or prime 
minister. While in earlier practice f'ull powers were issued for 
these occasions, 179 such documents appear largely to have dis-
appeared in modern practice. The possession of the instrument 
of ratification by a foreign minister or an accredited diplomatic 
representative is regarded as sufficient evidence of authority 
to exchange or deposit it. 180 It may be inferred f'rom this 
practice that, should the diplomat concerned in fact not have 
been authorized to proceed to exchange the instruments, this 
circumstance is irrelevant to the binding effect under interna-
tional law of the exchange or the deposit. The question of the 
competence under international law of a diplomat effecting the 
exchange of the instruments of ratification to express the con-
sent of his government to supplementary agreements or agreed 
interpretations by virtue of his competence to effect the 
exchange is a matter touching the extent of the authority of a 
diplomat, and will be discussed in another section of this 
chapter. 181 
J 
' J 
l j 
:.J 
65 
4. Competence to exchange or deposit notes of approval 
Some attention must be paid also to the procedure, not 
uncommon in the modern practice of states, by which an agree-
ment, signed or initialled, is brought into force by an 
exchange of notes or a deposit of notes of approvai. 182 This 
method, though being less solemn than the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification, fulfills largely the same function as 
tha.t procedure. There is, however, this diff'erence: While an 
instrument of' ratification customarily is signed by the head 
of state or some other high dignitary, and gives, therefore, 
assurance that internally the ratification has been effected, 
notes of approval frequently emanate from the accredited diplo-
matic representative, there being no evidence of approval by a 
governrnento 183 Accordingly, there would seem to exist as good 
reason to expect the use of full powers in these situations as 
when agreements are signed to become binding upon signature, if 
indeed, full powers are necessary or helpful in the latter situa-
tion. The practice of exchanging or depositing notes expressing 
consent is too new to have caused much doctrinal comment, 184 
and there is no way of knowing whether or not evidence of author-
i ty is customarily or even often requested from diplomatic 
agents who sign and deliver notes. 185 Some conventions concluded 
under the auspices of the United Nations have permitted states 
t o become parties by "instruments of acceptance", which appear 
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to be of the same character as notes of approval. Distinguish-
ing between instruments of ratification and accession on the 
one hand and instruments of acceptance on the other, Leriche 
states: 
"La dif'f~rence pratique consiste en ce que le Secretaire g~neral des Nations Unies a considere en tant que depositaire que l'acceptation pouvait avoir lieu par un instrument moins formel que ceux generalement requis pour lea instruments de ratification et d'adh~sion. C'est ainsi qu'une lettre ~manant du representant permanent, accompagnee de pouvoirs K cet effet, a &t& re9ue comme6instru-ment d'accep~ation. 11 (Emphasis supplied)1~ 
While his statement is of great interest, the absence of 
broader knowledge of diplomatic practice in this regard, of 
incidents, and cases, makes it difficult to draw any inf'erence 
as to the possible need for full powers for protection in this 
procedure. 
United States memorandum on the competence of accredited diplomats 
From the practice of states in the matter of the competence 
under international law of diplomatic agents, there must f'urther 
.be noted a highly interesting memorandum in which the legal 
adviser of the United States Department of State unequivocally 
declared that the position of his Government was to consider a 
head of diplomatic mission competent under international law by 
his very position not only to sign an agreement, but also to 
certify the authority of other agents: 
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" • • • any agreement signed on behalf of a foreign government by a person whom that govern-ment officially designates as authorized to sign such an agreement is :fully binding on such govern-ment . This Department accepts the advice of the duly recognized chiefs of the diplomatic missions of foreign governments in the United States as to who is authorized to bind their governments and as t o the extent of such authority . A chief of mission who signs an agreement is assumed to be acting within his authority. Even if, under the domestic law of his country, he, or a person whom he has certified as qualified to act, may have exceeded his authority, his government would not be excused from performing under the agreement. 11 187 
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While apparently there are no court cases bearing on the 
question of the effect under international law of an agreement 
signed by a diplomatic agent who has neither exhibited evidence 
of internal authorization, nor received such authorization, an incident must be cited concerning an agreement signed in 1941 
by the Danish minister at Washington, Mr Henrik Kauffmann. 
6. The Kauffmann incident 
Immediately after the German occupation of Denmark on 9 
April 1940, Mr Kauffmann informed the Department of State and 
the American press that he had come to the United States in 
order to repr.esent his King and an independent people, that he 
was still there for this purpose, and that he would work for the 
rees t ablishment of a free and independent Denmark. He reported 
the se statements to the Danish foreign office. 188 In a dispatch 
of 4 September 19140, he stated f'urthermore that to safeguard 
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Greenland, it was absolutely necessary that matters concerning 
Greenland, whether handled by the authorities in Greenland 
or by himself, should be decided without reference to the 
Government in Copenhagen. 189 He further reported that, with 
his approval, the United States had sent coastguard cutters 
to patrol the coast of Greenland, and both the United States 
and Canada had established consulates in Greenland. As might 
indeed be expected, the German occupation authorities in 
Denmark were far from pleased with the activities and attitudes 
of Mr Kauffman, 19° but as no formal recall had yet been e:ffected, 
and his acts had not been even disavowed, the inference must 
be drawn that the Government in occupied. Copenhagen al lowed Mr 
Kauffmann a remarkable latitude of power • 
Such was the background when, on 7 April 1941, the United 
States Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, addressed a note to 
Mr Kauffmann. Referring to previous informal conversations, he 
appended a draft of an agreement relating to the defence of 
Greenland. 191 He adduced five reasons for the conclusion of 
the agreement, only the fourth of which is relevant here: the 
situation in G!eenland was unusual, for the United States recog-
nized Danish sovereignty over the island, but considered the 
Government in Copenhagen unable to exercise that sovereignty 
during the occupationo In a note of 9 April 1941, Mr Kauffmann 
replied that in his opinion the proposed agreement was •under 
the singularly unusual circumstances, the best measure to assure 
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both Greenland's present safe,ty and the future of' the island 
under Danish sovereignty. 111 92 The preamble of the agreement 
itse1r193 ended with the following phrase: 
"The undersigned, to wit: Cordell Hull, Secretary of state of the United States of Americ::a, acting on · behalf of the Government of' the United States of America, and Henrik de Kauff'mann, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark at Washington, acting on behalf of his Majesty the King of' Denmark in his capacity as sover-eign of' Greenland, whose authorities in Greenland have concurred herein, have agreed as follows:" 
By article 1 of the agreement, the United States re-iterated 
its recognition of' the Danish sovereignty over Greenland and 
accepted "the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the 
maintenance of i ta present status. n Articles 2 to 9 laid down 
the right of the United States to make defence installations in 
Greenland, and regulated to some extent the mode of their esta-
bl ishment and operationo Article 10, finally, provided that 
the agreement should remain in force "until it is agreed that 
the present dangers to the peace and security of the American 
Continent have passed", and prescribed modes for the modif'ication 
and termination of the agreement. 
It appears that Mr Kauffmann had agreed with Mr Hull not to 
inform the Government in Denmark of the agreement until it was to 
be published, at noon on 10 April 1941. 194 On that day, Mr 
Kauffmann cabled Copenhagen informing it of the conclusion of 
the agreement. 195 He stated that the German interest in 
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Greenland had increased since the summer of 1940, and a German 
occupation was regarded as imminent. In order to forestall 
this, to protect Greenland and the rest of the American contin-
ent, and to safeguard Danish sovereignty over Greenland, the United States, Mr Kauffmann reported, offered to assume the 
responsibility for the defence of 'the t land. Although the 
United States continued to recognize Danish sovereignty over Greenl.and, it maintained, on the basia of the Monroe doctrine, 
that under present conditions, Danish sovereignty could not be 
exercised from Copenhagen, and when, in addition, for military 
reasons, the United States re~uested that the proposed agree-
ment should not be entered into at Copenhagen, the only solu-
tion was that he, Mr Kauffmann, the f'ree representative of 
Danish sovereignty, as "Negotiorum Gestor" for the Danish 
Government, which could not itself act, should sign the agree-
ment with the assent of the two governors in Greenlando This he had accordingly done. 
Following demands by the German authorities in Copenhagen, 196 
the Danish Government cabled Mr Kauffmann on 12 April that it 
strongly disapproved of his concluding the agreement without any 
authorization from Copenhagen, and in violation of the constitu-
tion, that, by a royal resolution of 12 April, he had been 
recall ed :from his post, and that he was re~uested to come to Copenhagen immediately. 197 A note of protest that was sent to 
the United States charg~ d'affaires at Copenhagen read in part as follows: 
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0 The Royal Danish Government hereby begs to enter a definite protest against the Government of the United States of America ••• initiating negotiations and concluding an agreement with the Danish Minister at Washington without his being warranted to act on behalf of the Danish Government either ex officio or fursuant to special authorization from his Government o• • Emphasis supplied) 
"As the said agreement o •• is signed by Mr Kauf'fmann without his being authorized to do so, it goes without saying that it will not be binding on Denmark in point of interp[ation]al law. 
ttAs Mr Kauffmann thus has decidedly exceeded his powers and as his behaviour most emphatically must be disapproved of, His Majesty the King has to-day decided to recall him from his post as Danish Minister at Washington •• 0 tt198 
On 14 April, Mr Kauf'fmann cabled the Danish foreign office 
that he believed the action taken in Copenhagen for his recall, 
as well as that concerning the agreement, to have been taken 
under duress, and that he considered it "invalid both from the 
. ' 
point of view of Danish and of' generally recognized common law". 
He stated further that he thought it his duty to carry on his 
wor k as minister, and that the Secretary of State had concurred 
in these views. 199 Upon the receipt in Copenhagen of this cable, 
Mr Kauffmann was dismissed from the foreign service, and a crim-
inal action was brought against him by the Government. 200 Mr 
Kauffman remained in the United States, however, and continued 
to be recognized by the United States Government, and to purport 
to act on behalf of Denmark. Numerous notes concerning the 
authority of Mr Kauffmann were exchanged between the two Govern-
ment s during 1941, 201 but no modification in the legal positions 
Which the parties had staked out for themselves took place. 
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Later during the war, Mr Kauffmann took steps toward the conclusion of treaties on behalf of Denmark, but he never went as f ar as to purport to bind Denmark definitely 0 202 
At the first session of the Danish "Rig,sdag" after the l iberation, in May 1945, the Prime Minister, in his opening speech, stated that the forced dismissals of the Danish envoys t o London and Washington were rescinded, and that the Government adhered to the Danish-American agreement on the defenc.e of Green-l and. 203 The agreement was, in fact, submitted to the "Rigsdag", and the Foreign Minister, introducing it for the approval of the second chamber, stated io a o: "I think that I may now be allowed to state that our colleague [Mr Kauffmann now being a cabinet minister] on that occasion acted quite correctly and looked after the Danish interests in the best possible manner. 11204 The "Rigsdag" having given its assent, the agreement was approved by the King by a royal resolution of 23 May 1945. Presumably this action was thought to have a retroactive effect, although the offic'ial Danish treaty series does not contain any indica-tion to this effect . 205 
Analysis ~t this extraordinary affair will be limited to the que stion of the validity of the 1941 agreement as a treaty between Denmark and the United States. 206 The absence of any pronouncement Upon the episode by impartial authority, and the fact that neither of the Governments involved yielded in the position it had J initially taken (except insofar as the Danish actions of 1945 
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might be viewed as such) renders the incident less instruct-ive than it might otherwise have been. These features, among others, are worth noting. The legal contentions of the Govern-ment of occupied Denmark were clear. 207 Mr Kauffmann, as accredited Danish minister was not competent "ex officio", nor "purs:uant to special authorization from his Government", and the agreement accordingly was not valid under international law. In the opinion of the Danish Government - or perhaps of the German occupation authorities - Mr Kauffmann would have needed a full power, and to be binding, the agreerrent would further have required the assent of the Danish "Rigsdag". Mr Kauffmann, on the other hand, took the position that he had acted as a :.) "Negotiorum Gestor" for the Danish Governmento It is notable, however, that neither in its reply to the Danish protest, nor in the enauing correspondence, did the United States Government choose to advance any arguments o~ the point which had been the most vigorously pressed by the Danish Government, namely, that concerning the competence Mr Kauffmann had possessed, not to represent Denmark generally, but to make the agreement. Perhaps this circumstance may be taken as an admission of the difficulty of advancing any contrary contention. The Government of the United States, indeed, contended itself with the argument that the Danish Government was unable to recall Mr Kauffmann, and to denounce the agreement, because it could not exercise its sover-eignty. The American attitude might possibly be interpreted to 
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have meant that the agreement was voidable, 208 but that there 
was, at that time, no authority able validly to denounce it. 
Even with this explanation it is somewhat difficult to under-
stand, however, why, when supposedly the Danish Government was 
unable to exercise its sovereignty, Mr Kauffmann nevertheless 
purported to bind it in law by the agreement. 
The views of the Free Danish Government upon the question 
of international law involved do not definitively emerge from a 
consideration of its actions of 19450 On the one hand, it is 
obvious that, since it submitted the agreement to the "Rigsdag" 
for its assent, and had it approved by a royal resolution, it 
did not consider the agreement otherwise valid municipally. 
Moreover, it appears that this approval of the two branches of 
government was communicated by the regular diplomatic channel 
to the United States Government, from which it could be argued 
to follow that the Danish Government considered the agreement 
voidable, or possibly even void 0 209 
Writers who have discussed the Kau:f'fmann incident have been 
unanimous in considering that Mr Kauffmann was incompetent to 
conclude the agreemento Grewe - writing in Germany in 1941 - 210 
expressed the view that a regular diplomatic representative is 
never by himself able to conclude an international agreement 
Which binds the country he re::presents. When he is charged with 
the formal conclusion of a treaty, he needs a special full power 
Which is usually examined before the signing. In the case of the 
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Greenland agreement, Grewe points out, not only was this examin-
ation of full powers neglected, but the United States authorities 
knew in advance that the Danish envoy lacked a full power from 
his Government. Briggs - writing in the United States in 1941 - 211 
found the conclusion irresistible that unless the State Depart-
ment had been aware of the Danish Government having secretly 
authorized Mr Kau:f:fmann,. he had lacked competence to bind Den-
mark0 H:yde, 212 noting the Danish repudiation of the agreement, 
states that it was not apparent how Mr Kauffmann could have been 
deemed competent to bind Denmark, and suggests that the chie:f 
importance of the agreement might have been that it registered 
some Danish approval of the American activities in, and the 
United States:." defence of, Greenlando Jones, 21 3 finally, sub-
mits that insof'ar as the "agreement" had any effect, it could only 
have been as a unilateral declaration of the United States, .. 
Though Mr Kauffmann had been accredited to Washington, and had not 
been recalled until after he had signed the agreement, the exist-
ence of diplomatic status was not enough for the purpose of nego-
tiating and signing an agreement. A full power would have been 
required, Mr Kauffmann had not had one, and there was nothing to 
show that the King had authorized him to act as he did. 
It appears impossible, indeed, to defend the position that 
the agreement could have been valid as between the Danish and 
Uni ted States Governments, for though it might be maintained that 
an agreement concluded by a diplomat is voidable rather than void, 
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it is inconceivable that diplomatic status could raise more 
tban a presumption of competence to conclude agreements; and 
the question is, whether such a presumption exists at all. 
Where it is reasonably clear - from express declarations or 
otherwise - that no municipal competence to conclude an agree-
ment exists, a possible presumption - if such should exist 
under international law - rs11s to the ground. It is true that, 
in the instant case Mr Kauffmann, without being diaavowed, 
had been able to take several important steps toward making 
Greenland independent of the authorities in Copenhagen, but 
it is submitted that, at the time, the political and strategic 
situation was such as to nullify any arguable presumption as to 
competence on his part to conclude the agreemento 
7o Opinionsof w.riters 
The opinion of some writers on the question of the authority 
of diplomats have been recorded above, but it remains, finally, 
to report the views of some other authorities, who have not dis-
cussed the Kauffmann incident. Satow writes: 
"A diplomatic agent to whom a particular negotiation is entrusted for the conclusion of a treaty or a con-vention, or an agent who is deputed to take part in a congress or conference for a similar purpose, requires as a general rule a special authorization, called a full power, from the head of the State whom he represents; or, it may be, from his government, if the proposed treaty arrangement is to be between governments. 11 214 
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In a paragraph devoted to letters o'f credence of diplo-
mats, Oppenheim similarly declares: 
"Now a permanent diplomatic envoy needs no other empowering document if he is not entrusted with any task outside the limits of the ordinary business of a permanent legation. But in case he is entrusted with such a task as, for instance, the negotiation of a special treaty or convention, he requires a special empowering document - namely, so-called Full Powers (pleins pouvoirs). 11 215 
While Meissner216 takes precisely the same view as Oppen-
heim, Bittner's view to the contrary has already been quoted. 21 7 
The account given above of the practice of states, and 
of the opinions of a number of authorities, does not point 
with certainty to any particular ruleo It may be said with 
confidence that there is a tendency - witnessed in practice by 
an often rather carefree attitude shown by states to full powers, 
and even more evidenced by the United States memorandum cited -
to see in the position of accredited diplomats a presumption, 
which may be relied upon unless there is any evidence to the con-
trary at the time the treaty is concluded, of competence under 
international law to express irrevocable consent to treaties. 
On the other- hand, it is well known that municipally all diplo-
mats require authorization in order to be competent to express 
the consent of their governments, and the inclusion of refer-
ences to these authorizations or instructions in most treaties 
as well as the apparent practice of not infrequently issuing and 
eXhibiting f'ull powers - formal or telegraphic - for the making 
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of such agreements, seem to point to the conclusion that some 
evidence of the municipal authorization is believed to be 
required in the practice of' states. This latter conclusion 
would have the support of the majority of writers, and it could 
not, moreover, be said to impose any great practical inconvenience. 
8 0 Conclusion 
The difficulty in choosing between these alternatives 
evidently lies in the rather heterogenous picture that is 
offered by the practice of stateso Neither can be said to 
embody settled law. Under such circumstances, caution would 
advise a government to request evidence of the authority of an 
envoy with whom it proposes to conclude a · treaty. Perhaps 
the telegraphic authorization described above, addressed person-
ally to the agent au tho.:uized, and signed with the name of the 
prime minister, foreign or acting foreign minister, or assistant 
for eign minister, offer a convenient mode of issuing an instru-
ment serving both as an instruction and as evidence of author-
ization. 
Should a party neglect to request a diplomat to exhibit 
evidence of his authorization~ or fa11 to establish that there 
exists evidence of such authorization, a presumption as to the 
competence of the diplomat must nevertheless arise, of course, 
if his government, having acquired knowledge of the agreement he 
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has purported to conclude on its behalf~ and perhaps even 
acted upon it, does not denounce it and disavow the agent 
79 
as having acted ultra vires. In this case it is not the posi-
tion of the diplomat, however, that raises the presumption, but 
rather inaction over a period of time, which may bring into 
play the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppelo 
Vl o THE COMPETENCE OF DIPLOMATS: IS THE EXTENT OF THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORIZATION INTERNATIONALLY RELEVANT? 
1 • In troduc.ti on 
Had it been possible to demonstrate above that there 
exists a presumption under international law to the effect that, 
by his status, an accredited diplomat proceeding to make an 
agreement, entering into fo~ce upon his signature, is author-
i zed to do so, there would have followed .another presumption, 
namely, that in concluding such an agreement, an accredited diplo-
mat acts within the limits of his authorization. The second 
presumption would allow the other party to feel confident that 
each and every part of the agreement in question would be bind-
i ng upon the government represented by the agent, even if, in 
agreeing to some particular provision the agent was in fact 
violating his instructions and, thereby, acting in excess of 
his municipal competenceo This, of course, only would be true 
were there nothing to suggest that the agent was acting ultra 
vires. 218 It has been shown, however, that the existence of a 
presumption to the effect that an accredited diplomat has been 
municipally authorized cannot as a matter of law be proved, and 
accordingly no presumption that a diplomat is acting in accord-
ance with his instructions follows. The question may then be 
' .L 
I ( ~ f 
81 
put whether, when there is evidence, in the form of a full 
power or otherwise, or it is not disputed, that an accredited 
diplomat has been authorized to conclude an agreement, there 
exists a presumption that he is acting within the limits of 
t his authorization as it is determined by his instructions. 
2. Procedures employed tend to eliminate risks of transgressions of municipal authority 
An important circumstance that must be noted initially 
is that the procedures normally adopted in the practice of 
states for the conclusion of agreements in simplified form tend 
to minimise, though not completely to eliminate, the significance 
of the distinction made here between the existence of authority 
and the extent of authority. To Bittner, of course, there 
appeared to be no distinction at all: practice, as he had found 
it, demonstrated that whenever diplomats signed agreements meant 
to be binding, the full texts of the agreements had already been 
approved by their governments, and they were merely acting as 
proxies. 21 9 Basdevant and Chailley, however, reacted against 
220 this reduction of accredited ministers to ttnotaires diploma tiques". 
While one may dispute Chailley's contention that the diplomats 
Proceed to sign "de leur propre initiative et en toute 
liberte, 11221 it is no doubt true, as he contends, that the 
legally binding force of the agreement arises with the consent 
expressed by the diplomatic agents. This does not prove, 
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however, that the power to sign agreements is something more 
than and dif'ferent from the power of "notaires". 
Authorizations to sign mostly ref'er to complete drafts 
In negotiating draf'ts, diplomatic agents possess some 
latitude of power, of course, however f'requent instructions 
they may receive, but a final draft is not a binding agree-
ment0222 The question is whether the municipal authoriza-
tions of diplomats ever or of'ten grant them any leeway in 
expressing final consent. As has been seen, writers have 
expressed varied opinions on this matter, 223 the answer to 
which could have been authoritatively supplied by treaty 
divisions of' f'oreign. of'fices. It is submitted that generally 
the municipal authorizations received by diplomats to express 
f'inal consent ref'er to complete draf'ts, which have been already 
approved by their governments, thus - as maintained by Bittner 
leaving the agent no latitude of power, at any rate not under 
his domestic law4 That such is the normal practice of the 
United States appears clearly from a circular already cited: 
" Except as otherwise specifically authorized by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary [of State], a complete text of a treaty or other international agreement shall be delivered to the Secretary or the Acting Secretary, or other person authorized to approve the text, before any such text is agreed upon as · final or any date is agreed upon for its signature. 11 224 
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A similar practice seems to prevail in the United 
Kingdom: 
" ••• a United Kingdom plenipotentiary would not, under ordinary circumstances, proceed to the signature of any treaty until the text in final form had been approved by the Foreign Office. When the negotiations have been concluded, the points of agreement are embodied in a draft treaty which, after approval bf the Foreign Office, is signed in duplicate ••• 11 225 
A memorandum submitted by the Austrian Government to the 
United Nations reveals that, with respect to some agreements 
at any rate, the same procedure is followed by Austria. The 
memorandum reads in part: 
"In the case of economic matters the representatives of the two parties usually conduct negotations without written authorization and initial the results of their negotiations. The head of the Austrian delegation reports on the results of the treaty negotiations, whereupon the competent Federal Ministry submits a proposal to the Council of Ministers requesting the latter to approve the agreement, and to appoint a plenipotentiary to sign the treaty on behalf of the Federal Government. 11 226 
A modern authority on diplomatic practice is quite 
explicit on this point of procedure. The last edition of 
Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1957), contains the 
following passage: 
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" • • • In modern times, when all the capi tale of the civilised world are in tel~graphic communi-cation, it is the usual practice for plenipoten-tiaries to submit the precise wording of the proposed treaty to their governments for approval before signature ••• 11 227 
An examination undertaken by this writer of some 80 
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treaties concluded by Sweden in 1951 has further revealed 
it to be the consistent practice of the Swedish Government 
not to issue an authorization to a diplomatic agent to express 
final consent to an agreement until it had received a full 
draft text of the agreement and subjected it to the approval 
of the King in Council. 
It appears, in addition, that both in Swedish practice 
and in the practice of other states, signature of treaties 
which are to be subjected to a subsequent approval of some 
kind - ratification or acceptance or the like - is often, 
though not always, appended only after authorization given 
228 upon the approval of a f'ull draft text of the treaty in question. 
Late issuing of full powers. Treaties open for signature. Practice of initialling 
The limitation upon the power of diplomatic agents, both 
With respect to agreements entering into force upon signature 
and to those which become binding by a subsequent act, to sign 
only what has already been approved as drafts, can be deduced 
also from the common, probably even general, practice of 
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issuing full powers to sign only after the end of the nego-
tiations, and following governmental approval of draft 'texts. 229 The practice of leaving multilateral treaties open for signa-
ture is a device which provides time in which the draft texts 
may be submitted to governments for their approval, and for 
the issuing of authorizations to sign, 230 even if, presumably, full powers are more commonly issued earlier in the case of 
multilateral than in the case of bilateral treaties. 231 
Bilateral treaties and treaties among a small number of 
parties, on the other hand, are commonly initialled232 by 
the negotiators when the drafts are complete but before 
authorizations to sign have been issued. This practice is 
followed at the conclusion of treaties subject to subsequent 
approval as well as agreements in simplified form. 233 It 
appears certain that unless there is clear evidence to the 
contrary, the initialling of a treaty does not bind a state. 234 It merely constitutes evidence that the draft text has been 
drawn up and personally approved by those who have initialled 
it, and the authority to initial seems to be comprised in the power to negotiate. 235 
Wang-Karahan incident of 1924: non-binding effect of "preliminary" signature 
In this connexion, a Russo-Chinese incident which 
occurred in 1924 is of interest. At the end of March 1923, 
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Dr C.T.Wang was appointed by the Chinese Government as chief 
of. a mission to negotiate with Soviet representatives. 236 
During the last months of 1923 and the first months of 1924, Dr Wang negotiated with the Russian delegate, Mr Karahan, and it appears that on 14 March 1924 the two delegates had 
reached agreement on the text of a final draft. 237 Whether 
or not Dr Wang signed the draf.t, or merely initialled it238 
the document was later described by both sides as a "prelim-inary text", and the two delegates seem to have agreed to 
affix formal signatures on a clean copy which was to be made 
out. 239 Meanwhile, the agreement was submitted to the Chinese Government, which refused to accept it without modifications. This act of disavowal having come to the knowledge of the 
Russian representative, he sent an ultimatum to Dr Wang on 16 March declaring himself willing to wait for three days for 
confirmation of the agreement by the Chinese Government. 24° Mr Karahan dispatched a note of similar tenor to the Chinese foreign office. He referred expressly to a note of 28 March 1923 by which the foreign office was aaid to have informed 
the Soviet Government that Dr Wang had been appointed offical delegate for the negotiations with the Soviet Union. He 
stated further that his Government considered the negotiations with I the offical delegate of the Chinese Government as concluded, 
and refused to reopen the discussion. Replying to Mr Karahan, 241 Dr Koo, the Chinese Foreign Minister, who assumed charge of the 
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matter upon Dr Wang's resignation, 242 is reported to have 
stated that on 2 October 1923, Dr Wang had been commissioned 
to discuss and to reach decisions, all decisions being 
subject to the approval of the Government. Mr Karahan had 
admitted himself - according to Dr Koo - that he had not 
seen the credentials of appointment of Dr Wang. If he had, 
he would not have acted as he did, Dr Koo suggested 0 24~ 
The controversy came to an end when, on 31 May 1924, Mr Karahan 
and Dr Koo signed an agreement and a declaration, 244 there 
emerging no express conclusion as to the competence of Dr Wang. 
It appears probable that, in fact, Dr Wang had not 
received, much less given evidence of, any authorization tm 
sign, and that when he signed - or initialled - the agreement, 
he thereby expressed only his personal approval of the text 
before submitting it to his Government. 245 Interviewed by a 
Chinese scholar in Paris in 1939, Dr Koo is reported to have 
said that Dr Wang had been "authorized only to negotiate, 
but not to sign any agreement before it passed through the 
Cabinet meeting and was approved by the President". Dr Koo 
added significantly that "such is the international practice". 246 
It is conceivable that the Soviet representative, on the other 
hand, misunderstood Dr Wang's signature. A circular cable of 
25 March from the Chinese Government to various Chinese author-
ities stated in part: 
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"We are now surprised that the representatives of the two countries have signed the preliminary agreement without instructions from the Government being given to Dr Wang as Director-General. This was done on the 14th instant and not until two 
87 
days later was the Government advised by Dr Wang that the signature was affixed only as a preliminary measure, which differed from a formal signature. The Russian representative, however, thought it a formal signing and thereupon gave a three-days' limit for a deciaion. 11 247 
Whether or not the above was an apt description of 
what had taken place, it is of interest to note that the 
Russian delegate, being unable to refer to any evidence of 
Dr Wang having been authorized to bind his Government by a 
formal signature, could not insist that Dr Wang's act of 
initialling - or signing - amounted to more than a provisional 
approval of the draft text. That provisional approval required 
the confirmation of the Chinese Government, and was not in 
itself binding, Mr Karahan' s only recourse being to declare 
himself' not bound in the event.of oontirm~t1on being refused 0 248 
Conclusions emerging from the procedures employed 
Considering the practice of states as described above, it 
may be concluded that when an envoy presents evidence of an 
authorization to sign an agreement, issued after the end of 
the negotiation of the agreement - which may or may not have 
been initialled - that authorization refers to the specific 
text which has been finally drafted, even tho.ugh on the face of 
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it the authorization will normally only vaguely . i ·denti:f'y 
the agreement. In this situation, a party satis:f'ied as to 
the existence of' an authorization may feel also confident 
that the agent has not exceeded the extent of his competence, 
unless, of course, the agent should have fraudulently sub-
mitted another text to his government than the one drafted, 
a contingency which may presumably be disregarded. 
3. Situations in which there is a risk that municipal authority may be exceeded 
Disputes as to the extent of authority of agents may 
arise in some situations, one being that, immediately before his proceeding to sign an agreement upon the basis of an 
authorization received after the end of negotiations, the 
agent agrees to something beyond the draft. The same problem 
arises if an agent proceeding to exchange or deposit instru-
ments of ratification or notes of' approval purports to con-
sent to something beyond the signed text. Another possibility 
that must be envisaged is that the agent has received author-ization to sign before his government has had opportunity to 
approve a complete draft, and that - whether he has exhibited 
evidence of this authorization to the other party, or the 
existence of it is not in dispute - he disregards instructions, 
and is disavowed on this ground. 
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4. The competence of an agent whose authorization to express final consent is given subsequently to the principals having approved a draft agreement 
89 
With respect to the first situation described above, 
it should be noted that in practice authorizations issued 
for the signing of a draft text do not always completely 
deprive the agents of discretionary power. Thus, the 
examination undertaken of the practice of the Swedish Govern-
ment revealed that, when an authorization to sign an agreement 
was adopted by the King in Council, often the power to make 
minor modifications was concurrently granted. Sometimes this 
power was given to the agent authorized to sign, while on 
other occasions it was given to the foreign minister, to whom 
presumably the agent would then have to apply for permission 
to effect a modification. No case was found in which this 
narrow discretionary power was spelled out in a cable embody-
ing authorization to sign. It seems likely that similar prov-
isions are found in the authorizations granted by other countries 
as well. It may then be asked, what is the competence under 
international law of an agent to agree to modifications when 
proceeding to sign, having been so authorized after the end 
of the negotiations. No case or incident has come to light 
which turns on this point. Three not very modern incidents 
are relevant, however, with respect to the parallel problem 
of the power to agree to modifications by virtue of an 
authorization to exchange instruments of ratification. 
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Controversy concerning the treaty of Erzerum 
The first of the three incidents concerned a treaty be-
tween Persia and Turkey, signed at Erzerum on 31 May 1847. 249 
Before the treaty was signed, on 26 April 1847, an explanatory 
note was addresi.ed to the Ottoman Government by the agent& r, 
of Great Britain and Rui.sia, which were mediating Powera. 250 
The note was accepted by the Ottoman Government before the 
treaty was signed, and, on 31 January 1848, it was acknowledged 
by the Perian envoy stating to the British agent: 
"I hereby declare to Your Excellency that, in 
virtue of the mission with which I am entrusted by my Government for the exchange of ratifications 
of the Treaty of Erzerum, I concur entirely ••• "251 
The exchange of ratifications took place on 21 March 
1848. 252 In a ~ispute discussed in the Council of the League 
of Nations in 1935, Iraq - as the successor of Turkey -
invoked the treaty of Erzerum. 253 The Persian Government 
objected that the treaty was void because the agent of Persia 
had exceeded his competence by accepting the explanatory 
note. 254 Although the delegate of Irak ~~ed not surpris-
ingly that "the plea that a Government is not bound by the 
act of its duly accredited representative is always ••• 
a very weak one in law", he added: 
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"Whether or not the Persian envoy in fact exceeded his powers depends upon a number of considerations, including his instructions, which have not been produced ••• 11 255 
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The Council did not, however, pronounce itself upon the 
matter, which was subsequently left to the negotiation of the 
parties. 
Incident of 1849 between the United States and Mexico 
The second incident arose over a protocol signed in 
connexion with the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of 
peace between the United States and Mexico, signed at Guadalupe 
Hidalgo on 2 February 1848. 256 The treaty having been signed, 
the United States Government submitted it for the advice and 
consent of the Senate, and though such was given, the Senate 
attached certain reservations. Subsequently, the Mexican 
legislature approved the treaty, including the United States 
reservations. 
With a view to the exchange of ratifications, the United 
States Government appointed two commissioners, who proceeded 
to Mexico. In one of their notes to the Mexican Foreign Minister, 
the commissioners apparently mentioned that they were author-
ized to give "explanations" of the reservations made by the 
Senate. 257 As a result, such explanations were given verbally, 
and later, upon the request of the Mexican Foreign Minister, 
they were put in writing in the form of a protocol, signed by 
the Minister and the commissioners. 
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When, early in 1849, the American President referred 
to the protocol as "the substance of conversatioil3 held", 258 
the Mexican minister to Washington informed the United States 
secretary of State that in his opinion, the Protocol was a 
"real diplomatic convention, concluded between the Government 
of Mexico and that of the United States, and equally binding 
on both". 259 He disapproved of the President's referring to 
the Protocol as a "memorandum of conversations" and maintained 
that the instrument had "most properly been given the name of 
"Protocol" and that what had been held in Mexico were "confer-
ences" and not "conversations". 260 He also pointed to the 
protocol containing a declaration to the effect that the 
Commissioners had acted in virtue of ":f'ull powers from their 
Government to- make to the Mexican Republic, suitable explanations 
in regard to the amendments 11261 and that "the said explanations 
were given by the P.Uenipotentiaries in the name of their Govern-
ment, and in fulfilment of the commission conferred upon them". 262 
The Mexican Government had treated with the commissioners in 
good faith and it could not assume that they had exceeded their 
powers and instructionso 263 The minister further asserted 
that if the protocol were annulled, the Mexican ratification 
of the treaty of Guadalupe could not subsist, for it was predi-
cated upon the Protocol, which, indeed, contained the following 
clause: 
"And these explanations having been accepted by the Minister of Relations of the Mexican Republic, he declared in the name of his Government, that with the understanding conveyed by them, the same Government would proceed to ratify the Treaty of Guadalupe~ as modified by the Senate of the United States."2o4 
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The United States Secretary of State appears to have 
thought that the Commissioners had not, in fact, exceeded 
their powers; they had represented themselves as authorized 
to make "explanations" not "interpretations", and "a mere 
power to make explanations in reg~rd to the amendments of 
the Senate would not have authorized them to give an inter-
pretation or construction to these amend(Dl:e nts changing 
their true meaning". Similarly, he pointed out, in a letter 
to the Mexican Foreign Minister his predecessor as Secretary 
of State had made certain explanations with reference to the 
amendments made by the Senate, but "nothing could have been 
further from his intention than to suppose that the Mexican 
Government were to receive or that his own Government was to 
be bound by these explanations either as a substitute for or 
as a construction of the amendments 11 • 265 Indeed, referring 
to the contention put forward by the Mexican minister that the 
Protocol was a diplomatic convention capable of modifying 
the treaty, his predecessor had stated that such device, if 
1 t were valid, would enable diploma tic agents to "usurp the 
powers of the American Senate and bind the Government of the 
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United States in express violation of the Constitutionu. 266 
He had termed it a "monstrous proposi tionu that "the diplo-
matic agents of the two Governments, by an agreement in the 
form of a Protocol, possess the power to change, modify and 
annul the articles of this Treaty at pleasureu. 267 
The Secretary of State sought further support for his 
view that the protocol was not a diplomatic convention in 
the circumstance that no full powers had been exchanged for 
its conclusion, and stated: 
"A treaty between two sovereign states is an act too solemn and momentous to be hastily or unadvisedly entered into. Whatever, therefore, may be the dispos-ition of one party, he is bound to be sure that it is met by the other, and that their respective governments have conferred upon them like powers for accomplishing the object of their negotiation. The mere assurance of one to the other, whatever may be the confidence due to his integrity, ought not to be sufficient. He is liable to err in regard to both the nature and extent of his powers, and if the other party, instead of aatisf"ying himself of their real character by occular inspection, is content with assurances as to their import, he cannot jusglY complain of the consequences of his own neglect. 11 2 8 
Pointing to the texts of the full powers carried by the 
American Commissioners, the Secretary of State rightly con-
cluded that if the Mexican Government had inspected them it 
wo,uld have been apprised of the fact that the Commissioners 
had "no authority to add to or subtract from the a endments 
Proposed by the Senate of the Uni.ted States, or to propose 
any new stipulation ••• 11 • 269 
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Pointing to the texts of the :f'ull powers carried by the 
American Commissioners, the Secretary of State rightly con-
cluded that -if the Mexican Government had inspected them it 
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had "no authority to add to or subtract f'rom the amendments 
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Though the Secretary of State had asserted that he was not 
aware of any instance in which a treaty had been concluded by 
the United States without the powers of the negotiators being 
exchanged, 27° he was able to cite himself an instance where, 
in conjunction with the exchange of ratifications, and by 
means of a simple document drawn up without any :f'u.11 powers 
being exchanged, the United States and Mexico made an import-
ant modification in a treaty which was to be ratified. A 
boundary treaty between Mexico and the United States had been 
ratified in 1832. It had stipulated that commissioners were 
to meet within one year from the ratification to mark the 
boundary line. The Mexican Government having failed to appoint 
a commissioner within the time prescribed, an additional con-
vention became necessary to prolong the period stipulated. On 
3 April 1835, the United States Charg~ d 1Affaires in Mexico 
signed such a convention. In the autumn of that year it was 
discovered, however, that the new convention provided only for 
the "appointment" of commissioners instead of the "meeting" of 
commissioners. The Mexican Government then sent a special 
envoy to Was~ington to conclude yet another convention. Mean-
while, however, the incorrectly formulated convention had been 
submitted to and indeed approved by the Senate, and the Mexican 
Proposal for a new convention was declined. The convention 
Providing for the "appointment" of' commissioners was ratified 
by the President, but the same day the instruments of ratification 
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were exchanged, a paper was drawn up and signed by the 
secretary of State and the Mexican envoy~. stating that the 
convention which was to be rati.fied was not "clearly expressed", 
and that "the intention of the governments ••• was that it 
should have stipulated that their Commissioners and Surveyors 
were to meet within the time and at the place prescribed by 
the original Convention". 271 This "instrument" was not sub-
mitted to the Senate, and the Secretary o.f State adds that when 
it was later communicated to Congress "it escaped the attention 
and animadversion of that body and the public which i ta illegal 
character deserved". 272 From his account of the incident it 
is thus clear that the Secretary of State thought the proced-
ure practiae.d. impermissible even for the purpose of correcting 
a simple error. 
Incident between the United States and Turkey regarding a treaty of 1874 
The third incident in point concerned a convention on 
naturalization, signed at Constantinople on 11 August 1874 
by representatives of the United States and Turkey. 273 The 
convention was subject to ratification, and while the United 
States Senate - to which it was submitted - gave its approval, 
it inserted two reservations. After new negotiations, the 
Sublime Porte accepted these amendments, but made it a condi-
tion that they were to be interpreted in a certain manner. Mr 
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Baker, the minister of the United States at Constantinople, 
agreed to the interpretations, and ratifications were exchanged 
on 22 April 1875. As soon, however, as Mr Baker's consent to 
the Turkish interpretation came to the knowledge of the State 
Department, it disavowed him, declaring that he had been mis-
taken, and indicating the au thori tati ve American in terpret.ation. 
After long negotiations, the Sublime Porte accepted Washington's 
interpretation. Referring to this incident in a letter of 15 
October 1896, Mr Olney, the Secretary of State, declared: 
"Mr Fish [then Secretary of State] treated the 
exchange of ratification, at Constantinople as invalid, in view of the construction placed upon the amended 
text ••• by the Turkish memorandum, and declared that 
there had been in fact no real exchange of ratifications. "274 
Conclusions emerging from the incidents cited 
All three incidents described above illustrate the diff-
iculties which may arise when an agent charged only with the 
task of exchanging instruments of ratification proceeds to 
consent to something which has not received the express approval 
of his government. It may be concluded that the competence to 
exchange or deposit instruments of ratification or notes of 
approval does not create authority under international law to 
express consent to new interpretations or additional instru-
ments of any kind. Nor does there seem to be any reason to 
suppose that an agent, having been authorized to sign a draft 
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agreement approved by his government, should be competent 
under international law to agree to modifications or addenda 
or interpretations concerning the substance of the agreement. 
This conclusion seems inescapable where, as is common, the 
written or cabled authorization only speaks of power to sign. 
But even where a formal full power is issued authorizing the 
agent to "negotiate and sign", the power to negotiate must be 
assumed to refer to the negotiations which have already been 
concluded. The inclusion of the word is no doubt a relic 
from the practice of issuing t'Ull powers at the beginning of 
netotia tions. 
When it is established that an agent has exceeded his 
competence by accepting additional provisions of some kind, 
the addenda are thus thought to be voidable, but it may well 
be asked if, as was suggested in the Turkish-American incident, 
such addenda really make the whole agreement voidable at the 
option of the party whose agent exceeded his competence. It 
would seem more reasonable if, as was suggested by the Iraqi 
delegate in the Council of the League of Nations, 275 the main 
treaty was voidable only at the option of the party which has 
been deprived of possible benefits under the addenda. 
In spite of what has been said above, agents expressing 
the final consent of states to treaties by exchanging or 
depositing instruments of ratif'ication, or notes of approval, 
or by signing, or otherwis..e, must be deemed to possess - by 
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the practice of states if not under their domestic authority -the competence to agree to modifications of form and style, 
276 
and to emendations not affecting the substance of the agreement. Moreover, should there be evidence of an authorization issued after the end of the negotiations and expressly conferring some latitude of power upon the agent - eogo empowering him to sign an instrument along the lines of the draft - the other party may, of course, rely upon actions taken by the agent on that basis. 
5. Competence of an agent whose authorization to sign is given before the principal has approved a draft agreement 
The question remains of whether a diplomatic agent who, before his government has had opportunity to approve o:f a draft, has been municipally authorized not only to negotiate, but also to sign, an agreement, may be legally disavowed under international law on the ground that on some point he has exceeded his competence by violating his instructions. Although this kind of authorization, or at least evidence of it, is no doubt not frequently issued, it seems certain that it is given on occasion. 277 For example, on 30 June 1945, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States cabled: 
"Justice Jackson is authorized to sign agreement regarding prosecution European Axis leader~ and assoc-iates which conforms with general principles already enunciated by him."278 
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The agreement referred to was signed - and became 
binding - on 8 August 1945, and it seems likely that, when 
the authorization was issued, the State Departnent did not 
possess a complete and final draft of it. 279 An agreement 
signed on the authority of a cable such as this might con-
ceivably be successfully disavowed on the basis of the quali-
fication attached to it. If conformity with instructions 
should have been expressly prescribed in a full power, 280 
there would presumably be little difficulty in a renunciation 
of an agreement reasonably alleged not to have been reached in 
conformity with such instructions. Where no such qualifica-
tions are made, however, it is submitted that for the follow-
ing reasons, a disavowal of signature appended on the basis of 
an authorization otherwise given in the same circumstances 
and terms would not be effective under international law, 
unless it had been known to the other party or was manifest 
that the agent exceeded his powers. 281 
The reluctance of states, as demonstrated above, to 
exchange, at an early stage in negotiations, evidence of 
authority to sign may well be taken to mean that the governments 
often consider the early issuing of full powers as involving a 
risk, and seek to protect themselves against becoming bound 
through any inadvertent acts of their agent. A f'ull power 
to negotiate and sign, given before the negotiations or early 
in the negotiations, may therefore probably be understood to 
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confer a fairly wide latitude of discretion. To .allow this 
latitude to be limited with international effect by secret 
instructions which may be given from time to time would enable 
a government to disavow its agent if the agreement signed were 
thought inconvenient. The other party would not be able to 
feel certain of the validity of a signed agreement until a 
reasonable period had passed after its signature. If the acts 
of the agent were not disavowed during this period, the assumpt-
ion would arise that either the agent had in fact acted in 
accordance with his instructions, or else that his government 
had acquiesced in such deviations as he might have made. This, 
indeed, seems to be the position to which Dr Mervyn Jones 
adheres. Referring to inter-governmental agre~ments, he states: 
" • • • their validity depends on the authority given to the agent, either in his Full Powers or by express instructions. Of course, if he signs an agreement contrary to his Full Powers or instructions the agreement may be repudiated. If not repudiated within a reasonable time it is binding'!282 
It does not seem altogether clear whether in the words 
"express instructions", Dr Jones included instructions not 
communicated -to the other party • . Nor can it be stated with any 
certainty whether Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, to whom Dr Jones refers, 
in suggesting that a state is entitled to repudiate the action 
of an agent as ultra vi res, "provided the breach of authority 
can clearly be shown", 283 thought evidence of instructions not 
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known to the other part y - permissible to demonstrate "clearly" 
a breach of authority. If these writers had in mind only such 
instructions as had been communicated or were otherwise known 
to the other party, principles of good faith would, no doubt, 
have precluded that party from relying upon action taken in 
violation of instructions. It seems more probable, however, 
that Dr Jones and Sir Gerald thought secret instructions to be 
internationally relevant. Assuming that this interpretati. on 
of their view is correct, and that their view is itself correct, 
the existing situation could be briefly described as the same 
as that which once led to the procedure of ratification becoming 
both necessary and discretionary. 284 Though modern require-
ments of expeditiousness have led to a decreased use of rati-
fication, it may not be argued that the requirement of reliabil-
ity in modern relations between states should in any way have been 
lessened so as to tolerate the ambiguity and uncertainty that 
would result from conceding the international relevance of 
undisclosed instructions. It is perfectly permissible under 
international law for a negotiating party to inquire of the 
foreign office of the other party as to whether its agent has 
respected his instructions, and, though such inquiries must be 
rare, instances have been recorded. 285 A right to inquire is 
not of much value, however, to a party not suspecting the agent 
of the other party with viola ting his instruc ti.ons. While 
the common interest of reaching genuine agreement seems to have 
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led to the duty of every party to exercise reasonable and 
feasible caution - by checking evidence of authority to express 
final consent, and being on guard against evident violations of 
instructions - it cannot be expected to have had more far-
reaching consequences~ It is not unreasonable to assume that 
the risk of an agent departing from his instructions in 
circumstances when the other party is unaware of such departure, 
is borne by the agent's principal. States may thus be obliged 
to seek to protect themselves against such deviations by stipul-
ating penalties or disciplinary action against agents guilty 
of them. Such provisions are indeed found in municipal law. 286 
Practice of states; controversy between 
Hungary and Roumania 
There is little in the modern practice of states that 
tends to resolve the problem. An incident brought before the 
Council of the League of Nations may be reported, however. 
Under the chairmanship of the Japanese delegate to the Council, 
Mr Adatci, and at the express recommendation of the Council, 
negotiations were opened at Brussels on 26 May 1923 between 
representatives of Hungary and Rownania with a view to the 
settlement of a dispute regarding land owned by Hungarian nationals 
and expropriated by the Roumanian government in the course of an 
agrarian reform. 287 The full powers carried by the Hungarian 
delegates were issued before the negotiations and read as 
follows: 
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"Budapest, 23rd May, 1923. "I, the undersigned, Royal Hungarian Minister for Justice entrusted with the direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, certify by the present note that the Royal Government of Hungary has charged His Excellency the Count Emeric de Cs~ky, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, as delegate, and Monsieur Ladislas Gajzlgo, Councillor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as assistant delegate, to represent the Kingdom of Hungary in the negotiations which are to take place on May 26th of the present year at Brussels, between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Roumania, on the question of the expropriation of the landed property of the Hungarian optants. 
"The delegates above mentioned are provided with f'ull powers to treat and to sign in the name of the Royal Government of Hungary the provisions of the agreement to be concluded. 288 (signed) G8za de Daruvlry." 
Minutes of the conversations at Brussels were drafted by 
a League official, and though they were neither signed nor 
initialled by the Hungarian delegates, the latter do not seem 
to have raised any objection to the account given of their 
statements. 289 The minutes included i.ao a passage recording 
recognition by the Hungarian representatives that the Treaty 
of Triarion did not preclude the expropriation of the property 
of optants for reasons of public welfare, including the social 
requirements of agrarian reform. 290 In addition, a draft 
resolution to ·be submitted to the League Council was drawn up 
at Brussels, and i ta contents were submitted for the approval 
of the delegates. According to later Hungarian statements 
in the Council, the Hungarian representative had declared that 
he participated in the procedure in his personal capacity only. 291 
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However that may have been, it is certain that, on the morn-
ing of 29 May 1923, Count Czlky initialled a portion of the 
text reading: 
"The Council is convinced that the Hungarian Government, after the efforts made by both parties to avoid any misunderstanding on the question of optants, will do its best to reassure its nationals."292 
A preamble of the text stated that the Council took note 
"of the various declarations contained in the minutes'', thus 
including the passage reported aboveo A third paragraph of 
the resolution referred to the duties of the Roumanian 
Government, and was similarly initialled by the representative 
of Roumania. 
On 12 June, Mr Adatci received a letter from the Hungarian 
Foreign Minister, disavowing the acts of Count Czi1ky. 293 In a 
separate memorandum, 294 the Hungarian :f'u.11 power was cited, and 
it was stressed that the instructions given to the delegates 
had only had reference to an agreement with Roumania. It was 
admitted that Count Cz&ky had appended his initials in the 
name of his Government, but it was pointed out that the Hungar-
ian full power only authorized direct negotiations with Roumania. 
The Hungarian Government, not having been aware that a report 
was to be drafted, had not been in a position to delegate powers 
for this purpose. The Hungarian Foreign Minister contended that 
the drafting of the report did not enter into the tasks of the 
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negotiators, and that, moreover, the Hungarian representatives 
had stressed repeatedly that they did not have full powers or 
instructions as to the drafting of' the reporto The memorandum 
continued: 
"Il est done ~vident que ledi t d~l~gue du Gouvernement royal hongrois a franchi les limites de sea pleins pouvoirs et que le Gouvernement royal de Hongrie, A son grand regret, ne peut pas, malgr~ l'apposition du parafe d 1un de sea repr~sentants sous une partie du texte, adh&rer au projet de r~solution." 
In a reply to the letter of disavowal, Mr Adacti stated: 
ttil est cl air que 1' acti vi tc! du Conseil de la Socic!t~ des Nations en vue de maintenir les bonnes relations entre lea Membres qu'un dif'f'~rend s&pare, serait rendue impossible, si, contrairement l tout usage international, lea d&l~gu~s envoy~s par lea parties et dument autoris~s par elles pour n&gocier, sous lea auspices d'un Membre du Conseil, pourraient ensuite 8tre d~savou&s par leurs Gouvernments."295 
Mr Adacti added that he did not understand the Hungarian 
Government to have disavowed what its agents had done within 
the strict limits of their full powers, that in his view 
the discussions had led to certain agreed conclusions on 
several points, and that these had been recorded in the proc&s-
verbal. In his opinion, these conclusions could not be chall-
enged. He subsequently referred to them and relied upon them 
When the matter came before the Council of' the League of' Nations 
on 5 July 1923. 296 During the meeting the Roumanian delegate 
297 strenuously argued that an agreement had been reached at Brussels. 
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It is of interest to note that Lord Robert Cecil supported 
this contention. His statement, as recorded in the minutes 
of the Council, reads in part: 
0 He was quite aware that the Hungarian Government said that the agreement had only been obtained because its representative had exceeded his powers. He did not propose to examine the legal grounds for that contention; he desired simply to say that it did not seem to him that the powers of the Hungarian representative had been so restricted as to prevent his entering into such an agreement. In these circumstances, he thoughtthat the Council could assume that an agreement had been entered into by the representative of Hungary, and it was extremely undesirable that that agreement should not be con-sidered by the Council as having great weight. 11 298 
Mr Branting, the Swedish delegate, concurred in the 
remarks of Lord Cecil, while the French representative, Mr 
Hanataux, considered that what had taken place at Brussels 
did not amount to an agreement, but only to the first step 
toward conciliation. 299 To the gratification of the Roumanian 
delegate, who saw the "Brussels agreement'' thereby confirmed, 
the Council approved the report of Mr Adatci and adopted the 
draft resolution based upon it. 
In a case which subsequently came before the mixed 
Roumanian-Hungarian tribunal, the State of Roumania, as defendant, 
sought to rely upon the "Brussels agreement".300 In its 
judgment, the tribunal avoided entering into the question of the 
competence of Count Czlky, but rejected the view that a formal 
declaration - if such it had been - which had been made in the 
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course of negotiations, and perhaps in the hope of winning a 
concession from the other party, could be isolated and inter-
preted as an agreement.3°1 After the Roumanian Government had 
refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the tribuna1,3°2 
the question of the "Brussels agTeement 11 came again before the 
council of the League, but no new light was shed upon it.303 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Hungarian 
optants incident is the various views expressed on the question 
of what constitutes an agreement. The incident also demon-
strates the great difficulty of disavowing an agent once he 
has been supplied with evidence of authority to negotiate and 
express a government's final consent. The difficulty in this 
case is the more remarkable in view of the fact that the agent 
had only appended his initials. Evidently the Council attached 
some weight to the f'ull power upon which Count Cziky had acted, 
but it does not appear that the lack of instructions of the 
agent on the point on which he was disavowed made any impression 
upon the Council. 
Opinions of writers, Conclusions 
The conclusion that, within the limits imposed by con-
Bidera tions of good faith, violations by agents of their secret 
instructions are irrelevant under international law has the 
support of several writers. Thus, Basdevant st~tes that ''on 
ne peut exiger d'un ministre qu'il communigµe ses instructions: 
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6 a lettre de cr~ance ou sea pleins pouvoirs suffisent 
pour qu' on garde foi A sa parole". 304 Lord McNair writes 
similarly that a question as to the limitations contained in 
the secret instructions "could hardly arise in the case of a 
treaty of a kind not requiring ratification provided that the 
negotiators held full powe~s couched in the customary extensive 
language''. He continues: "If it should arise, it would seem 
clear that secret instructions given by one party to its 
plenipotentiary cannot affect the other party who has no notice 
of them~05. This conclusion, it is submitted, is a reasonable 
one, whose compelling character derives a certain support 
from the practice of states. 
6. Authority conferred by a f\.111 power silent as to the need for ratification 
A separate aspect of the problem of the extent of author-
ity of an agent is found in the question sometimes discussed of 
whether full powers that do not expressly declare that the 
agreement to be concluded is subject to ratification confer 
authority to sign treaties binding upon signature. 
It was perhaps understandable that, in a period in which 
the desire to safeguard constitutional procedures led many 
writers to the view that the procedure of ratifcation was 
discretionary where promised, and required where it had not been 
stipulated, the view should also have been current that a 
reservation as to ratification should be read into the full 
110 
powers of agents where no express ·stipulation to that effect was to be found in them.3°6 Today such a view is utterly untenable; the majority of treaties do not enter into force upon ratification, and, though the issuing of instruments of full powers or authorizations may have been neglected in the case of many treaties entering into force otherwise than by ratifica-tion, those which have been issued have not reserved the right to ratify, nor can such a reservation be read into them. It does not follow, however, that every full power that is silent as to ratification raises a presumption of competence to bind by signature. 
Though several states seem always to include a reserva-tion as to ratification in full powers issued for the conclusion of treaties intended to enter into force by ratification, 307 and though such a practice may probably even be said to be general,30B instances seem to occur where full powers not reserving the right to ratify are issued for the signature of treaties entering into force by ratification.309 The absence in a full power of a reservation as to ratification cannot be said, therefore, to imply with any certainty that the treaty is to enter into force upon signature.310 Nor does it seem possible to contend that the absence of such reservation should !lways imply that the agent is empowered to affix a con-
clusively binding signature: where the full power~ as is often the case - is issued only when a complete draft has already been drawn up, the draft will normally be found to contain an 
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express provision prescribing that the treaty shall enter 
into force either by signature or by ratification, or possibly 
in some other manner. The :f'ull power must then be understood 
to refer to the compiete draft. In case the :f'ull power should 
not expressly reserve the right to ratify, while an express 
clause in the draft does so, there would be no reason to 
suppose that the agent proceeding to sign was competent to 
agree to modifying this cJ..a.use so as to make the treaty enter 
into force upon signature. This conclusion conforms with the 
general rule deduced above as to the lack of competence of 
agents holding full powers issued at the end of negotiations to 
agree to modifications when proceeding to sign.311 
With the exception suggested in the preceding paragraph, 
it appears likely, however, that any full power to sign that 
does not reserve the right to ratify confers competence to 
bind by signatureo312 Thus, if a full power not reserving 
ratification rights has been issued before there is a complete 
draft - as seems to have been the case with the full power 
issued to Mr Justice Jackson313 - the state issuing the instru-
ment cannot l _ater renounce a treaty that, on the basis of the 
full power, was signed to come into force upon signature, 
With the argument that the instrument did not raise a presumpt-
ion of authority to bind by signature, nor, indeed, that a 
reservation as to ratification should have been· read into the 
tu.11 power. Similarly, a full power issued at the end of 
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negotiations that does not reserve ratification rights, and that refers to a draft which is silent as to the mode of its 
entry into force, or which offers a choice of procedure on this point, must be understood to confer competence to conclude a treaty binding upon signature. 
This conclusion has been strongly advocated by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. 314 It would seem,, also to be suggested by the certainty that the modern relations of states require, 
and to derive some support from modern diplomatic practice 
as well. Thus, it is reported by Leriche315 that, in the practice of the United Nations, with reference especially 
to tbe conclusion of treaties allowing governments to become bound by signature with or without reservation as to sub-
sequent acceptance, the Secretary General examines the full powers of the agents proceeding to sign, checking notably 
whether they contain any reservation as to ratification - the implication being that if no such reservation is found the Secretary-General considers the agent competent to sign without a reservation as to ratification. 
A recent diplomatic incident is in point, A. European 
conference of ministers of transport was held at Brussels from 13 to 17 October 1953, at which a protocol was drawn up.316 It was open for signature from 17 October 1953 to 1 May 1954. In accordance with article 14 (2) of the agreement, a government 
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could become a contracting party either by signature without 
reservation, or by signature with a reservation as to ratifica-tion, followed by ratification. Paragraph 4 of the same 
article stipulated that the protocol was to enter into force 
when six governments had finally approved it. 
It appears that the protocol was signed on 17 October 1953 
without any reservation as to ratification by the representa-
tives of Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland. In the case 
of France, the signature was appended by its minister of 
transport, M. Chartelein, by virtue of a telegraphic authoriza-tion that did not reserve the right of ratification.317 A formal full power reserving· ratification rights that was sub-
mitted somewhat later appears to have led the Belgian 
authorities to inquire as to the reason for the discrepancy between the two documents. The answer received seems to have 
explained that the written full power was incorrect and that 
the telegraphic authorization should prevail. A letter 
received later by the Belgian foreign office from French 
authorities stating that the French minister had exceeded his full powers, and that his signature must be considered "!.Q; 
.r,_eferendum0 , did not meet with Belgian approval. The protocol is found to be registered by Belgium with the United Nations, and France is there listed as having bound itself by signature without a reservation as to ratification.318 
VII. THE COMPETENCE OF AGENTS OTHER THAN DIPLOMATS 
If' it had been possible to demonstrate that there exists 
a presumption under international law to the eff'ect that 
diplomatic agents are competent to bind their principals by a 
t reaty when they purport to be authorized to this effect, a 
question would have arisen as to whether the group of agents 
was limited to any category of diplomats, or as to whether the 
principle perhaps extended to apply to some other groups of 
i ndividuals as well. Bittner, who affirmed the existence of 
t he presumption, maintained that it applied to foreign 
ministers, leading officers of the foreign offices, and 
accredited diplomats, but no others.319 The foregoing examin-
a tion of the question has confirmed Bittner's view with respect 
to foreign ministers, but, though a tendency in the direction 
of the presumption has been found to be unmistakable with 
regard to accredited ministers, no more than a tendency can be 
shown to apply to them. This being so, there is no reason 
to expect that the presumption could possibly apply to agents of 
lesser diplomatic standing, or others who might purport to act on behalf of a state.320 Questions as to their competence must be 
assumed to be regulated by the same rules as have been shown above 
to apply to accredited ministers. Accordingly, a special dis-
cussion of their situation does not seem to be called for. 
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THE GENERAL RULE RELATING TO COMPETENCE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO CONCLUDE TREATIES 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The existence of a rule 
Before a discussion may be undertaken of the content of 
the rule of international law that determines what authorities 
are competent to conclude treaties, an answer must first be 
sought to the preliminary question of whether any such rule 
may be expected to exist. It has been asserted by at least 
one writer that the answer is in the negative. On the basis 
of an examination of various constitutional texts, Dr Chailley 
denies that there is a rule of international law and ascribes 
the determination of the competent treaty-making power exclus-
ively to the constitutional laws of various countries. He 
concludes: 
" ••• selon la conviction juridique des Etats, ce n'est pas au droit des gens, mais au droit constitutionnel en tant que tel qu'il appartient de d~terminer les r~gles de comp~tence et de proc~dure, sans l'observation desquelles un trait~ ne pourra pas Stre consid~r~ comme internationalement valide. 111 
This conclusion cannot be accepted. When desiring to 
treat with a foreign state, any government will try to deal 
With the authorities it believes competent to undertake obliga-
tions binding under international law. If there is found to 
be uniformity and consistency in the convictions of governments 
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as to the criteria of competence, that very conviction, 
of evidenced by practice, will constitute a rule/international 
law. Thus, if governments invariably look to the constitu-
tional laws of other countries to find the authorities compet-
ent to ~ake treaties, the conclusion would be inevitable that 
a principle of international law refers the determination of 
the competent treaty-making authorities to the various consti-
tutional provisions. 2 Chailley's statement quoted above is 
therefore a contradiction in terms. It amounts, indeed, to 
saying that, by international law, it is not to international 
law, but to constitutional law one must look for a determina-
tion of a competent treaty-making power. But this is actually 
to say that a principle of international law refers the deter-
mination of the competent treaty-making organ to constitu-
tional law, a principle the ve-ry existence of which Chailley 
denies. In another context that writer ventures to suggest, 
nevertheless, that the competence of a de facto government to 
cfonclude treaties is determined under international law by the 
same juridical principles as prevail in the internal order.3 
This would seem to be an admission of the existence of pertinent 
rules of international law. Indeed, while there is much disagree-
ment as to the content of the rule of international law indicat-
ing the treaty-making authorities, an overwhelming body of 
opinion assumes the existence of such a rule. The following 
examination of the matter will record ample evidence in support 
of that assumption. 
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2. Most important theories 
According to one school of thought, the head of each state 
possesses by international law a jus representation.is 
omnimodae.4 The origin of this rule is obviously found in the 
circumstance that at one time, a few hundred years ago, the 
political system prevailing in many states was that of absolute 
monarchy. The internal power possessed by the sovereign~ 
gratiae was such as to justify another party relying upon his 
words alone.5 
Though most absolute monarchies were later replaced by 
constitutional systems in which normally the power of the head 
of state was strongly curbed, so as to enable him to act only 
with the advice of ministers, and often only with the consent 
of an elected legislature, and though the theory of the jus 
r epresentationis omnimodae was thus deprived of its rationale, 
it continued to be asserted. It was now suggested by adherents 
of this theory that, in dealing with each other, states were 
not concerned with the question of what authorities had the 
act ual power to carry out a particular undertaking , of~ as it 
was expressed - "forming the will of the state". All they 
were interested in was to find the organ which was competent 
to declare that the state undertook the particular obligation, 
and this authority was almost universally the head of state. 
It may be taken for granted, however, that governments would 
not have been content to receive only a p:rumise by a head of 
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state, if offered, were it known that fulfilment would depend 
upon the consent of ministers or a legislature, unwilling to 
give it. 'Though the theoreticians thus retreated from praatical-
ity, it may safely be assumed that the men of government never 
did. 
Gradually the concept of constitutional government forced 
the discarding of the old theory, and most writers now hold 
that, by international law, the constitution of states, or the 
internal order of states, determines the authority competent 
to make treaties.6 A majority of authors also recognize that 
provisions regarding countersigning and legislative approval 
may be significant internationally.7 This theory is obviously 
much more flexible than the head of state theory, and, indeed, 
even fits where the head of state may still possess the whole 
treaty-making power. While it takes into account the predomin-
ant factual situation of today in a fashion more satisfactory 
than does the old theory, it has given rise to much controversy 
regarding the international relevance of subtle constitutional 
interpretations, constitutional provisions prohibiting special 
types of trea~ies, and the like. Some who have felt concerned 
about the safeguarding of the observance of constitutional 
provisions have backed their unqualified relevance under inter-
national law. Others, who have felt concerned about the need 
for reliability and predictability in international treaty rela-
tions, have maintained that there are certain limitations -
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flowing from principles of good faith or otherwise - upon the 
relevance of constitutions in the international sphere. Yet 
others, and perhaps those who have felt the most concerned at 
the far-reaching consequences of the theories held by the group 
of writers first mentioned, have persisted in their support 
of the head of state theory. To them, the old theory remains 
attractive because it seems simple to apply and incapable of 
being abused. At the same time, attaching binding effect, as 
this theory does, to the consent of an authority which is 
frequently devoid of all independent power under domestic law, 
obviously makes possible the most severe conflict between domestic 
legal effect and effect under international law. Opponents 
of the traditional rule, on the other hand, propound a rule 
which is complicated in application, permits of use as a 
subterfuge, but reduces to a minimum the risks for conflict 
between international law and domestic law. However, not even 
if this theory were found to be acceptable and accepted would 
the risk of conflict altogether disappear. For it would always 
be possible, of course, that by the internal laws of some states, 
domestic legislation subsequent to and conflicting with a treaty 
would prevail over the treaty. 
l . 
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3. Formula submitted 
It is submitted that the broader adherence to the view 
that international law refers to constitutional law the 
determination of competent treaty-making authority marks a 
rapp:r..cM~hemen t between doctrine and prevailing reality, and, 
therefore, is a step forward. It appears, nevertheless, that 
even this formulation of the rule is too rigid to be applic-
able in all situations in which a competent treaty-making power 
must be indicated, and, in some respects,is misleading. 
Accordingly, it is rather submitted that, historically 
as well as at the present time the authorities competent 
under international law to make treaties are those which may 
reasonably be expected to be able to bring about fulfilment of 
the obligations undertaken: apparent factual ability gives 
rise to international legal competenceo 8 The formula proposed 
is so broad that it may encompass and apply to the reality from 
which the head of state theory emerged, as well as the situa-
tions envisaged by the constitutional theory. It is applicable, 
moreover, not only to states but also to other subjects of 
international iaw that may be found to conclude treaties. As 
will now be shown, this formula emerges from, and embraces, 
a number of different situations in which the competence of 
various authorities to make treaties is at issue. 
II. DO SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INVARIABLY 
POSSESS COMPETENT TREATY-MAKING AUTHORITY? 
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Without exploring the question of what entities possess 
the capacity to be bound by treaty, it may be asked 1Nb.at is 
the position, in international law, with regard to entities 
possessing no authority in fact able to undertake new obliga-
tions, e.g~, a state during a period of anarchy. Does a rule 
of international law nevertheless point to the nominal head of 
state as the competent treaty-ma.king power, or is it always 
t rue to suggest that 
''in the absence of any special constitution con-taining provisions bestowing the exercise of the treaty-making power of the state on one or another agency of the government, international law would undoubtedly sustain the conclusion that the executive branch might act in that capacity and bind the state thereby? 11 9 
While this problem does not seem to have attracted much 
attention, some writers have suggested that, though interna-
tional law permits states a wide latitude in the mode of their 
internal organization, certain minimum requirements are imposed in this respect. It is thus stated by Potter: 
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"It must be admitted at once that international law does permit the national state to regulate to some degree the exercise of the treaty-making power on its behalf. The state might intrust the exercise of that power to some agency other than its chief executive officer, doubtless, provided that the agency selected were suitable or adequate to the purpose, although it is difficult to conceive of legislative or judicial agencies fulfilling this requirement."10 
If the implication of the above statement is that interna-
t ional law imposes a duty upon states always to hold out 
authorities suitable to make treaties, it is difficult to 
accept. Though a state in which anarchy prevails for some 
t ime may presumably become liable for not respecting its inter-
national obligations, 11 it cannot be argued that it would incur 
international responsibility merely by not holding out any 
agency capable of concluding treaties on its behalf. It must 
be concluded that states have no duty under international law 
t o possess a treaty-making authority, 12 just as they have no 
du ty to conclude treaties. On the other hand, it is evident 
t hat, due to the need in most communities for international 
i ntercourse, and for the regulation of such intercourse, the 
authorities existing in the communities normally adapt them-
selves so as to offer convenient channels for treaty-making, 
and guarantees for the execution of treaties. If, however, the 
authorities should not so adapt themselves, or if for some 
period, a community should completely lack governmental authority, 
the reaction of the international cornmuni ty might well be passive. 
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Though such a community would continue to be regarded as a 
subject of international law, and as possessing the capacity 
to conclude treaties, foreign governments might well simply 
abstain from attempting to -make any treaty with it until it 
had established authority giving promise of ability to :f'ulfil 
obligations to be undertaken. 13 In practice, such cases arise 
in periods of civii war, or chaos following defeat in a war. 
A few examples may be cited to illustrate this point. Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht, who suggests that there is a presumption 
in favour of the international authority of a law:f'ul government, 
doubts nevertheless that "political or commercial treaties of a 
far-reaching character" may properly be made with such a govern-
ment, even though it may remain in the national territory and 
assert authority, if it is seriously shaken by a revolutionary 
government that is gaining ground. 14 It may be inferred that 
in the opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, no treaty - of the kind 
mentioned - can be concluded in the situation envisaged. In 
support of his view Sir Hersch cites a dispatch of 1859 from 
the United States minister to Mexico, which merits examination. 
In 1859, the united States. recognized President Juarez' Consti-
tutionalist Government at Vera Cruz in Mexico, and declined to 
recognize the revolutionary government of General Miramon which 
was then established in the capital. The American minister 
to Mexico even negotiated and eventually signed important treaties 
of alliance and transit with the Constitutionalist Government, 
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but while negotiating with that government he expressed doubts 
t o the Secretary of State as to the prudence of acquiring 
t erritory from Me~ico by a treaty of cession with a government 
as shaky as that to which he was accredited. In a dispatch of 
25 June 1859, he wrote as follows: 
"The cession of territory is the gravest and most important act of sovereignty that a government can perform; it is therefore questionable, whether it should be performed at a moment when it is in con-flict with another government for the possession of the empire, even though it may be de jure and de facto mueh more entitled to respect than tbat with which it is struggling in civil war, and this consideration is as important to the party purchasing as to the party ceding the territory. 11 15 
Another instance is recorded in an American diplomatic dispatch 
of 1926, a period in which China was torn by strife. The 
di spatch notes that a British delegation to a conference negotiat-
ing a treaty with China found further negotiation purposeless 
because the Chinese delegation, although apparently appointed 
by the regularly constituted government, was unable to speak 
for the country as a whole. 16 
The fact that governments refrain from making treaties 
with communities - even recognized states - in periods during 
Whi ch they do not possess authority which appears likely to be 
able to carry out the obligations to be undertaken seems to 
Point to the conclusion that such entities ar e considered as not 
Possessing any organs competent under international law to con-
clude treaties0 
III. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION 
An inquiry into the history of treaty-making organs 
is outside the scope of this study. It may suffice to say that 
the head of state does not always appear as the treaty-makihg 
organ under municipal law. Grotius limits himself to stating 
that ."in Kingdoms ••• the lings have the right to make 
t reaties 11 • 17 It is interesting to note that Grotius was per-
f ectly aware that in a republic - as in the case of Rome, which 
he himself cites - the treaty-making power may rest el e~here. 
Even ' in monarchies the treaty-making power of kings does 
no t appear always to have been as absolute as seems to have 
been the dominant pattern in the 16th century. It is thus 
fi rmly maintained by one writer that the Saxon body of men 
t ermed Wi tanagemot "had a consultative voice in every public 
Act which could be authorized by the King ••• and possessed and 
exercised the power of making treaties ••• "~B The Saxon and 
Roman examples may be enough to show what will hardly be con-
t r overted, namely, that, in the course of time, and in various 
human communities, the power of undertaking and of fulfilling 
treaty obligations has resided in a variety of authorities or 
combination of authorities. 
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No thorough historical research is required to establish 
that those who have made treaties in past centuries have not 
always been content simply with obtaining the consent of the 
head of a foreign community. Where the object desired has 
seemed outside, or partly outside the power of the foreign 
chief of state, they have - perhaps always - been concerned 
with securing the consent of the authorities actually cap:1ble 
of :fulfilling the obligations to be undertaken. It is thus 
reported that "the British government tried in vain to procure 
the summoning of the Estates-General to approve the Treaty of 
Utrecht". 19 Even more striking is a passage found in a recent 
work on the history of Swedish foreign policy. It is there 
stated that King Gustav Vasa of Sweden (ruling 1523-1560) 
generally was eager to act with the support of the Council. The 
author adds: 
"During the first decades [ of his rule] this was all the more necessary as the necessity for the con-sent and confirmation of the Royal Council was commonly taken for granted abroad, in.conformity with older custom as regards settlements with Sweden. 11 20 
I t appears, furthermore, that the members of the Council appended 
their personal seals next to that of the King on treaties entered 
i nto, and that this custom continued even after the death of 
Gustav Vasa. The passage quoted indicates that foreign states 
customarily certified when concluding treaties with the pre-
decessors of King Gustav Vasa, that the latter had the support 
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of the power:tul Council. Indeed, so firmly established was 
this custom that King Gustav Vasa, whose 
dependent upon the Council than was that 
was disposed to defer to it • 
power was much less 
or his predecessors , 
IV. THE TREATY-MAKING COMPETENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY 
GOVERNMENTS 
1. Preliminary remarks 
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It has been shown above that where chaos or anarchy pre-
vails, there is no organ competent under international law to 
make treaties. It may be asked what minimum conditions an 
authority must f'ulfil to qualify under international law to 
assume treaty obligations on behalf of a state. An examination 
of the treaty-making activities developed by revolutionary 
governments might provide an answer to that question, for such 
governments purport to act on behalf of states in conditions 
which frequently border upon anarchy. Since it must be assumed 
furthermore, that foreign governments will only treat with a 
revolutionary government purporting to act on behalf of a 
, 
state if they · are convinced that the treaties made by the revolu-
tionary government will be imputed to the state - or, to put it 
differently, if they are convinced that under inte~national law 
the revolutionary government is a competent treaty-making organ 
of the state - the mere fact that they conclude treaties with a 
certain revolutionary government purporting to act on behalf of 
a state must, in all likelihood, imply that they consider it 
satisfying the minimum conditions required of a treaty-making 
J 
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organ. Corroboration of their views may be sought in the 
attitude adopted by the governments succeeding the revolu-
tionary authorities: their respect or disregard of treaties 
made by the predecessor revolutionary regime will show 
whether they accept or reject the view that that regime 
possessed such qualities as to have constituted an organ 
of the state. For, by definition, a body that constitutes 
an organ of the state, is one - inter alia - whose acts will 
continue to be respected despite the disappearance of the 
particular person(s) who, at a given stage, constituted the 
organ. 
It may be noted in this connexion that the authorities 
ruling states have not always been looked upon as "organst' 
in the sense indicated above. In past centuries there has 
been no lack of application of the opposite principle, namely, 
that a treaty remained valid only so long as the person con-
cluding it remained alive. It is reported that in old European 
public law, despite the system of hereditary monarchy, and 
despite the maxim "Le Roi est mort, vive le Roi t1, the suecessor 
on the throne was not always held bound by the treaty obliga-
tions of his predecessor. 21 It is obvious that very great 
disadvantages attached to this older doctrine, and it appears 
that as early a commentator as Grotius qualified it by 
distinguishing between "trai tes personnels" and "traites 
r~e1s 11 • 22 
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The ever present need in any modern community for 
governmental acts, and for continued respect for such acts -
whether they be the issuing of marriage licenses or the con-
clusion of defence alliances - is so great that the character 
of "state organ" may - indeed must - be expected to be 
attributed to revolutionary governments, even if their mode of 
f'u.nctioning only partially resembles that of a normal govern-
ment. A revolutionary government cannot be considered in the 
light of a private law analogy as a thief trying to administer 
what he has stolen. "La chose publique n' appartient A 
personne", 23 and if it is not administered and so regarded, 
damage will follow. 24 This argument applies as much to the 
conclusion of treaties as to the performance of domestic acts. 
It is of interest to note in this connexion the practice of 
revolutionary governments to declare their intention of 
respecting treaties made by prior governments. 25 The inquiry 
here, however, will concern the practj.ce of governments 
that succeed revolutionary regimes in abiding by treaties 
made by the latter: what qualities must a revolutionary regime 
possess in order that subsequent governments will agree with 
foreign governments in attributing treaty-making competence 
to them? 
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2. Rules theoretically possible 
In abstract theory there would be no objection to a 
rule of international law to the effect that only authorities 
certified by the General Assembly of the United Nations to be 
competent under international law to conclude treaties poss-
ess such competence. Nor would there be any logical objection 
to a rule prescribing that only such authorities would be 
competent to conclude treaties as were found organized in accord-
ance with some hypothetical model constitution. Though it 
is obvious that no rule of either kind exists at the present 
time, governments have at times shown tendencies to enter 
into relations - including treaty relations - only with 
authorities deemed satisfactory in the light of some political 
ideology. 
Ideas to the e:ffect that only hereditary monarchs were 
"legitimate" rulers of European states were current in the 
first half of the 19th century. 26 It appears to have been 
during this period, indeed, that the term "de facto" govern-
ments was coined, in distinction to the "legi tima te 11 govern-
ments, then thought to derive their authority from God. 27 
The general opinion as to what constituted such a "legitimate" 
government changed radically in the 19th century, however. 28 
The view that the "sovereignty" of a state was vested in the 
monarch receded before the ever stronger claim that "sovereignty" 
lay with the people. 29 "Legitimate", became that regime which 
supposedly had the approval o:f the people. 
' J 
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The existence of popular approval of a government has 
also sometimes been attributed definite international signi-
ficance. Such was the case in the Tobar doctrine, a principle 
advanced in an annex to a General Treaty of Peace and Amity, 
signed by :f:li2v:e1.. central American states at Washington on 20 
December 1907. The first article of this annex, apparently 
devised by Mr Tobar, a former foreign minister of Ecuador, to 
discourage civil war in the Central American region30 provided 
as follows: 
"The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not recognize any other Government which may come into power in any of the five republics as a consequence of a coup d'etat, or or a revolution against the recognized Government, so long as the ·freely elected representatives of the people thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized the country. 11 31 
The "Wilsonian policy of recognition'' was first enunciated 
on 11 March 1913 by the President in a statement prompted by 
the question whether or not the revolutionary Huerta regime in 
Mexico should be accorded recognition. He stated in part: 
" ••• We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of rep~blican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed ••• We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpful-ness between our sister republics ani ourselves. 11 32 
Natural law was invoked in support of the claims of royal 
houses to rule states in Europe, and principles of conventional 
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international law in favour of the need for popular approval 
of a government in Central America. The requirement of a 
particular form of government in a state must indeed be 
sought in norms superior to, and outside the constitution 
of states, for while the legality of an amendment of a con-
stitution may be gauged by a provision of the constitution 
for its revision - and such provision may therefore be regarded 
as superior to the rest o-f: the consti tution33 - the legality 
of the constitution as a whole cannot be judged by amrstan-
dards laid down in itself. Thus, unless its legality can be 
determined by reference to principles of natural law - which 
is not admitted - or by principles of international law -
which is conceivable - the conclusion must be drawn that 
there exist no legal criteria for its validity; only the 
maxim ex factis jus oritur will be applicable to it.34 
In spite of a certain tendency favouring forms of govern-
ment dependent upon popular approval, it cannot be said of 
course that international law prescribes any particular form 
of government or constitution.35 It is not suggested that 
the intern~ tional community should be completely indiff'eren t 
to the kind of governments or constitutions existing in 
various states. On the contrary, it is certain that it is con-
cerned, and that its concern is increasing, but this concern 
has not yet become so strong and productive of sanctions as 
to translate itself into lawo Indeed, on the contrary, there 
... 
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has long existed a principle of international law prohibiting 
interventiono36 It is paradoxical that while the growing 
interdependence of states increases the mutual concern for 
the respective governmental systems, it makes indispensable 
state intercourse regardless of the governmental system 
practieed. So strong is the need for commercial agreements, 
travel arrangements, trade relations etc., that states are apt 
to disregard considerations that are not strictly relevant to 
the fulfilment of these various needs.37 The Hoover govern-
ment succeeding Wilson's administration discarded the Wilson-
ian policy of non-recognition,38 and by 1934 there were only 
three parties to the Central American Convention that had taken 
the place of the one cited above.39 It may be concluded that 
although a particular form of government may be thought 
\ u1egi tima te tt in the light of some poli ti. cal ideology, as yet 
no particular system of government can be said to be required 
under international law. The pertinence of the maxim ex factis 
jus oritur is, with respect to the system of government and 
constitution that emerge, accordingly clear. This circumstance 
does not, however, preclude the expectation that international 
law must lay down the criteria by which it is determined 
whether a particular authority is competent to assume treaty 
obligations on behalf of a state. 
' 
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3. Treaty-making competence and recognition 
The requirements which must be fulfilled in order to 
render an authority competen't\ under international law to 
conclude treaties ought to be distinguished from those which 
may customarily be observed before recognition is accorded. 
It is true - as has been said by several wri ters40 - that a 
treaty cannot logically be negotiated with and entered into 
with a legally non-existent entity, or a legally non-existent 
authority. The conclusion of a treaty between two states must 
imply that the government of each party considers that there 
exists an organ competent under international law to act on 
behalf of the other party. It seems unnecessary, and perhaps 
even unfortunate, however, to term this consideration "recog-
nition" of any kind.41 If the term "recognition" were under-
stood literally, its use in this connexion would be unobject-
ionable. The term is rarely understood merely literally, 
however, and it appears that in the practice of states 
"recognition" is mostly an act - a signal - to which various 
legal effects are attached in various legal systems.42 It is 
conceivable that objective criteria may be found, or may in 
the future be found, · for the circumstances in which "recogni-
tion" should and should not be accorded to a state or a 
governmento That problem will not be COGSidered here. The 
following inquiry will only concern the question whether 
objective criteria may be found for the conditions under which 
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an authority may validly assume treaty obligations under 
international law on behalf of a state. It is possible 
that such criteria, if found, would prove identical or 
similar to those which may - one day - be taken to indicate 
conditions in which the according of recognition is obli-
gatory. It is certain, however, that in the present practice 
of states, treaties are sometimes concluded with entities not 
"recognized" as states, and authorities not "recognized" as 
governments.43 This circumstance is not as illogical as has 
been contended.44 It demonstrates simply that a government may 
be willing to have some relations under international law 
with another entity or authority, while holding other possible 
relations in abeyance, perhaps with a view to bargaining. 
Conversely, it is possible that a government may have recog-
nized a foreign government - and thereby placed itself in a 
certain relation to it - while declining to enter into any new 
treaty relations with it, because it considers it incompetent 
to assume such obligations on behalf of the state.45 
Let us now turn to an examination of a number of diplo-
matic incidents and court cases in which the treaty-making 
competence of revolutionary governments was at issue. 
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4. Incidents and cases 
Salaverry incident 1835 
In 1835 the validity of a treaty then concluded between Chile and Peru was the subject of several notes exchanged between the Government of Chile and the minister accredited to that government by the United States. On 3 April 1835, the American minister reported to the Secretary of State that, not long before, a treaty which contained features detrimental to the interests of the United States had been signed between Chile and Peru; on behalf of the latter state by a representa-tive of the constitutional government of General Obregon.46 Subsequently a revolution led by General Salaverry broke out and gained ground in Peru. In the hope that this circumstance might lead the Chilean government to reopen the question of the treaty, the American minister tried to convince that government that the treaty was unfavourable, but his efforts were unsuccessful.47 In August 1835, the minister learnt on the one hand that the government of General Salaverry had ratified the treaty, and, on the other hand, that forces of the constitutional government were marching towards the capital of Peru. In the combination of these circumstances he saw a possibility of challenging the validity of the treaty on the ground that it was ratified by an incompetent authority.48 In the first place he argued that the treaty was null because, 
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the constitution of Peru not having been expressly revoked 
by Salaverry, and therefore, allegedly, being in force, the 
treaty required the assent of the legislature, and such had 
not been given. It is of greater interest in this connexion 
to note, however, that in the ensuing discussion both the 
minister of the United States and the Chilean foreign minister 
recognized that treaties concluded by a revolutionary "de facto 
government" are binding internationally, and that the discussion 
focussed upon the question whether the authority of Salaverry 
could be considered a "de facto government". It was thus 
argued by the United States minister that the principle that a 
de facto government is one with which other nations may treat 
could not apply to the power of General Salaverry. In support 
of this contention, the minister stated that, at the time of 
ratification, General Salaverry had had no control over four 
out mf seven provinces of Peru, and the constitutional Presid-
ent of Peru was claiming his authority and pre:i;:aring to vindi-
cate it. Moreover, no member of the diplomatic corps at Lima 
had formally recognized the authority of Salaverry.49 In the 
opinion of the American minister, Peru had simply not possessed 
any authority competent to bind the state by a ratification: 
11 
• • • there was an interregnum in the properly constituted Government of that country. General Salaverry having seized upon the Government cannot be considered as its organ until it is so deter-mined by the people. Then it would seem that no act of his . could be binding as the act of the nation. "50 
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In reply to the contentions ad.vanced by the American 
minister, the Chilean foreign minister maintained that the 
consti t.wrtl:ionali ty of a regime was irrelevant with respect to 
its authority to conclude treaties, provided that the regime 
was effective.51 At the time when the treaty had been 
ratified, he argued, the authority of General Salaverry had 
been the de facto government of Peru: 
" ••• nearly all Peru was subject to his authority, not by force of arms, but by a spontaneous act of nearly all the departments ••• officials all vied with each other in proclaiming and recognizing him as the head of the nation ••• "52 
In addition to spontaneous support from citizens and 
recognition by officials, the Chilean minister considered 
acquiescence of the rest of the nation evidence of de facto 
authority; and such authority was maintained to be enough to 
allow foreign states to treat with the government wielding it.53 
Though in February 1836 the constitutional government of 
Peru defeated the forces of General Salaverry and executed him, 
and though it appears to have declared the treaty with Chile 
null and void, 54 the grounds advanced for these actions not 
being published, the chief interest of the incident lies in 
the clear adherence of the United States minister and the Chilean foreign minister to the principle of the competence of a de facto government to conclude treaties, and to the not dissimilar 
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criteria by which they determined the existence of a de facto 
government. 
United States - Peru 1841 
Another incident involving the United States and Peru had 
regard to the ratification of a Claims Convention signed between 
the two states at Lima on 17 March 1841.55 Article 7 of the 
convention laid down that ratifications should be exchanged 
within two years :from the signing, and after approval by the 
United States Senate and the Congress of Peru. When, on 
5 January 1843, the former body gave its consent, it was evident 
that the instruments of ratification could not be exchanged 
within the time prescribed, and the Senate therefore author-
ized the government to effect that exchange before 20 December 
1843. Executive ratification having been effected shortly 
after the Senate approval, an instrument was transmitted the 
same month by the Secretary of State to the United States min-
ister in Peru, with the instruction that, if he were to effect 
an exchange of ratifications after 17 March 1843 - the dead-
line imposed by the convention - he should see to it that the 
agent of' the other party was duly empowered to do so.56 The 
Secretary of State continued: 
"A clause in the Convention requires f'or it the approval of the Congress of Peru previously to ratification by the Executive head of' that Republic 0 
i. 
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If this sanction should not have been given and should in the existing state of things there still be deemed indispensable, you need not detain the bearer of this letter ••• If, however, there should not have been a material change in the political affairs of that Country since the 8th of August, last, it is supposed that the person exercising the f'unctions of President of Peru will deem himself authorized to ratify the Convention without submitting it to the consideration of the Congress of that Republic. Under all the circumstances, it is not deemed necessary at present that any steps should be taken o~ our part with a view to a new Convention for the purpose of extending the time within which the exchange may take place., 11 57 
It appears that the United States minister succeeded in 
persuading the administration of the "Supreme Director" 
General Vivanco to effect an exchange of ratifications, and 
such took place on 22 July 1843 without prior Peruvian legis-
lative approval, there having been no session of the Peruvian 
Congress since 1840, and there being no prospect of one before 
April 1844. 58 
Though the Peruvian instrument of ratification carried 
no date, it seems to have been signed before 17 March 1843 by 
the chief executive preceding General Vivanco. It contained 
that executive's approval of the convention, but stipulated, 
at the same time, that the convention and the ratification 
were to be submitted to the National Congress for final appro-
bation, in accordance with article 7 of the convention. Two 
full powers, one similar to the other, issued by General 
Vivanco, authorized the eMchange of ratifications, and laid down 
expressly that the exchange should take place without 
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prejudice to the circumstances that the period prescribed in 
the convention had lapsed, and, since Congress had been unable 
to meet "in opportune time" and, moreover, the government was 
exercising the legislative powers "demanded by the needs of the 
state", without the approval of the National Congress, 59 When 
transmitting the instrument of ratification and the full 
power to the State Department, the United States minister 
expressed his opinion that, there having been no session of 
the PeDuvian legislature, and the executive of that country 
exercising legislative power, the ratification was sufficient 
for any purpose, "absolute and unconditional". 60 Subsequently 
the convention was proclaimed in the United States. 
In October, 1843, General Vivanco was deposed, and the 
United States minister to Lima reported to the State Department 
that the new government, which claimed to be constitutional 
had decided that the ratification of the convention was insuff-
icient, because effected by General Vivanco, whose government 
had been an usurpation, the acts of which were null, and because 
it had not been approved by the Peruvian Congress as was 
provided by its terms. The minister added: 
"All this aff'ected reverence f'or constitutional forms, is but a subterfuge, the object being, I have no doubt, either to avoid the payment of the claims entirely or to postpone it indefinitely. There has been no Congress to approve the Conventio~, but being ratified by two executive chiefs ••• the ratification could not have been more formal or more effectualo 1161 
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Two years later, in October 1845, the Peruvian congress 
nevertheless approved the convention, though in doing so it 
added a further condition. That condition was subsequently 
submitted to the United States Senate as an "amendment" and 
approved, and new ra~ification of the convention was author-
ized to take place within two years. 62 The President of the 
United States thereupon issued a new instrument of ratification 
which made reference to the circumstance that article 7 of 
the convention had not been observed, and that the legisla-
tures had given their approval. Instruments of ratification 
were exchanged on 31 October 1846. 63 
The fact that the United States issued a second instru-
ment of ratification may be interpreted as acquiescence in 
the Peruvian claim that the first ratification had been void 
because effected without prior legislative approval, and because 
acts of General Vivanco were denied validity as being performed by an ''usurper". 64 It must be noted in this case, however, 
that the constitutional Pe~uvian Government did not object to 
the contents of the convention, but merely to the procedures 
employed. Had the Peruvian Government, as first feared by the 
United States minister, repudiated the convention altogether, 
on the ground that it was ratified by an incompetent authority, 
the United States Government might have endorsed the attitude 
taken by its minister that "tha ratification could not have 
been more formal or more eff'ectual". The temptation must have 
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been great to agree to a new process of ratification in 
order to attain Peruvian performance under the treaty, regard-
less of the view taken of the validity of the first ratifica-
tion. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the United States 
Government appears, indeed, at least to have avoided conced-
ing that the first Peruvian ratification was void as issuing 
from an incompetent authority. Both in the Senate resolution 
approving the treaty, and in the second instrumm t of ratifica-
tion, the only ground expressly offered for the lack of valid-
ity of the first exchange of ratifications was that article 7 
of the convention, requiring the exchange of ratifications 
within two years, had not been observed. Though, if the 
United States should have regarded General Vivanco as compet-
ent to authorize ratification, it may be difficult to under-
stand why the f'ull power issued by the general could not have 
been regarded as effecting a modification of article 7 of the 
convention, and though it is not known what degree of 
"ef'fectiveness" the Vivanco government displayed, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose, on the basis of the foregoing, that 
the United States Government did not intend to acquiesce in 
the grounds advanced by the new Peruvian Government for the 
nullity of the first procedure of ratification, and that the 
attitude taken by the Se<i:'retary of State in his .first instruct-
ion to the ef'fect that legislative approval was irrelevant 
under the .iprevailing circumstances, was not belied by the 
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subsequent agreement of that government to a second process 
of ratification. It must be noted, finally, that since the 
Peruvian Government did not object to the contents of the 
treaty, its objection must have been prompted chiefly by 
reasons of principle. It is unfortunate that the documents 
do not reveal whether the Peruvian Government specified what 
it meant by an "usurper". 
Peru - United States 1847 
A note of 22 April 1847 by the Peruvian minister to 
Washington, and a reply of 9 June of the same year by the 
United States Secretary of State Buchanan, provide some further 
material of interest to the topic under discussion. 65 
It seems not to have been disputed between the two govern-
ments that by the end of 1835 General Santa Cruz, the President 
of Bolivia, invaded Peru, and that during 1835 he had subdued 
that country. He appears to have divided Peru _into two states, 
North Peru and South Peru, and by a compact of April 1837 a 
confederation of Bolivia, South Peru and North Peru was 
decreed. Though this instrument is said to have been subject 
to the approval of the legislative bodies of the three states, 
such, apparently, was never given. By October 1837 - accord-
ing to the Peruvian note - South Peru was no longer under the 
control of Santa Cruz, in July 1838 the capital was said to 
have risen against him, and in 1838, finally, he was driven 
from the country. 
In the early part of this unstable period, on 30 
November 1836, plenipotentiaries of the President of the 
United States and of' 0 the Supreme Protector of' the North and South Peruvian States, President of the Republic of Bolivia, 
encharged with the direction of' the Foreign Relations of the 
Peru Bolivian Con1'ederation" signed a treaty. Ratific.ations 
were exchanged much later, on 28 May 1838, and thus at a time 
when the general was losing ground. Though not long after his downfall a law was passed declaring that Peru did not acknow-
ledge the treaty made with the United States, that law appears 
not to have been published until 1845. Notice of it was given 
to the United States only in 1847 by the Peruvian note cited 
above. This note is of considerable interest. Having referred 
to the circumstances related above, the Peruvian minister denied 
that the Confederacy was sufficiently well established to 
possess the capacity to enter into treaties, and maintained 
that even if it had possessed such capacity, the treaty in 
question would have been entered into by an incompetent author-ity, because the Federal Compact prescribed that the consent of 
the Senate was required for the conclusion of treaties and that body was never assembled or even appointed. 
Though the minister readily admitted that "governments 
de facto" were competent to conclude treaties on behalf of the 
states they controlled, he denied that the authority of general Santa Cruz had constituted such a government. In his opinion, 
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the general was only "a f'oreign chie:f'tain who invaded the 
country without cause, ruled it by force of' arms, and who was 
incessantly engaged in hostilities to maintain his power". 66 
He added: 
"None of the q_uali ties which are thought indis-pensable to constitute a government de facto out of any authority - viz., the entire submission of the country, the undisturbed possession of the supreme power, strengthened and consolidated by time -constituted the powers of General San ta Cruz in Peru. 0 67 
The minister also interestingly emphasized that nowhere 
would it be more fatal than in states exposed to the evils of 
political vissicitudes, if it were a principle that any author-
ity, whatever its origin, the means employed by it to stay in 
power, however destitute of permanence implying the consent 
of the nation, would be considered competent to bind the state 
towards other nations. This, he avowed, was the reason why 
Peru denounced the treaty as "a sinister precedent" which 
might otherwise have been authorized by her silence. 
The United States Government, in its reply not surprisingly 
stressed that seven years had passed between the Peruvian 
municipal law denouncing the treaty, and the Peruvian notifica-
tion. In this period the Government of Peru had consistently 
respected the convention. With regard to the authority of Santa 
Cruz, it was pointed out that he had achieved supreme power in 
the republic before the treaty was signed, and that his downfall 
had occurred only after the treaty was ratified. 
J 
1-
11+8 
As appears clearly from the above account, both sides 
in this controversy were agreed that a "de facto government" 
was competent to bind the state by a treaty. Their difference 
had regard only to the degree of respect an authority must 
enjoy, and the permanence it must evidence, to be considered 
a de facto government. The Peruvian Government maintained 
fairly strict requirements in this regard, and it may be 
presumed that the United States would have disputed them more 
severely, had it not thought the argument of Peruvian acquiesc-
ence conclusive. 
Peru - Ecuador 1861 
In the beginning of September, 1859, a revolution broke 
out in Ecuador. The constitutional president resigned his 
office and planned to withdraw to Chile. The capital and 
several cities and provinces fell into the hands of the revolu-
tionary party, and at the end of November, the Provisional 
Government of that party appeared to have established its author-
ity in all the provinces of the state, except that of Guyaquil, 
where a local govemment resisted, under the leadership of a 
general of the name of Franco. 68 This situation seems to 
have subsisted for some time. In March 1860 the United States 
minister to Quito reported to the State Department that the 
Provisional Government had extended its authority over all 
the mountain country. The authority of General Franco at 
Guyaquil was confined to the lowlands west of the Andes. He 
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further reported that General Franco's negotiating a treaty with Peru for the cession of a large region claimed by Ecuador East of the Andes had caused many local protests. The con-clusion of the treaty had weakened the government of General Franco, and tended to strengthen the Provisional Government. 69 In September of the same year the army of General Franco seems to have been decisively defeated by the forces of the Provisional Government, and from then on that government was the only authority acknowledged in the republico 
Such appears to have been the background of a note sent on 5 October 1861 by the Ecuadorian Government to the Peruvian Government.70 The note reveals that the Peruvian Government had demanded fulfilment of a treaty concluded at Guyaquil on 25 January 1860, in all probability the treaty referred to in the United States diplomatic correspondence cited above. In 
.reply to this demand, the Ecuadorian Government declared: 
11 
• • • 1 es pri nci pes du droi t international enseignent que la facult~ de c~l~brer des trait~s publics appartient exclusivement au Souverain; que ces trait~s ne sont pas valides sans l'approbation du Pouvoir l~gislatif dans les pays r~gis par des Constitutions qui le prescrivent de la sorte; et que l'~change des ratifications ne peut se faire qu'autant qu'il est pr~c~d~ de l'approbation susmentionn~e." 
Though this declaration can perhaps only be interpreted as an endorsement of the theory that constitutional provisions requiring leg:iaative approval of treaties are internationally relevant, the Ecuadorian Government did not, on the other hand, 
,J 
150 
deny that apparent possession of power gives legal competence. 
It stated: 
tl ••• un trai te de paix ne laisse pas que d'etre obligatoire quoique ayant ete celebre par une autorite incompetente, irreguli~re et usurpatrice, si cette autorite a la possession apparente du pouvoir gu 1elle exerce."71 
The Ecuadorian Government went on to declare that a local 
authority was not competent to exercise the treaty-making 
power which attached to the "sovereign". The treaty invoked 
by Peru was not valid because it had been made by a general 
who had exercised authority only over a small fraction of the 
state, while the authority of the Provisional Government had 
extended over the majority of the population. The alleged 
circumstance that neutral powers had not recognized the 
diplomatic agent accredited by the general to the Government 
of Peru proved, alone, that the authority which had signed the 
treaty had not represented the nation. In addition, the 
Ecuadorian Government protested, the treaty had been ratified 
by the general himself and had not been approved by Congress, 
which was indispensable. 
Franco - Chilean arbitration of 1901 
An award rendered in 1901 by an arbitration tribunal in a 
dispute between France and Chile may also be ex~mined in this 
connexion. 72 Although the award had regard to a contract made 
by an unconstitutional authority, the reasoning of the tribunal 
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aimed primarily at the rules applicable to treaties concluded 
under similar circumstances, and is of considerable interest 
to this study. 
A contract made in 1869 between the French enterprise 
Dreyfus Brothers and Coo and the Peruvian Government gave rise 
to a number of controversies between the parties. Complete 
settlement of these was attempted by means of a new compact 
entered into in November' 1880 by the company and the govern-
ment of the dictator Nicolas de Pierola, which purported to 
act on behalf of Peru. 
Chile having succeeded to part of the debt of the state of Peru, a Franco-Chilean tribunal had occasion in 1901 to examine 
the competence of the Pierola government to represent Peru. 
Payment being claimed of a debt recognized in the compact 
made with the Pierola government, it was objected before the 
tribunal that the Government of Peru had contested the validity 
of the acts of the Pierola government. In support of that 
position it had invoked the Peruvian constitution of 1860, 
article 10 of which read as follows: 
"Sont nuls les actes de ceux g_ui ont usurp~ les fonctions publig_ues et les emplois confies sous les conditions prescri tea par la Constitution et les lois. u73 
The tribunal found, however, that the constitu~ional 
provision invoked could have no effect unless it was in force 
at the time when the compact was made. Upon his seizing power 
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in 1879 Pierola had promulgated "Provisional Statutes" which suspended the constitution of 1860. The question 'Whether that constitution should prevail over the statutes depended upon the validity of the dictatorial regime itself, and could not be determined by application of the constitution. The Court said: 
" ••• elle ne peut des lors etre r~solue g_ue par un principe sup~rieur ~ la loi positive, puisg_ue les revolutions de l'organisme politig_ue auxquelles les pouvoirs publics sont impuissants ~ r~sister ~cbappent par leur force propre ~ l'application de cette ' loi, etablie en vue d'un ordre de choses diff~rent; ••• 11 74 
This principle superior to positive - domestic - law, the tribunal sought in international law. It found that though in the interest of monarchies it had earlier been denied by European diplomacy, it was now universally admitted that the competence of a government to represent the state in international relations did not depend upon the "legitimacy" of its origin. The tribunal stated the principle as follows: 
" ••• l 'usurpateur g_ui detient en fait le pouvoir avec l'assentiment expr~s ou tacite de la nation agit 
et conclut valablement au nom de l'Etat des trait~s, 
que le Gouvernement legitime restaur~ est tenu de respecter ••• 11 75 
The tribunal went on to say that this principle must be valid not only for treaties concluded under international law, but also for c·ontracts made undef public domestic law. The 
I. I 
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underlying rationale was the same in both situations, namely 
the circumstance that, apart from cases of pure anarchy, the 
continuous existence of the state necessarily calls for a 
bl t t . 't 76 power a e o ac in 1 s name • . To satisfy this need, the 
application of the principle of competence and continuity 
must not, in the opinion of the tribunal be restricted to 
authorities which had subsisted a prolonged period of time. 77 
The tribunal found, indeed, tha,t the conditions, the fulfil-
ment of which were required by an authority in order that the 
principle of competence and continuity should apply to it, 
were identical with those required for its recognition, and 
the tribunal defined these as follows: 
" • • • les juri sconsul tes modernes • • • les plus considerables ••• consid~rent uniquement le point de savoir si ce regime [nouveau] presentait des caract~res de stabilite et d'autorite tels qu'on pQt envisager ses organes comme detenant en fait le pouvoir vacant par la chute du pouvoir anterieur; qu'ainsi 11 font dependre la validite des actes d'un Gouvernement, m~me transitoire et usurpateur, de conditions identiques A celles auxquelles les Puissances etrang~res subordonnent la reconnaissance d'un Chef d'Etat qui leur annonce son av~nemen t. 11 78 
Though the tribunal did not think this doctrine applicable 
to insurgents, · it thought it must have regard to acts con-
eluded by such intermediary or provisional governments as 
have proved their vitality and actually exercised power in an 
incontestable manner,79 and without finding themselves in 
conflict with a coexisting regular government. The tribunal 
attached some importance, furthermore, to the existence 
of popular approval of, or lack of popular opposition 
against, a regime: 
" ••• le Gouvernement qui dispose de tous les moyens d'action l~gale du souverain avec l'assenti-ment de la Nation manifest~ expreesement par un plebiscite ou tacitement par le fait qu'elle se soumet au pouvoir nouveau sans protester (Martens, § 81), s'impose A la reconnaissance de l'in~ividu comme A celle de~ Gouvernements ~trangers." 0 
154 
A number of instances having been cited in which the 
principle of competence and continuity had not been applied, 
the tribunal commented that these cases concerned insurrection-
ary governments still competing with regular governments, or 
governments which were in fact recognized neither by the nation 
nor by foreign states. Their acts and engagements would be 
denied validity also under the doctrine to which the tribunal 
had adhered. 81 The tribunal concluded that the compact entered 
into by the Pierola government and the French company was bind-
ing upon Peru, because the government of Pierola had satisfied 
the conditions the fulfilment of which was thought required. 82 
Frarico - Peruvian arbitration 1921 
The reasoning adopted by the Franco-Chilean tribunal in 
the award related above was confirmed in an award rendered in 
1921 by a Franco-Peruvian arbitration tribuna1. 83 This case, 
too, concerned claims based upon the compact made between the 
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Dreyfus Brothers and Co. and the Pierola government on 
behalf of Peru, and had regard to that part of the debt of 
Peru to which Chile had not succeeded. In reaching the 
conclusion that the compact was binding upon the state of 
Peru, the tribunal called attention to the circumstances 
that Pierola had been proclaimed chief of the republic by 
popular assemblies and been supported by numerous "plebiscitary 
adhesions", that he had exercised the executive, the legisla-
tive and, in part, the judicial power, that his government 
had been recognized by a number of states, and that, finally, 
a British municipal court, a Belgian municipal court and the 
Franco-Chilean arbitration tribunal had deemed that Pierola's 
government had represented and bound the nation. 
The Tinoco arbitration 1922 
The conditions which must be fulfilled to render a 
revolutionary government competent under international law 
to bind the state it purports to represent was the subject of 
interesting treatment in an arbitration in 1923 between Great 
Britain and Costa Rica. 84 Though the obligations of the 
revolutionary government were undertaken towards private 
foreign subjects, the reasoning of the arbitrator would seem 
to apply with equal or even greater force to treaty obligations 
entered into under similar circumstances. 
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In January, 1917, Frederico Tinoco led a revolution 
against the constitutional government of Costa Rica and assumed 
power. Having called an election and established a new con-
stitution in June 1917, Tinoco governed the state until 
August 1919 when he retired and left the country. Shortly 
thereafter the old constitution was restored, and new elections 
were held under it. In 1922 the constitutional legislature 
adopted a "Law of Nullities" invalidating all contracts 
made between the Tinoco government and private persons. Some 
British subjects having acquired substantial contractual 
rights of this kind, the British Government claimed that these 
had been wrongfully annulled through the Law of Nullities. The 
Costa Rican Government, on the other hand, disclaimed respons-
ibility for the acts of Tinoco, and maintained that the Law 
of Nullities constituted lawful exercise of powero 
The arbitrator found that the Tinoco regime had in fact 
been a sovereign government. For two years Tinoco had peaceably 
administered the state without any other government asserting 
power in the country, and the people had seemingly accepted the 
government with great good will. Though the arbitrator 
admitted that recognition of a government by foreign states con-
stituted nan important evident:fa.l factor in establishing proof 
of the existence of' a government in the society of nations", 85 
he did not think that non-recognition, when determined by 
inquiry not into the de facto sovereignty of the government but 
'! I 
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into its irregularity of origin, could outweigh other evidence 
as to the de facto character of a government "according to 
the standard set by international law 11 ~ 6 The argument put forward by Costa Rica to the effect that to constitute a 
de facto government, the Tinoco regime ought to have been 
established in conformity with the constitution of 1871 was 
considered a contradiction in terms by the arbitrator. He 
stated: 
u ••• The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its administration under constitutional limitations established by the people during the incumbency of the government it has over-thrown. The question is, has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in itsplace? Is it discharging its f'unctions as a government usually does, respected within its own jurisdiction? 1187 
The circumstance, finally, that the plaintiff govern-
ment had never itself recognized the revolutionary government did not, in the opinion of the arbitrator, estop it from 
advancing a claim. It was of no avail to show that the municipal 
courts of a state could not assume the de facto character of a government wl].ich was not recognized by the executive of that 
state. The executive branch of the government was free to 
change its position as to the de facto character of a regime 
which it had chosen previously not to recognize. 
'-'-
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5. Criteria for competence of revolutionary governments 
Deductions from the cases and incidents examined 
Much material bearing on the issues here under discussion 
could no doubt be gathered by an examination of circumstances in which states commonly begin to conclude treaties with governments emerging through revolutions and coups d'~tat 
without there arising any controversies regarding the validity 
of these treaties. An examination of that kind drawing on 
modern material would no doubt be of interest. There are no 
reasons to believe, however, that it would add much to the 
conclusions which may be drawn from the cases and incidents 
cited above, which are all found in easily accessible documents. What, then, are the criteria emerging from the incidents 
and cases related above as determining whether or not a revolution-ary authority is competent under international law to bind a 
state by a treaty? 
General conclusion 
The mat~rial examined above demonstrates that the rule 
which is sought must be expected to embody an adjustment of two functional needs ever present in the modern life of states. On the one hand, there is the need of every state community at 
all times to be represented by son:e body, and the need of the Whole international community to be able to treat with a body 
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representing the state. A gap in the representation of a 
state - a veritable interregnum - will inevitably cause 
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damage in the state community as well as in the international 
community at large. This circumstance calls for acknowledge-
ment of the competence of even rather ephemeral authorities. 88 On the other hand, a highly irresponsible authority might, 
not enjoying the confidence of any important force in the 
community through some upset gain power for a brief period in a state before it is ousted. An authority of this kind 
might attempt to act on behalf of the state in a manner so 
contrary to the interests of the dominant forces of the 
state communi-cy that the acts may be expected not to be 
respected by a subsequent regime. This circumstance calls for the denial of international competence to an authority 
unless it appears to be the outcome of a reasonably permanent balance of social forces ., 89 and to be speaking for that constella-tion. What adjustment has the practice of states produced be-tween these two functional needs? 
From all the cases and incidents cited above one require-
ment emerges clearly and convincingly, namely that which may be termed "effectiveness". This rather vague term calls for further definition. A number of elements are always taken into consideration as evidence of the "effectiveness" of an 
authority. Some of these have - erroneously, it is submitted -
( ..) 
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occasionally been claimed on the one hand as absolute 
requirements for international competence, and on the other,· 
as conclusive evidence of such competence. These elements will 
now be considered one by one. 
Permanence 
According to one train of thought, an authority attains 
international competence as a de facto government only by 
subsisting a proloned period of timee90 This idea was adhered 
to in the notij cited above in which a Peruvian minister to 
Washington claimed that a de facto government would have to 
be "strengthened and consolidated by time". 91 
It is probably true in most cases that the initial period 
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o a new governmen is cri ica, an ou is circums ance 
will no doubt most frequently make foreign governments reluct-
ant to conclude treaties with a new government at its very 
inception, it would seem rash to conclude that subsistence for 
any period of time constitutes a sine gua non of international 
competence. 
In the Franco-Chilean arbitration quoted above, the tribunal 
expressly rejected that idea,93 and there are doctrinal pro-
nouncements to the contrary.94 It is submitted to be rightly 
stressed by Dr Gemma, on the other hand, that the subsistence 
of a government for a period of time may well raise a presumpt-
ion as to its "vitality", 95 or, to use the term chosen, its 
effectiveness. 
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Recognition 
According to another school of thought, recognition of 
an authority conclusively proves its intermtional competence 
to conclude treaties. It was thus maintained by the Govern-
ment of Ecuador, in one of the incidents cited above, that the 
alleged circumstance that the representative in Peru of the 
general who had purported to conclude a treaty on behalf of 
Ecuador had not been recognized by tbe diplomatic agents in 
Peru of neutral powers, made it unnecessary to give other 
proof of the contention that the gerEral did not represent 
Ecuador.96 The same idea is adhered to by Dr Gemma who 
queries whether the Franco - Chilean tribunal could not, in 
the award cited above, simply have referred to the recognition 
accorded by foreign governments to the Pierola regime in order 
to prove conclusively that Pierola's government was competent 
to bind Peru.97 
There are weighty arguments militating against this 
doctrine, and much authority that rebuts it. It may first 
be noted that the Ecuadorian Government, whose opinion was 
cited, was not content to rely upon the absence of recognition 
alone, but was careful to point out that the authority of the 
general who had concluded the treaty in question had extended 
only over a fraction of the state, while that of the government 
residing in the capital had extended over the majority of the 
population. 
. 
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Similarly, though the Franco-Chilean tribunal did 
refer to the Pierola government's being recognized by foreign powers, it clearly considered this fact only as one among 
several others, which, taken together98 led to the conclusion that the Pierola government was competent to represent Peru. It appears, indeed, that the tribunal considered recognition only indirect evidence of competence, t~r it invoked authority to the effect that the criteria for competence were identical with those by which states were said to determine whether 
or not to recognize an authority. The logical~inference from this statement is obviously that recognition is not, in itself, an absolute condition for international competence, but is likely to indicate that those conditions which~ required for such competence are satisfied. 
In the Salaverry incident, similarly, the American minister to Chile seems to have considered the non-recognition of Salaverry not as conclusively showing his lack of international competence, but only as indicating that the conditions 
required for competence were not fulfilled.99 
The clearest pronouncement on the relation between recogni-tion and international competence is found in the Tinoco case. The judgment in that dispute gives strong support to the view that recognition constitutes only indirect evidence of compet-ence. The arbitrator had no doubt that there wa~ an interna-tional law standard by which the existence of an internationally 
j 
: ' I 
l 
_l J 
163 
competent government could be determined. This may be seen 
clearly from the fact that though he considered recognition 
of an authority important evidence of its competence, having 
found that in the case before him the non-recognition was 
caused by considerations extraneous to the legal standard he 
thought required, he refused to conclude from it that there 
was no internationally competent government. It followed as 
a logical consequence of this view that even a foreign govern-
ment having refused to recognize the authority in question, 
could later argue that that authority had been competent to 
bind the state it purported to represent. 100 
In the Tinoco case, it is important to note, further, the 
clear distinction drawn by the international arbitrator between 
his own power and that of a national court to decide on the 
international competence of a national authority. While he 
confessed that domestic courts could not without inconvenience 
be attributed such power, 101 and must, therefore, follow the 
conclusions reached in this matter by the executive branches 
of their governments, he did not admit that an international 
tribunal was in a similar position, but was clearly of the 
opinion that such a tribunal was entitled to reach its own 
conclusion concerning the international competence of a national 
authority. 
It would, indeed, be peculiar if recognition accorded 
by a state to a revolutionary authority would at present 
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automatically make that authority competBnt to bind the state it purported to represent. If such were the case, a foreign 
state might conceivably attempt to instigate a fake revolution 
and to recognize an ephemeral puppet authority in order immed-
t 1 t 1 d d . d t "th •t 102 
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Popular approval 
In almost all the incidents and cases cited above the parties were caref'ul to refer to the presence of popular 
approval or resistence to the revolutionary authorities con-
cerned. In the Salaverry incident, for instance, the American 
minister maintained that the general could not be regarded as 
an organ of the Peruvian Government until so determined by the people, 103 while the Chilean Foreign Minister argued in support 
of his case that nearly all Peru had spontaneously subjected itself to the general, and that officials were eager to recog-
nize him as head of the nation. 104 In view of such expressions it might be asked if perhaps the popular approval of an 
authority constitutes a sine gua non for its international 
competence. The answer seems to be in the negative. 
Though Dr Gemma suggests confidently that a government 
cannot long maintain itself against the will of the people, 105 he cites, himself, the more moderate pronouncement by Cavour to the effect that the support of public opinion is the most 
secure means of preserving a governrnent. 106 Evidently public 
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support of an authority must be regarded as likely to 
strengthen it and to increase its stability. It is submitted 
that this circumstance, in addition to a certain tendency to 
international support for democratic forms of government, 
explains why the element of popular approval is generally 
taken into consideration by the international community. It 
would be erroneous, on the other hand, to see in such approval 
a sine qua non of effectiveness or competence. The tribunal 
adjuding the Franco-Chilean controversy cited Martens to 
the effect that the assent of the nation is required either 
expressly in the form of a plebiscite or tacitly by its sub-
mission without protests to the new authority. 107 It would 
seem that in the practice of states submission of the people 
without any active resistance is all that is required. 
The means by which submission is brought about appear 
to be of only limited international significance. It is true 
that in the Salaverry case, the Chilean minister emphasized 
in support of the competence of the government of Salaverry 
that the authority wielded by him was not founded upon the 
force of arms, and in the case of the government of general 
Santa Cruz, the subsequent regime in Peru was careful to stress, in arguing the lack of competence of that general, that he had 
ruled the country by force of arms. Against the background 
of such ex:pressions it might perhaps be asked if the exercise 
of authority without the use of arms is an absolute requirement 
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for international competence. The answer would seem to be 
that states are reluctant to treat with authorities still 
engaged in active hostilities. Provided, on the other hand, 
that the authorities have succeeded in subduing their enemies, 
and that their prospect of permanence appears reasonably good, 
foreign governments treat with them, even though they may be 
maintaining their authority by means of terror. In this connex-
ion the following statemBnt found in a recent work may be cited: 
"It must be regretfully conceded that it is of no relevance whatever whether the revolution expresses the will of the overwhelming majority of the nation or only of a fraction of terrorists. At the present time, 'man's right to government by consent' is still unprotected by positive international law, however obvious the connection between internal freedom and international peace 0 "108 
Command of respect 
Step by step the above discussion has approached what 
seems to be the key requirement imposed upon a revolutionary 
authority in order to be considered effective: it must command 
general respect in the state it claims to represent. 
The obvious explanation of the preoccupation and concentra-
tion of foreign governments upon this requirement must be seen 
in the circumstance that upon this respect depends the likeli-
hood that the authority will be able, in fact, to carry out the 
international obligations which it purports to undertake, as 
well as those which have been assumed in the past. The prognosis 
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in this regard seems to be all that foreign states examine at present, pressed by the need to safeguard their interests and those of their citizens. A better illustration of the findings made above can hardly be found than the following opinion voiced in 1877 by Secretary of State Fish: 
"The origin and organization of governm.en t are questions generally of internal discussion and decision. Foreign powers deal with the existing de facto government, when sufficiently established to give reasonable assurance of its permanence, and of the acquiescence of those who constitute the state in its ability to maintain itself, and to discharge its internal duties and its external obligations. 11109 
The cases and incidents cited above also off'er good illustrati. ons of the same point. In the Salaverry incident the American minister to Chile tried to demonstrate that the General commanded only limited obedience by alleging that he controlled only four out of seven provinces, and he described the prognosis as dark by the statement that the consti.tutional president of Peru was preparing to vindicate his authority. 110 The Chilean Foreign Minister, on the other hand, supported his stand by claiming that nearly all Peru was subject to Salaverry's authority, and he tried to make the prospects of the general look good by emphasizing that the authority of the general rested on spontaneous support in nearly all departments and on acquiescence of the nation, but not upon the force of arms. 111 
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In the Ecuadorian case, the Government of Ecuador signi-ficantly admitted that a treaty would be bind-ing although 
concluded by an internally incompetent, irregular and usurped 
authority on the condition only that it appeared to possess 
tre power it purported to exercise. A general whose authority 
extehded only over a fraction of the state could not appear 
to have such power; so much the less when there existed another government commanding the respect of the majority of the popula-
t . 112 ion. 
In the Franco-Chilean arbitration, the tribunal similarly 
attached importance to the stability and "vitality" of an 
authority, to the question whether or not it was challenged by another authority, and to the acquiescence of the people. 11 3 The t::rribunal adjudging the Franco-Peruvian case also stressed 
the popular approval of the Pierola regime, and the circum-
stance that the dictator had in fact exercised all governmental 
authority there was to exercise. 11 4 
The arbitrator in the Tinoco case emphasized that Tinoco's 
authority had not been challeneged by anyone, and the people had submitted to him with "great good will", thus finding that 
there was,. again, complete respect and prospects for continued 
respect. 
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Irrelevance of constitutions 
If the material examined consistently points to effect-
iveness as the key condition for the international competence 
of an authority, it demonstrates, as the other side of the 
coin, that the violation of a constitution by a revolutionary 
regime is irrelevant for its international competence. 
The American Minister to Chile having asserted that the 
treaty ratified by Salaverry was null because concluded in 
violation of a constitution which he had not expressly 
revoked, the Chilean minister eloquently replied: 
"If, in order to treat with a foreign govern-ment, its titles had to be examined and proved in the crucible of written constitutions, how many of the treaties which are today in force would there be? De facto possession is all that foreign nations verify in order to conclude commercial con-ventions among themselves. 11115 
And further: 
" ••• The acts of the supreme authority of the state openly recognized by an immense majority, must be presumed to be legitimate in the eyes of foreign nations, because they bear ••• the sanction of that primitive authority which makes and unmakes constitutions at its will, and the expression of which is the first law. 11 116 
It may be noted, further, that although the Peruvian 
Government succeeding General Santa Cruz and the Ecuadorian 
Government which had defeated General Franco both sought to 
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support their contentions that the treaties made by these 
authorities were void by arguing that, under the respective 
constitutions, legislative approval would have been required, 
neither of them denied that an "effective" de facto government 
was competent to make treaties. 11 7 
In the case examined in the Franco-Chilean arbitration 
the constitution which had been revoked by Pierola had contained 
a specific provision declaring null in advance acts of those 
who usurped the constitution. The tribunal found, however, 
that this very provision could be valid only if the revolutionary 
order was found invalid, and that that question could not be 
resolved by reference to the old constitution, but only by 
principles superior to domestic law, to wit~ international law. 118 
The arbitrator in the Tinoco case, likewise, expressed 
the opinion that it was irrelevant whether a revolutionary 
government respected constitutional limitations previously 
established, and that the real question was whether the control 
exercised by the new government was recognized and unopposed 
within its own jurisdiction. 11 9 
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60 Doctrine confirming the conclusions reached 
The conclusions reached above are confirmed by many writers, 
and it may suffice merely to quote some of them. Gemma main-
tains that the foundation of a de facto government lies in its 
aptitude to maintain order and to accomplish all the f'unctions 
which attach to sovereignty. 120 In his opinion, it is the 
ability and willingness of the government to f'ulfil its obliga-
tions that is decisive to enable it to be a party to a treaty. 121 
Anzilotti expresses himself as follows: 
" ••• au point de vue du droit international, 
on ne distingue pas entre les gouvernements l~gitimea et les gouvernements illegitimes, les gouvernements de iure et les gouvernements de facto. Celui qui detient r&ellement le pouvoir de commander (gui actu re~it) a, dans les rapports internationaux, la qualit~ d organe de la personnalite internationale dont il s'agit; celui qui perd en fait ce pouvoir 
cease de representer internationalement l'Etat ••• 11122 
Larnaude, in his study of de facto governments, pronounces 
the following opinion: 
"Ce qu' il faut, me ce qui suf'fi t pour rendre aux yeux des puissances etrang~res le gouvernment de fait capable d'etre une personne du droit interna-tional ·avec qui elles peuvent traiter et qui represente valablement 1•ttat, c'est la constatation que ce . gouvernemen t est obei en fai t ••• 11123 
And further: 
J 
HLes Etats etrangers ont un criterium exclusive-ment r~aliste pour distinguer lea gouvernements 
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avec lesquels ils sont appeles A avoir des rapports ••• : c'est l'cte!ssance de fait ••O d~ la population regie ~ar ces gouvernements. Il ne peut d~pendre d'un Etat quelqonque, et quelque respectable que soit le principe de souverainete l~gislative, d'exiger que les Etats &trangers renoncent Aune regle. qui, seule, leur permet de donner satisfaction awe interets dont ils ont la garde. 11 124 
The following statement by Marek may also be quoted: 
0
. , ••• As a rule, negotiations can only be conducted with a real and effective government; treaties can only be concluded with such a government which alone can give the guarantee of their implementation, and only a real and effective government can successfully be held responsible. In all those real transactions of international law fictitious or merely claimant governments can have no place. ,~1125 
The views expressed by Chailley may finally be noted: 
- " . . • 1' on peu t dire qu' un Kta t ne 1' accorde [reconnaissance] Aun gouvernement etranger que lorsqu' il a conscience ou se cro it fonde A ... ; 1. • · ·"r· esperer que ce gouvernement fera preuve d'une vitalit~ telle que la conclusion d'un traite avec lui ne demeurera pas oeuvr e vaine. La reconnaissance et la conclusion du traite supposent que le gouverne-. ment considere presente des garanties de stabilite qui 1 1 autorisent A representer, dans. les relations internationales, l'Etat au nom duquel il pr~tend parler: lea principales de ces garanties sont l'effectivite de son pouvoir, 1 1 obeissance qu'il re9oit OU Sait obtenir de la generalite des gouvernes, la confiance qu'on lui accorde ou qu'il conquiert. En un mot, l'acceptation du gouvernement par les gouvernes est le fondement dernier de sa capacite interna tionale; ••• " 126 
And further: 
" •• o lorsqu'un gouvernement a fini par se faire ob&ir d'une fa9on g~nerale, §@ competence n'est plus contestee, en pratique, du point de vue juridique; 
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la conviction juridigue est gue ce gouvernement a un titre valable pour 1ouverner; 1 1acceptati.on du gouverne-ment par les gouvern~s est devenu le principe de sa competence. C'est ce principe, et non l'id~e d'une legitimite constitutionnelle, qui correspond A la conviction juridique des Etats et qui traduit le droit positif; c'est lui que fonde, en particulier, du point de vue interne, la validit~ des traites conclus par le gouvernement de fait. 11 127 
7. Criteria for lack of competence 
If, as is hoped, the above discussion has made clear the 
criteria by which are determined the competence of a revolution-
ary government to conclude treaties, it should also have 
indicated, a contrario, when such competence does not exist. 
In this connexion the following statement by Dr Gemma may be 
quoted: 
" ••• Ou bien le gouvernement insurrectionnel n'est pas arrive Aune consistance quelconque; c'est-~-dire il a menace, mais il n'a pas bouleverse ~1e droit public existant, et alors il ~tait inutile de prevoir quoi que ce soit. Tousles actes d'un soi-disant dictateur, d'une soidisant assemblee constituante etco, sont des actes c6ntre la loi et leur nullit~ n'a point besoin d'une declaration prealable. Ou bien la revolution, ou 1 e coup d'etat a reussi et le g ouvernement · de fai t a trouvesa legitimation ••• 11 128 
In some situations there will be no difficulty in establish-
ing that a particular authority does not constitute a competent 
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government • .An interesting example is offered by the case of the Kuusinen government, which purported to represent Fin-land during the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940. At the beginn-ing of the war, Otto Kuusinen formed a "Finnish People's Government" on a small f'raction of Finnish territory, occupied by the Soviet Union. It claimed to be competent to represent Finland internationally, and attempted to brand the regular Finnish Goverrummt as the "Helsinki clique". 129 The Soviet Union immediately accorded recognition to the "revolutionary" government which - not surprisingly - had acceded to Soviet demands upon Finland, and even requested military aid from the Soviet Union. On the basis of these constructions, and in spite of the notorious existence of a shooting war, the Soviet Union contended that it was not at war with Finland. On 2 December 1939 it even purported to conclude a "Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship" with the friendly Finnish government, 130 and, in a telegram of 5 December 1939 to the Council of the League of Nations, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr Molotov, referred to the treaty as solving all the questions which the Soviet Government had ttfruitlessly discussed with delegates [of the] former Finnish Government now divested Of its power. 111 31 He declared that, accordingly, the League was not justified in convoking the Assembly. The League of Nations had no difficulty in concluding, however, that the Kuusinen "governmen ttt was incompetent to bind the state of 
[C, 
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Finlando It attached no value to the "treaty" but expelled 
the Soviet Union for its attack on Finland. It is of interest 
to note also, that the Soviet Government was later compelled 
to conclude a peace treaty with the regular Finnish Government in Helsinki. The "revolutionary government" had then evapor-
ated.132 
Dr Marek cites the Kuusin.en case as an example of a "fake 
revolution", - a form of illegal intervention by a foreign 
state - and distinguishes this situati.on from that of a genuine 
revolution which, if successful, produces a government competent 
to speak for the state. In her opinion, the competence of a 
government emerging from a fake revolution, on the other hand, is doub~f'ul, because the very statehood of a puppet "statefl is in doubt. 133 This is not the place to enter into a :f'ull 
discussion of Dr Marek' s interesting analysis. It may be 
sufficient to point out that if the puppet government subsists for a prolonged period of time without being formally merged with 
that of the mother state, foreign states eventually, tend to 
accept it and to treat with it. It seems probable that it is the instability a~tached to a puppet government that makes foreign 
states reluctant to attribute international competence to them. Even though complete order and obedience may have been established in a puppet state - as i~ an occupied territory - the prognosis is often uncertain. This appears to be the reason why compet-
ence is more reluctantly conceded to them than to other de facto 
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governments. In the case of the Kuusinen government there 
was no problem at all, for it controlled only a fraction of 
Finnish territory, it was not accepted by the majority of the population, and its continued existence was dependent upon the 
outcome of tr2 war. It was not even an effective puppet 
government, far less an effective de facto government. 
8. Bord.er region between competence and non-competence 
While the denial of competence to the Kuusinen "government" did not pose any problem for third parties, such g_uestions must 
undoubtedly arise with some frequency in the practice of states. Indeed, any revolutionary government will - by definition -begin as an illegality, and it is only by augmenting its author-ity that it will eventually become competent under international law. 134 
In this connexion it should also be noted that when insurg-
ents have established themselves relatively securely, al though 
only in a limited area, foreign states sometimes treat with them in order to safeguard urgent interests. These are the so called 
"local de f'acto governments". 135 It is of interest to find that 
the competence of these governments, too, under international law, 
seems connec~ed with their effectiveness and stability, i.e. 
elements which render it likely that they will be able in fact 
to :f'ulfil the obligations they purport to undertake. It must be kept in mind, on the other hand, that these authorities are 
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not, of course, regarded as organs of the state in whose 
territory they are active, but either as ad hoe bodies binding 
themselvea and no one else, or possibly as organs of the move-
ments they claim to represent. 
It must frequently be a delicate task to determine the 
precise moment when the authority of insurgents is suff:icient 
to give them competence under international law to make treaties 
on behalf of the whole state, and when, correspondingly, the 
authority of the regularly constituted government is so under-
mined as to deprive it of the comp::tence to act validly for 
the state. 136 It is conceivable, but difficult to verif'y, that in case of doubt, a residuary rule of international law points 
to the older government ' as competent to represent the state. 137 
It may be, on the other hand, that in these situations states 
refrain altogether from making treaties with the state in 
strife, on the assumption that there is no government competent 
to make treaties on behalf of the state. 
The difficulties pointed to above are only problems arising in the application of a rule which was found to be established in the practice of states and accepted by writers. This rule, 
more than problems, of detail, is of interest here, and it only 
remains to restate it as the conclusion of this section: a 
revolutionary government is competent under international law to 
conclude treaties on behalf of the state it purports to represent, 
regardless of the constitutional provisions traditionally 
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respected, provided only that it appears to wield effective 
authority, so that there seems to be a high degree of likeli-
hood that it will be able in fact to.f'ulfil the obligations 
it is prepared to undertake, as well as those already assumed 
by the state. This conclusion is all the more important as 
disputes, generally, are perhaps more likely to arise as a 
result of the activity of an internally irregular government 
than that of ·a long established constitutional government. 
·r. 
PART III 
COMPETENCE UNDER INTERNATI ON.AL LAW '.ro CONCLUDE TREATIES ON 
BEHALF OF A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 
Io INTRODUCTION 
In the previous part, an attempt has been made to 
prove that there exists a rule of international law to the 
effect that, in a number of situations, at least, the legal 
competence to enter into a treaty or an agreement flows from 
apparent ability to :fulfil the obligations to be undertaken. 
It has been demonstrated that it may be seriously doubted 
that historically the promise of a head of state, alone, has invariably been considered sufficient to pledge his state; 1 
that it appears probable, indeed, that governments have always put reliance only upon promises given by those whose co-opera-
tion was likely to be needed, and, at the same time, to suffice, 
to bring about fulfilment of the obligation; and that, finally, 
the theory of the head of state possessing a jus representationis 
omnimodae may not unreasonably be regarded as an expression 
of the principle of apparent ability in a period in which many 
monarchs possessed almost unlimited powers. 2 In contrast, it has been sho~ that in a state where an authority, however regular 
under m~ic~pal law, appears to wield no actual power, that 
authority~ accordingly, appears to possess no competence under international law to make treaties.3 It has been shown, moreover, that the competence under international law of revolutionary _ governments to make treaties attaches, not to a constitutional 
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title, but to the apparent ability to fulfil obligations, to the "effectiveness" of the authority in question. 4 It appears probable that the same is true for the competence of governments of new states,5 and governments-in-exile.6 
Does a different principle prevail in the determination of the authority competent under international law to conclude treaties on behalf of a state where a constitutional order is maintained? Or, perhaps, do constitutional provisi~ns merely constitute evidence of an apparent factual authority, which is, 
-
arone, relevant under international law? 
With a view to finding an answer to these questions, it is proposed to examine the historical background of the problem, the predominant doctrinal views, and the actual 
attitudes of states as these attitudes may be studied in cases before municipal courts, in positions taken in international intercourse, notably in relations which have led to diplomatic inciden~s, and in cases adjudged by international tribunals. 
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE MODERN PROBLEM 
The modern controversy over the international legal rele-
vance of constitutional provisions relating to the conclusion 
of treaties has already been discussed somewhat. 7 It goes back to the development of a democratic control over the mak-ing of treaties, which was started by the French Revolution, 
and by the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. It may be useful to recall these developments before the doctrinal controversy is discussed. 
It may first be noted that even a pre-revolutionary advocate of the supremacy of the popular will, like Rousseau, stopped 
short of demanding that the treaty-making activity of the state 
should be placed under the control of the people. 8 The men of the revolution had a clearer vision of the importance of 
treaties. Thus, Petion observed: 
nsi le pouvoir ex~cu tif n' a pas le droi t de faire la loi la plus simple, pourquoi lui donnerait-on celui de _faire des trait~s dont lea cons~quences sont ai importantes?"9 
Consti tut,ions adopted in the course of the French Revolu-tion accepted this argument, and introduced popular control 
over the making of treaties.10 It is from these constitutions, 
an.a. from that of the United States, that the modern precepts of 
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legislative, democratic control over the treaty-making activ-
ities ·Of states derive. 11 
A number of problems have arisen, and are perhaps inher-
ent, in the adjustment between the spreading adherence to 
these precepts, on the one hand, and the need for secret nego-
tiations, for ability to settle _matters of international con-
cern without delay, and for unequivocal and convenient forms of 
consent to treaties, on the other. 12 
One of the problems encountered, which will not be sub-jected to close examination, has regard to the difficulty of 
exerting popular control, not over the conclusion, but over 
the negotiation of treaties. This problem was, and still is, 
important, because once a treaty has been negotiated, the posi-
tions of the parties have become settled, and the possibilities 
of the popular assemblies to bring about modifications are poor. 13 
In the early practice of the United States, the problem was met 
by the negotiators being highly dependent upon the Senate: their 
instructions were submitted for its approval, and the course of 
the negotiations was reported to it, and subjected to its con-
trol. The system was found impractical, however, and was aban-
doned.14 At the present time such measures as the inclusion. of 
members of legislatures in negotiating missions, or . the early 
consultation of such smaller groups as parliamentary commissions 
on foreign affairs in secret session, 15 or even more informal 
arrangements, 16 have proved more successful. 
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Generally, the control exercised by . the legislature 
over the treaty-making activities of states has come to take 
the form of a power of withholding authorization required by 
the executive branch of government in order to ratify treaties, 
or categories of treaties. 17 This structure of the contro118 
has led to certain difficulties, some of which have been solved. 
Among the first difficulties to appear was the circumstance 
that, there being no certainty that a legislature would, in 
fact, authorize ratification, that measure could no longer, 
logically, be promised. From having been consideredaa duty 
under international law, ratification came gradually to be a 
discretionary act, however, and the difficulty was in this 
sense obviated. 19 
Other difficulties have been felt much later. Due to the 
ever growing number of agreements made between states, extensive 
control exercised by legislatures over the treaty-making activities 
of states have become impracticable. 
It is true, as asserted in 1931 by Dr Mirkine-Guetz,vitch, 
that at that time there was still a general ~endency of enlarg-
ing the power of legislatures over. the treaty-making activities 
of the states. 20 That tendency was all the more understandable 
in view of the ever greater importance of treaties in the life 
ot states, and in view of the notion that democratic control 
over the foreign relations of states offers guarantees for a 
Peacef'ul policy, while autocratic forms of government are 
J 
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inherently more dangerous to the peace. 21 Parallel with 
these developments, however, another development has led, in 
most states, to the withholding of large numbers of treaties 
from legislative control. This has been brought about by the 
important practice of concluding treaties in so-called "simpli-
fied forms", i.e. types of informal treaties, such as exchanges 
of notes, agreed minutes etc. In certain states such types of 
treaties have been used extensively, because thought not to 
22 require a legislati ve assent, otherwise constitutionally necessary. 
Another problem resulting from the manner in which democratic 
control over the conclusion of treaties is predominantly exer-
cised has regard to the legal relevance in the international 
sphere of manifestations of popular approval, or the satisfact-ion of other requirements under constitutional law. This is 
the problem that is of chief interest to this study. 
Expressions of consent, such as signature, ratification, 
and accession have remained acts performed by the executive 
branch of government. The speakers of legislatures are never 
called upon to sign treaty documents in evidence of approval 
given by the bodies over which they preside, nor are certificates 
to the same effect ever issued. 23 Furthermore, though it may 
well have been expressly prescribed in f'u.11 powers, in the texts 
of treaties, or in connexion with the signing of treaties ) 
that authorization by a legislature would be required before the 
state could be committed irrevocably, and though sometimes mention 
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of the existence of such authorization may well be made in connexion with the final expression of consent, such as rati-fication, formal evidence of such authorization is never offered or requested in the practice of states. To the extent that authorizations occur, they remain municipal acts of which another party becomes cognizant, if at all, either by their being public knowledge, 24 or by contentions made by the executive branches of the other parties to the effect that they have received due auth.orization. 
If the mechanism thus established has put effective con-stitutional checks upon the treaty-making executive organs without introducing any cumbersome procedures, 25 there never-theless remains doctrinal controversy over the question whether such checks are allowed to operate in the realm of international law. 
III. DOCTRINE 
1. Theory of strict relevance in international law of constitutional provisions on competence 
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It is understandable that some of those who have most 
warmly supported the establishment and maintenance of consti-tuional guarantees for a demo~ratic control of the treaty-
making activities exercised by the executive branches of govern-
ments would not be completely satisfied to see this advance 
undermined by the risk that the executive might, nevertheless, irrevocably pledge the faith of the state under international law. In certain situations, the checks and sanctions established under constitutional law might prove an insufficient deterrent. It is against this background that the claim should be . considered that.the constitutional provisions governing the treaty-making power are operative in the realm of international law. One con-
sequence of this claim, if found substantiated, would be the 
existence in international law of a guarantee of pa~t of the domestic democracy of many states. 26 Another consequence would be that the risk would be diminished that executive authorities 
might conclude treaties without being able later to make them 
operative. 27 To put it differently, there might be expected to occur fewer breaches of treaty obligations if the claim were 
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accepted, than otherwise. 28 This latter circumstance is 
perhaps the strongest point advanced in support of the con-
tention that it is desirable that all constitutional provisions 
bearing upon the competence to conclude treaties should be 
relevant under international law, a view that we shall summar-
ize as the theory of strict relevance of constitutional law. 
As it is usually put forward, this theory consists of 
two parts, the first to the effect that international law 
leaves the determination of the competent treaty-making author-
ity to constitu~ional law; the second to the effect that a 
state organ concluding a treaty without being duly authorized 
thereto under constitutional law is an organ incompetent under 
international law, and the treaty made by it, an act that is 
null. 29 
A number of writers have adhered to this theory, the gist 
of which is succinctly stated by SchUcking as follows: 
"Un trait~ n'est obligatoire, pour lea parties contraetantes, que lorsqu'il a &tf concluc par les organes compltentes et lorsque toutes les dispositions de droit constitutionnel r&gissant la conclusion des trai t~s ont ~ observ~es. "30 
Similar positions without qualification are taken by many 31 other writers. In the opinion of Dr Chailley, who considers 
constitutional law, alone, relevant for the competence to con-
clude treaties, any irregularity in the observation of that 
law leads, of course, to lack of validity.32 
Difficulties in the theory of strict relevance of constitutional law 
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The theory of strict relevance of constitutiooal law has 
been criticized on several grounds, all of which are related 
to the need for certainty in international treaty relations. 
It is obvious that should the international validity of 
a tr~aty be dependent upon its being concluded in precise 
accordance with the parties' municipal provisions concerning 
competence, these provisions would become a matter of primary 
importance in the international sphere, and especially to 
governments which are about to conclude agreements with each 
other. As a measure of protection against unwelcome surprises 
they would be obliged to inquire carefully into the municipal 
law of the other party. In view of the extreme difficulties 
which may arise in the interpretation of constitutional prov-
isions regarding the conclusion of treaties, there would in 
many cases remain elastic provisions on the basis of which an 
unscrupulous government might attempt to deny the validity 
of obligations undertaken.33 Many writers have pointed to the 
vagueness of _modern constitutions, and to the danger that refer-
ences to them might be used as subterfuges for unilateral 
denunciations. The difficulties are well described in the 
following statement by Professor Paillieri: 
.i: 
"Les constitutions internes sent devenues toujours plus compliqu&es, la d~termination de 1 1 organe com-p~tent donne naissance l des questions toujours plus subtiles; l uncertain ~oment, il n'y a presque plus de trait~ dont la validit~ ne soit douteuse l cause de l'incompt!tence de l'organe ••• "34 
And :further: 
" • • • un E:ta t peu t croire '·avec la plus compl~'t;e et la plus l~gitime bonne foi gµe le trait~ sera qon-sidt!rt! valable par l'aut~e contractant, tandis que ce dernier peut trouver dans _ son droit ·interne le moyen de soulever des questions juridiques sur la comp&tence de 1 1 organe ••• 0 35 
With reason it has also been suggested that if all 
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municipal provisions regarding the competence to conclude 
treaties were to be of international relevance, foreign govern-
ments, faced with difficult juridical problems arising from _ the 
law of another state, might be obliged to request the treaty-
making authorities of their opposite parties to prove to foreign 
satisfaction that they are entitled to enter into a particular 
agreement. Whereas some think such inquiries possible in the 
present relations between states,36 many writers have voiced 
the opinion that they would be unwelcome; and even regarded as 
undue interference in the domestic affairs of a state.37 
An even more serious consideration, it is submitted, is 
that the inquiries in question could only be directed to the 
executive branch of government of the state with which a treaty 
1a to be concluded, and, indeed, probably only to its ministry 
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of foreign affairs.38 Since that department of the government 
concerned must have already demonstrated its willingness to con-
elude the treaty, and thereby presumably implied that it con-
sidered itself competent, most express inquiries would seem 
meaningless and redundant. If one were made, and answered, 
as must be assumed,in most cases, in a reassuring manner, the 
reply could only reflect the view of the very organ whose con-
stitutional competence is questioned. It would not be of much 
value if later denounced by a legis~ature or by a court as an 
illegal act, void because unauthorized by the constitution. 39 
2. Head of State theory 
If the theory of the strict relevance of constitutional 
provisions is at the one extreme, the other extreme is found 
in the view that constitutional limi ta.tions upon the treaty-
making power of the head of a state are completely irrelevant 
under international law. 
Not even under this theory, however, is the relevance of 
constitutional law altogether eliminated by all writers, but 
its relevance is considered limited to its determination of the 
organ competent to declare the consent of the state to a treaty.40 
The municipal procedures the fulfilment of which may be required 
to permit that organ to declare the consent of the state, on 
the other hand, are regarded by this school as .of no concern 
in the international sphere. It is thought to be a duty of 
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these organs under municipal law to abide by the limitations 
and procedures established, and any tendencies to disregard 
these procedures and limitations are thought to be left to be 
checked by the municipal sanctions which might be infli.cted 
upon those guilty of encroachments.41 
The practical advantage of the head of state theory lies 
obviously in the measure of legal finality and certainty it 
seeks to offer, or, to put it in negative terms, in the circum-
stance that it avoids the inconveniences pointed to above in the 
theory of strict constitutional relevance.42 
Some modern writers have adhered to this theory, although 
the grounds invoked by them vary somewhat.43 It may suffice 
here to examine the reasoning advanced by Bittner. That writer 
starts from the fundamental assumption that the municipal laws 
of states indicate the organs competent under international law 
to declare the consent of the states. It is on this ground that 
he finds that heads of states are invariably competent to con-
cl ud.e treaties:: 
"Ala Vertreter der Staaten, als Organe der Vertragschliessung, werden diejenigen physischen Personen angesehen, denen diese Be:t'ugnis von der inneren staatlichen Rechtsordnung zugewiesen sind. 
"Die Entwicklung der inneren staatlichen Rechtsordnung aller Staaten, die in den bestehenden Verfassungen jeweils ihren vorl;ufigen Endpunkt gefunden hat, weist nun die v5lkerrecht1ic.ha Vertretungsbefugnis den Staatsh!uptern ~u. 1144 
It is for the reason that (allegedly) documents connected 
with the conclusion of treaties o~ly exceptionally make any 
references to constitutionally required parliamentary approval 
that Bittner rejected its relevance to the international validity 
of treaties.45 
Difficulties in the head of state theory 
The most serious objection to the view that heads of states 
possess a jus representationis omni odae seems to be, as already 
suggested,46 the thin basis of political reality which today 
underlies it. While in the era of absolute monarchies in 
which _ the ,:,theory has its origin, it had a solid foundation of 1 1 
political reality in the broad _powers possessed by monarchs, 
modern heads of states are frequently deprived of all political 
power. Although in modem states their avowed and formally 
expressed consent to a measure may constitute a sine qua non 
for its being carried out, the expression of consent, in itself, 
hardly ever suffices to bring about that result. If international 
law were found to attribute unconditional competence to the heads 
of states to promise specific conduct by the states, it would 
ascribe to them an authority which had no basis in the internal 
power wielded by many of them.47 
There are stronger foundations of reality underlying the 
more moderate variation of the theory, according to which bind-
ing effect is attributed to the final consent expressed by the 
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executive branch of government.48 Although admittedly with 
lees force, the objection made above is applicable in this 
case, too. To attribute unlimited competence to executive branches of governments in the international legal sphere would be to appoint them administrators of a power they do not 
al ways possess. 
3. 1ledia ting theories 
The inadequacies embodied both by the theory of the strict 
relevance of constitutions and the head of state theory have 
led many modern writers to seek compromise solutions which take into account the political and constitutional structures of 
most modern states without jeopardizing reasonable need for 
certainty in treaty~making. Most of these mediating theories 
start from the point that international law refers the determina-tion of the treaty-making organs to the municipal law of the 
state. To mitigate the unfortunate effects of the theory of the 
strict relevance of constitutions, however, they bring into 
play, in addition, some other principle of international law 
which tends ~o eliminate rt.e mrawbaoks, or at least some of them. 
Time lapse theory 
What may be termed the "time lapse theory'' is based on 
the notion that violation of constitutional provision for the 
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conclusion of treaties does not invalidate a treaty provided that, for some period of time, the state concerned has neglected to repudiate the treaty, despite its awareness of the violation. This view is thought to apply with even greater force, of 
course, with regard to a state that for some period of time has allowed itself to benefit from a treaty of this kind, or 
carried out obligations supposedly flowing from the treaty.49 If the theory is looked at from another angle, it may be 
said that the treaty is suggested to be voidable only for a limited period of time. This theory has strong support among 
writers,50 and, as will be seen, it is not without foundation in the practice of states.51 There seems to be little, indeed, that can be advanced against the grounds on which it limits the strict constitutional theory, or the manner in 
which it does it. What may be objected, only, is that the limit-ation is probably too modest to satisfy the need for finality 
and certainty. It is true that the limitation it does provide, 
makes impossible denunciations where such would be the most 
obnoxious, e.g. in the case of treaties perhaps relied upon for several years without any previous suggestion having been made 
as to invalidity due to irregularities in their conclusion.52 With respect to many treaties, however, measures of execu-tion must be taken, and are taken, immediately upon their con-
clusion. It may be feared that such measures might not be taken With confidence if there were a risk that the treaty might later 
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be repudiated on the basis of some obscure point of constitu-tional law. In view of that consideration, it is not surpris-ing that other theories have been developed which seek to 
take more satisfactorily into account the international need for certainty in treaty relations. 
T5eory of notoriety 
The complicated and subtle character of constitutional provisions governing the conclusion of treaties in many states has already been discussed.53 It has been pointed out that a good deal of uncertainty would attach to the international 
validity of many treaties if all municipal provisions governing the competence to make treaties were internationally relevant. This is the background of a theory advanced by Lord McNair to the effect that only such constitutional provisions as "are 
matters of common knowledge" should be relevant interm tionally, 
' and that constit~ional defects of which the other party is 
"ignorant and reasonably ignorant" do not invalidate a treaty.54 
'!'he same idea has been developed by Professor Basdevant in -~ lectures at the Hague Academy. While maintaining that in prin-
ciple there is no need to take account of the constitutionality 
of a ratification performed by the head of a state, Basdevant 
makes an exception for constitutional provisions which are 
"notorious", for the reason that, in his opinion, "chaque l!ltat doit tenir compte des limi tea clairement apport&es A ce pouvoir". 
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If' a treaty has been ratified in "manifest" violation of' the 
constitution of' a state, the other contracting party is under 
a duty, according to Professor Basdevant, not to invoke the 
treaty.55 The same, or very similar opinions are voiced by 
several other writers.56 
The theory described has not, on the other hand, f'ailed 
to draw critie'ism f'rom several writers. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
has warned that the dif'f'iculty of' distinguishing between notor-
ious and other constitutional provisions tends to show that 
"the theory as a whole is not without weakness".57 Dr Mervyn 
Jones has cited Sir Gerald with approval on this point, and 
f'urther advanced the view that, if' it is admitted that consti-
tutional provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties are 
effective internationally, it seems irrelevant whether or not 
they are known to the other party. It is worth noting, however, 
that Dr Jones himself', appears to have felt the need f'or some 
limitation of' the international relevance of' the municipal law, for he qualifies his position to exclude "rules of' a 11prelilbinary 
character". In his opinion, "all that the principle covers is 
the distribution of the actual power to make treaties - to issue Full Powers and to ratif'y or accede to a treaty".58 It may 
be objected that it is perhaps not much easier to distinguish 
between principle and detail in constitutional law governing the 
conclusion of' treaties than to draw a line between notorious and 
"non-notorioue" constitutional provisions. 
j: 
' ' 
' I 
- l 
197 
Professor Balladore Pallieri has criticized the theory of 
notoriety, first on the ground that allegedly it lacks support 
in the practice,of states, and, second, and chiefly, because 
of . the anomalous situation that, in his opinion would arise 
if international tribunals were obliged to decide upon the 
contents and the notoriety of constitutional provisions of which 
perhaps the courts of the state in question proceed to give an 
al together different interpretation. 59 As Professor Pallieri 
himself is aware, this criticism may be advanced quite generally 
against the view that international law requires resIJect for 
municipal law in the matter of competence of tr~aty-making 
organs. 
It may suffice to say that if the latter view were to be 
accepted, some limitation would be needed to protect against 
possible abuses, and to afford a minimum measure of confidence 
and certainty in treaty relations. The great merit of the theory 
of notoriety lies, it is submitted, in the circumstance that it 
seeks to exclude as source of conflicts an element that might 
otherwise be likely to cause conflict, namely, obscure municipal 
procedural rules, or subtle interpretations of the municipal 
regulation of the treaty-making competence. 60 
A l 
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Theory of good faith 
P~ofessor Pallieri whose critical views of the theory 
of notoriety have been cited, has advanced a different theory 
which, while not disregarding the relevance of constitutional 
provisions in the predominant political reality, steers clear 
of the weaknesses, involved in the time lapse theory and in the 
theory of notorietyi In his view, the municipal law alone 
determines the international competence of the agents of states 
to conclude treaties. 61 This principle, in his opinion, is 
not limited to notorious provisions, but extends to all 
municipal provisions that directly relate to the validity of 
treaties. Those of indirect importance, on the other hand -
such as ppovis·ions regulating the power of introducing legisla-
tion to implement a treaty- - are not considered relevant, 62 
nor are those prohibiting altogether treaties by which are 
incurred obligations of special kinds, eog. treaties of cession 
. 6 
of territory. 3 In full accordance with this view, Pallieri 
adheres to the principle that a treaty concluded by an incompet-
ent authority is invalid under international law. 64 
VVhile Professor Pal1ieri's theory thus , far seems to amount 
to a simple endorsement of the theory of strict constitutional 
relevance, he attempts to avoid the inconveniences of that 
theory by superimposing upon it the principle of good faith. 65 
It appears that, in his opinion, an organ which is incompet-
ent under municipal as well as under international law may 
( J 
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nevertheless conclude a treaty that becomes valid and binding, 
provided that the other party was in good faith with regard 
to the competence of the organ. It is not a subjective good 
faith that Pallieri has in mind, but "une bonne foi objective, 
dans le sens qu'elle doit !tre fond~e sur des circonstances 
objectives". 66 He concludes that the question before a court 
would not be one of law, but one of fact, namely, to determine 
whether the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 
treaty had been such as to make the other party believe, 
in good faith, that the treaty was valid. Among the circum-
stances to be considered, nota bene, would then be the applica-
tion and in~erpretation given in each state to its municipal 
norms. 67 
No serious objections can be raised against Professor 
Pallieri's theory from a functional point of view. It seems to 
have no untoward effects, and it might not be too difficult in 
application. However, what may be argued against this theory 
as well as those described above, is that the premise that inter-
national law refers the determination of the competence to con-
clude treaties to municipal law is uncertain. 
Professor Pallieri submits that it is a general principle 
of law that "to'lilt corps moral d&cide quels sont ses orgal;les, 
quels sont ceux comp&tents A traiter avec les ·tiers, et quelle 
eat la comp&tence de chacun'i. 68 It is not deni .ed that such a 
principle might exist in municipal law, nor is it disputed that 
( .et 
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states and international organizations may determine, each 
· 69 for itself, the competence of their organs, and establish 
sanctions to uphold that determination. Furthermore, it ia 
obvious that the determination of competence under international law must be expected to be such that its result approaches 
closely the result that ia obtained by a similar determination 
under municipal law. All this does not prove, however, that international law refers the determination of the conditions 
of competence to constitutional law. For that conclusion, 
it must t'urther be convincingly shown that such a reference 
finds full support in the practice of states. This, it is sub-
mitted, has not been done by Pallieri. 
It is not believed that that writer's argument to the 
effect that general principles of law were of si:ecial import-
ance in international law at a time when treaties were not as 
common as today, makes redundant support for the alleged prin-
ciple in the practice of states. In the last four hundred 
years, at least, the making of treaties has not been a feature 
so rare as not to cause the question of competence to arise, 
and to be answered with some frequency. An international 
practice must, therefore, long have existed, in the light of 
which the alleged applicability of the invoked general principle 
of law may be tested. 
Professor Pallieri seeks t'urther support for the view that 
a municipal determination of competence may be accorded 
l::i.J 
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international relevance in the international sphere in the 
' 
alleged circumstance that the competence under international 
law of plenipotentiaries exactly equates with that enjoyed by 
them under municipal law; and that the instruments of :f'u.11 
powers offer an example of a domestic determination of compet-
ence which is accepted as internationally relevant. 
To this argument it must be objected that, although 
the issuing of instruments of full powers admittedly is a 
municipal act, the determination of competence made in these 
instruments is of a uniform type which has emerged from centur-
ies of adaption between states. Furthermore, though nowadays 
mostly per:f'unctory, the examination and the acceptance of full 
powers may still be regarded as an agreement between the parties 
to the effect that the competence granted the agents offer a 
mutually satisfactory basis for negotiation.70 No correspond-
ing agreements are known to be made by which states accept as 
relevant between themselves precisely the highly varied deter-
mination of the competence to conclude treaties that are made 
in their respective municipal laws. It does not seem, therefore, 
that the analogy to competence possessed under f'ull powers in 
any way helps to show that the municipal regulation of the 
treaty-making competence should be accepted in toto in interna-
tional law. 
J • • 
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!heory of damages 
Yet another theory is that, although a treaty concluded 
by an organ in excess of its municipal competence will be 
invalid under interm.tional law, a contracting party having 
not unreasonably relied upon the competence of the agent will 
be entitled to compensation for damages resulting from the injury 
suffered by the cancellation of the treaty. Such a theory has 
found prominent support in the Harvard Draft on the la,\V of 
Treatiea, 71 and in the first report on the law of treaties sub-
mitted by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht to the International Law 
Commission.72 
It might seem, at first, that an obligation to pay damages 
must logically be predicated upon a breach of an obligation, 
., and that this obligation cannot be other than a valid treaty. 
The fact that the proponents of this theory do not admit that 
the treaty is valid would accordingly seem illogical. 73 It 
appears, however, that the damages are supposed to arise from 
the responsibility of the state for the acts of its organs and 
agents, and are intended to cover direct injuries only - the 
so-called. "negative Vertragsinfa>esse" - caused by the unauthorized 
acts of the organs.74 If the treaty were thought valid, on the 
other hind, the responsibility of the state would have been to 
effect specific performance, or, in the last resort, presumably 
to pay damages covering not only injuries sustained by the 
j 
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breach, but also the loss of advantages to which it was antici-
pated the treaty would give rise. 
Though an ingenious construction, the damages theory has 
obvious weaknesses of which the most serious is the api::arent 
total lack of support in the practice of states. N:ot even 
its formulators have attempted to adduce any other basis for 
it than its reasonableness. It may be doubted, however, that 
the award of damages actually offers a reasonable solution to the 
problem of treaties made by constitutionally incompetent author-
ities. Obligations undertaken in the form of treaties are most 
frequently of such a kind that the evaluation in :_ tettma of money 
of injuries resulting from non-fulfilment must offer extreme, 
if not insuperable, difficulties.75 It may well be argued, 
therefore, that reasonableness is on the side of a solution 
that favours the adjudgment of either specific performance or 
absence of obligation, and introduces damages only as a remedy 
· 76 of the last resor.t. .. 
4. Conclusion 
The foregoing survey makes it abundantly clear that there 
is little agreement among writers on the p-oblem, though admitt-
edly a tendency may be perceived towards the finding of a comprom-
ise solution of some kind.77 
The hypothesis submitted by this wiiter78 to the ef'fect 
that the competence of an authority under international law 
t 
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to make treaties attaches not to any constitutional title 
possessed by the authority, but to its apparent ability of 
fulfilling the obligations it is ready to assume, has clearly 
not found support in any of the views discussed above. As 
will be shown, however, it does have some doctrinal support.79 
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF STATES 
1. Preliminary remarks 
Several writers have examined large numbers of municipal 
constitutions in order to throw light upon the question of the 
international validity of a treaty made by a constitutionally 
unauthorized organ. 80 
It is clear that a single constitution's provision to the 
effect that a treaty entered into by a constitutionally incom-
petent authority will have no validity in regard to the other 
party, is not, in itself, sufficient to bring about that 
result between the state and the other party. A treaty's 
validity between parties must depend upon the common solution 
given to that question by parties in treaty relations. Indeed, 
· 81 it has been well stressed by Ross that, as a promisor and 
as a ~ondsee, one and the same state has an interest both in 
upholding constitutional provisions, and in the full reliability 
of the undertakings of which it is the beneficiary. 
Constitutional regulations of competence may conceivably 
by- made relevant generally between certain states, by means 
of a convention to that effect. 82 Alternatively, they may 
conceivably be made relevant specifically between two parties 
With respect to a particular treaty, by means of a special 
I r 
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provision inserted in the treaty. In these cases, the basis 
f'or the relevance of' the constitutional regulation would be 
the express agreement between the parties. On the other hand, 
the assertion made by de Visscher83 that, where a state 
declares in its constitution that it will not be bound by a 
treaty but for consent given to the treaty by the state's 
representative organs, it becomes superfluous to examine if' 
this requirement is also mentioned in the formulae of :full 
powers and ratifications, is not necessarily correct. 
In the case of such express provisions in :full powers, 
treaty texts, or instruments of ratification, there is a 
presumption that the other party agrees to the provisions by 
accepting the instruments. 84 . No such presumption exists gener-
ally regarding the relevance of constitutional provisions. 
It follows that even if a great number of constitutions 
were found to be concordant in the manner in which they 
determine the competence of' treaty-making authorities, this 
circumstance in itself, would not suff'ice to elevate that 
determination into a rule of international law. 85 The deter-
mination must also be mutually accepted. Thus, if many con-
stitutions were f'ound to direct their treaty-making authorities 
to negotiate and treat only with such authorities of' other 
states as are indicated in the constitutions of these states, 
such provisions, if' indeed f'ollowed in practice, would consti-
tute evidence of acceptance of' the constitutional determination 
j 
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made by the other states. Though no such provisions have been found, the actual practice of states might furnish evidence of such acceptance. 
If every constitution simply were to provide that the 
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head of state, alone, was competent to bind the state to any treaty, and this provision were effectively followed, it may be assumed that, in international practice, it would gradually become customary to rely completely upon the promise of the head of a state. s:imilarly, if for municipa..l validity l~gisla-ti ve approval of every treaty were to be required everywhere, that requirement would presumably soon be present in the minds of negotiators and find i ta way into international law. Pract-ice, however, presents no such simple picture. Existing consti-tutional provisions are of the most varied kind, and there can be no presumption, at any rate, that, in their intercourse, states habitually rely only upon promises given in a manner according with, and by authorities indicated in, constitutional provisions. 
2. Value of constitutional provisions as evidence 
While today's varied constitutional regulation of the treaty-making power of states does not suggest any particular 
. solution of the question of competence under international law, it must be admitted, on the other hand, that a given constitutional 
' • J 
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provision may be found prediated upon a particular evaluation 
of the tenor of the rule of international lawo The views on the 
. possible international relevance of the constitutional regula-tion of the competence to make treaties held by the f ramers 
and interpreters of constitutions must be entitled to some 
respect. They are part of a latent attitude that might achieve 
expression in the state's international relations: it might be 
asserted by the state, or recognized as legitimate when taken by another state. It does not seem justified, therefore, to brush these opinions aside as only "le fruit d'une surprenante 
.. 86 inexactitude de pens!e . . . . On the other hand, some writers 
seem to exaggerate the importance of the views underlying con-
stitutional provisions. Thus, Dr Mervyn Jones maintains that 
"the constitutional texts prevailing in the vast majority of States are at least cogent evidence of the attitude of those 
states, if' not a source of a new rule of international law."87 The expression "·cogent evidence" seems too strong in view of 
the circumstance that there is no certainty that, in a concrete 
situation, a state will actually assert the attitude reflected in its constitution, either with respect to obligations already 
undertaken by itself, or, indeed, pledges supposedly given by 
another state. Dr Chailley exiresses himself with somewhat greater caution. Referring to constitutions, he states: 
11 
••• on lea envisage comn:le des faits, propres autant que d'autres, l manifester, sur un point dorm&, la conviction juridique des Etats."88 
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To estimate the potential "'juridical conviction" of a 
state with regard to the international treaty-making competence 
of some organ, i.e. the legal stand it may reasonably be 
expected to take in a concrete situation, it is necessary, of 
course, to take into account not only the bare text of a con-
stitutional provision, but also the travaux pr~paratoires, and the interpretation given to it by practice, jurisprudence and doctrine. 
A comprehensive analysis of this kind of national attitudes 
would require extensive research into the constitutional law 
and practice of various states, and is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this inquiry. Moreover, a better picture of the 
tt juridical conviction" of states probably may be gained from an 
examination of the stands actually taken by states in concrete international situations, to the extent that such situations 
may have prompted public pronouncements. Under such circum-
stances, it may perhaps be asked if any purpose is served by 
a necessarily superficial examination of the provisions of a 
number of.' constitutions. Some writers have thought it possible to draw support from such inquiries into constitutions for their 
views on the international rule of competence. 89 In order to 
verif.'y their conclusions, if, for no other reason, it is here proposed to undertake an inquiry of this kind. 
The constitutional provisions and of.'ficial memoranda 
collected in a volume entitled "The Laws and Practices concerning 
r 
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the Conclusion of Treaties 0 and issued in the United Nations 
Legislative Series,90 being the latest collection of this kind,91 
have been used as the chief basis for the examination. A few 
of the provisions reproduced there may have later been super-
seded by others, but the collection no doubt still gives a 
fairly accurate total picture of the types of provisions 
encountered at the present time. What, then, emerges from 
an examination of this material? 
3. The vast majority of constitutions are silent on the question of the effect of an unconstitutional treaty 
The .fundamental fact emerges from the examination of the 
whole material that o'f' some eighty-five provisions reproduced 
and practices described in the cited collection, the vast 
majority - some seventy - merely prescribe the procedure to be 
followed in the conclusion of treaties, and lay down the divi-
sion of duties between the various organs of states, without 
expressly dealing with the situation which arises when the 
regulations are violated. It is not possible merely to write 
off this majority of constitutions without comment, and to 
take the evidence supplied by a minority of' instruments as 
representative of a general attitude of states.92 
It must be kept in mind that although not made explicit in 
constitutional provisions on the conclusion of treaties, con-
sequences may nevertheless be attached to violations. First., 
.l 
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of course, political sanctions are an effective deterrent 
against unconstitutional behaviour in most states. 93 Second, 
while express provisions on impeachment may not be found in 
articles on the conclusion of treaties, most constitutional 
systems possess that institution as an inducement, if need be, 
to government officers to respect all parts of a constitution, 
including, indeed, prov1s ions on the conclusion of treaties.94 
Third, and more important in this connexion, constitutional 
precepts not made explicit in the texts of constitutions, or, 
at any rate, in the provisions on the conclusion of treaties, 
may nevertheless exist to the effect that an unconstitutional 
treaty shall be municipally void, or perhaps both municipally 
and internationally voido 
Since it is what has been termed the "juridical conviction" 
of the state95 that is of interest to the determination of 
the international rule, it cannot matter if that "conviction" 
is spelled out in the constitution, or only figures behind it. 
The existence of such convictions is possible, of course, in 
l the case of the vast majority of constitutions which have no 
express provisions on the point, and which cannot here conven-
iently be looked into. This being so, it goes without saying 
that the evidential value of the small minority of constitutions 
Which do have express clauses on the effect of unconstitutionality 
upon the validity of treaties will be very limited. The risk 
is obvious that they might not be representative. Though in 
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his inquiry into constitutions, Dr Chailley cites as a first group numerous provisions silent on the matter under discussion, he fails to mention this important point.96 
To demonstrate that a 11 juridical conviction" in the 
question under discussion may underlie a constitutional prov-ision on treaty-making, ostensibly silent on the point, and to illustrate the existence of a political sanction against viola-
tions of a constitution, and of rules on impeachment, the 
recent Danish constitution offers an example in point. Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Danish constitution of 5 June 1953 
reads as follows: 
"The King acts on behalf of the realm in international affairs. Without the consent of the Folketing he shall not, however, do anything that increases or decreases the territory of the realm, or enter into any obligation, for the fulfilment of which concerted action by the Folketing is necessary, or which is of major importance. Nor shall the King, without the consent of the Folketing, denounce any international agreement which has been entered into with the assent of the Folketing. 11 97 
It may further be noted that article 12 of the same con-
stitution provides that the King shall exercise his powers 
through his ministers; article 13, that responsibility for the 
acts of the government rests upon the ministers, and not upon 
the King personally, that laws and decisions of the govern-
ment are rendered valid by their being signed by the King and 
. countersigned by one or several ministers, and that the minister Bigning is responsible for the decision; article 15, that no 
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minister can remain in office after the adoption in the Folket-
ing of a motion of non-confidence in him; article 16, finally, 
provides that ministers may be impeached by the King or by the 
Folketing for governmental acts for which they are responsible. 
As may be clearly seen from the above, there exists in the 
Danish constitution both political and legal checks upon a 
minister who might be about to conclude an unconstitutional 
treaty,98 even if these checks are not found in the very 
article which deals with the conclusion of treaties. Further-
more, and of special importance here, in spite of the absence 
in that article of any express mention of the status of 
treaties concluded in violation of the constitution, it appears 
that the framers of the article had a very precise opinion 
on the matter. The report by the commission which framed the 
constitUi.on makes it clear that a memorandum prepared by 
Professor Max S5rensen served as a basis for the commission's 
deliberation of -the new article.99 
A reading of the report of the commission reveals immed-
iately, indeed, that the commission accepted without modifica-
tionsthe draft article proposed by Professor Stsr·enaen. 100 It 
may safely be assumed, then, that the commission also accepted 
the views advanced by the drafter in support of his formulation, 
and these acquire special significance for the understanding 
and interpretation of the provision. The following passage 
or the memorandum is relevant in this connexion: 
·!. 
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••• constitutional rules concerning the conclusion of treaties do not only have importance as such, fixing the duties of the government towards parliament [ ''rigsdagen" J, but have importance under international law, too, so that their non-observance will have the result, in general, that the treaty is not binding upon the Danish state. It is generally said that these rules limit the competence of the government under international law. They have, consequently, a greater effect tban common parliamentary practice. Thus, if a government were to enter into an obligation without the consent of parliament in a case where consent is not required by the constitution but by parliamentary practice, the minister concerned may possibly be made responsible, but the obligation entered into binds the Danish state. Only if the rules of the constitution are not observed, is it possible to contend ~~at the obligation is invalid. It may consequently be of special importance care:fully to weigh the f'ormulation of' these rules. "101 
This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of' the views expressed by the learned professor, and apparently shared by the framers of the new Danish constitution. It may suffice to note that a distinction seems to be made between the rough lines staked out by the written article, and practices arising under that article, and that only the former are thought internationally relevant. To what extent, if any, parliamentary and governmental practice is thought internationally relevant as interpreting and defining, and perhaps modif'ying the written constitution is not indicated. 
What is believed clearly proved by the above, however, is the contention that behind a constitutional provision which is Bilent on the matter or the effect of an unconstitutional treaty, there may nevertheless be a "juridical conviction" as to the 
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international validity or lack of validity of unconstitutional treaties . 
4. Constitutions containing express but allegedly equivocal provisions on the effect of unconstitutional treaties 
As a second group of constitutions, Dr Chailley considers those which deal expressly with the effect of unconstitutional treaties, but which, in his opinion, do not make it clear if the unconstitutionality entails only municipal, or perhaps also international invalidity of the treaties. 
In this group, Dr Chailley cites the Italian constitution 
of 1848, the Belgian of 1831, the Luxemburg constitution of 1919, and the Egyptian of 1930, all of which at the time of his writing prescribed that treaties of certain kinds which had not 
r eceived parliamentary approval were to "have no effect". 102 Of these constitutions, the Italian has been superseded by one 
whose provision on the conclusion of treaties is silent as to t he effect of unconstitutionality. 103 The Egyptian constitution has been suspended by President Nasser's revolutionary govern-
ment, and the - present Egyptian municipal regulation, if any, 
of the treaty-making power, is not known. The Belgian consti-tution remains unmodified, however, and the relevant part of its article 68 reads as follows: 
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"Le Roi fait lea traitt!s de paix, d'alliance et de commerce. Il en donne connaissance aux Chambres auasitSt que l'inter~t et la sarett! de l'Etat le permettent, en y joignant lea communications convenables. 
"Les trait~s de commerce et ceux qui pourrait grever l'Etat ou lier individuellement des Belges, n'ont d 1 effet qu 1 apres avoir recu 1 1 assentiment des Chambres. 11104 
_ ' 
It is of interest to note that according to an official 
memorandum of 6 March 1951, submitted by the Belgian govern-
ment to the United Nations, the expression "n'ont d 1 effet'', 
has reference 1only to municipal effects: 
" ••• le deuxibme paragraphe de 1 1 art. 68 stipule que pour sortir leurs effets - et, par comparaison avec le paragrapre premier, 11 ne peut s'agir que de leurs effete en droit interne belge certaines cat&gories de conventions internationales doivent @tre sanctio:mi~es par l'assentiment des Chambres. 11105 
The constitution of Luxemburg, cited by Chailley, 
• • • 
likewise remains in force, and the relevant article still reads: 
"Le Grand-Due commande la force armee. Il fai t lea trait~s. Aucun traite n'aura d'effet avant d'avoir re9u l'assentiment de la Chambre ••• u10b 
Here, too, the vagueness of the expression is conclusively dispelled by an official communication, namely, a memorandum 
of 20 February 1952 submitted by the Government of Luxemburg 
to the United Nations. It reads in part: 
; I 
0 Les r~gles juridiques internee, &noncees ci-dess~, d~terminent exclusivement la comp~tence des organes ••• pour autant qu'il s'agit d 1actes de port&e interne. Pour le reste, la mati~re des traites est rt§gie par le droit internationa,l." 
And further: 
11 
••• lea pouvoirs reconnus dans lea relations internationales au Chef d'Etat et au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, pour repr~senter et· pour engager l'Etat, .sont bien plus ~tendus que ceux que le droit luxembourgeois reconnatt au Grand Due et au Gouvernement ••• les Etats ~trans• rs et lea organisations internationales attachent .toujours foi a l'acte fait par le Chef d'Etat et le Ministre des .l\.ffaires Etrang~res, sans contrSler si cet acte est r&gulier au regard du droit interne de l'Etat en cause."107 
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Thus, it appears that of four constitutional provisions 
cited by Chailley as equivocal, one has lapsed without being 
replaced, one has been substituted by a provision altogether 
silent on the point at issue, and two, although unmodified, 
have been authoritatively stated to aim only at the municipal 
effect of unconstitutional treaties. 
5. Constitutional provisions that allegedly are· clear expressions of the view that unconstitutional treaties are internationally ~ 
As a third group ~t instruments, Dr Chailley presents 
constitutional provisions which, in his opinion, clearly 
demonstrate that their authors have thought the neglected 
observation of constitutional formalities entail the lack of 
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validity of the treaties. 108 Of the constitutions cited by 
Chailley, those of Baden, Hessen and Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
have no longer any international interest, while those of 
Cuba, Albania, Rwnania and Bulgaria have been superseded by 
new constitutions which lack express provisions on the question 
of the effect of unconstitutional treaties. Indeed, of all 
the constitutions cited by Chailley in this group, only those 
of Au stria, Li:ech tenstein and Lebanon remain unchanged. How-
ever, several other constitutions cited by Chailley in this 
group have been replaced by instruments very similar to their 
predecessors on the point under discussion. These new consti-
tutions, and the three which have remained unchanged will now 
be examined. 
The Venezuelan constitution of 1925, cited by Chailley, 
appears to have prescribed that certain treaties were to 
have "neither validity nor effect", it they had not been 
approved by parliamen~. 109 The Venezuelan constitution of 
1936 as amended in 1945 only provides that treaties not having 
been approved by the legislature "shall be invalid and shall 
not be ratifi'ed. 11110 It must be noted that this provision 
does not aim at treaties which have been unconstitutionally 
ratified, but merely lays down that treaties requiring ratifica-
tion and not being approved shall not be ratified, and thus 
!emain non-obligatory. It might not, therefore, be relevant 
to tbe question of the effect of unconstitutional treaties. 111 
I The provision of the Austrian constitution cited by Dr Chailley112 as clearly evidencing a conviction to the effect that constitutional flaws in the conclusion of treaties entail international invalidity, is still in effect. It reads as follows: 
11Article 50. All international political treaties and all other treaties, in so far as they contain provisions modifying existing laws, require for their validity the approval of the National Council. n113 
It is difficult to understand how the above formulation 
could be thought clearly implying the view tbat international invalidity results from lack of approval of the Council. Indeed, it is now certain, as admittedly was perhaps not the case when Chailley stated his opinion, that, contrary to his contention, the Austrian provision only aims at depriving the treaty of 
municipal validity, and leaves the international validity 
unaffected. This interpretation has been sanctioned in the 
case of Pokorny and Another v. Republic of Austria, 114 in 
which, on 20 February 1952, the Austrian Supreme Court was 
careful to point out that it was the "municipal and constitu-tional validity11 of an agreement that it negatived on the ground that the agreement had neither been submitted to parliament for consent, nor been published. It appears, further, indeed, that the Court clearly implied that, in its opinion, the treaty remained internationally valid. The Court is reported to have Said: 
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"Thus as the promise to pay embodied in the treaty concerned is ineffective and not binding under internal law, a special Federal Law (Art.10(1) subparo 15) will be required in order to regulate under internal law the compensation for war damages p~rsuant to the present treaty. 11115 
The French constitution of 1875 has been replaced by 
that of 1946; the Syrian instrument of 1930, first by the con-
stitution of 1950, and later by that of 1953. These two 
states, and Lebanon, never.theless preserve a formulation that is of interest to this inquiry. 
The present French constitution lays down that certain 
treaties "ne sont definitifs qu'apres avoir !t~ ratifi~s en 
vertu d'une loio 11116 The Lebanese constitution of 1926 lays down that treaties of' specified . kinds "ne sent definitifs qu'apres 
avoir ete votes par la Chambre. 1111 7 The Syrian instrument of 
1950 similarly prescribed that some treaties "ne sont definitive-
ment acquis qu'apres leur ratification par la Chambre des 
D~put~s'; 118 while the precise formulation of the constitution 
of' 11 July 1953 has not been available to this writer. 
It seems somewhat rash to conclude, as does Chailley, 11 9 
that formulations such as those quoted above, clearly imply 
the view that treaties lacking legislative approval are not 
internationally valido It is not denied, on the other hand, 
that a closer examination of' the history of the provisions, 
and of the manner in which the provisions have been applied, 
might necessitate that conclusion. The assertion made by one 
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writer may here be mentioned that there is "general agreement" in French doctrine "tha t the international competence of 
state authorities to conclude treaties is determined by internal law, and that the international validity of a treaty is, 
therefore, dependent upon its 'regularity' or constit~tional-i ty. u 120 That the relevant provision of the French consti tu-tion · of' 1875 has been understood to imply precisely this con-
viction 'is maintained by several modern writers. 121 
Although the Lebanese and Syrian constitutions are verwy 
similar to the French on the point under examination, it would have to be established in the case of each of them that their true meaning in this regard is identical with that which seems likely to be implied in the French provisionp Before that is done, not much evidential value can be attributed to the bare provisions. 
It may be noted, in this connexion, that in an article dealing with the 1953 constitution of Syria,. one writer has 
asserted that a treaty of' a specified kind "ne peut entrer en 
vigueur que s • il a ~t& approuv~ par la Chambre". 122 This formulation may conceivably seem more likely than that cited 
above to relate to the international validi.ty of the treaty. It is unknown, however, if it is really a quotation of the 
original text. Judging by another article on the same constitu-tion9 it would seem very probable that lack of international Validity is assumed for unconstitutional treaties. Referring 
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to the fact that the s·yrian instrument of 1953, unlike the 
F'.rench constitution of 1946, makes no mention of rules of 
international law, the author of that article makes the follow-ing, somewhat surprising statement~ 
" ••• on doit d~duire de ce fa,it que la Syrie n'est pas lie par lea r~gles abEitraites du droit international, · mais par _celles qui se concretisent dans des traites approuves par le Parlement et ratifies et publies par le Chef de l'Etat."123 
If', indeed, the jur'idical conviction of the state of' Syria 
were to the effect that the absence of a reference to interna-
tional law in its constitution should indicate that that state does not consider itself bound by abstract principles - such 
as the whole body of customary international law! - the assumpt-ion would no doubt follow a fortiori that the same state con-
aidered irrelevant abstract criteria of competence to make 
treaties. However, the first "conviction", if actually held, 
would be so grossly and obviously mistaken that no persuasive 
value could be attributed to it, nor to any consequences that 
would seem to flow from it. 
The criticism voiced above against Chailley'a reliance 
upon the constitutions of Lebanon and Syria applies also to 
his views respecting the international validity of unconstitutional I treaties in the -formulation employed by the constitution of Liech tens.tein, 124 which declares that treaties of certain kinds 
"are not valid unless approved by the Diet't, 125 and, possibly 
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by the 1927 constitution of Greece, which provided that certain treaties were to have no obligatory force before they 126 were approved by the Chambers. It is submitted that only a closer examination of the background of these provisions, and of the manner in 'Ml.ich they have been interpreted, can reveal if they really, as Chailley thinks, are expressions of the conviction that lack of constitutionally required legislative approval entails international invalidity. The present Greek constitution, like that cited by ·Chailley, gives no obvious clue on the point in question. It provides, in effect, that certain treaties "are not · valid without the consent of the House of Representatives". 127 
If an illustration should be needed of the necessity to exercise the greatest care before the conclusion is drawn that a constitutional provision lends support to one view or another of the international validity of a constitutionally unauthorized treaty, attention may be called to the following example: 
In 1956, the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate issued a report on a proposed amendment to the United States constitutional provision concerning the treaty-making paver. Part of the proposed amendment read as follows: 
I 
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other inter-national agreement which conflicts with any ·provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. 11128 
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It would perhaps have been tempting to assume that the proposed amendment demonstrated that some Senators believed that unconstitutional treaties lack international force. Such a conclusion, however, would be erroneous. The Committee, which, it may be noted, was in favour of the proposed amendment, commented in part as follows upon it: 
" ••• The words 'shall not be of any force or effect' mean that the agreement will be void inso-far as the municipal or domestic aspects of the agreement are concerned. The committee wishes to point out that the international obligations of the treaty are not affected by this language .for the external force and effect of such agreements are governed by international law and usage rather than by constitutional provisions."129 
From the above quotation it is clear that, contrary to what might have been inferred from a superficial interpreta-tion of the proposed amendment, the committee clearly distin-guished between the domestic and the international validity of a treaty, and, indeed, was convinced that a treaty would not lose its international validity because of unconstitution-ality and lack of domestic validity. 130 
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6. Constitutions found to offer clear evidence of their authors' views of the international effect of certain unconstitutional treaties 
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While none of the provisions cited above may safely be said to be an expression of the view of its authors that lack of legislative approval entails lack of international validity, it must be readily admitted that some other constitutional provisions, past and present, may be found which imply the conviction of their authors quite clearly. 
Chailley cited a Costa Rican decree of 1888 by which 
certain treaties, if not made in accordance with a specified complicated procedure, would be 11absolutely null". 131 While this particular decree might have _lapsed and Costa Rica is endowed with a constitution of 1949, a very similar rule seems to exist in that state. Article 7 of the new constitution lays down that any person concluding a treaty conflicting with the sovereignty and independence of the Republic shall be tried for treason. The same article prescribes very rigid conditions for the approval of treaties which affect the territorial integrity and political organization of the country. 132 While this article itself does not contain anything that relates to consequences in the international sphere of its violation, it is asserted in an ofricial Costa Rican memorandum of 29 November 1949 that such a treaty would be "invalid" as a result of article 10 of the constitution which is said to provide 
< • 
quite generally: "Enactments of the Legislative Power or of the Executive Power contrary to the Constitution shall 
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be null and void. 111 33 It seems likely that these expressions have been thought to refer to the legal effect in the interna-tional as well as in the domestic sphere. 
The constitution of the Dominican Republic of 1947 provides that the President shall submit !11 treaties for the approval of Congress, "failing which they shall have no validity and shall not be binding on the Republic". 134 While there is no room for doubt as to the meaning of this provision, it is not known to what extent, if any, the provision is of any relevance under the present dictatorship of President Trujillo. The Portuguese constitution of 1933 provides that the President shall submit conventions to the National Assembly for approval, but does not .combine this duty with any express provision on nullity of treaties in cases of violations. To the article requiring the acts of the President to be counter-signed by the President of the Council, or by the appropriate minister ( artie·1e 82), on the other hand, is added the proviso · that -"otherwise they shall be null and void" o 135 It is difficult to ascertain if the provision quoted would actually be of municipal importance in the dictatorship that has long prevailed in Portugal. 
In distinction to what has been said about the three instru-ments cited above, the internal relevance of the provisions of 
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quite generally: "Enactments of the Legislative Power or 
of the Executive Power contrary to the Constitution shall 
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be null and void. 111 33 It seems likely that these expressions have been thought to refer to the legal effect in the interna-tional as well as in the domestic sphere. 
The constitution of the Dominican Republic of 1947 provides that the President shall submit .!11 treaties for the approval of Congress, "failing which they shall have no validity and 
shall not be binding on the Republic 11 • 134 While there is no 
room for doubt as to the meaning or this provision, it is not known to what extent, if any, the provision is of any relevance under the present dictatorship of President Trujillo. 
The Portuguese constitution of 1'933 provides that the President shall submit conventions to the National Assembly for approval, but does not .combine this duty with any express provision on nullity of treaties in cases of violations. To the article requiring the acts of the President to be counter-signed by the President of the Council, or by the appropriate minister (artiele 82), on the other hand, is added the proviso that. "otherwise they shall be null and void" o 135 It is difficult to ascertain if the provision quoted would actually be of municipal importance in the dictatorship that has long prevailed in Portugal. 
In distinction to what has been said about the three instru-ments cited above, the internal relevance of the provisions of 
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two constitutions to be mentioned below, cannot be doubted. Article 5(2) of the Irish constitution of 1937 reads as follows: 
"The State shall not be bound by any interna-tional agreement involving a charge upon public funds unless the terms of the agreement shall have been approved by the D~il Eirann. 11 136 
The Norwegian constitution enacted in 1814 and later amended, provides that certain treaties "shall not bo Lbinding until the Storting has given its consent thereunto". 137 A memorandum of 4 April 1951, submitted by the Norwegian government to the United Nations conf'irms the impression gained from the text of the article that in Norwegian official opinion, "the regulation ••• limits not only the King's right but also his cai;acity to create binding obligations" •138 
Some comments are required, finally, to the Peruvian and Swedish provisions on the matter, the only articles which, in the opinion of Chailley, could conceivably be taken to imply that their authors thought constitutional irregularities in the conclusion of treaties without relevance internationally. The Peruvian provision cited by Chailley may now be overlooked, for it appears to have lapsed and to have been replaced by one which raises no implication of interest in this connection. 139 The Sw.edish provision quoted by the same writer remains unchanged, however, and lays down, in effect, that any treaties 
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which, under the Swedish constitution, require : the approval 
of the legislature, shall contain an express reservation 
which makes its validity dependent upon that approva1. 140 It 
seems correct, as is maintained by several writers, 141 that 
the inference t'rom this provision is that its authors acted 
upon the assumption that the absence of a constitutionally 
required legislative approval would not lead to lack of inter-
national validity unless such approval were made an express 
condition in the treaties. 142 
7. Conclusion to be drawn t'rom the examination of constitutional provisions 
The above examination of a large number of constitutional 
provisions regulating the treaty-making f'Jlnotion of states has 
shown that the vast najority of such provisions is silent as 
to the possible municipal and international effect of irregular-
ities. That in all these instances there may nevertheless 
exist less accessible constitutional precepts on the matter was demonstrated by an examination of the case of the Danish consti-
tution. An examination of some other case might likewise have 
yielded a positive result, al though perhaps one .evidencing 
another opinion than that held by the fra-.mers of Denamrk' s con-
stitution. It must be stressed that, in the absence of a 
penetrating inquiry into a very large number of constitutions, 
no safe assumption can be made concerning a general attitude, 
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if there should be one, among the framers of constitutions 
as to the international relevance of violations of constitutional provisions on the conclusion of treaties. 
An examination of the relatively small number of funda-
mental laws which do have some express paragraph on the matter 
under discussion reveals no uniform tendency among the framers 
of constitutions. Admittedly some provisions were predicated 
upon the view that certain unconstitutional features entail 
both domestic and international invalidity. Among these 
were the Dominican and the Portuguese constitutions. However, 
these instruments can hardly be accorded evidentiary value, 
since their practical importance as state instruments is doubt-
f'u.l. It may be recalled, in this connexion, that one of the 
chief reasons why support is given to the alleged rule of the 
international relevance of constitutional provisions on the 
conclusion of treaties lies in a wish to create an international guarantee for the democratic domestic control of the treaty-
making power. 143 It would be somewhat strange if the official 
opinion of dictatorships were allowed in evidence of a rule of 
law expressive of that desire. 
It is submitted that in the material examined above, the 
Irish and the Norwegian provisions, alone, clearly demonstrate 
their authors' view that certain unconstitutional features make 
treaties invalid internationally. The Danish constitution, 
although on the face of it silent on this matter, has also been 
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shown to have been written in the same conviction. In addi-
tion, it may be conceded as probable that the French, Costa 
Rican, and Greek provisions were predicated upon the same 
view, and that there is some likelihood that the same is 
true for the Lebanese and Syrian provisions. 
It must be noted that although the convictions underlying 
the provisions cited in the preceding paragraph would no doubt 
accord with a rule making constitutional irregularities gener-
ally relevant in international law, only one of the provisions 
- that of Costa Rica - actually necessitated such a rule for 
its functioning, while another - that of Portugal - merely 
required that international relevance of countersigning, and 
the rest only could be taken to imply the belief that the con-
stitutional requirement of legislative assent is relevant under 
international law. This position, it must be stressed, is much 
more moderate than the broad assertion that municipal irregular-
ities of whatever kind regarding legal competence entail the 
international invalidity of a treaty if they have the effect 
of domestically voiding the same treaty. 
In contrast to the group of provisions cited above, the 
Belgian and Luxemburgian provisions, although explicit on the 
municipally invalidating effect upon treaties of certain 
unconstitutional features, have been sho~n to be officially and 
deliberately interpreted as not relating to the international 
effect of the same features. Indeed, the recent Luxemburgian 
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attitude was to the effect that the international validity 
of a treaty would not be affected by its not being approved by the state legislature. The same has been shown to be the Austrian and Swedish constitutional convictions. In addition, it has been demonstrated that a United States Senate Judiciary Committee, although eager to void domestically treaties in any 
way unconstitutional in substance, 144 did not consider affect-ing the international validity of the same treaties. It must finally be noted that it is not surprising that constitutions 
written or interpreted in the conviction that international invalidity of treaties does not necessarily follow with 
municipal invalidity do not make this position explicit ': there is no reason why such a rule of international law - if actually it be a rule of international law - should be embodied in the 
constitution. 
Wh.a t has been said above ought to suf'fic e to show that -
with a reservation as to what might be disclosed by a :fuller inquiry into the constitutional precepts of a large number of 
states whose provisions on the matter give no ready insight into their positions, - it cannot possibly be maintained that the general 'juridical conviction• among those who have framed, or interpreted constitutions is that unconstitutionality generally, 
or even certain unconstitutional features in treaties, make the latter invalid under international law, if invalid under municipal law. 
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Furthermore, it cannot be maintained that the circum-stance that constitutional provisions on the conclusion of treaties universally indicate the division of duties and procedures to be followed must be predicated upon a rule of international law delegating to constitutional law the determination of the organ or person internationally compet-ent to conclude a treaty on behalf of a state. It is true, of course, that the provisions of constitutions in no way excludes that possibility. It is equally possible, in theory, that such provisions are predicated upon a ~onviction that the rule of international law on the matter is sufficiently broad generally to permit the application of these provisions. A rule to the effect that the authority which appears likely to be able to bring about the fulfilment of the undertakings to be made is competent under international law would in no way be contradicted by the tenor of pertinent constitutional provisions as they have been described above. 
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V. CASES OF NATIONAL COURTS 
It is obvious that, in general, national courts will not have occasion to discuss the question whether a treaty which 
may be void under the domestic law of the state will also be 
void between the parties. In states where the courts are permitted to look into the constitutionality of treaties, they 
will pronounce themselves upon that matter alone, and their judgments cannot be expected often to be of direct interest to this discussion. 145 An examination of a number of cases con-firms this expectation, but reveals also a few instances where the courts have expressed opinions on the question of interna-tional law here at issue. To begin, the first type of case 
will be illustrated. 
In re Van Bellinghen, decided in 1950, the Court of Appeal 
of Paris ref'used to grant extradition which was requested on 
the basis of an exchange of notes between Belgium and France. The court found that the agreement had not been published and 
ratified, nor approved by a law, and could not, therefore, 
"override" article 27 of the French constitution which provided that treaties of certain kinds - and the exchange of notes in question was thought to be of such kind - were not "d~fini tifs" 
unless ratified on the basis of a law. 146 There was nothing in 
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the language of the court, as it appears in English transla-
tion in the International Law Reports, to suggest that the 
court thought the exchange of notes invalid between the two 
states. Nor, indeed, was there any need for such conclusion, 
since the court was only asked to decide whether or not extrad-
ition should be granted. 
In the above case, as in others, where an agreement has 
been refused application by a domestic court for the reason 
that it has been entered into in an unconstitutional manner, 
the question of the international validity is tacitly left for 
the executive branch of government to solve. 147 In the wake 
of such decisions there might consequently be expected diplomatic 
settlements bearing on the point of international law under dis-
cussion, unless, of course, the other party were always readily 
to accept the discontinued application of the treaty on the 
ground of its having been concluded unconstitutionally. In the 
apparent absence of published information as to diplomatic con-
sequences, or lack of consequences, in this type of case, they 
must be deemed to be without any particular evidential interest. 
There are nevertheless cases in which national courts have 
expressed their attitude to the problem under discussion. These 
opinions merit a certain consideration. Before the cases of this kind are considered, however, it may be mentioned that the United States Supreme Court, although it has had many opportunities 
to declare various agreements void on the ground of unconstitution-
ality, has always refrained from doing so. 148 It is possible, 
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of course, that the court might have exercised this caution regardless of any possible conviction that the international validity of an agreement would remain unaffected, even if the court chose to void the agreement municipally. The court's caution must at least imply, however, that the tribunal is aware that grave complications on the international level might follow a declaration making the treaty municipally void, for the reason that the other party might reject the view that the agreement should be internationally invalid because found 
entered into in an unconstitutional manner, or for the reason that the executive branch of the United States Government might not want to make such an assertion, on the one hand, and on the other, might not be able to fulfil what it would consider to be an international obligation. The general tendency of courts to interpret provisions of treaties as not violative of constitutional requirements, rather than refusing to accord municipal effect to their provisions, 149 may perhaps be given the same explalation. Of greater interest than the circumstances referred to above are certain cases in which domestic courts have used language pos:5ibly reflecting their views upon the international law problem under discussion. These will now be examined. In the case of In re Daem, decided in 1951, the Court of Appeal of Montpelier found the exchange of notes referred to above150 and decl,ared invalid in 1950 by the Court of Appeal of Paris, not to require French legislative approval, and declared: 
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"The Belgian Government is therefore entitled to request ••• 
the extradition ••• n 151 It might be argued that the inference 
must be drawn from this expression that the court considered 
the Belgian right under international law to be dependent upon 
past French compliance with article 26 of the French constitu-
tion. An inference of a similar attitude may perhaps be drawn from two pronouncements by Philippine courts. 
In the case of Co Chiong et al. v. The Mayor of Manila et al., the Supreme Court of the Philippines held that treaties to 
which the Philippines was not a party could not invalidate a 
municipal ordinance, and added: "The Philippines is bound only by the trea tie·s concluded and ratified in accordance with our 
Constitution."152 The conclusion seems here inevitable that the 
court had in mind obligations under international law. 
The second Philippine pronouncement was made by the Court 
of first instance of Manila, which, having discussed in some 
detail the constitutionality of an agreement entered into with 
the United States, and affirmed it, declared: 
"As an international agreement concluded with prior au~hority from the Congress of the Philippines, it is binding upon the Philippine Government ••• 11 153 
The conclusion, a contrario, would seem to be that an agreement 
concluded without prior authority from the Congress would have been held not binding upon the Philippine government. 
237 
In view of the circumstance that the international effect of unconstitutionality was probably not in the minds of the judges in either of the Philippine cases cited, it is perhaps not verry significant that the courts chose the broad express-ions used rather than narrowing their language to cover only the applicability of the agreements. It is of interest to note, moreover, in the second case, that, the plaintiff having raised the point that the agreement was signed by the Secretary of the Treasury rather than the Secretary of' State .. of the United States, the court declared that anyone could be appointed to sign an agreement on behalf of a state. 154 It added: 
" ••• as correctly pointed out by the defendants' counsel, 'it is not for the Philippine Government or any of its organs to determine whether or not the Agreement contravenes the laws of the United States. Only the United States Government may make that deter-mination. For courtesy and respect on the part of the Philippines require that it should not impose its Qwn interpretation on the laws of the United States •• : 11 155 
Though the court did not expressly contend that the United States would be irrevocably bound under international law by an interpretation given by the executive branch of its government to its constitution at the conclusion of a IB,rticular agreement, the logical implication of the statement is obviously that a foreign government, being, in the opinion of the court, forbidden to challenge the opposite government's interpretation of the constitution on the basis of which that government operates, must be entitled to rely upon that interpretation. 
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The case of Dyer v. ~,156 decided in 1951 by the Supreme Court of the United States, also merits examination. Admittedly this decision has regard only to relations between the states subject to the federal constitution of the United States, and is an expression of that law,. but some of the problems which confronted the judges have parallels in the international sphere, and the answers are consequently of interest here. The circumstances were the following: With the authorization of the Congress of the United States, West Virginia and seven other states of the United States entered into a compact to control pollution in the Ohio River system. Subsequently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found the act approving West Virginia's adherence invalid as violative of the state's constitution. On the question of whether West Virginia was nevertheless bound by the compact, the Supreme Court of the United States held: 
"It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified, or given final meaning by an organ of one of the contracting States. A State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a controversy with a sister State." 
The court went on to say that it would give weight to the interpretation that the highest court of a state gave to its 
constitution, but it would not be bound by it. After an 
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examination of the West Virginian constitution, and the 
relevant parts of the compact, the Supreme Court concluded that the compact did not conflict with the constitution. 
Two separate opinions written in the case are also of great interest. Mr Justice Black stated that he did not think the Supreme Court of the United States had the power to inter-pret the constitution of West Virginia. He thought it was 
obliged to accept the state court's interpretation of the con-
stitution of that state, unless it was prepared to say that that interpretation was "a palpable evasion to avoid a federal rule". Mr Justice Jackson, on the other hand, expressed himself as :follows: 
"West Virginia, for internal aff'airs, is free to interpret her own constitution as she will. But if the compact system is to have vitality and integrity, she may not raise an issue ultra vires, decide it, and release herself' from an interstate obligation ••• " 
He continued: 
"West Virginia points to no provision of' her Consti-tution v..hich we may say was clear notice or f'air warning to Congress or other States of any defect in her authority to enter into this Compact." 
He concluded: 
"Whatever she now says her Constitution means, she may not apply .retroactively that interpretation to place an unforeseeable construction upon what the other States to this Compact were entitled to believe was a fully authorized act. Estoppel is not often to be 
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invoked against a government. But West Virginia assumed a contractual obligation with equals ••• After Congress and sister States had been induced to alter their positions and bind themselves to 
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terms of a covenant, West Virginia should be estopped from repudiating her act. 11 157 
The following features of the decision are worth noting. All the judges thought the constitution of the state re:Evant to the determination of the binding force of the compact. On the other hand, none of the judges was prepared to accept as conclusive in the interstate sphere, whatever interpretation the highest state court of the state in question might choose to give to its constitution. If that proposition was not thought acceptable in a federal system, where the states treat with each other on the basis of a very high degree of mutual confidence and communal solidarity, how much less acceptable would the proposition not have seemed to the judges if they had applied it to the international community? Justice Jackson's important consideration may also be stressed that a state should no.t be allowed to apply retroactively an unforeseeable construction of its constitution; his adherence to what has above been te~med the doctrine of notoriety158 is noteworthy. The case of Pokorny and Another v. Republic of Austria has already been referred to in the discussion of the Austrian constitution, 159 and it may be recalled here that the Austrian Supreme Court clearly demonstrated that, though i. t considered a particular agreement municipally void because made in an 
j 
l I 
.) 
241 
wiconstitutional manner, it held the same agreement to be f'ully valid under international law. It should perhaps also be emphasized that the Austrian court thought fit to advise the government that a solution of the conflict that its judg-ment caused between the domestic law and the international law could be obtained by the adoption of a special federal law, 
modif'ying the municipal law to conform with the treaty. A Colombian case is of interest in this conne~1:~n, 
especially because of the directness of the language used in it. It appears that a provision of the Colombian constitution as amended in 1910 fixed the boundaries of the state, and laid down that these could only be "al tered 11 by treaties approved by the legi&iature. In a treaty of 24 March 1922, duly 
approved by the means of a law, large tracts of land were ceded by Colombia to Peru. It was contended before the court that changes permitted by the constitution were only small altera-tions and that, consequently, the law was unconstitutional. In its judgment of 6 December 1930, the court refused to decide on the issue of constitutionality. One of the reasons advanced for this position merits quotation: 
" ••• if the Treaty were held unconstitutional, there would be an insoluble conflict between the discharge of the international obligation assumed under it and obedience to the judgment of the Supreme Court. After the ratifications had been exchanged, the Treaty was an agreement between two States. One of them must not have the right to relieve itself of its obligations under that agreement, even by the action of its highest court. 11160 
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On the basis; of the limited material presented above, it is not possible to draw any general conclusions regarding atti-tudes of national courts to the question of international law under discussion. The scarcity of relevant cases is not surpris-ing. It is, indeed, remarkable that national courts have at all dealt with the question, and it is remarkable, too, that the supreme courts of three states - the United States, Austria 
and Colombia - have come to the result that treaties concluded in violation of the constitution of a state may nevertheless be binding upon the state. It has been shown, on the other hand, that no more than weak and uncertain inferences to the contrary may be drawn from the few remaining cases of relevance. 
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VI. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF INQUIRING OF A GOVERNMENl J WHETBER IT IS MUNICIPALLY AUTHORIZED TO CONCLUDE A PARTICULAR TREATY 
Several writers have discussed the question of whether it is permissible for a government to direct an inquiry to another government regarding that government's municipal authority to assume a particular treaty obligation. The matter has already been touched upon in a preliminary fashion above, 161 and it has been pointed out that inquiries generally would be meaningless, because they could only be directed to the very authorities whose competence was in question. While this circumstance might offer some explanation of the apparent rarity of inquiries, it might nevertheless be argued that if inquiries were, in fact, not tolerated, this circumstance, while in no way constituting conclusive evidence of the proposi-tion that municipal laws regarding the conclusion of treaties are not accorded strict relevance internationally, would undoubtedly m~e that proposition a reasonable one. 162 
Some writers' treatment of the matter will first be taken up. Wohlmann maintains that an inquiry has never been regarded aa forbidden intervention; not even an inquiry concerning the head of state. 163 Dr Mervyn Jones admits that it is not a Practice of states to make inquiries into constitutional 
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requirements for the conclusion of treaties. 164 The same 
commentator suggest, far too optimistically, it is sub,itted, 165 
that "the fact that no instances are recorded of inquiries to 
this effect merely shows that, in most cases, information is 
so readily available, and the laws so obvious, that no 
inquiries are necessary11 • 166 1)1' Jones ventures the opinion, 
finally, that 0 in cases of doubt a S.tate is certainly entitled 
11 167 
to rely on representations made by the State concerned . . . . , 
although that proposition seems hard to reconcile with his con-
clusion that constitutional provisions on competence are decisive for the international validity of a treaty. 168 
Professor Basdevant declares that inquiries would be 
undesirable. In the opinion of the learned French jurist, 
ratification by the head of state 'ought to be relied upon with 
confidence: 
0 L'autre Etat n'a pas A la contraler, a v~rifier son exactitude constituiionneDe. Un Etat ne doit pas s'immiscer dans les questions douteuses,sur les limites au pouvoir de traiter du chef d'un Etat ~tranger: ces questions douteuses doivent @tre trait~es dans l'ordre interne ••• 11 169 
Other authorities have maintained with even greater emphasis 
that inquiries would not be tolerated, and have adduced this 
circumstance as an argument against the international relevanee 
of constitutional provisions on the conclusion .of treaties. 
Thus, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice whose view carries the greater 
Weight because of his practical experience, states: 
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"An intolerable situation would, it seems, be created if' states were forced to make minute and often invidious inquiries 'before they could feel certain of their position. "170 
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What answer, if any, is actu~lly provided by the practice of states'? An incident from the 18th century may first be reviewed. In 1793, the French Minister to Washington requested 
I 
an exequatur for a consul whose commission was addressed to the Congr.ess of the United States. Mr Jeff'erson, Secretary or State, declared that an exequatur would be issued by the President only for a commission correctly addressed. He is further reported to have stated: 
" ••• as the President was the only channel of communication between the United States and foreign nations, it was f'rom him alone 'tha t foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the nation;' that whatever he communicated as such, they had a right and were bound to consider 'as the expression of the nation;' and that no foreign agent could be 'allowed to question it', or to interpose between him and any other branch of government, under the ~retext of either's transgress-ing their functions. tt171 
. 
It ,accordingly appears that the United States Government would not have tolerated any inquiries regarding the comptence of the President. A similar attitude was assumed in a later i ncident. In 1817, the Rush-Bagot agreement concerning arma-ments on the Great Lakes had been concluded between the United States and Great Britain by means of an exchange of notes which had the formal approval of Congress, but was not formally ratified. 
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On 23 November 1864, the United States minister to London, acting upon instructions, gave the required six months' notice of the United States' wish to terminate the agreement. This action was subsequently "adopted and ratified" by Congress. In view of changed circumstances, however, Mr Seward, Secretary of State, declared early in March, 1865, that the United States was willing to preserve the convention "practically in force". The British Government, thereupon, inquired whether this was intended as a formal withdrawal of the denunciation, and was apparently given an affirmative answer. In a report of 1892, however, Mr Foster, Secretary of State, commenting upon the incident, declared that the British Government was "incompetent to inquire" into the authority of the Secretary o'f' State, and 
"could only accept and respect the withdrawal as a fact". He stated further that the question of competence, "being a matter of domestic administration, affecting the internal ·relations of the executive and legislative powers" in no way concerned Great Britain. 172 
In spite of the evidence afforded by the incidents des-cribed above, _ it does not seem that the principle of non-inquiry has been rigidly adhered to by the United States. It is reported that, in 1907, the United States Secretary of State, Mr Adee, transmitted a memorandum concerning the authority of his govern-~ ment to conclude executive agreements, to the Swedish Qharg~ • _j d'Affaires, in reply to an inguiry of the latter. 173 
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A recent official United States pronouncement, on the 
other hand, again supports the position that foreign states 
should not concern themselves with questions relating to the 
constitutional competence of the United State& Government. 
With a letter of' 14 December 1949 to Mr Clyde Eagleton, the 
Department of State enclosed a memorandum, containing some 
comments upon the formula "subject to approval", used in 
modern treaty practice. The following passage is taken from 
the memorandum: 
"In any event, the national action which a particular government considers necessary in order to reach the point where it may take the requisite international action to become a full-fledged party to an agreement is not the concern of the other governments eligible to become parties to the agreement. So long as the ·· terms of the agreement with respect to the method by which governments may become parties thereto are couched in sufficiently precise language, the way should be left open as far as practicable for each of the governments to handle its national procedure as it sees fit. That would seem to be the primary, if not the whole, object of the flexible formula which has lately gained popularity among negotiators; ••• "174 
Reference may here also be made to the pronouncement made 
by a Philippine court, and quoted above. 175 The inference 
could be drawn from that statement that the court considered 
the Philippine government not justified in questioning the 
authority to conclude an agreement that the executive branch 
of the United States Government purported to possess. 
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If the evidence supplied above permits it to be doubted that there is a general legal rule - and not only one of comity176 
- forbidding inquiries, such must be rare, indeed. In view 
of the extreme uncertainty attaching to the precise meaning of many constitutional provisions on the conclusion of treaties, the circumstance must be considered of some importance that the point of constitutionality hardly ever seems to be raised, or to prevent governments from confidently entering into agreements with states, such as the United States, whose constitutional provision on the making of treaties has a literal meaning that is plain and even notorious, but a real meaning that can hardly be assessed. 178 It is believed that this circumstance must be taken to mean that states are confident that the international validity of a treaty is, at any rate, not strictly dependent 
upon the competence existing under constitutional law, or the 
strict compliance with procedures established in municipal law, as that competence or those procedures may eventually be authoritatively de~ined in the municipal sphere in a given case. 
• :J 
VII 0 DEPOSITARIES' CONCERN FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF TREATIES 
249 
While the foregoing analysis has had primarily in view parties in bilateral relation, it is clear that the problem and the reasoning is the same in multilateral treaty relations. When one government is made the depositary of instruments relating to a multilateral treaty, there has merely occurred a cent.ralization of some tasks which would have otherwise belonged to each party to the multilateral treaty. The depositary, acting on behalf of all the parties, receives the various instruments by which final consent is expressed by states, and examines the regularity of these documents. 
It has been suggested, probably with good reason, that the control and judgment exercised by the depositary is not custom-arily of a f'inal nature. 179 According to this view, the con-tracting parties - however that concept is defined180 charge an organ, such as a government, with various tasks as a depositary, but retain final judgment. Appeals by entities that desire to adhere to a multilateral convention, as well as protests from states which are parties to the convention may, therefore, be lodged against the determination ma.de by the .depositary, and decided by the contracting parties. 181 
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Whether a government or an international organ, the 
depositary will nevertheless normally render a preliminary judgment which becomes final unless appealed or protested -
upon the validity of instruments submitted to it for deposit. Its :f'urther duties as a depositary, such as the declaring of a treaty in force when a specified number of states have become parties, will frequently depend upon such judgments. It would be of interest to find out to what extent, if any, depositaries 
concern themselves with the ~uestion of the municipal regularity 
of instruments expressing final consent. 
A member of the legal division of the Secretariat of the United Nations states in an article published in 1951 that, in 
exercising the functions of a depositary, the Secretariat 
examines whether instruments of ratification, acceptance, or 
adherence emanate from a "competent authority", 182 but that 
author does not report what, in the opinion of the s ·ecretaria t, 
constitutes a "competent aut.hori ty". Judging by another author's treatment of the same matter, however, the Secretariat does not inquire into the constitutionality of instruments which express final consent-, but is satisfied that these are internationally 
valid if emana-_ting from the head of state, the head of government, 
or the foreign minister of a state. The same writer ventures to suggest that the depositary organ ought to undertake a 
more rigid control. He is content to propose, however, that the depositary should re:f'use to accept an instrument emanating from 
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the head of state only when the instrument is given in manifest violation of the constitutional law of the state. 183 There appears to be only scant material on the principles followed by governments acting as depositaries, and what has been found relates to the practice of the Government of the United States. 
An incident connected with the Washington Conference of 1922 on the limitation of armaments is of some interest. 184 One resolution of the conference provided that the parties to the conference should supply each other with lists . .a>f' all treaties and agreements they had made with or regarding China. Switzerland being invited to adhere to the resolution, the Swiss Foreign Minister notified the American minister to Bern on 27 June 1922 that the Swiss Federal Council had decided to adhere, and a copy of the only Swiss treaty with China was appended to its note. Subsequently the Swiss Government dis-covered that its adherence was illegal, because not affected in conformity with the Swiss constitution. A secretary of the Swiss legation at Washington called on the Department of State on 23 February and 6 March 1923, explaining the above circum-stances and "asked how Switzerland should proceed to withdraw i ta !,dherence". 185 He was informally advised that the Swiss Govern-ment should notify the American minister in Switzerland about the difficulty, and ask that the Swiss adherence be cancelled or Withdrawn. He was further informed that "such a note would be 
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communicated to the other powers notified of the Swiss 
adherence and that if they raised no objection the Swiss adher-
ence would undoubtedly be regarded as annulled". 186 
No note of the kind recommended was addressed to the 
United States minister, and when, in April 1929, the latter 
inquired whether Switzerland considered itself a party to the 
resolution, or desired to withdraw its note of adherence, the 
Swiss Government replied that it had supplied a copy of the only 
treaty it had with China, that the other parties had not 
communicated their treaties with China to the Swiss Government, 
and that the Swiss Political Department felt, therefore, that 
it was not called upon "to withdraw at the present date the 
declaration, which has always remained a dead letter" •187 
Undoubtedly the incident described above reflects the 
opinion of the State Department, acting as depositary, that a 
conat-i tutional deficiency in the adherence did not aff'ect the 
validity of the adherence under international law; release 
f rom the obligation under that law could only be obtained by 
agreement with the other sta tea. Without a doubt, too, the 
Swiss Government shared this view in 1923. The meaning of 
the Swiss reply in 1929 is somewhat more difficult to ascertain. 
Presumably the Swiss Government considered its own declaration a 
"dead lettertt t'or the very reason that it advanced, namely, 
non-fult'ilment by the other parties. It is conceivable, however, 
that, without advancing any express grounds t'or such an opinion, 
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the government meant to say that the declaration of adherence 
was a dead letter because unconstitutionai. 188 
A memorandum of 1930, addressed by the Secretary of State 
of the United States to the Danish minister to Washington has 
already been cited in the discussion of the position of depositar-ies.189 In this connexion it is of interest to note the follow-ing passage of the memorandum: 
ttThat r there might well be some uncertainty as to the degree of adherence given by a mere notice of adherence may be illustrated by the case of a notification given to the Government of the United States by a depository Government of the adherence of a third Government to a multilateral treaty, where, when an occasion arose to apply the treaty, it was stated in effect that ratifica-tion with the approval of the national legislative body was required to make the adherence complete and definitive, although no mention had been made in the notice of adher-ence that the adherence was subject to ratification. 11190 
The incident described in the memorandum seems to indicate that, in exercising depositary functions, the State Department does not closely examine the constitutionality of instruments 
of adherence . 191 
When applied to at least one treaty for which the United States Government acts as a depositary, namely, the Charter of the United Nations, the observation made in the preceding para-graph has strong support in a detailed discussion by Professor Kopelmanas. 192 Paragraph 1 of article 110 of the Charter Provides that the Charter shall be ratified by the signatory 
states ttin accordance with their resi:;ective constitutional 
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II processes; paragraph 2 of the same article lays down that 
ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the 
United States, which shall notify all the signatory states 
of each deposit; paragraph 3, finally, prescribes that the 
Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications 
by the five great powers, and by a majority of the other signatory 
states. 
It has been suggested by Kelsen that the second paragraph 
cited might be interpreted to mean that the ijovernment of the 
United States, as the depositary, was obligated to accept 
instruments of ratification only when it thought they satisfied 
the requirement of constitutionality. 193 Kopelmanas, on the 
other hand, does not attribute to the United States Government 
the po.wer of refusing municipally irregular ratifications 0 194 
He attempts to prove that several instruments submitted were, 
indeed, unconstitutional, and he notes that the question of 
their regularity was not even raised. He suggests f'urther that 
the only way out woulu have been to give the United States an 
absolute right or the duty to decide on the regularity of · ratifi-
cations, 195 a solution he finds inconceivable in the present 
state of international relations. It may be added that, although 
in this case the right or the duty of the depositary to reject 
( unconstitutional ratifications may be subject to discussion, 
the right of the signatories, including, indeed, the United 
States Government in that capacity, to raise the question of the 
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regularity of ratifications cannot be doubted, and whether or 
not Kopelmanas is correct in maintaining that some instruments 
were unconstitutional, it is believed significant, at least, 
that apparently attention was not officially called to the 
question of the regularity of these instruments. 
It is submitted that the rather meagre material 
described bearing on the attitudes of depositaries and of 
signatories of the United Nations Charter, points in the same 
direction as the discussion on inquiries, namely, that states 
feel confident of the binding effect under international law 
of expressions of final consent, although these may not have 
been given in perfect conformity with the municipal law of' the 
state concernedo 
256 
VI~1. DIPLOMATIC INCIDENTS 
A number of diplomatic incidents and cases not settled 
before international tribunals will be examined below with 
a view to deducing, if possible, the principle or principles 
which may have been followed with regard to the determination 
of the competence under international law of authorities 
purporting to represent constitutionally organized states. 
1. Incident of 1832 between the United States and France196 
j J In 1831, a treaty between the United States and France 
was concluded and duly ratified. It provided that France 
should pay a large sum to the United States as compensation 
to American subjects for damages inf'licted by France in the 
course of the revolutionary wars. Under the French consti-
tution of 1830, the executive branch of the government was 
competent to enter into the treaty without legislative 
approval. In order to perform the obligations undertaken, 
however, the French Government needed an appropriation by 
the legislature. The bill introduced for this purpose in 
the chamber having been rejected, the government became 
unable to perform under the treaty and resigned. 
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While in the conflict that ensued, the French Govern-
ment apparently never disputed the binding force of the 
treaty, it claimed that it could' not be accused of a breach 
of faith if it refrained from performing in violation of its 
constitution. In piain words, this defence amounted to an 
assertion that the validity of an international obligation 
was dependent upon the fulfilment of other municipal require-
ments than those relating to the treaty-making competence of 
the head of state. The United States rejected this contention, 
and maintained that, being concluded and ratified in accordance 
with the constitution, the treaty was binding on every depart-
ment of the contracting government. After a protracted 
controversy, including the rupture of diplomatic relations, 
the French legislative assembly eventually voted the necessary funds, and performance was secured. 
It does not seem justified to argue, as has been done, 197 
that the incident supports the contention that constitutional limitations upon the competence of the head of state are decisive for his competence under international law, simply because the United States maintained that, having satisfied its constitu-
tional provisions on the conclusion of treaties, France was 
bound to performo The conclusion does not necessarily follow 
that the treaty would not have been thought binding had these provisions been deemed violated. That question was simply 
not at issue. The United States Government migp.t, indeed, have 
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considered the treaty valid regardless of the constitutional-ity of the ratification, but have found the argument even 
more impressive that, under the law of the very party that 
made difficulties, the treaty was validly concluded. 
It is submitted that the incident only lends some author-ity to the theory that internal provisions relating to the 
execution of treaties cannot be pleaded in excuse of a failure 
to perform. 198 
2. Incident of 1832 between the United States and Mexico199 
A United States-Mexican exchange of views of 1832 is 
cited by Dr Mervyn Jones in support of the contention that, 
on the American continent, constitutional limitations are 
thought relevant internationally. 200 The Mexican charge 
d'affaires at Washington having proposed that ratifications 
of certain treaties should be exchanged, the Secretary of 
State, Mr Livingstone, declining the proposal, stated in 
part, with a sornewha t peculiar formulation: 
''in order to proceed to the exchange of treaties, the ratifications of both high contracting parties by their constitutional organs must have preceded such exchange ••• "201 
Though it is no doubt permissible to draw a certain 
support from the above statement for the view that constitu-
tional requirements are relevant internationally, its primary 
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meaning must have been only that it was not enough that 
Mexico was ready to proceed to the exchange. The United 
States, too, was obliged to have satisfied its internal require-
ments, before the exchange could take place. The Secretary 
of State simply did not have in mind the situation that would 
arise were either party to exchange ratifications without 
legislative approval. 
3. Incident of 1849 between the United States and Mexico202 
Another United States-Mexican exchange, likewise cited 
by Jones, 203 appears also to be of limited value as evidence 
in the question under discussion. When performing the 
exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace signed in 
1848 at Guadalupe Hidalgo, the two commissioners appointed 
by the President of the United States for this purpose signed 
a "protocol" with the Foreign Minister of Mexico.. In that 
instrument they purported to explain the meaning of certain 
amendments made by the United States Senate to the treaty 
that had been signed. Subsequently, the validity and nature 
of the protocol became the subject of a controversy, at the 
height of which in 1849 the Mexican minister to Washington 
maintained that the protocol was a "real diplomatic convention 11 • 204 The Secretary of State of the United States emphatically 
rejected that view. He stated: 
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" ••• inasmuch as that instrument does not on its fa .c e purport to be a diplomatic Convention, as it was not concluded according to the forms usually observed in negotiating or by men having power to make such Conventions, as it has not been approved by the Senate of the United States and the Congress of Mexico, or ratified by the President of either Republic agreeably to the requirements of their respective Constitutions, it is not and will ne~er be held to be binding in honor or in law upon the Congress or the Executive of the United States. 11 205 
Though some support for the theory of the strict rele-
vance of constitutions may undoubtedly be gained from the 
above statement, it must be stressed that the primary 
purpose behind it was not to prove that a treaty was void-
able because made in an unconstitutional manner, but rather 
,'.that the absence of constitutionally required domestic 
procedures, in addition to other circumstances, indicated 
that the intention of the authors had never been to conclude 
any treaty at all. 
4. Western Grigualand Diamond Deposits case of 1871 206 
With a view to the judicial settlement of a boundary 
controversy, a compromis was signed by President Pretorius 
acting on behalf of the Transvaal Republic, and the British 
Governor of the Cape Colony, on behalf of native chiefs of 
territory in Western Griqualand. Though the award rendered 
by Sir Robert Keate on 17 October 1871 was very unfavourable 
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to the Republic, President Pretorius informed the British 
Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, that he would submit to it. 
Public opinion in the Republic became so adverse to the 
President, however, as to cause him and his government to 
resign. 
In a proclamation of 25 November 1871, the new government 
of Transvaal protested against the award, and contended that 
the compromis - and, therefore, the award - was a nullity, 
because President Pretorius had exceeded his constitutional 
powers in signing it without the legislative assent that was 
constitutionally requir-ed. The Governor of the Cape Colony, 
in rejecting this argument, maintained that an internal con-
flict between the executive and the legislative power of the 
Republic was of no concern to him, and declared that he 
intended to respect the award. In view of the firm juridical 
position thus taken, it is perhaps of slight importance that 
the British Governm.em.t is reported to have subsequently 
actually insisted on compliance with the award only to the 
extent that British interests were affected. 207 
The position taken ~Y the British Governor undoubtedly 
lends some support to the view that non-compliance with a con-
stitutional requirement of parliamentary assent may be irrele-
Vant under international law. The background of the action 
taken by Transvaal, on the other hand, inspires the doubt that 
the legal argument was a mere subterfuge, behind which there was no genuine view of the law. 
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It is not believed that ~h~ significance of the stand 
taken by the Governor is weakened, as has been suggested, 208 
by Westlake' s note doctrinale __ on tbe report of the case, 
endorsing a principle con,trary to that advanced by the 
British Governor. 209 The sp~cial _importance of positions 
taken in diplomatic relations lies in their being concrete 
expressions of the practice of states, as that practice is 
moulded by various functional needs. Doctrinal notes by 
whomsoever may diminish the apparent importance of an incident 
by demonstrating that special circumstances explaine4 the 
position taken, or that a special interpretation should be 
given to it. It is submitted, however, that they cannot 
deprive positions taken of their value as evidence merely by 
opposing them. 
It seems equally :futile to attempt to reduce the value 
of the incident by contending that the controversy was not 
truly international, because one or the sides consisted of 
native tribes. 210 Today, there should be no difriculty in 
the recognition of the compromia as a compact made under 
international law. It has not been explained what else could 
have given it legal force, nor why the Transvaal Republic 
sought to invoke its constitutional provisions on the conclu-
sion or treaties in defence of its refusal to comply with the 
award. 
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What is, alone,believed significant in this incident, is the circumstance that a responsible governing authority 
refused to admit the contention that the constitutional provisions on legislative assent in a foreign state, were decisive for the competence under international law of its President. Only the circumstance that the authority taking the negative stand had a direct interest of its own in doing 
so, 211 may reasonably be advanced as limiting somewhat the 
evidential value of the positions taken. 
5. Incident of 1873 concerning the termination of the Anglo-UrugµYan Postal Convention of 1853212 
After having been applied for some twenty years by the 
authorities of Great Britain and Uruguay, a postal convention 
signed on behalf of the two states on 28 November 1853, 21 3 
was denounced by a Uruguayan Government as not binding, because 
not sanctioned by the legislature of the state. The British Government, on the other hand, declining to accept the argument, maintained that the convention was binding and could only be 
revised or terminated after a year's notice as prescribed by 
article 6 of the convention. In view of the circumstance that the Government of Uruguay, in fact, no longer respected the 
convention, the law officers of the British Crown advised the British Government in 1873, however, that it would be justified in summarily terminating the agreement. 
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The ap:i;aren t absence of any published account of the British replies to the Government of Uruguay admittedly 
makes the incident somewhat inconclusive. 21 4 It is true, furthermore, as suggested by de Visscher, 21 5 that it may be seen as .evidence of a South American practice making legislative assent internationally relevant. Whatever may have been the precise grounds of the British stand, however, it is evident that in its opinion lack of a required legis-lative assent was either wholly irrelevant internationally, 
or else rendered irrelevant internationally under certain 
circumstances, such as actual application continued over a period of time. 
6. Incident of 1885 concerning the denunciation· bf Ecuador of the Industrial Property Convention of 188321:i 
In 1883, the Ecuadorian Government had adhered without 
any reservation as to ratification to the Industrial Property Convention of 20 March 1883. 21 7 It had neglected, however, to 
submit the . convention for the legislative approval that was 
required under the constitution of Ecuador, and when it later did so, the legislature refused to give its consent. Faced 
with this situation, the Ecuadorian Government did not con-tend that the state was not bound internationally for the 
reason that the government had acted in excess of its consti-tutional powers, but gave notice of its denunciation of the 
.1: ' 
convention in the manner prescribed by article 18 of the 
convention. The Bureau of the Union, accordingly, listed Ecuador as a member until a full year had passed after the denunciation. 218 The procedure employed must reasonably be taken to imply that the Government of Ecuador considered 
the state bound under international law in spite of the 
possible lack of validity of the treaty under the law of Ecuador, 21 9 and that the Bureau of the Union concurred in 
this view. 
The above conclusion is admitted by Basdevant 220 and by Vitta, 221 while Chailley tries to see in the action of 
the Ecuadorian Government only the expression of a wish to 
avoid difficulties which might have arisen, had a different 
course of action been taken. 222 It is, of course, frequently possible to argue that a subject refraining from a certain 
course of action does so to avoid an adverse reaction from its environment, rather than to avoid the infraction of a legal principle, and the argument is especially convenient in the international field where there may not be a great difference between "difficulties" and what may be termed 
"decentralized sanctions of law''. The evidential value of 
this incident would undoubtedly be greater if it could be 
shown that there was a positive juridical conviction behind 
the course of action chosen by the Ecuadorian Government. 
By any ordinary methods of interpretation, however, the 
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conclusion must be permissible that a government giving 
notice of the termination of a convention in conformity 
266 
with a provision of the convention, implicitly admits that it is bound by that convention. 
7. Incident concerning the African Boundary Agreement of 1889 between France and Great Britain 
An occasion on. which the French legislature refrained from internationally asserting its constitutional right to pass upon treaties before their ratification is cited by Cottez. 223 
On 10 August 1889, an arrangement between Great Britain 
and France was signed at Paris, delimiting British and French possessions on the coast of East Africa. The French Govern-
ment promulgated the agreement by a decree, without obtaining legislative approval. On 4 November 1890, M. d~ la Ferronays, 
speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, characterized this procedure as a "violation f'lagrante, positive, indiscutable de la constitution". He did not, however, deny that the treaty was valid internationally, and it is significant that he con-
sidered that the faith of the state was involved. He declared: 
"Le prestige de la France, le souci de sa Qi gnit~ et de son honneur ne nous permettent pas vis-A-vi i , de l'~tranger de discuter la signature de M. le l ·r ~sident de la Rt§publique, qu'il l'ait donnt§e l tort ou A raison, nous n'avons m@me pas l 
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!'examiner; c'est un fait, le trait~ est acquis ••• Nous devona accepter, subir, respecter, au nom de 1 1 honneur francais, lea conventions qui ont t!tl conclues. r,224 
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The Foreign Minister, M.Ribot, was eager to conclude 
that the treaty had been ratified by the President, and 
that no one required that the signature of the President 
be put in gµestion. 
Thus, though the treaty was alleged to have been rati-
fied in violation of the constitution, it was admitted by 
the very member making that allegation that the treaty was 
nevertheless an internationally valid instrument, and this 
opinion was apparently not contradicted. 225 
8. Incident of 1 
alliance of 1 
concernin umanian-Austrian 
Without relying upon it as a precedent, Dr Mervyn 3ones -
citing Mirkine-Guetz&vitch as authority - states that in 1914 Rumania repudiated a secret treaty, alleging that it was 
unconstitutiona1. 226 This statement appears to be due to 
a misunderstanding of the authority cited. Dr Mirkine-
Guetz~vitch maintains that a secret treaty of 30 October 1883, by which Rumania bound herself in relation to Austria to place herself on the side of the Central Powers in case of a war with Russia, was unconstitutional, because by the Rumanian consti-
tution, to be valid, all treaties required the assent of the 
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Parliament. That writer further states that the Rumanian Council of the Crown, meeting on 3 August 1914, at the out-break of the first world war, decided almost unanimously to remain neutral, and he adds that the Council, drawing support from the position taken by Italy, considered that the casus foederis of the treaty did not correspond to the situa-tion in 1914. 227 Thus, it does not appear from the account given by Dr Mirkine-Guetz~vitch that the unconstitutionality of the treaty228 
- whether or not it was considered in the Council - was invoked in relation to the other party, nor does that conclusion arise from the sources cited by him. 229 If, as alleged by Dr Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, the treaty was unconstitutional, the incident may acquire a significance totally different from that assumed by Dr Jones. Since it appears the Council refused performance under the treaty only on the ground that the casua foederis had not occurred, it must be concluded, indeed, that did the Council consider the treaty unconstitutional •and.perhaps even invalid - it nevertheless considered itself bound under international law. 
9. The treaties of 1915 between China and Japan 
It has been asserted by several writers that the treaties based upon the so-called Twenty-one Demands made by Japan upon China in 1915 were invalid internationally because made in violation of the Chinese constitution. 23° The following 
i 
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account, which is a summary of a detailed investigation of the matter, will show, however, that the fact is conspicuous that the Chinese Government never argued the invalidity of the treaties on that ground. 
On 7 May 1915, after lengthy negotiations on twenty-four demands that had been made by Japan upon China, the Japanese Government presented an ultimatum to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, while Japanese men-of-war headed for China. 231 The following day, the Chinese President and Cabinet, the Council of State, and the military leaders met and resolved to accept the ultimatum. 232 As a result, on 25 May 1915, two treaties, one concerning Shantung, the other regarding South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and thirt.een 
exchanges of notes were signed on behalf of China by her President, Yuan Shih Kai. 233 The two treaties laid down that they were to enter into force upon signature, but prov-ided for ratification, as well. They were, in fact, rati-fied by the Chinese President, and instruments of ratification were exchanged on 8 June 1915. 234 No assent was given to the treaties or the notes by any Chinese legislature. It is possible, though not altogether certain, that such assent 
was constitutionally required. The question calls for a short discussion. 
According to the provisional constitution adopted in 1912, legi;~lative assent would unquestionably have been 
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required. 235 However, Yuan Shih Kai, who had legally been 
elected President under that law had dissolved the National Assembly elected under the same law, by a decree issued in January 1914. 236 Moreover, a conference called by him had drafted a "Constitutional Compact", which was promulgated 
on 1 May 1914. Article 25 of this instrument - which 
should perhaps be considered the domestic- law governing the issue 237 - provided as follows: 
"The President makes treaties; but, should articles therein provide for any change of territory, or increase the burdens of citizens, the concurrence of the Legislature shall be required." 238 
It may safely be assumed that had the above article, 
alone, been controlling, the treaties entered into would have been unconstitutional. It is to be noted, however, that the 
"Legislature'' referred to in the article had not come into 
existence at the time of' signature and ratification of the 
treaties, 239 and that, this being so, article 67 of the same 
constitutional compact acquired relevance. It read: 
"Before the Legislature shall have been con-voked, its powers and :functions shall be assumed and discharged by the Council of State. tt240 
The Council of State, mentioned in the above article, 
existed at the relevant time, and as has already been pointed 
out, the Japanese ultimatum was, indeed, accepted only after 
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consideration and decision by this Council. The treaties, 
which in substance did not differ from the demands contained in the ~ltimatum, do not, however, appear to have been sub-
mitted to the Council. 241 Whatever constitutional provision is thought applicable to the case, there may thus be doubts 
as to the formal constitutionality of the procedure employed by the Chinese President in concluding the treaties. However, these doubts did not find any expression at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaties, or immediately thereafter, nor 
were there, at that time, any doubts as regards Nu.an's 
actual authority in the country. One writer describes the 
situation as follows: 
"During March to May, when these agreements with Japan were being negotiated there was, in fact, no parliament in China properly so called. 'President' Yuan Shih-k'ai was practically a dictator, whose monarchical aspirations were supported by a strong faction of politicians in actual possession of authority. 
'President' Yuan signed those agreements as the only Chinese commanding authority in and for China from the point of view of competence to deal with foreign states."242 
In June _1916, Yuan Shih Kai died, and to secure the 
co-operation of all factions in the country, his successor, Li Yuan-hung, the Vice-President, proclaimed the provisional constitution of 1912 again to be in force. 243 It may be of interest to note, also, that the new -President appears to have proclaimed that all treaties which had been concluded 
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0 subsequent to dissolution of [ the] Parliament in May, 1914" were to be recognized as valid. 244 
The National Assembly which was convened by the new President, and which actually met at Peking in June 1915, does not appear to have passed upon the treaties before it was dissolved again. 245 On 24 September, 1918, moreover, notes were exchanged between the Chi~ese Minister to Tokyo and the Japanese Foreign Minister on questions concerning Shantung. 246 How~ver corrupt the origin of these notes may have been, and whatever were the precise circumstances of their being exchanged, their contents were predicated upon the 
continued validity of the treaties of 1915, and they must be taken to have implied Vhe then Chinese Government's recogni-tion of those treaties. As such, as well as in themselves, they turned out to be highly damaging to the Chinese claims advanced at the Paris Peace Conference. 247 
At the Paris Peace Conference, the Chinese delegation urged the "abrogation" of the treaties of 1915 on the grounds, among others, that they were concluded under duress, and 
"lacked in finality". 248 The latter expression had no refer-ence, as might be supposed, to constitutional finality; behind it lay a claim to the effect that for their permanence, the treaties required the assent of the Great Powers. 249 Among the legal arguments presented by the Chinese at the Peace Conference, there is indeed no trace of a contention that the 
0 
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treaties of 1915 should have been invalid because uncon-
stitutional. 250 
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In spite of initial strong United States support for 
the Chinese position at Paris, the final result of the con-
ference was a complete rejection of the Chinese claim. 
Article 157 of the Versailles Treaty provided that "The movable 
and immovable property owned by the German State in the terri-
tory of Kiaochow ••• ~ and remain acquired by Japan ••• " (emphasis supplied), a formulation which seems to be predicated 
upon the view that valid acquisition had occurred by the 
treaties of 1915.~5>:i The United States, which did not ratify 
the treaty, cannot, perhaps, be regarded as having acquiesced 
in this position, 252 and the Chinese delegation which ref'used 
even to Si8P the treaty may certainly not be said to have 
done so. By submitting the treaties of 1915 for abrogation -
and citing as a precedent the Congress of Berlin, where the 
Great Powers took upon themselves to revise a treaty betvreen 
Russia and Turkey253 - the Chinese stand must nevertheless 
be taken to have been that the treaties were, at the most, 
voidable. 254 
At the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, the Chinese 
Government again submitted the treaties of 1915 for "cancella-
. tion". 255 The four grounds on which the abrogation of the 
treaties was urged did not include lack of constitutionality, 256 
although that ground appears to have been advanced by private writers at this time. 257 The Japanese apparently felt that their legal position was secure. On 2 February 1922, their delegate, Baron Shidehara, stated in part as follows: 
"It is presumed that the Chinese delegation has no intention of calling in question the legal validity of the compacts of 1915, which were formally signed and sealed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Govern-ments, and for which the exchange of ratifica-tions was effected in conformity with established international usages ••• 11 258 
The Chinese, on the other hand, appear to have felt 
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that their position was weak on what they tenned "the technical or juristic validity of the agreements of 1915, as having been actually signed in due form by the two Governments", for they were careful to point out that the conference had 
not been called for the purpose of maintaining the legal status . guo. 259 
Even when, subsequently, the Chinese Parliament had declared the treaties null and void, the executive branch 
of the Chinese Government appears not to have abandoned the position that Japanese agreement would be required for the 
abrogation of the treaties. Furthermore, that branch does 
not appear to have attached much significance to the contention that lack of parliamentary consent deprived the treaties of 1915 of validity under international law. 
'--
275 
In the autumn of 1922, at the ordinary session of the Chinese National Assembly, two motions introduced independently of each other in the House of Representatives, called upon the National Assembly to declare the treaties of 1915 null and void. 26° Follo~~ng a debate in the House on 1 November 1922, the two draft resolutions were merged into one and passed unanimously. 261 Apprehension concerning the effect of the resolution appears to have been voiced in the Senate, and the resolution was temporarily held up. A new and similar resolution appears to have been passed by the House on 17 January 1923, however, and to have secured adoption in the Senate on 19 January. 262 No translation of the exact text of this resolution has been found. How-ever, in a memorandum presented to the Lytton Commission, it is stated: 
"In its session of January 19th, 1923, the Senate unanimously adopted a Resolution declar-ing that the Agreements of May 25th, 1915, should be considered null, considering: (a) that they were imposed by force and they were contrary to the spirit of InterIB.tional Law; (b) that they had not been sanctioned by the Parliament; and (c) that the Chinese Delegations at Interna-tional Conferences had on many occasions declared them not bindi~ for the two reasons cited above."2b3 
t The wording of the passage quoted above cannot but give f I the impression that the Assembly passed its resolution on 
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the basis of the theory that a constitutional requirement for parliamentary approval is relevant under international law. 264 Under such circumstances, it is of interest to find 
that a note addressed by the Chinese Government on 10 March 1923 to the Japanese Government, in pursuance of the resolu-tion quoted above, 265 failed to advance constitutional 
invalidity as a ground for international nullity of the 
treaties. This note read in part as follows: 
"The Treaties and Notes of 1915 have been consistently condemned by the public opinion in China, and it was based on the wishes of the people that the Chinese Government brought forward at Paris and Washington proposals for the abrogation of the agreements in question. The Chinese Parliament in ordinary session, in January, 1923, passed a resolution declaring the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 null and void, and the Senate called on the Government to act accordingly. The foregoing facts are enough to show that the opinion of the Chinese people on the question has been unanimous throughout. The expiration of the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen is near at hand, and the Chinese Government con-sider that .the time is now ripe for improving Sino-Japanese relations, and declare that the Sino-Japanese Treaties and.Notes of May 25, 1915, should forthwith be abrogated, ••• The Japanese Government is hereby requested to appoint a day on which to discuss questions incidental to the restoration of Port Arthur and Dairen or con-sequent upon the abrogation of the Treaties and Notes in question ••• 0 266 
As can be seen from the ·. note, the Chinese Government 
seems to have reduced the international significance of the 
resolution of the Assembly to an expression of the ''opinion 
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of the Chinese people". The Japanese Government f'la tly 
refused to go along with the proposal. It cited the posi-tion it had assumed at Washington, and stated: 
"The at tempt on the part of' your Government to abrogate, of' its own accord, treaties and notes which are perfectly valid ••• should be regarded as contrary to the accepted principles of inter-national intercourse ••• "267 
The attitude of' the two Governments did not change in the following years, nor did the treaties of' 1915 cease to be a source of conflict. As has been pointed out above, 268 the Chinese memorandum submitted to the Lytton Commission in 1932 cited the resolution of 1923 of' the Senate of' the Chinese National Assembly as declaring the treaties of 1915 null on the grounds of' duress, violation of' the "spirit of international law", and lack of parliamentary assent, and as recording - erroneously, it seems, as regards the lack of parliamentary assent - that these two grounds had been advanced at several international conferences. The ground of unconstitutionality was not, however, further elaborated in the memorandum, and there is no indication that the govern-men t had now come to consider the res,oJ.ation as more than an expression of the opinion of the Chinese people. The Japan-ese memorandum submitted to the Lytton Commission269 is of greater interest, for the lack of' Chinese parliamentary assent is discussed somewhat in this document. It is worth noting 
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that the Japanese Government cited the Chinese constitu-tion of 1914 (not the provisional constitution of 1912). It asserted: 
"Yuan Shih-kai ••• ratified the treaties without the consent of the Legislature, because he con-sidered, in the sovereign capacity of Head of the State of China, that the agreements ••• did not come within the proviso of that article. 0 270 
There may perhaps be a question whether, by citing Chinese constitutional law, the Japanese Government 
implicitly admitted the relevance of that law to the interna-tional validity of the treaties. 271 However, an affirmative 
answer does not seem warranted by the statement quoted above, 
which does not refer to any independent Japanese consideration of the Chinese constitution, but merely to the judgment of the Chinese Head of State. Citing, further, the Chinese consti-tutional developments from 1912 to 1916, and the lack of a legislature with competence as regards the conclusion of treat-ies at the relevant time, the Japanese Government asserted that it was absurd "to call the Treaties unconstitutional in character and to try to have them abrogated after so many years of existence."272 
The Report of the Lytton Commission, signed at Peking on 
-4 September 1932, although referring to the treaties of 1915, 273 and to ttJapanese rights", 274 can hardly be said, as was ;tater 
contended by the Japanese Government, 275 to have recognized 
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the validity or the treaties of 191 5. In the absence of any specific discussion of the question in the report, it must be assumed that the Commission took no position in the matter. 
The subsequent course of Sino-Japanese relations appears to throw no new light upon the question at issue. 276 
Conclusion to be drawn from the controversy between China and Japan over the treaties of 1915 
No simple and clear-cut conclusion emerges from. the long controversy outlined above. Several considerations come to mind, however, In the first place, it may perhaps be asked whether unconstitutionality in the conclusion of treaties can ever be of relevance in cases where the treaties are entered into while duress is exerted upon the whole state. It may not be doubted that there exists some rule of interna-tional law laying down criteria for the competence to conclude treaties on behalf of a state subjected to duress, for it is inconceivable that such treaties may with binding effect be made by anyone who presents himself to the other party. It would seem highly improbable, on the other hand, that in these situations - which will frequently have the character of emeggencies - constitutional criteria for domestic competence would be internationally relevant. 277 
It is of interest to note that in the present instance, the Japanese Government seems not to have been concerned about 
280 
the Chinese constitutional position. In its memorandum to the Lytton Commission, it appears to have taken the view that the Head of State was competent under international law to determine his own constitutional competence, and to have held, furthermore, that where there is no legislature, legislative assent to treaties cannot be required for their validity, regardless of the formal requirements of a constitution. It is further believed significant that the Chinese Government chose never of'f'icially to argue the lack of inter-national validity of the treaty on the ground of lack of parliamentary assent, not even when that contention had been forcef'ully advanced by the Chinese National Assembly itself. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reticence was due to lack of faith in the force of the argument, at least in the present case. 
10. Chinese Russian treaty of 1913 on Mongolia 
Against the background of the Sino-Japanese controversy, it may be of interest to examine the circumstances surrounding a treaty concluded in 1913 by the Chinese Government and the Russian Government. This treaty was made not only without ' the parliamentary assent required under the Provisional Chinese Constitution of 1912, 278 but, indeed, subsequently to an express rejection of the treaty by the parliament. The facts 
•ere the following: At the end of October 1911, the Chinese 
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province of Mongolia declared itself independent. This 
event had been preceded by Russian aid to the independence 
movement, and was followed, in 1912, by a treaty in which Russia pledged herself to assist Mongolia to maintain her 
autonomy. As a result, relations between Russia and China 
were seriously strained at the end of 1912. Negotiations 
were opened with a view to a settlement, and by the end of May 1913 an agreement had been drafted. 279 
On 28 May, the Chinese Government submitted this draft 
to the National Assembly at the request of that body. 
Despite efforts by the Premier and the Foreign Minister, 
the House of Representatives appears to have resolved to give its assent to the agreement only on the condition that certain 
modifications were secured. 280 Similar resolutions appear 
to have been passed on 13 and 18 June 1913, and on the latter 
occasion the House, itself, offered a draft of an agreement 
to which it would agree. 281 
In the beginning of July, the Government having renewed its efforts to persuade the House to accept the agreement drafted by the Governments, and having declared that there 
was no hope to achieve any modifications, the House finally gave its consent. However, the agreement was rejected by the Kuomintang dominated Senate. 282 Following this event the 
Russian Government withdrew its previous consent to the draft 
and presented new conditions. In this situation, the Chinese 
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Foreign Minister resigned, and the negotiations were discon-
tinued for two months. 283 In the course of this period, a 
revolution which broke out in the Yangtse Valley was effect-
ively suppressed by Yuan Shih Kai, the Provisional President. 
In September 1913, Yuan selected a new cabinet, and negotiations 
with Russia were resumed and lasted until the end of that 
month. 284 Yuan Shih Kai's successful handling of the revolu-
tion strengthened his political power, and in the beginning 
of October, he was elected regular President. 285 Not fully a 
month later, on 4 November 1913, the new President issued 
three Mandates by which he dissolved the Kuomintang party. 
Its three hundred members of parliament were banished from 
the capital and deprived of their right of representation. 
Though complicity of the Kuomintang in the suppressed revolu-
tion was offered as chief justification for the action, it is 
of interest to note that, among other reasons listed, was the 
refusal of the Kuomintang members of parliament to assent to 
the Sino-Russian agreement on Mongolia. 286 
The day after the action against the Kuomintang, which 
had rendered the National Assembly without a quorum, on 5 
November, the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Russian Minister 
to Peking signed a declaration and exchanged notes settling 
the Mongolian question. The terms of this new agreement, 
Which was not submitted to the National Assembly or i ta remnants, 
appear not to have differed substantially from those rejected 
earlier by the Assembly. 287 
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The validity of the new instruments appears never to have been challenged, and some writers have even asserted that parliamentary approval was not constitutionally required for this kind of agreement. 288 One writer has explained that the Chinese Government held the ag~eement not to be a treaty in the formal sense, but merely a declaration not requiring submission to the National Assembly. 289 Given the background described above, it is hard, if not impossible to accept the explanation advanced in favour of the constitutionality of the agreement. It seems highly improbable, indeed, that the Government should have fought bitterly in the Assembly to induce it to give an expression of consent that was not constitutionally required. How little respect the executive branch of the government had for the co{J3 ti tution is best evidenced, of course, by its ousting the Kuomintang members of ·the Assembly. The violation of the constitutional provision on the conclusion of treaties was, indeed, but a feeble echo of the first blow. It is worth noting that the Russian Government apparently did not hesitate for a moment to conclude the agreement although its opposite party was a government that was obviously exceed-ing its constitutional powers. The conclusion seems tempting s that the Russian Government was satisfied that they were secure in obtaining the pledge of the only Chinese Governmental organ that appeared to wield authority. Perhaps the Russian Government 
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did not even ask itself' if the position in international 
law made it advisable to postpone the conclusion of the 
treaty until Yuan Shih Kai implemented the democratic 
284 
prescriptions that had been proclaimed in the constitution of 
1912. If the question was posed, it must have been answered 
in the negative. 
11. The adherence of Luxemburg to the League of Nations in 1920 
An incident connected with the ad.mission of' Luxemburg 
into the League of' Nations is of interest. The matter 
appears to have arisen as a result of there being in the 
Covenant no clear provision regarding the entry into force 
of the Covenant with respect to states admitted to member-
ship by decisions of the Assembly. Paragraph 2, article 1 
of the Covenant provided: 
"Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armamen ta. 11 290 
Luxemburg not being mentioned in the annex referred to, 
its admission could only be effected under the paragraph 
J quoted. By t a letter of 23 February 1920 to the President of 
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the Council of the League of Nations, Mr Emile Reuter, 
Minister of State of Luxemburg, of:f'icially communicated his Government's wish that Luxemburg be admitted to membership. He pointed out that the Parliament of Lu.xemburg had repeatedly 
expressed the same wish. He added that constitutional reform 
might be necessitated as a result of affiliation for, by a 
treaty or 1867, the neutrality of Luxemburg had been guaran-teed by various European powers, 291 and that status had been 
sanctioned in a provision of the constitution of the Grand Duchy. Apparently sensing that Luxemburg's proclaimed 
neutrality might be thought incompatible with membership in 
the League, Mr Reuter underlined the reasons for that 
neutrality, His country was eager to be admitted to member-
ship without sacrificing its neutrality, and difficulties 
would attach to a repeal of the principle of neutrality. 292 
In two memoranda-,· approved on 15 May 1920 by the Counci 1 
of the League, the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, 
stated that it was doubtful if the maintenance of the neutrality 
of Luxemburg was compatible with article 16 of the Covenant, and that the que_stion of the conditions upon which the Grand-Duchy 
could be admitted must be left to the Assembly. 293 
The question of the admission of Luxemburg was considered by the Fifth Committee of the Assembly. In reply to a question,- -
naire, and in oral hearings before a subcommittee of' the Fifth Committee, the Government of Luxemburg, represented by Mr 
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Reuter and three other delegates, made clear that to qualify 
for membership, it was willing to agree to certain modifications 
in its proclaimed status of neutrality. 294 The delegates 
pointed out, in addition, that "La Constitution du Luxembourg 
ne permet pas A aucun gouvernement d'engager definivement le 
pays en cette mati~re sans 1 1 assentiment de la Chambre des 
deputes.n 295 
In view of the replies given by the delegates, the sub-
committee examined various possibilities of reconciling the 
admission of Luxemburg with the provisions of the Covenant. 296 
Apparently fearing a negative outcome of the deliberations, 
however, the Luxemburg delegation, on 28 November 1920, 
addressed a letter to the President of the subcommittee, 
declaring that "le Luxembourg ne fait aucune difficul te 
pour se soumettre aux oblig~tions decoulant du Pacte de la 
Societe des Nations et specialement de l'article 16 de ce 
Pacte." It added that the admission of Luxemburg would necess-
itate certain changes in the text of the constitution of the 
Grand-Duchy, and that n1e gouvernemen t s' engage A proposer en 
ce cas les changements appropries sans retard a l'Assemblee 
l~gislative." 297 
When, on 16 December 1920, the question of the admission 
of Luxemburg eventually came before the Assembly, the Rapporteur 
of the Fifth Committee stated that the constitution of Lu.xemburg, 
Which had not yet been modified, sanctioned the status of 
. ' 
·:t 
.... ~ "t. ~. 
l \. } 
_, 
287 
neutrality, and that this was why the Grand-Duchy had 
requested to be admitted without any modification in this 
regard. Luxemburg had realized, however, that the status was 
not compatible with article 16 of the Pact, and eventually it 
had, by a letter, expressed its acceptance of that provision 
without any reservation. The condition of neutrality, con-
sequently, should be considered withdrawn. In another letter, 
continued the Rapporteur, the Government of' Luxemburg had 
promised to take appropriate measures to make the constitution 
conform to the obligations flowing from the admission into the 
League. In making that declaration the Government had simply 
had regard to paragraph 2, article 20 of' the Covenant which 
provided: 
"In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of' the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations." 
The Rapporteur stated that the second letter cited by 
him formally announced the intention of' the representatives of' 
Luxemburg to -adapt their legislation to the obligations which 
would flow from the admission of the Grand-Duchy into the League. 
In view of what was thus reported, the Committee recommended 
the admission of the Grand-Duchy, and the Assembly acted accord-ingly. 298 
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The decision of the Assembly was reported by Mr Reuter 
to the Luxemburg parliament, which, however, took no immed-iate action, either with a view to giving its consent to the 
affiliation to the League, 299 or to a revision of the consti-
tution. The question then arose whether the Covenant was in force with regard to Luxemburg before such assent was given, 
and such modifications affected. 
That question was the subject of a letter of 25 April 1921 from Mr Reuter to the Secretary-General of the League. He further inquired whether Luxemburg would be called to 
take part in the next session of the Assembly, were the con-
stitutional revision not yet to have materialized.300 In a letter of 20 May, Mr Reuter reverted to the matter, explain-ing that the accession of Luxemburg to the League had not 
yet received parliamentary ratification, and that that ratifi-
cation was needed to give the Government the necessary means 
to pay the contribution of Luxemburg to the League.3°1 In a letter of 2 June, finally, Mr Reuter requested the Secretary-General to submit the question to the Council, and stated that If au point de· vue du d.roi t in terne la ratification parlemen ta ire de l'incorporation du Luxembourg dans la Soci&t& des Nations devant intervenir sous la forme d 'une revision consti tutionnelle11 , 
and that the procedure required for this was complicated. He 
added that until such procedure had been satisfied, the of Government did not dispose/the legal means necessary to fulfil 
obligations under the Pact.3°2 
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When transmitting the correspondence betwe~n himself 
and the Government of Luxemburg to the Council of the League, 
Sir Eric Drummond commented that the expression "parliamentary 
ratification" - occurring in the letter or 20 May - was used 
ambiguously: the accession or Luxemburg had taken place 
without any reservation with regard to the consent of parlia-
ment, or other ratification.303 The Secretary-General's 
opinion in the matter, which may easily be deduced from that 
comment, alone, was to be made quite explicit in a letter . 
which he submitted for the approval of the Council, and by 
which, he proposed, the Council should reply Mr Reuter. 
The letter is of particular interest since it was, in fact, 
adopted by the Council on 21 June 1921, and may thus be said 
to express the of~icial position of that body. 
The letter stated, first, that Luxemburg had been admitted 
in a rinal and unqualified manner on the basis of an applica-
tion,the only reservation of which had been withdrawn. 
Second, it held that the rights and obligations of Luxemburg 
as a member resulted directly from the act of admission and 
from that al-0ne. Third, the Secretary-General submitted that 
even i f the Government of Lux em burg was obl:ig ed to bring 
about a revision of the constitution and legislation of the 
Duchy to avoid conflicts with its international obligations, 
the situation was not provisional rrom the point of' view of 
the League. The rights and obligations of Luxemburg had been 
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established once and for all by the accession to the League. Fourth, the Secretary General consequently advised that ' Luxemburg had the right to take part in every session of the Assembly. With regard to the Luxemburg contribution, finally, the Council proposed its payment to be deferred for four months.304 
In this connexion it may be noted that neither was the constitutional revision effected later, nor was the formal assent of the parliament ever given to the accession to the League.305 
The position taken by the Council has been criticized by several writers.3°6 This is not the place, however, to enter into a discussion of the wisdom of the stand taken by the Council. The controversy is here merely seen as a con-crete case in which the question of the international rele-vance of a constitutionally needed parliamentary action was at issue. The conclusion is inevitable that, in spite of the notice given by the delegation of Luxemburg to the effect that parliamentary assent was required for undertaking the final obligation, and in spite of the notice given later by the Government of Luxemburg that the internal legal basis for the f'ulfilment of the obligations under the Covenant did not exist, the Council very firmly took the position that no formal reservation as to ratification having ·. been advanced, the application and the vote of the Assembly sufficed to 
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create an obligation under international law, and that the 
constitutional position, whatever its effect internally~ 
was of no relevance for the binding character of the interna-
tional obligation. The position of the Council may be summed 
up as follows: an international obligation undertaken in 
conflict with a constitutional provision imposes a duty upon 
the state to modify its constitution; an international obli-
gation entered into by a government in excess of its consti-
tutional authority is nevertheless binding. 
12. Controversy of 1921 between Austria and Rumania 
In 1921 Rumania appears to have asserted that an agree-
ment made with Austria lacked validity under international 
law, because Rumanian parliamentary assent had not been 
secured. The primary material on this incident has not been 
available to this writer, but the accounts given of it by 
various writers do not substantially differ. 
On 14 August 1921, a provisional commercial agreement was 
concluded at Bucharest between Austria and Rumania. It was 
to enter into force when approved by the two parties307 to 
remain valid for a year, and to continue in force thereafter 
., 1 unless denounced with t.~ree months' notice. According to 
one version, at least, the agreement entered into force on 6 October by means of an exchange of notes between the two 
·r governments~08The agreement was at any rate published by both 
aides.309 
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In the summer of 1921 the Austrian Government ap;ears to have suggested to the Rumanian Government that a convention 
should be concluded on certain matters cognate to those 
treated in the provisional agreement. When, in replying to this proposal, the Rumanian Government intimated a willingness to conclude a regular commercial convention, the Austrian Government remarked that there already existed one which had 
not been denounced. To this remark the Rumanian Government 
objected that that convention was not binding: Some provisions 
of the convention, it contended, were contrary to the Treaty 
of St Germain. Moreover, although the agreement had been published, article 11 of it provided for entry into force 
not by its being published, but by its being adopted by the 
respective parliaments.310 Such, indeed, seems to have been the Rumanian text of the treaty, while the Austrian text 
seems to have referred to approval by the governments.311 
The Rumanian Government argued further that the constitution 
of Rumania provided that treaties concerning commerce, 
navigation and similar matters required legislative approval, 
and that but_ for such approval, they did not have binding force.312 The convention in question, not having been sub-
mitted to Parliament, could not be binding. 
The Austrian Government ref'used to accept the reasoning 
advanced by Rumania. It appears to have argued that, the 
convention being published on both sides, and being proclaimed 
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in Rumania by a decree, carrying the signature of the King,313 
could not be challenged internationally on the ground of 
Rumanian constitutional law. 
The controversy was eventually eliminated by the negotia-
tion and conclusion of a new convention, but neither party 
ever accepted the juridical arguments of the other. The 
incident is generally, and it seems with good reason, 
regarded as inconclusive. 
13. Politis incident, 1925 
An incident concerning the validity of an international 
obligation which a diplomat purported to assume on behalf of Greece, without being competent under the Greek constitution 
to do so, occurred in 1925 in the Council of the League of Nations. 
Under the auspices of the League, negotiations had taken place in 1924 between Mr Kalfoff, representing Bulgaria, and Mr Politis on behalf of the Greek Government, and agreement had been reached on the question of how to settle a dispute 
concerning minorities. Rather than putting this agreement in the form of a convention between the two states, the negotia-tors suggested that each state should undertake certain obliga-tions - identical in substance - vis-a-vie the Council of 
the League. For that purpose each of the two representatives 
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submitted to the Council a proposal embodying the obligations to be undertaken by his Government, and each proposal ended as follows: 
"The stipulations of the present scheme will come into force as soon as they have been approved by the Council of the League."314 
Upon the basis of an authorization given by the Council which, on 29 September 1924, accepted the proposals made by the two representatives, the President of the Council and the Secretary-General of the League signed with the two representatives protocols embodying two sets of proposals, and their acceptance by the Council. Subsequently it turned out, however, that in purporting to sign the Protocol on behalf of Greece with immediate binding ef'fec t, Mr p·oli ti s, al though in good faith, had acted not only in excess of the authority con£erred upon him by his Government, but also of the authority possessed by that Government under the Greek constitution. Though the Greek Government submitted the protocol to the National Assembly, it appears to have been unable to recommend the instrument to the approval of that body, and, on 3 February 1925, the National Assembly unanimously resolved to reject the pro to col. 315 
By a letter of 11 February 1925, the permanent Greek representative to the League of Nations communicated the resolution of the National Assembly to the Secretary-General, 
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who circulated it for the consideration of the Council. 
On 14 March 1925, the latter body adopted a report submitted 
to it by its President, and covering the issue. The report 
read in part: 
"On signing with the representative of Greece the Protocol of September 29th, 1924, the Council of the League of Nations was justified in thinking that it was signing a document absolutely legal in all its parts and provisions, including the clause in accordance with which the proposal made by Greece came into force as soon as its stipulations were approved by the Council of the League of' Nations. 
"It now appears, however, :from the official state-ments made by the Greek delegate accredited to the Council of the League of Nations, that the repre-sentative of Greece who signed the Protocol was not authorized to append to that instrument ~~e final clause, by the inclusion of' which the Protocol in question was withdrawn from the Parliamentary sanction required in the case of any international instrument of this nature, in accordance with the f'undamental law of the country and the invariable usage obtaining there. 
"The Council of the League of Nations expresses its deep regret at having proceeded to sign through its President, an instrument which it felt justi-fied in regarding as a contract between itself' and the Greek Government. Although this document at the moment of' signature, so far as the Council is concerned, assumed the character of a complete legal agreement, the Council does not desire to impose on Greece any new obligations which are not provided for in the treaties and to which the National Assembly has already refused its consent. 11 316 
The studiously vague formulation of the report has 
not failed to evoke conflicting interpretations. Chailley 
stresses that the Council did not say the protocol was valid; 
only that it had believed it valid. In his opinion, this 
I L 
j 
296 
shows that the Council wished to demonstrate that it had 
acted in good faith. But, asks Chailley, if the interna-
tional validity of the protocol were not thought dependent 
upon Greek law, why should the Council have feared the 
reproach of having ignored that law? Chailley finds confirma-
tion of his own interpretation in the circumstance that Mr 
Venizelos, Greek representative in the Council, underlined 
that neither the prestige of the League, nor the honour of 
the Greek Government was affected by the ref'usal to apply 
a protocol which, juridically, did not exist,317 and that 
the meeting, ending as it did, on that note, must be con-
sidered to have accepted the view thus propounded. This 
extremely subtle, not to say far-fetched, interpretation 
is justly criticized by de Viascher who, with much better 
reason, it is submitted, concludes that in the opinion of 
the Council, Mr Politis had validly bound his country, and 
that, although the Council gave way to Greece, it did so 
in terms which did not conceal that the Council left law 
aside for reasons of courtesy and convenience.318 
Among -0ther writers' treatment of the incident, Professor Fairman's view may be noted to the effect that the resolution inferentially upholds the Greek position.319 Dr Jones finds 
the resolution inconclusive, but stresses that the Council 
did not, at any rate, reject the view that constitutional 
provisions are relevant in considering the creation of an 
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international obligation.320 Dr Vitta, finally - like de 
Visscher criticizing Chailley's interpretation - cites 
the report in support of his view that constitutional limi ta-
tions have no international relevance.321 
This writ.er finds it difficult not to agree with the 
interpretation suggested by de Visscher. The phrase " ••• 
the Council does not desire to impose on Greece any new 
obligations ••• to which the National Assembly has already 
refused its consent" seems to imply that the Council thought 
it could legally have imposed such obligations, if' it had only 
desired to do so, and that it refrained from doing so for 
""' di 322 reasons o~ expe ency. 
1l-,.. Argentina's membership in the League of Nations 
The international relevance of a constitutional require-
ment for parliamentary assent to treaties was at issue also 
in connexion with the admission of Argentina into the League 
of Nations. 
Under Article 1 of the Covenant, Argentina, among other 
states, had the opportunity to become an original member of 
the League by acceding without reservation to the Covenant, 
such accession to be effected by a declaration deposited with 
the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force 
of the Covenant; under the same article, notice of each 
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accession was to be sent by the Secretariat to all members 
of the League. 323 
The Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919, and the Covenant entered into force on 10 January 1920. At that time Article 86(14) of the constitution of Argentina invested the President of the state with the treaty-making power, while Article 67(19) of the same instrument gave the legisla-ture of the state the power of approving or rejecting treaties. Apparently, action by Congress was therefore required before the President could legally express the final consent of the state to a treaty.324 On 12 July 1919, however, without 
awaiting such action, and without even awaiting the entry into force of the Covenant, the Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic instructed the minister to Paris as follows: 
"In accordance with Article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Executive Power has decided to adhere to it without any reservation. Publish this decision. Please deposit with the Secretariat the appropriate communication. 0 325 
As a result, on 18 July 1919, the Argentine minister to Paris addressed Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General designate of the League, a letter reading in part as follows: 
11 
••• I am instructed to adhere unreservedly to the League of Nations in the name of the Argen-tine Republic, and in accordance with the terms of Article 1 of the Covenant. I hasten, therefore, to do so in order that ~ou may take such action as you consider necessary."326 
. i 
In reply, Sir Eric stated that the League was not yet 
legally constituted, and that he could not exercise any 
functions as Secretary-General. He concluded by inquiring 
if the letter of the minister signified that Argentina 
"d~sire faire son adhesion A la Societ~ aussitot que la 
commission des ratifications necessaires au Traite de Paix 
lui en fournira formellemen t le moyen. 11 327 
On 29 July 1919, the Argentine minister answered in 
the affirmative: 
"Such is, in fact, the interpretation that should be given to my note of the 18th July: the Government 
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of the Argentine Republic adheres to the League of Nations, and it will ratify this adhesion as soon as the Chambers have given their approval. The Secretar-iat General of the League or Nations will be officially advised of this in due course. 11328 
Professor Hudson has concluded that the exchange of 
letters described above had no binding effect, but consti-
tuted merely an indication of the attitude of the Argentine Government. He refers particularly to the circumstances that 
the Versailles Treaty was not yet in force, that the Argentine Republic had. not yet been invited to accede, and that practice 
offered examples of accession conditioned upon subsequent 
parliamentary approval.329 Dr de Visscher has come to the same final conclusion, but sees the basis for it in the circumstance 
that after the above mentioned exchange of letters had taken 
Place, on 10 January 1920, the date of the entry into force of 
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the Covenant, Mr Clemenceau, President of the Peace Confer-
ence, addressed an invitation to Argentina to accede to the Pact.330 If Argentina had already been a member, the invita-
tion would have been redundant. 
In spite of the considerations advanced by these author-ities, it appears that the League of Nations, or at least its Secretary-General, and possibly also the Government of 
the Argentine Republic, regarded the premature exchange of letters as effective.331 Professor Hudson reports himself, indeed, that on 10 January 1920, the very day the Covenant 
entered into force, and the day Mr Clemenceau formally invited 
accessions, and thus at a time when no reply had been rendered to the invitation, at any rate from the Argentine Republic, 
the Secretary-General notified the Argentine Foreign Minister that notice of the Argentine Republic's accession to the Covenant had been sent to other governments, and, on 11 February 1920, that note was formally acknowledged.332 Presumably 
the Secretary-General, not unreasonably, regarded the letter 
of 18 July 1919 as an accession subject only to the condition that the Covenant should enter into force. It seems likely, 
moreover, that this was precisely what was wanted by the Argen-tine minister to Paris, to judge by his expression II 
• • • the Argentine Republic desires to adhere to the League of Nations, 
as soon as the necessary ratification of the Peace Treaty 
makes this possible".333 That early date was, indeed, 10 January 1920. 
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The circumstance that an invitation to accede was 
issued that day in no way contradicts this interpretation, for it may well be that the advance accession was considered 
effective the moment the invitation was sent. Hudson's 
statement that practice offered examples of accessions con-ditioned on later parliamentary approval, and that such procedure was not excluded by the language of the Covenant334 
will not be challenged. Nor is it subject to doubt that the 
expression "unreserved" in the letter of accession of 18 July 1919 had reference to absence of reservations regarding 
substance, and not reservations regarding the mode of entry into forceo However, instruments of accession, like instru-
ments of ratification, are certainly not presumed to be made 
subject to subsequent parliamentary or other approval, and the letter of 29 July 1919 from the Argentine minister can hardly be said to have expressly subjected the accession to parlia-
mentary approval. It was not so interpreted by the Secretary-General, at any rate. The interpretation here given to the 
exchange of letters seems, further, not precluded by the reply given on 16 January 1920 by the President of the Argentine Republic to the invitation of 10 January. He stated as follows: 
"I take pleasure in transmitting to Your Excell-ency the formal ratification of the Argentine Government under the conditions of adhesion expressed in the note of July ~18, 1919, addressed to the · Secretary-General of 1t:b.e League by our representative in France."335 
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.Any interpretation or this communication is necessarily 
uncertain. However, the statement does not appear in any way to contradict the construction that the note of 18 July 1919 was held effective as from 10 January 1920. Perhaps the intention of the new statement was merely to confirm that 
note. That 18 July 1919 continued to be considered the date 
of accession, and that that act was thought ratifi.:e. a b y the letter of 16 January 1920, may be seen from a message of 6 June 1923 in which President Alvear of Argentina asked the legislature of the state for an appropriation to pay the 
country's contribution to the League. He is reported to have referred to the accession as follows: 
"La referida adhesion se opero con el dep~sito de la communication correspondiente hecha en la Secretar!a de la Liga ••• el 18 de Julio de 1919 y fue ratificada por el Senor Presidente de la Nacion en 16 de enero de 1920 respondiento a la. invitacion a adherir al Pacto de la Liga que dirigio el Presidente del Consejo6Supreme de las Potencias Aliadas y Asociadas. 11 33 
. . . . , 
The subsequent conduct of the Argentine Republic was 
also such as to bear out the conclusion that in regard to the League, the Argentine Government considered itself as definitely bound. It is true that the delegation of that state withdrew from the Assembly of the League at the first session, but the reason for this action was that certain Argentine proposals for the revision of the Covenant had not been accepted. The Argentine Government participated in other League activities, 
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however, and paid contributions to the League, frequently 
basing itself upon authorization of the Argentine Congress.337 
In spite of repeated attempts by the Argentine executive 
to induce Congress to approve the Covenant, as was required 
by the constitution of the state, such action was not taken 
until over ten years after the accession had taken place. 
There is evidence showing that in this period the Argentine 
Government considered its accession valid under international 
l aw, but illegal under constitutional law. Thus , the Harvard 
Research cites Kelchner as'saying that in April 1926, when 
the cabinet of the state was considering whether it should send 
a delegation to a conference held under the auspices of the 
League, the conclusion was reached that "Argentina was a 
member of the League of Nations from the international point 
of view, but not from an internal constitutional viewpoint".338 
It may be noted, furthermore, that when the Covenant was, at 
last, successf'ully submitted for the approval of the Argentine 
Chamber of Deputies in September 1932, it appears to 
have been "explained during the debate that Argentina already 
was a member - of the League from an international viewpoint, 
but not from an internal constitutional viewpoint, the purpose 
of the bill being to clear up this ambiguous situation".339 
In view of the cabinet decision of 1926, cited above, 
it is not likely, as suggested by de Visscher34o that the 
explanation given in the debate in 1932 was merely a tactical 
move to facilitate approval. 
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Against the background given above, a cable of 26 
September 1933, sent by the Argentine Foreign Minister to 
the Secretary- General of the League, is remarkable, for it 
implied that until the parliamentary approval had been given, 
the Argentine Republic had not been validly bound by the 
Covenant. The cable read as follows: 
"The Argentine Parliament has just sanctioned in both Houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which yesterday unanimously approved it, 
our country's accession to the League of Nations, 
at the same time approving the Covenant in accord-
ance with the constitutional powers of Congress, 
which gives legal validity to the international 
tie that will henceforth bind us together. "341 
The communication quoted did not provoke any action 
whatever on the part of the League, and nothing further seems 
to have happened in the matter. 
On the basis of the above description and discussion 
of the relations between the League and the Argentine 
Republic, it may be concluded that from July 1919 and until 
the cable of 26 September 1933, the executive branch of the 
Argentine Government consistently considered the state bound 
under international law by the Covenant, although it recognized 
that the situation was irregular from a constitutional point 
of view.342 It seems to have considered the letter of 18 
July 1919 as a declaration of accession with effect from 10 
January 1920, 343 and, in spite of the reference in the Argentine 
letter of 29 July 1919 to parliamentary action, this view was 
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shared by the League authorities. Dr de Visscher's conclu-
sion to the effect that the League must have considered the 
constitutional provisions of purely internal relevance344 
~ay be accepted, therefore, though it must be noted that the question seems never to have come to a head in that organiza-
tion. 
In the opinion of de Visscher, the incident has special interest as contrasting a state of South America where 
allegedly the concept of the international relevance of con-
stitutional limitations is accepted, with an organization 
originating in Europe where, supposedly, the opposite doctrine prevails 0 345 Though it is admitted that the Argentine cable 
of 26 September 1933 is difficult to understand if not seen 
as an expression of the theory that constitutional limitations 
upon the treaty-making power are effective in the international 
sphere, that cable, while not insignificant, cannot alone cancel 
out the fact that for 
€hirteen years the opposite view was 
taken by the executive branch of the Argentine Government, 
apparently without protest from the legislature. This circum-
stance, and the League's adherence to the same principle are, in the opinion of this writer, the most significant features 
of the case. 
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15. Irish Free State Annuities Dispute, 1932 
Upon taking office in the Irish Free State, in 1932, Mr de Valera challenged the validity of two agreements made by the government of that state with the United Kingdom in 1923 and 1926, alleging that the agreements required parliamentary ratification.346 
Before details of this incident are given, the following facts should be noted. Upon the signing, on 6 December 1921, of "Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland", the Irish Free State was accorded independence and dominion status.347 Article 18 of that agreement provided that the approval of the legislatures of both states was required, and such approval was given.348 The constitution of the Irish Free State, adopted by the Irish and British Parliaments in 1922, contained no express provision regulating the procedure for the conclusion of treaties.349 On 12 February 1923 an instrument termed "Financial Agree-ments between the British Government and the Irish Free State Government'' was signed. 350 It did not provide for ratification, nor was it, in fact, ratified or submitted for the formal approval of either the British or the Irish legislature. Another instrument, called "Heads of the Ul tirnate Financial Settlement between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State" was signed on behalf of the two govern-ments on 19 March 1926.351 Like the agreemen t cited above, 
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this instrument does not appear to have provided f'or either 
parliamentary or international ratification, or to have, 
in f'act ., been submitted f'or the f'ormal consent of either 
parliament. 
Throughout the Twenties, the two agreements seem to 
have been respected by the Government of' the Free State. 
The agreement of' 1923 is stated to have been discussed in 
the Dail, and payments to have been effected under it and 
reported in the accounts of the Free State.352 The agree-
ment of 1926 is, likewise, reported to have been discussed 
in the Da!l, on 8 December 1926, and to have been published.353 
Upon gaining office in March, 1932, Mr de Valera appears 
to have stated his intention to stop payments which had, 
until then, been made under the agreements.354 Referring to 
this statement, the British Secretary of State f'or Dominion 
Af'f'airs, in a communication of 23 March 1932 to the Minister 
of External Affairs of the Irish Free State, expressed the 
opinion of the United Kingdom Government, as follows: 
11 
••• the Irish Free State Government are bound by the most formal and explicit undertaking to continue to pay the land annuities ••• and the failure to do so would be a manifest violation of an engagement which is binding in law and in honour on the Irish Free State, whatever administra-tion mar be in l;)Ower, in exactly the sarre way as the Treaty Lof' 1921J itself is binding on both countries. 11 355 
t _l. 
. .t 
x. 
.i:. _i_ 
) 
.i: 
-· 
308 
Mr de Valera having replied on 5 April 1932 that his 
Government was not aware of the existence of any formal and 
explicit undertakings to the effect contended,356 the Secre-
tary of State for Dominion Affairs, on 9 1 April 1932, expressed 
the surprise of his Government, made express reference to 
the agreements of 1923 and 1926, and reiterated the view of 
his Government that these agreements were binding in law and 
honour upon whatever the administration in power.357 
In a subsequent exchange of letters concerning the 
possible submission of the controversy to arbitration, Mr de 
Valera insisted that the items submitted should include all 
annual payments made by the Irish Governm6l t to the British 
Government "except those made in pursuance of agreements 
formally ratif'ied by the Parliaments of both States". He 
added that any agreement on arbitration must be submitted for 
the approval of the Irish parliament.358 The British 
Government, which declined to accept the condition suggested 
for an arbitration, stated in reply to the specific point 
quoted above that it was "unable to admit the distinction 
sought to be drawn between agreements formally ratified 
by the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Free 
State and other agreements formally entered into between the 
two countries".359 
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Mr de Valera's intimation that only agreements formally 
ratified were not thought open to objection was confirmed 
in a later memorandum in which the Government of the Irish 
Free State declined to recognize that the agreements of' 
1923 and 1926 were binding,for the reason, among others, 
that they had not been submitted to the Irish parliament f'or 
ratification.360 On this point the British Government replied: 
"According to the recognized practice of' nations, agreements concluded between repre-sentatives of Governments are binding upon the Governments concerned unless they are expressly stated to be subject to ratification. 11 361 
The British Government added that no such statement 
occurred in the agreements, and pointed out that, on the 
Irish side, the agreement of 1923 had been signed by the 
President of the Executive Council, and the 1926 agreement by 
the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the Irish Free State 
Parliament had passed legislation in order to give effect 
to.that part of the 1923 agreement which provided for payment 
of the land annuities.36~ 
The GQvernment of the Irish Free State continued to 
maintain, however, that the agreements were not binding. In 
a further memorandum, it contended that the,J ggreemen t of 1923 
had been kept secret from the parliaments of' both states for 
nine years, and that the terms of the agreement of 1926 had 
not been disclosed until eight months after the act of 
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signature. It called attention to the circumstance that 
there had been a stipulation for ratification in the treaty 
of 1921, and argued that "a similar condition must be implied in any instrument intended to amend, extend, or abridge its 
terms 11 • The agreements of 1923 and 1926 were of this kind, 
and the British Government had not explained "why, if these instruments were intended by both Governments to operate 
and rank as binding international agreements, the same practice 
was not followed in relation to them as in the case of those 
agreements for the amendment or variation of the Treaty [of 1921] which both sides agree were intended to be ~efinitely binding". The Irish Government added: 
"The Irish Free State Representatives cannot ad.mi t that agreements between Governments on matters of major importance are binding until they have been ratified. Ratification has become requisite by usage and is recognized by leading authorities on international law to be part of the positive law of nations. In the case of agreements which impose a charge on the revenues of the State the necessity for Parliamentary approval is universally accepted, and such approval is required by tbe established practice of the Irish Free State."363 
No :further expressions of the legal positions of the 
parties have been found, and the incident, therefore, does 
not offer much guidance. Sir Ivor Jennings, who has discussed the agreements, and reached the conclusion that. they were valid, 
seems to accept all through his discussion that the Irish 
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constitutional customs with regard to the conclusion of 
treaties were internationally relevant,364 but the British 
Government appears not to have taken that position.365 
It is hardly subject to doubt that the conduct of the 
Parliament of the Irish Free State constituted tacit 
approval of the agreements, but although this circumstance 
may provide a conclusive answer to the question of the valid-
ity of the agreements, it is not very helpful to this dis-
cussion. It is here of greater interest to note that while 
the British Government took the position that ratification, 
whether parliamentary or international, is never interna-
tionally required unless expressly reserved, the Irish 
Government appears to have been inclined to the view that a 
constitutionally required parliamentary ratification was 
relevant internationally, even if not expressly reserved in 
an agreement. The observation may finally be made that it 
is hard to avoid the impression that the constitutional 
objections advanced in this incident served chiefly as a 
legalistic subterf'uge for the discarding of politically 
unpalatable agreements which were made in good faith by 
a preceding administration. 
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A dispute regarding the boundary line between Persia 
and Iraq was brought before the Council of the League of 
Nations in 1935. Though the Council never declared its 
views in the matter, and the dispute was eventually left to 
the parties to be solved by negotiation, it is of interest 
to riote the parties' divergent opinions as to the validity 
of treaties concluded without constitutionally required 
parliamentary assent • . 
In its first communication to the Council,366 the 
Government of Iraq, as successor of the Government of the 
Ottoman Empire, invoked i. e . the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847, 
and a protocol of Constantinople of 4 November 1913~ The 
Persian Government, in its reply, immediately denied the 
validity of the two treaties;.367 the Treaty of Erzerum for 
the reason, as has been developed in the first part of 
this study,368 that when ratifying it in 1848, the Persian 
envoy, without being so authorized, expressed consent to an 
explanatory-note;369 the protocol of 1913, because it had 
not been approved by the Mejlis although the Persian con-
stitution required parliamentary assent for modifications 
of the frontiers.370 The Persian Government stated: 
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" ••• the Constantinople Protocol was not 
approved by the Mejliss; hence the condition essential for its validity, not only under 
municipal law, but, on the basis of municipal law, under international law, is lacking0 "371 
The Persian Government pointed out, in addition, 
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that the protocol had also not been approved by the Turkish 
legislature, and alleged that this was required under the 
Turkish constitution.372 To these arguments, a representa-
tive of the Government of Iraq remarked, on 14 January 1935, 
in the Council of the League that the Persian Mejlis had been 
suspended from December 1911 to December 1914. The Persian 
thesis, therefore, amounted to saying that in that period 
Persia. -would not have been able to conclude any valid 
treaty regarding her frontiers, and this could hardly be 
correct. He added: 
"Apart from this point, however, I submit 
with confidence that failure to comply with 
constitutional provisions as to parliamentary 
approval or ratification does not affect the 
validity, under international law, of a treaty 
or protocol regularly concluded, which does not in terms refer to these matters, or, as in this case, provide for ratification at all."373 
A Persian representative appearing before the Council 
of the League on the following day, dealt at length with the 
treaty of Erzerum, but his discussion of that treaty is not 
of interest here, since he argued that it lacked validity 
374 primarily because the Persian envoy had exceeded his competence. I 
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He also made reference, however, to the contention made by 
the representative of Iraq that a constitutionally required 
parliamentary ratification was not relevant under interna-
tional law unless expressly reserved in the treaty, and 
maintained that it was contrary to the doctrine and practice 
of contemporary law. With regard, finally, to the Iraqi 
observation that the Persian parliament, being dissolved 
from December 1911 until December 1914, could not have been 
consulted, the Persian representative in the Council objected: 
" ••• But the Constitution remained intact, with this vital article, embodied in the amendment of 1907, that 'the :fundamental bases of the Constitution cannot be suspended'. The Mejlis, which was dissolved in December 1911, met again in December 1914. Iraq replies that it was impossible to wait for three yearso Why such haste, when, as I have shown, this period of waiting, dating from 1847, amowited to nearly seventy years'? ••• 11 375 
He added that parliamentary approval would have been 
required under the Ottoman constitution, and that the Ottoman 
parliament had been in session. 
Consideration of the controversy was adjourned by the 
Council, and later, at the request of the parties, left to 
them for direct negotiation,376 and the Council therefore 
never had an opportunity to pronounce itself upon the issue 
that is of interest in this connexion. The incident, therefore, 
only reflects the positions taken by the parties,. 
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IX. VARIOUS STATEMENTS 
Certain statements unrelated to any particular diplomatic 
controversy should also be registered in this survey of evid-
ence of international practice, reflecting as they do, or 
have been alleged to do, official opinion on the problem 
under discussion. 
1. United States-Venezuela, 1909 
On 21 August 1909, a protocol between the United States 
and Venezuela was signed by which the latter state agreed to 
satisfy certain American claims. Somewhat later, the United States minister at Caracas reported that, under the new con-
stitution of Venezuela, a new Government Council had come 
into existence on 4 August of the same year. Though the 
Government of Venezuela did not feel that the protocol required 
to be submitted to the Council, the minister had suggested 
that this should be done in order to avoid any question of its 
validity. This proposal did not meet with the approval of the United States State Department, which instructed the legation 
at Caracas as follows: 
T 
J 
• i I 
I 
!} ' I J 
0 J J 
j .i 
) 
316 
" • • • In signing the protocol as a finality and not ad referendum, the Venezuelan Foreign Office gave assurance that it either had or would obtain power to make its action good. Upon these assurances this Government is, internationally speaking, entitled to rely, and behind them it is not entitled to go. With the steps, if any, which the Venezuelan Government should take to regularize its action according to Venezuelan municipal law, this Department has no concern and can tender no advice. "377 
2. United States Memorandum of 1911 
The same position as that reported above, was expressed 
unequivocally in a memorandum of 1911 by the Solicitor of the 
Department of Stateo Referring to agreements not made under 
authorization of acts of the United Sta.tes Congress, Mr Clark 
wrote: 
" ••• So far as the international aspect of the question is concerned, there is little doubt but that a nation entering into an arrangement by the exchange of diplomatic notes is, certainly as to the other negotiating power, estopped to say that the Foreign Office, in making such arrangement, had not power or authority in the premises. This is- Lthe position which has been assumed not infrequently by this Govern-ment in dealing with other countries ••• II Of course, the principles here stated must not be so extended or so announced as to interfere with our own doctrine - that the mere signature of a treaty by our representative does not bind us internationally until the treaty has been ratified by the Senateo This matter is, however, practically always met in our treaties by tbe provision which requires that the treaty shall not go into effect until it has been ratified, 8 the ratif'ications exchanged, and the treaty proclaimed.u37 
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3. Codification under the League of Nations, 1927 
At the end of the Nineteen Twenties, it was proposed 
within the League of Nations that the procedures for the 
conclusion of treaties, among other matters, should be 
made the subject of codificationo A subcommittee dealing 
with this matter pointed out that the democratisation of 
the national treaty~making processes, on the one hand, and 
the respect for the traditional forms of' international law, 
on the other, produced a conflict between international validity 
and domestic applicability of treaties. In order to shed 
more light upon the problem, this body suggested that members 
should undertake to communicate, reciprocally, the texts 
of their constitutions, as well as the authentic interpreta-
tions given to them.379 The proposal was included in a 
questionnaire, in which the member governments were asked if 
they considered it possible to formulate rules that might be 
recommended as guiding procedure for international conferences, 
as well as for the conclusion of treaties.380 Among the 
many governments which answered the questionnaire only one 
objected to the proposal tbat constitutional texts should be 
exchanged. The Swiss Government answered on this point: 
"Une semblable publication risquerait d•impliquer, qu'on le veuille ou non, que, dans certains cas tout au moins, un gouvernement pourrait, pour se delier d'un engagement international, exciper d'une 
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inobservation de la Constitution. Il s'ensuivrait que, pour Stre certain de la parfaite regularite de l'engagement A intervenir, chacun des Etats contractants devrait verifier si l'autre Etat ou les autres Etats ont 'correctement precede selon leur propre droit constitutionnel et serait fonde, par consequent, A presenter des objections, si quelque formalit~ lui paraissait avoir ete omise. La securite des relations internationales semble exiger que l'on s'en tienne au principe, g~neralement admis aujourd'hui, que les accords ratifies par le pouvoir executif d'un Etat engagent defintltiv.ement celui-ci. 11 381 
The reply quoted does not leave any uncertainty as to the 
opinion of the Swiss Government upon the legal question discussed 
here. It is submitted, furthermore, that the mere circumstance 
that the other governments did not raise any objections to 
communicating their constitutional texts, leaves no inference 
that, unlike the Swiss Government, they did not object to the 
theory that the infraction of constitutional provisions on 
the conclusion of treaties render treaties internationally 
void. That co~clusion, indeed, is drawn by de Visscher,382 
who maintains that the reason why the subcommittee included the 
proposal on the exchange of constitutional texts must have been 
that the committee thought the respect for such texts an 
essential condition for the international validity of treaties.383 
It is conceivable t:.bat the subcommittee held the opinion 
imputed to it by de Visscher. It seems somewhat rash, however, 
to draw that conclusion from merely the proposal cited. A 
compilation of constitutional texts and comments on current 
practice might facilitate the understanding of the internal 
procedures required, without necessarily implying their 
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relevance under international law. It might be noted, in 
this connexion, that a compilation of constitutional provisions 
on the making of treaties edited by the United Nations in 1952384 
was the result of a recommendation made by the International 
Law Commission to the effect that the United Nations should 
publish: 
"A collection of the constitutions of' all States, with supplementary volumes to be issued from time to time for keeping it up to date. Precise knowledge of' constitutional provisions of other countries is essential to those who in any country are engaged in negotiating treaties. 11 385 
If the conclusion drawn by de Visscher were correct that 
the League subcommittee's proposal for the exchange of consti-
tutional texts implied adherence to the view that constitution-
ality of treaties was relevant under international law, the 
same conclusion ought to emerge from the statement by the Inter-
national Law Commission. In view of the Commission's discussion 
of that question during the session cpvered in the report 
~uoted, it is quite clear, however, that the Commission had taken 
no position on the issue. Indeed, there was wide disagreement 
in the CommisBion on the law governing the issue.386 
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4. Havana convention of 1928 
The Pan-American Convention on Treaties, adopted at Havana 
on 20 February 1928 by a large number of American republics, 
provided in its first article as follows: 
"Treaties will be concluded by the competent author-ities of the States or by their representatives, accord-ing to their respective internal law. 11 387 
Writers have taken the article to mean that a constitution-
ally invalid treaty is internationally null and void.388 Such 
interpretation hardly seems warranted. It may be questioned, 
indeed, whether, by the provision, the parties to the convention 
undertook any obligation at all. To judge by the English 
formulation of the article, it amounts merely to a non-binding 
prediction of policy. The article does not prescribe that 
treaties "shall be" concluded by constitutionally competent 
authorities 389 at the risk of otherwise being void. It does 
. , 
not seem certain, consequently, that the article can be invoked 
with a view to the voiding of a treaty made by an uhconstitut1.6nal 
authority. 
The weak and ambiguous formulation of the article is all 
the more striking when seen in contrast to article 5 of the 
same convention which lays down that "treaties are obligatory 
only after ratification 0 •• even though this condition is not 
stipulated in the full powers of the negotiators or does not 
appear in the treaty itself". 390 
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If, in spite of the considerations advanced above, the 
interpretation given here should not be found convincing, 
the article would undoubtedly carry some weight in favour 
of the view that constitutional provisions on treaty-making 
competence are internationally relevant.391 
5. Chaco conflict, 1935 
One writer has cited the Government of Bolivia as main-
taining in the discussion of the Chaco conflict that "approval 
by Congress is generally necessary in order that an international 
agreement may be valid". 392 It is believed that the statement 
referred to was the following: 
"In the international practice of' democracies, every international agreement means a limitation of national sovereignty, and, generally speaking, it cannot take effect without being approved by Congress. 11393 
As it does not appear whether the statement quoted had 
reference to effect under domestic law or under international 
law, it is" submitted that no significance can be attributed to 
it in this discussiono 
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X. JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
Had there existed a body of clear international judicial practice on the problem here at issue, the preceding inquiry 
would have been shorter. There have been few cases, however, in which international tribunals have had occasion to discuss 
the matter. For what they are worth, these cases must now be added to the evidence adduced above. 
The oldest of the cases, and that which is cited as the 
strongest support of the theory of the international relevance of 
constitutional limitations, is an award rendered in 1888 by 
which President Cleveland, following a report submitted to 
him by Assistant Secretary of State, Rives, sustained the 
validity of a treaty concluded in 1858 between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.394 
1. Cleveland award of 1888 
The facts of the case were the following: From 1838 to 1858, the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua had been in dispute. In 1857, the relations between the two states deter-iorated to the extent that war was declared. In the course of 
the same year, it seems to have become generally recognized in Nicaragua that a reform of the constitution of 1838 was called 
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for, to end the three year old internal struggle, with 
two hostile governments claiming constitutional and supreme 
power in the country. A constituent assembly ~th ample 
powers was elected, and, meeting in November 1857, it 
immediately began drafting a new constitution, as well as 
legislating generally. 
On 18 January 1858, earlier negotiations for a settle-
ment with Costa Rica having failed, the assembly ordered 
the appointment of new negotiators to draft a treaty of 
peace, limits, friendship and alliance between the two 
states. By a decree of 5 February, furthermore, the assembly 
declared that "in the use of the legislative faculties with 
which it [was] vested", it authorized the executive branch 
of the government to settle the boundary dispute with Costa 
Rica as it deemed best, and stated expressly that such a 
~erritorial treaty, if only concluded in conformity with 
instructions given separately, would be final and not 
require ratification by the legislative power. If the 
provisions of the treaty were to de:pa.rt from the separate 
instructions, on the other hand, it would be subject to 
ratification by the assembly.395 What instructions were 
actually given does not appear to have been disclosed, and is 
irrelevant to the case, since in the dispute which arose 
later, it was not contended that legislative ratification would 
have been required on this ground. 
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On 15 April 1858, the boundary treaty was signed.396 
Article 12 of it provided that it should be ratified, and 
that the instruments of ratification should be exchanged 
within 40 days from the day of signing. Shortly thereafter, 
and without any prior approval by the constituent assembly, 
the President of Nicaragua issued a decree of ratification, 
in which he expressly stated that the treaty had been made 
in conformity with the instructions given separately.397 
The instruments of ratification were exchanged on 26 April 
1858. Forty-two days after the day of signature, on 28 
May ,1858, the constituent assembly decreed that "in use of 
the legislative powers vested in it", it approved the 
boundary treaty concluded on 15 April. 
The Constituent assembly subsequently concluded its work 
on the new constitution, and this instrument, adopted on 19 
August 1858, expressly laid down that "the laws on special 
limi ta" - presumably the legislative approval of the treaty 
of 15 April 1858 - formed part of the constitution. No 
further act of Nicaraguan legislative or executive approval 
of the treaty has 'teen reported, but it seems that the validity 
of the treaty continued to be recognized by Nicaragua until 
1870, when that state first contended that the treaty was void. Nicaragua having thereafter persisted in denying the binding force of the treaty, it was agreed in 1886 that the question 
should be submitted for arbitration by the President of the United States. 
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Two of the grounds on which Nicaragua relied for the 
invalidity of the treaty are relevant in this connexion. 
The first of these was to the effect that the treaty had 
"not received that sanction which the constitution of the 
state of Nicaragua requires to give effect to, and validate, 
a treaty of its character".398 In support of this contention, 
the Government of Nicaragua argued as follows: On 15 April 
1858, when the treaty was signed, the constitution of 1838 
was in force. That constitution fixed the boundaries of 
Nicaragua; it laid down, moreover, that to become valid, 
any amendment to the constitution must be adopted by 
two consecutive sessions of the legislature. The boundary 
treaty allegedly curtailed the boundaries fixed by the con-
stitution. The conclusion was drawn that, to be valid, 
the treaty "must receive the same formal ratification that 
an amendment to the constitution itself demand[ ed] u, 399 
and sirice it had, in fact, never been sanctioned by a second 
session of the legislature, it was not valid. 
It should be noted in this connexion that what Nicaragua 
actually argued was that to give effect to the treaty of 
1858, the approval of a modification of the constitution of 
1838 was required. From this circumstance the Government of 
Nicaragua inferred that the treaty itself required approval, 
as if it were, in itself, an amendment. The treaty was not 
an amendment, however, and in the arguments submitted to the 
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arbitrator, the Government of Nicaragua did not even make 
clear what restrictions,if any, the constitution of Nicaragua 
imposed upon the treaty-making power of the state. The sub-
mission in law, therefore, was to the effect that a treaty, 
the contents of which conflict with a constitutional provision, 
is void. 400 
The second ground on which the invalidity of the treaty 
was argued, and which is also relevant to this discussion, 
was to the effect that the instruments of ratification had 
been exchanged before the treaty was submitted to the Con-
gress of Nicaragua, and that the treaty had not been "approved 
by the First Congress of Nicaragua until after the expiration 
of the forty days provided for the exchange of ratifications 
in Article XII of the treaty" 0 "'°1 
The award rendered by President Cleveland in 1888 declared 
that the treaty was valid, but afforded no reasons for the 
judgment. The gTounds on which the decision was based are 
found, however, in the report written to the President by 
Assistant Secretary of State, G.L.Rives. 
Mr Rives found that the Nicaraguan contention that the 
treaty was invalid because not approved by the legislature 
as an amendment to the constitution, rested wholly upon the 
two assumptions that the constitution of 1838 was in force, 
and that it actually fixed the boundaries. In an oft quoted 
passage, Mr Rives thereafter expressed himself as follows: 
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"The general doctrine that in determining the validity of a treaty made in the name of a state, 
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the f'undamental laws of such state must furnish the guide for determination, has been fully and ably discussed on the part of Nicaragua, and its correctness may certainly be admitted. But it is also certain that where a treaty has been approved by a government, and an effort is subsequently made to avoid it for the lack of some formality, the burden is upon the party who alleges invalidity to show clearly that the requirements of the fundamental law have not been complied with. In my judgment, Nicaragua has failed in establishing a case under this rule. 11402 
In the first place, Mr Rives thought it doubtful 
whether the constitution of 1838 had been in full force when 
the treaty was concluded. Since the constituent assembly 
was created for the express purpose of amending the consti-
tution, it ought to have possessed the power to adopt a decree 
modifying the constitution.403 Second, and even more import-
ant in Mr Rives' opinion, the constitution of 1838 could not be said to fix definitely the boundaries of Nicaragua. It 
could not, therefore, be argued that the treaty of 1858 
required an amendment to the constitution. In t'urther support 
of his views, Mr Rives adduced the circumstance that for some 
ten years Nicaragua appeared to have acquiesced in the treaty. 
Mr Rives added: 
"I do not regard such acquiesc:ence as a substi-tute for ratification by a second legislature, if such had been needed. But it is strong evidence of that contemporaneous exposition which has ever been thought valuable as a guide in determining doubt-ful questions of interpretation. 11404 
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Mr Rives, likewise, rejec~d the contention that the 
treaty was invalid because instruments of ratification had 
been exchanged by the executive branches of government prior 
to the legislative approval and that such approval was given 
only after the period prescribed for ratification. He stated: 
"Nicaragua cannot now seek to invalidate the treaty on any mere ground of irregularity in the order o-f' its own proceedings. If its legislature did in fact approve the treaty that is enough for the present purposeo Whether such approval was expressed before or after the exchange of ratifications is an immaterial matter now, certainly so far as Nicaragua is concerned. 11405 
Mr Rives continued, indeed, that he had not even been 
convinced that legislative approval had been at all required 
under the Nicaraguan constitution, for that constitution had 
not been submitted to the arbitrator and it had not been 
made clear what restrictions it imposed upon the treaty-making 
power. Mr Rives added: 
"Rati-f'ication by legislative authority is not always required, even in constitutional governments. The necessity for legislative ratification is not to be presumed, but must be established as a fact. Still less can there be any presumption as to the form and· manner in whi cp Ghe legislative sanction is to be expressed ••• 14 0 . 
This case offers certain points of great interest to 
the problem under discussion. A preliminary observation of 
a non-legal nature may first be made: the impression is 
almost compelling that Nicaragua seized upon the argument of 
I I 
J 
'1 
i 
,_ 
:J j 
329 
unconstitutionality as a subterfuge for denouncing a 
treaty that was thought politically objectionable. While 
this circumstance must have impressed the arbitrator and the 
rapporteur, and inclined them to hold the treaty valid, it 
does not, of course, deprive the legal reasoning of the 
report interest or authority. It is important to note, 
further, that the validity of the treaty was not challenged on 
the ground that it was made by a constitutionally incompetent 
organ, and that the rapp@rteur did not look into that particular 
problem. The questions he examined were whether the substance 
of the treaty conflicted with the constitution of the state, 
and, if so, whether the constitution prevailed over the treaty 
in the international sphere. To the extent, consequently, 
that expressions used by the rapporteur lend themselves as 
authority in the question of competence, they are, though not 
unimportant, obiter dicta. 
This said, the first point that must be stressed is that 
the rapporteur did not, indeed, hold that compatibility with 
the constitution was irrelevant to the international validity 
of the treaty, and refuse to discuss the provisions of the 
domestic law. Quite to the contrary, he thought that the 
fundamental laws of the state must "furnish the guide" in the 
deter,nination of the validity of the treaty, and he had no 
hesitation at all in examining and interpreting the constitution 
of Nicaragua with a view to discovering if a treaty of the kind 
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concluded was compatible with it. Presumably, he would 
have proceeded in the same manner, had the validity of 
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the treaty been challenged on the ground that it was concluded 
by a constitutionally incompetent authority. The rapporteur 
further held that the burden of proof lay upon the party 
that alleged the presence of a constitutional irregularity.407 
While Mr Rives admitted that "the lack of some formality" 
might make a treaty internationally void, he was nevertheless 
not prepared to look upon the :fundamental domestic law as more 
than a guide, for he refused to admit that "any mere ground 
of irregularity in .... proceedings" sufficed to void a treaty 
internationally. Where the border between the two cases should 
be drawn, Mr Rives did not say. It is perfectly clear, how-
ever, that since, in his opinion, there existed irregularities 
that had no international relevance, and since such irregular-
ities might, of course, entail lack ofcbmestic validity of a 
treaty, Mr Rives implicitly admitted that conf'licts between 
the international and the domestic validity of a treaty 
might arise. 
It is of interest, finally, to note that although Mr 
Rives did not consider actual application of a treaty over a 
period of years a substitute for ratification, if such were 
constitutionally needed, he pointed, somewhat enigmatically, to 
such application as likely to constitute recognition of the 
domestic regularity of a treaty. 
~ l .J-
.t . 
L 
' . ~ I l . 
+ •. t 1 J. 
;C 
331 
2. The Metzger Case, 1900 
This case, settled by arbitration between the United States and Haiti 0ffers some points of interest to this study, even though no direct reliance was placed upon the doctrine of constitutional limitations.4°8 
The American firm Metzger & Co., which operated a mill at Port au Prince, had been unable to secure execution of a contract made with the local authorities. It applied to the United States Government for support, and the State Department took up the matter through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The official representatives of the two countries devised a mode by which the difficulty encountered by the firm might be settled. Although no instrument embodying this agreement was drawn up, the Govevnment of Haiti appears to have stated that local authorities at Port au Prince were to take certain action envisaged by the governments. Such action was not in fact taken, and before long the matter was submitted for arbitration to William R.Day, a former Secretary of State of · the United States and a judge of the United States Circuit Court. 
Perhaps the point of greatest legal interest in the decision was that, despite a Haitian assertion to the effect that the diplomatic exchanges had only amounted, on the part of Haiti, to a pledge to use its good offices with the commune of Port 
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au Prince, the arbitrator held that they constituted a 
diplomatic agreement under which the Government of Haiti 
assumed :full responsibility for a settlement. In this 
connexion, however, it is more important to note that although 
the Haitian Government had also objected that it had no 
authority over the commune of Port au Prince, and was obliged 
at all times to limit its interference to friendly advice 
and suggestions, the arbitrator refused to admit such limita-
tions upon domestic competence as relevant under international law vis-a-vis a party having no notice of them. The arbitrator 
expressed himself as follows: 
"I do not understand that the limitations upon official authority, undisclosed at the time, to the other government, prevent the enforcement of diploma tic agreements. 11409 . 
3. Franco-Swiss Customs Convention Case, 1912 
Further material of great interest is to be found in 
the judgment rendered on 3 August 1912 in an arbitration 410 between Switzerland and France. The award has been interpreted in widely diverging ways. The facts and arguments of the case 
must, therefore, be set out in some detail in order to provide 
a satisfactory basis for a correct assessment of it. 
On 20 October 1906, a commercial convention was signed 
between France and Switzerland.411 After approval by the 
legislatures of the two states, the convention was ratified, 
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and instruments of ratification were exchanged on 21 November 1906. On that occasion the plenipotentiaries signed a protocol, not previously submitted to the legislatures. In the latter instrument they stated that, during the period in v.hich the convention was to be in f'orce, the General Direction of French Customs would enforce regulations which 
were specified in certain annexes, and which had apparently 
already been applied by the French administration vis-a-vis goods entering France from Switzerland. Among these regulations was one reading: "N. 510. Rentren t dans ce numero les 
turbines A vapeur 11412 Nr.510 of the French tariff, it may be noted, prescribed the tariff imposed upon stationary steam 
engines. 
In a French law of 29 March 1910, a new category of items 
entitled "machine A vapeur sans piston" - in practice applic-
able only to steam turbines - was created within Nr. 510 and 
subjected to a surtax of 50%. This measure adversely affected Swiss exports, and the matter was submitted to an arbitration tribunal with the distinguished membership of Eugene Borel, D.L.L. of the University of Geneva, M. No~l, Senator, and Lord Reay, former President of the Institute of International Law. 
The Swiss Government complained before the tribunal that the French law constituted a violation of the administrative 
regulation agreed upon in 1906. In reply, the French Government 
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argued that by the acceptance of the protocol, which included steam turbines in Nr. 510 for the purpose of collecting customs duty, France had done no more than assumed an obligation to preserve the article in the designated category.413 Apart from this, she had intended to reserve her entire freedom upon tariff decisions and upon revising and classifying the article.414 The French Government thus admitted that steam turbines must remain included in Nr.510, but maintained that not only was France free to change at will the rate of duty imposed upon articles under this item, but also to redefine at will articles under the item. The protocol it was asserted, could not have had the effect of fixing the duty upon goods that were assimilated to steam enginea.415 The French Government argued :t'urther that if, indeed, the protocol were interpreted to fix the tariff rate upon the article indi-cated, the conclusion would follow that a simple administra-tive measure, not submitted to the parliamentary body, would suffice to restrict the liberty of the state in tariff matters. To this position French legislation was formally opposed. In brief, the F~nch argument was that since French law did not authorize the conclusion of treaties affecting the tariff rates without parliamentary approval, and since such approval had not been obtained in 1906, it could not then J have been the intention of the French Government to bind itself in such a matter. It was not denied that the protocol 
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constituted a binding obligation, nor was the protocol asserted 
to be void under international law as concluded by an authority 
not constitutionally authorized thereto. It was merely sub-
mitted that the authority which had made the protocol must be presumed not to have intended to exceed its constitutional 
competence, and that the protocol must be interpreted accord-ingly. 
It is against the background of these arguments that the judgment of the tribunal must be read. The arbitrators 
referred to the protocol in which the plenipotentiaries had 
stated that the regulations specified in the annexes were to be applied through administrative channels, and held that the 
regulations constituted an integral part of the convention, 
and that the parties were bound to observe the tariff regime 
established in them. They further held as follows: 
"Considering that the treaty of commerce and the regulations are international conventions governed by the sanction which the contracting parties, represented by their plenipotentiard:e ,s, have given thereto; 
uThe tribunal is not called upon to consider whether or not the regulations must be submitted to the _sanction of the legislature3: that is a matter pertaining to internal law; 11416 
They went on to refer to the principle of effective 
interpretation, and held that the regulation including steam 
turbines under Nr. 510 of the French tariff would have no 
meaning and practical importance if it signified only reference 
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to a number of the tariff, for the numbering in itself was 
a matter of indifference. The tribunal admitted that France 
remained free to modify her customs duties upon item Nr.510, 
but stated that she could make use of that freedom only 
within the limits of the undertaking made vis-a-vis Switzer-
land to treat turbines as machines under item Nr. 510. B.1' 
imposing a surtax of 50% upon steam engines without piston, 
the new French tariff had, in fact, created a differential 
treatment prejudicial to steam turbines, and this was not 
compatible with the customs practice existing before the con-
clusion of the convention of 1906 and sanctioned by the protocol 
of 1906. 
On the basis of the above description of facts, arguments 
and judgment, the following summary of the relevant parts of 
the case seems justified: 
1. The Swiss complaint was to the effect that a treaty 
obligation was being violated by a subsequent lawo 
2. The French defence aimed at showing that the particular 
obligation alleged had never been undertaken, on the ground 
that, since it would not have been permitted under French 
public law, it could not be assumed that the French negotiators 
could have intended to include it. 
3o The Court, applying the principle of effective interpretation, 
found that the obligation had, indeed, been assumed. It 
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expressly refused to interpret the intentions expressed in 
the international instruments in the light of national legis-lation, and held that the obligation was undertaken and binding internationally, whether or not submission to the sanction 
of the legislature was required internally. 
The above analysis of the case, which renders it of con-
siderable importance to this study, has the support of a 
number of writers.417 It must be noted, however, that some 
other writers have concluded - erroneously, it is .submitted -
that the case is irrelevant to the problem under examination. 
Chailley correctly states that only points relating to 
the interpretation of the convention were discussed and that 
the question of the constitutionality of the treaty had not been raised.418 For this reason he denies that the case is 
authority for the view that constitutional rules regarding 
the conclusion of treaties have no international significance. It has been shown above, however, that the tribunal must have 
acted upon this theory, since it proceeded to interpret the 
convention to embrace an international obligation that was 
allegedly not assumed in accordance with French constitutional law, and refused even to look into the question of the consti-
tutionality. 
Wohlrnann submits that the French Government demanded 
consideration of the question whether the validity of the protocol was not dependent upon parliamentary approval, and that the 
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court did not look into that question, because it had already 
' affirmed the validity of the protocol as an integral part of 
a valid convention.419 To that interpretation it must be 
objected that since, contrary to Wohlmann's assertion, the 
question of the validity of either the convention or the 
protocol was simply not raised, it is not remarkable that the 
tribunal did not answer it. What did take place was that the 
tribunal affirmed the existence of an obligation within a 
treaty, the validity of which was not challenged, and declared 
that it was irrelevant under international law whether that 
particular obligation would have required parliamentary approval 
under constitutional law. 
Finally, Mervyn Jones states that the "French Government 
objected that the tariff could nnly be modified by legislation, 
thus adopting exactly the sane argument as she had put forward 
in 1832 against the United States Government".420 This inter-
pretation, however, seems to be based upon a misunderstanding 
of the judgment and of the arguments put forward. In 1832, 
France had admitted that an obligation had been assumed in 
conformity with her constitutional law, but pleaded that the 
resistance of her legislature was an excuse for non-performance. 
t 0 In the present case, however, France denied that a particular 
obligation had ever been undertaken. She did not plead her 
internal law as an excuse for non-performance. Rather she 
held it out to show that as the executive branch of the 
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court did not look into that question, because it had already 
'affirmed the validity of the protocol as an integral part of 
a valid convention.419 To that interpretation it must be 
objected that since, contrary to Wohlmann's assertion, the 
question of the validity of either the convention or the 
protocol was simply not raised, it is not remarkable that the 
tribunal did not answer it. What did take place was that the 
tribunal affirmed the existence of an obligation within a 
treaty, the validity of which was not challenged, and declared 
that it was irrelevant under international law whether that 
particular obligation would have required parliamentary approval 
under constitutional law. 
Finally, Mervyn Jones states that the "French Government 
objected that the tariff could nnly be modified by legislation, 
thus adopting exactly the sane argument as she had put f'orward 
in 1832 against the United States Government 11 .420 This inter-
pretation, however, seems to be based upon a misunderstanding 
of the judgment and of the arguments put forward. In 1832, 
France had admitted that an obligation had been assumed in 
conformity with her constitutional law, but pleaded that the 
resistance of' her legislature was an excuse for non-performance. 
In the present case, however, France denied that a particular 
obligation had ever been undertaken. She did not plead her 
internal law as an excuse for non-performance.· Rather she 
held it out to show that as the executive branch of the 
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government had had no constitutional authority to undertake 
the obligation that was alleged to exist, it could not be 
assumed to have intended to enter into such an undertaking. 
It was the relevance of this consideration that the tribunal 
rejected by the statement that has been quoted. Having thus 
found that there existed an international obligation the 
tribunal had solved the problem before it. It is not surprising 
that it did not discuss any proposition to the effect that 
performance could not be demanded because not permitted under 
domestic law, since such proposition had never been advanced. 
4. The Rio Martin Case, 1924 
In 1923, Judge Huber, acting as Rapporteur in certain 
claims between Great Britain and Spain, had occasion to 
consider the relevance of constitutional provisions to the 
international validity of an agreement.421 
By a treaty of 1783, the Maghzen of Morocco promised to 
provide a house for the English agent at Martin.422 In 1896, 
an agreement was made by way of an exchange of notes between 
the Maghzen and the British diplomatic agent at Tangier, to 
the effect that the house should be made available at or near 
Tetuan, instead of Martin. In 1923 the British Government 
claimed performance f'rom Spain under the agreement of 1896. 
The Spanish Government, which at that time exercised a protector-
ate over that part of Morocco, objected that the agreement 
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had not been embodied. in a Sherifian decree, and could not, 
therefore, be valid. Judge Huber's observations on this 
point are as follows: 
ur1 a ~t& soutenu du cSte espagnol que la proposi-tion anglaise n'aurait pu etre acceptee que par un d~cret cherifien. Le Rapporteur ne croit pas avoir ~ ~lucider ce point de droit constitutionnel marocain. Il lui suffit de constater que l'echange de lettres mentionn~ ci-dessus et qui a eu lieu entre les agents autoris~s des deux Gouvernements etablit de facon manifeste l'accord de leurs volontes pour transferer sur'une maison A Tetuan des droits que le Gouvernement britannique tenait sur 1a·maison a Martin aux termes d'un traite encore en vigueur sur .le point en question. Get accord se trouve en outre confirme par le fait que toute la correspondance ult~rieurel'a explicitement ou implici tement pris pour base. 11423 
The fact that the above statement occurred, not in a final 
award, but in a "report" to the parties hardly reduces its 
value as evidence of the law, for the circumstances in which it was rendered, and the purposes of it were practically the 
same as those of an award. 
It is of considerable interest to find that so great an 
authority as Judge Huber flatly refused to enter into a discussion 
of the co.nsti tution of Morocco, and contented himself with the 
observation that the agreement had been made by agents who were 
authorized by the two governments. It should be noted, in 
addition, that he considered the agreement confirmed by the 
circumstance that subsequent correspondence was predicated upon it. The case undoubtedly constitutes important authority for 
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the view that constitutional procedural provisions are not 
relevant to the international validity of treaties, and for 
the view that the behaviour of the parties may supply evidence 
of the validity of a treaty. 
Judge Huber did not, in fact, spell out what he con-
sidered to be the relevant criteria of international competence. The expression "autorises des deux Gouvernements" might imply, if the matte~ was at all present to his mind, that he did not question the view that the executive branch of a government is 
always competent to commit the state.424 
5. The Eastern Greenland Case, 1933 
The dispute between Denmark and Norway about the sover-
eignty over Eastern Greenland has alr4ady been discussed in 
the first part of this study.425 In this connexion, it may 
merely be recalled that the conclusion was reached that the 
Court sustained the Danish argument to the effect that consti-
tutional provisions relating to procedure are not relevant to 
another party, and that the Court did not take any position 
on the question of the international relevance of a constitutional 
requirement of parliamentary assent. 
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XI. CONCilJSIONS 
As may be seen from the numerous authorities examined 
in the principal part of this work, the ~uestion of the 
effect which constitutional provisions may have upon the 
competence of state organs to conclude agreements is one which 
has for nearly two centuries been a matter of concern and 
interest to governments in their normal diplomatic relations, 
to international tribunals, and to scholars. Nevertheless, 
despite the multiplication of authorities on this problem, it 
is difficult to extract from them any certain guidance as to 
what the rule .of law on this point may be. 
In these circumstances, it may not be inappropriate to 
suggest that there is one general conclusion which commends 
itself because of its general conformity not so much with 
doctrine as with international practice. Moreover, considera-
tions of international legal policy suggest that it may be the 
one which will, at the present time, most clearly accord with 
the convenience of states in one of the central aspects of 
their relationships, namely, the conclusion of treaties • 
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The general conclusion 
In spite of the almost general acceptance by writers of the tenet that international law refers to constitutional law for determining the identity of the competent treaty-making organ within each state, that principle can hardly be said to be born out by the practice of states. 
It is true, of course, that states normally conclude treaties with authorities which are indicated by constitutions as treaty-making organs, and that they feel confident that these organs can validly commit the states they claim to 
represent. However, this fact, taken by itself, in no way necessitates the ~onclusion that governments consider that competence in the international sphere is directly dependent upon competence within the municipal sphere. It is equally possible to explain their conduct by the suggestion that in dealing with constitutional regimes, as in dealing with de facto regimes, governments look for authorities and procedures likely to secure performance of obligations that are to be undertaken, and that, on th~ whole, these are found to be the very author-ities and procedures indicated by the constitutional nonns. These norms, indeed, supply evidence of actual power. The Validity of this suggestion seenB the more likely in view of the fact that, not only when states are treating with each 
other, but also when states and international organizations are 
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acting as depositaries, they do not ap:pear concerned about the precise constitutional competence of the authorities upon whose expression of consent they rely. 426 On the other hand, no instances have been found in which reliance has been placed in pledges given by constitutional authorities who do not 
appear able to give effect to them. 
This analysis would not, of course, carry much weight, had it been found that constitutional violations were invariably, or even of'ten, accepted by states or courts as valid grounds for the denunciation of treaties which appeared likely to be fulfilled, having regard to the actual power of the author-i ties who concluded them. The fact is conspicuous, howe.ver, that no treaty has been found that has been admitted to be void on this ground, either by an individual government in bilateral relations, or by an international organization, like the League of Nations, or that has been so held by an international tribunal. Furthermore, there is no lack of treaties made in violation of constitutions, or by constitutionally incompetent authorities, and yet admitted to be valid under international law. Some 
such cases have been recorded above.427 Many more could no doubt be found which have never attracted international attention. It must readily be admitted, on the other hand, that the 
notion that treaties made by constitutionally incompetent 
authorities, or in a constitutionally irregular manner, are internationally void, has not infrequently found official expression 
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in and between states. It has been shovvn above, however, 
that the instances are far fewer than asserted by write:NJ 
who maintain that constitutional provisions are directly rele-
vant in international law. As is understandable, these 
writers have sometimes seen evidence of their ovvn view in 
instances or statements which, upon analysis, offer no such 
evidence, or offer highly insignificant or negligible evidence.428 
It has been pointed out, moreover, that in several cases where 
the international relevance of constitutional provisions relat-
ing to the conclusion of treaties has been officially asserted, 
no sincere juridical convictions seem to have underlain such 
contention. The argument lends itself to, and has been used as, 
a subterfuge to justify the denunciations of politically 
undesirable treaties.429 
There remains, nevertheless, some evidence that speaks 
more significantly in favour of the international relevance of 
constitutional provisions relating to the conclusion of treaties. 
Above all, there is the report on which the Cleveland award was 
based.430 There are, further, a number of constitutions, notably 
those of Denmark, Norway and Ireland, which contain provisions 
to the effect that treaties not concluded in accordance with the 
proper constitutional process will not bind the state. These 
suggest that, by the draftsmen at least, it was assumed that the 
terms of their own constitutions would have some bearing on the 
international competence of the treaty-making authorities of the 
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state 0 431 This material cannot be explained away. However, while it is thus clear that there exists conflicting evidence, it is submitted, on the basis of the foregoing examination of the practice of states, that the evidence of a practice treat-ing constitutional provisions as not directly relevant in international law is both quantitatively and qualitatively more aignif'icant. 
There are, in the first place, the Customs Convention Case of' 1912, 432 and the Metzger Case of' 1 925, 433 in which the limitations upon the competence under domestic law of' the 
authority making the treaty were declared internationally irrelevant. rn ·addition, the judgrnents in the Rio Martin Case of 19a~3~nd the Eastern Greenland Case435 of 1933 must be taken to indicate that domestic rules of procedure are inter-nationally irrelevant. Among diplomatic incident~ those in which organs of the League of Nations have expressed an opinion are of special interest and value. The attitudes adopted by these authorities are not as open to the objection that they must be coloured by self-interest as are attitudes taken by individual states in bilateral incidents. It is, therefore, signif'icant that the Council of the League of' Nations appears to have rejected the relevance of' constitutional limitations upon treaty-making competence, both in the case of the admission of Luxemburg436 and in the l?oli tis incident of' 1.925. 437 The action of the League authorities in the case of' the admission 
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of the Argentine Republic is open to a similar interpretation.438 Nor would it be right, in this connection, to overlook the memorandum submitted by the Swiss Government to the League of Nations439 and that sub~itted to the United Nations by the Government of Luxemburg. 440 Memoranda to the same effect have been employed by the United States Government; 441 and there are the remarkable cases in which Austrian and Colombian courts442 did not hes-itate to adhere to the view that the violation of constitutional provisions relating to the conclusion of treaties does not affect the international validity of a treaty. The above survey of some of the evidence examined confirms the conclusion that there is no sufficient justification for holding that international law refers the question of treaty-making competence to constitutional law • 
On the other hand, it might well be an exaggeration to maintain that the evidence supports the view that apparent actual ability to secure performance of a treaty is the criterion 
-i of international competence. At the same time, that criterion 
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is certainly not excluded by the evidence; and as will be shown below, it offers a number of practical advantages over other theories, and a number of' cons:id erations point to it as the only possible solution. 
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The alleged distinction between constitutional provisions relating to the substance or execu-tion of treaties, and those specifically relat-ing to the competence of treaty-making authorities 
348 
The theory of apparent ability eliminates a distinction 
that is frequently made by writers between treaties, on the 
one hand of which the conclusion is totally forbidden by a 
constitutional provision, or the substance of which violates 
a constitutional provision or requires enabling legislation, 
and, on the other, those of which the conclusion is constitu-
tionally forbidden to a particular authority (normally the 
executive branch of government without a special authorization 
from the legislature). The predominant view among writers 
is that only the constitutional provisions relating to the 
latter type of treaty are internationally relevant.443 
It is not submitted that provisions prohibiting certain 
types of treaties altogether, or provisions incompatible with 
certain types of obligations, should be directly relevant 
internationally. Some evidence admittedly points to the 
opposite conclusion.444 It seems, however, that the adherence 
to the view that deprives these provisions of all international 
significance, when combined with the view that treaties are not 
valid if concluded by organs not constitutionally authorized 
thereto, introduces a highly artificial distinction between 
diif'ferent types of unconstitutional acts. 
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With regard, first, to those treaties of which the 
conclusion is forbidden altogether by a constitution, the 
following should be noted. It is rightly claimed that a 
state cannot by its constitution limit its own capacity to 
undertake international obligations.445 It is true that a 
state which has such provisions in its constitution may 
modify or abrogate them, and so rid itself of the limitations. 
Consequently, if these provisions are to have meaning, they 
must be seen as limitations of competence upon the organs of 
the state. In other words, treaties of the prohibited class 
may only be entered into by the procedure required for a revision 
of the constitution. However, this conclusion is not admitted 
by those writers who assert the international irrelevance of 
limitations relating to the substance of treaties. They suggest 
instead that if such a treaty were concluded by the procedure 
normally followed in the state, it would ipso facto be binding. 
They thus disregard the fact that it might prove impossible to 
secure the more qualified approval of the treaty that may well 
be necessary for a constitutional amendment. On the other hand, 
if the constitution,instead of forbidding altogether the treaties in question, provided ~i'l"S:'t-ea~ that for the conclusion of these 
treaties the government must have exactly the same kind of legis-lative approval as would be required for the modification of 
the constitution, these writers would recognize the requirement 
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as internationally effective. The least that can be said, 
is that this position seems highly formalistic. 
A similar anomaly is produced by the distinction between 
treaties for the conclusion of which legislative assent is 
constitutionally required, and treaties for which such assent, 
although not so required, is nevertheless needed to secure 
execution G Only the first kind of assent, it is asserted, is 
of any concern to the other party. The position in interna-
tional law is thus made dependent upon whether the framers of 
the constitution have written the limitation upon the competence 
of the government into a special clause governing the conclusion 
of treaties, or have been content to establish such a general 
division of powers that the same actual limitation results . 
This distinction, too, seems to be the result of formalistic 
thinking. 
The distinctions criticized above are the less easy to justify in view of the argument, which is not contested, and 
~ ~· which is commonly advanced by writers who make the distinctions, 
that the most important practical consideration in favour of 
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the international relevance of limitations upon competence is 
the greater measure of reliability that that theory offers. 
If that argument is accepted in one situation, . it would seem 
illogical not to apply it in the other. Prof. de Visscher 
offers the explanation that only limitations relating specific-
ally to competence are sufficiently well knovm and perceptible 
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to other parties.446 However, this is a very inadequate 
explanation. The simple fact is that most constitutional limitations which may prove of importance, whether they 
relate specifically to the conclusion of treaties, or gener-
ally to the powers of the government, or the executive branch of the government, offer considerable difficulties in interpre-tat ion. 
The rationale that underlies the distinctions which have been criticized above should probably be sought in the expecta-tion that if only the limitations relating to specific compet-ence are satisfied, execution of the treaty will, in fact, be secured, despite the fact that the substance of the treaty may violate the constitution or otherwise require enabling legislation. In a great many cases this expectation will prove correct. If the executive and the legislative branches of.a government have given their consent, and if, moreover, the 
courts are not allowed to refuse to apply treaties on the ground of unconstitutionality, there is little risk that the treaty 
will not be applied. However, the competence limitations in question may perhaps not prescribe any legislative approval at all, when such is needed to secure execution, or they may per-haps prescribe approval by a simple majority, when approval by a qualified majority is needed to secure execution. The courts may also be found to have the right to refuse to apply treaties the substance of which they find violates the constitution. 
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In all these situations the satisfaction of the specific 
competence limitations that may exist will not suffice to 
352 
secure fulfilment. Here, too, it is peculiar that writers 
who have argued the direct international relevance of specific 
competence limitations on the ground that that rule offers 
the highest degree of reliability, have not applied the same 
argument to the other limitations. 
In the theory of apparent actual ability there is no need 
for these somewhat unsatisfactory distinctions. Constitutional 
limitations upon the powers of a government will be considered 
part of the evidence of the actual ability of the government to 
secure performance, whether they are found in provisions directly 
relating to its treaty-making activity, or in provisions other-
wise affecting its power to execute the obligations in question. 
However, one important question remains to be considered: 
under what conditions will these legal limitations upon the 
authority of a government make the government appear unable to 
secure the performance of a treaty. In theory there would be no 
objection to requiring almost full certainty that no legal 
limitations. of any kind were to render the government unable to 
secure performanceo If this were, indeed, required under 
international law, foreign governments might have to refuse to 
accept as final the consent given to a treaty~~ a government 
which has not yet secured the action required by its legislature 
either to satisfy constitutional provisions relating specifically 
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to the treaty-making organ, or to modify prior legislation 
incompatible with the new obligations or to enact new implement-
ing legislation. If the governments concerned were not to 
await the action of the legislature, they would take the risk 
of entering a treaty that is internationally voidable. However, 
the practice of states doea .noft suggest the existence of such 
rigid requirements. Governments frequently accept with 
confidence final signature or ratification even before a con-
stitutionally required approval or enabling legislation has 
been secured. This practice would seem to suggest, indeed, 
that the executive branch of government is generally deemed to 
satisfy the requirement of apparent ability. Such a presumption 
- if the practice may be said to indicate a presumption -
ought to be particularly justified in the case of the many 
governments which function on the basis of reasonably reliable 
parliamentary majorities. These governments are very likely 
to appear able to secure the execution of whatever treaties 
they may want to conclude, even though they may have neglected 
to obtain timely legislative action. The same would be true 
for any gove~nment that has obtained the approval that may be 
constitutionally necessary for the ratification of a treaty, 
but has neglected to secure the enactment of legislation necess-
ary for the implementation of the treaty. If the same kind of 
majority were to be required in both instances, the evidence of 
its existence in the first situation ought to suffice to permit the conclusion that it might be relied upon again.447 
{ j 
) i 
( 
i I i 
f ) . 
.l -
' I 
.l 
( 
, J ' 
l· 
. J.. - J 
J 
354 
The conditions might be such, however, that the executive branch of a government might not appear able to secure perform-ance under a treaty unless and until it has obtained.1legislative action constitutionally required either for expressing final consent to the treaty or for its implementation. For instance, if there were reasons to suspect that a majority might not be obtained in the legislature when needed to secure performance, the conclusion would undoubtedly have to be drawn ti~at the government did not possess the necessary apparent authority and, therefore, was not internationally competent to conclude the treaty.448 The same conclusion would have to be drawn if a government attempted to conclude a treaty of a kind the execu-tion of which the supreme court of the state were known recently to have prohibited. 
Alleged need to distinguish rules of procedure 
In order to limit somewhat the scope of the theory that constitutional provisions relating to the conclusion of treaties are directly relevant internationally, the view is not inf'requently advanced that -such relevance is not attributed to rules of procedure.449 That proposition finds some support in cases examined. 450 
The rationale which underlies the exception appears to be similar to that suggested above, which lies behind the attempt to distinguish municipal limitations sr:,ecifically relating to 
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competence from other constitutional provisions. It is, in 
ef fect, that if the former requirements are satisfied, 
sufficient political authority exists to assure performance 
without any regard to other provisions. Behind the denial 
of international relevance to procedural provisions seems to 
be the idea that if the key requirements have been satisfied, 
there exists sufficient support in the state to secure performance. Though much can be said in favour of this theory, it would seem 
to necessitate a somewhat difficult distinction between rules 
of procedure and other rules. 
The complications inherent in drawing such a distinction 
may be illustrated by an exampleo In modern monarchies it is 
not unusual that the constitution vests the treaty-making 
power in the King, with the additional proviso that, for certain 
types of treaties, legislative approval,is required.451 It 
would obviously be a mistake to believe, nevertheless, that the 
mere consent of the King would suffice to assure performance, 
even in cases where legislative approval were not called for. 
In constitutional monarchies it is generally required that the 
acts of the K~ng, ~~ instruments of ratification must, if 
they are to be valid, be countersigned by one or several ministers • It would not seem far-fetched to maintain that such requirements 
relate to procedure. Yet, they are obviously of signal political importance. 
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Under the theory of apparent actual ability there is no 
need for a distinction between procedural rules and others. 
Most rules that would normally be termed procedural would no 
doubt be found of no importance for the indication of the 
authority apparently able to secure performance, and, thus, 
the evidence found in the cases examined, and in reason for 
the rule excluding the international relevance of procedural 
rules would in no way be contradicted. Under the theory of 
apparent actual ability, however, a case such as that cited 
in this section would fall into its proper place. As it can 
hardly be maintained that in modern constitutional monarchies 
the kings appear able to secure the performance of treaties (except perhaps a traite personnel concerning the marriage 
of a prince or a princess, if such a treaty should still happen 
to be made!), they would not, according to this theory, be 
competent to conclude a treaty on behalf of the state. For 
the attribution of such competence to them, there would have to 
be some evidence, in the form of a countersignature of an 
instrument of ratification, or otherwise, of the approval of 
their ministers • 
Revolutionary governments cannot be distinguished from governments acting unconstitutionally 
357 
If the international. treaty-making competence of a con-
stitutional government were to be directly dependent upon 
the constitution of the state, while the competence of a 
revolutionary government were to be dependent only upon its 
apparent actual ability to secure performance, an important 
distinction would have to be made between revolutionary 
governments and governments acting unconstitutionally. How-
ever, such a distinction seems difficult, if not impossible~ 
to draw. 452 
In principle, there can be little doubt that every revolu-
tionary government is unconstitutional.453 If this is so, 
it may equally well be maintained that every unconstitutional 
act is revolutionary as is the act of a revolutionary authority 
for how can revolutionary acts, or a coup d'etat be de~ined except 
as attempts to violate the fundamental laws of the state?454 
Indeed, it may perhaps not be unreasonable to suggest that even 
such deviations from constitutional provisions as may be modestly 
termed "new interpretations" are, in theory, revolutionary acts. 
The application of the doctrine of apparent actual ability 
to constitutional governments obviously makes unnecessary any 
distinction between revolutionary governments and governments 
acting in an unconstitutional manner. In both cases the prospect the of success will befrelevant point. At the same time, it is 
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believed, this theory serves the function that the criticized distinction is probably meant to fulfil, namely, to indicate 
as internationally incompetent a government that attempts, 
without much prospect of success, to make a treaty in dis-
regard of its constitution. Governments of well settled 
constitutional states are likely to be deemed not competent to assume 'treaty obligations of a kind or in a manner patently 
violating their constitutions, since, very likely, they 
will not, under such circumstances, appear able to assure performance. On the other hand, such governments will 
probably be held internationally competent to undertake obliga-tions of a kind, or in a manner, that involves such minor 
cons ti tu tional departures as may be termed "new interpretations". Again, the reason would seem to be that they might appear likely to be able to sustain actions of this type. 
No need for international tribunals to administer municipal law 
The theory of apparent actual ability offers the advantage that international tribunals asked to determine a question of treaty-making competence, although obviously free to examine 
any evidence relating to the treaty-making competence under 
municipal law, are never called upon to found their decisions 
upon fine points of constitutional lawo 
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It cannot, perhaps, be said that such an obligation 
would impose an impossible burden upon international tribunals. 
However, these bodies, which consist of people who are trained 
in international law, and who are likely to be familiar only 
with a constitutional system other than that relevant to the 
particular cases before them, are obviously little fitted for 
that task.455 It is not surprising, therefore, that interna-
tional tribunals have, on occasion, proved reluctant to under-
take a discussion concerning constitutional law.456 
Under the theory of apparent actual ability - as under 
Pallieri's theory of good faith457 - the tribunals will be 
called upon to make an evaluation of facts, for which they 
would seem eminently qualified. Moreover, no international 
tribunal would risk being placed in the unenviable position 
where it might be obliged to reject an interpretation given 
to a constitution by the supreme court of the state governed 
by that constitution. 
Minute examination of constitutional law not necess-
ary between states 
A :further advantage in the theory of apparent actual 
ability seems to be that, although it demands of governments 
some exercise of care to avoid treating with authorities 
irresponsibly acting in an unconstitutional manner, it does 
not necessitate extensive research into the constitutional laws 
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of other states, or embarrassing inquiries in the course of 
or after diplomatic negotiations .• 
Alleged violations of constitutional law not avail-able as subterfuges for unilateral termination of treaties 
In view of some of the evidence examined in the foregoing,458 it would also seem to be of some importance that the theory of apparent actual ability does not enable unscrupulous governments to use alleged violations of subtle points of constitutional law as a subterfuge :for wim:J~tt,-1 ~re really unilateral denunciations of treaty obligations. 
Doctrinal support 
The theory advanced in the preceding paragraphSas a solu-tion of the general problem here being examined differs con-
siderably from several modem doctrines advanced cin tbe subject. It comes fairly close to the modern and moderate version of the 
"head of state" theory. It has, moreover, the direct support of a few writers. 
The effects of the theory of apparent actual ability 
obviously differ very mucp from those which follow under the theory of strict international relevance of constitutional provisions. Even when the latter theory has been tempered by being combined with some principle such as that of "notoriety", 
"manifest violation", or "good faith", its effects dif:fer 
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somewhat from those of the present theory. In particular, 
the present theory gives international sanction to a treaty 
that has been made in unmistakable violation of a constitution 
provided that the authority making the treaty appears able to 
secure the execution of the treaty. 
What has been termed "the time lapse the ory"459 is in 
no way contradicted by the present conclusions. On the con-
trary, it seems to have found support in some of the material 
ex~mined.460 That theory does not, however, endeavour to 
supply any criteria by which the competence under international 
law to make treaties may be determined. 
The theory of apparent actual ability, as outlined above, 
does not come very far from the modern and moderate variation 
of the head of state theory, which teaches that the executive 
branch of government is always competent under international 
law to conclude treaties. While the latter theory has the 
recognized advantage of being simpler in application than any 
other doctrine, it has been rightly criticized on the ground 
that it may direct governments to treaty with authorities which 
might not poss_ess the power and ability they purport to possess. 
The theory advanced her·e is admittedly somewhat more complicated 
in application, but offers, instead, more realistic guidance. 
While it points, as a rule to the executive branch of govern-
ment as internationally competent, regardless of constitutional 
limitations, it leads to exceptions in cases where that authority 
l 
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acts irresponsibly, or, for some other reason seems not to 
speak for the state. 
A few modern authorities have relied upon the notion of 
apparent actual ability as a residuary criterion of competence, 
where constitutional provisions do not exist to give guidance. Thus Professor Scelle stated in the International Law Commission 
that in the absence of constitutional provisions to the contrary, 
and whether in regard to a state or an international organiza-
tion, "competence belonged to the organ which actually wielded 
sovereignty. In certain cases, it might be the Head of the 
State; in others the Parliament11 .461 Pallieri has expressed 
a similar view in a different context.462 
However, the above writers have referred to the notion 
of apparent actual ability only for limited purposes and do 
not constitute authority for its general application. In 
suggesting that the concept may be employed generally to deter-
mine which authorities are internationally competent to make 
treaties the present work extends the application of the doctrine. In the extensive literature that exists on the subject, 
only two writers have been found who have reached conclusions 
very similar to that advocated here. The first is Vitta, 
an Italian publicist, whose conclusions are as follows: 
r ' t 
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"En s omm~ on s'en tient toujours A l'etat de fait; la competence de stipuler appartient A celui qui possede le pouvoir supr~me, ou A celui qui se presente en son nom avec son assentimen t. 11463 
Even more explicit is Professor Siotto Pintor, to w~om 
reference has frequently been made in the foregoing, and with whose reasoning in the subject the present conclusions are in almost complete accord. He writes: 
"Le droit international ne reconnait pas les chefs d'Etat comme lea organes compgtents pour manifester la . volonte etatique en cette matiere, parce que la qualite d'organes leur est attrib~ee par le droit interne, mais parce qu'ils detiennent et en tant qu'ils d~tiennent effectivement le pouvoir. Du moment qu'ils sont depouilles de cette possession ils ne sont plus, d'apres le droit de gens, competents pour manifester la volon~e en question ••• Le droit des gens attribue directement la comp~tence dont il s'agit au detenteur efficace du pouvoir, quel qu'il soit. Rien de plus naturel que cette attribution coincide la plupart du temps avec celle que le droit interne sanctionne, rnais il n'y al~ qu'une simple circonstance de fait46 dont la doctrine juridique n'a pas A tenir compte." 4 
Final remarks 
It is, of course, possible to raise a number of object-ions to the conclusions suggested above. It might be asked, in the first place, if they do not force governments carefully to assess, in the case of each treaty they are about to conclude, the political situation prevailing in the other state. In fact, such a requirement, which would clearly differ from the practice actually followed by states, does not really arise under the 
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theory advanced; for it requires no more than that contract-ing governments shall have some awareness of the actual power 
of the authorities with which they treat, and shall act 
accordingly. If governments are entitled to rely upon author-ities possessing apparent actual power, as they seem to do, in spite of cons t i tu ti onal provisions,. there · would seem to be 
nothing strange in the converse proposition that they should 
not be entitled automatically to rely upon authorities merely because they possess formal constitutional status. 
· A further possible objection to the conclusions reached 
might be that they amount to an invitation to domestic lawless-
ness. Governmaits will be aware, it may be asserted, that provided only tbat they appear able successfully to break 
their own municipal law, the international community will 
sanction the breach. The correctness of the last observation 
cannot be denied. However, international law has not been 
criticized as inviting domestic lawlessness in the form of 
revolutions on the ground that it directs governments to treat 
with revolutionary authorities that appear successful. It 
might be addeq that, on occasion, circumstances may be such 
that even municipally a breach of the constitutional law appears highly desirable, eog. in emergencies, or in order to facilitate prompt action Vlhen such is needed to protect the interests of the state. 
J 
I< 
l l 
J 1 l I 
J • 
Finally, some consideration should be given to the 
possibility that it would be positively beneficial if inter-
national law provided guarantees for municipal respect of 
constitutional rules relating to the conclusion of treaties. 
From the viewpoint of those whose chief interest is the 
maintenance of a particular constitutional regulation, the 
advantages of thtLs· position are obvious. Looked at from 
the viewpoint of the international community, however, there 
is less to be said for it. It is difficult to understand why 
the international community, having little or no concern for 
the preservation of consti.tutions generally, should guarantee 
this particular part of a State's constitution. Admittedly, 
the importance of the world wide maintenance of certain basic 
standards relating to human rights, labour conditions etc. 
has become, or is becoming, generally recognized among states, 
and leads, indirectly, to concern for constitutional rules on 
these subjects. It does not appear, however, that the interna-
tional community has yet developed to the point where i.ts mem-
bers recognize a mutual interest in the upholding of constitutional 
rules generally, or of constitutional rules relating to demo-
cratic control in particular. Indeed, the very reverse seems 
true, for it appears that only very specific mutual needs translate 
themselves into international customs and conventions. 
The need for transacting business between states is 
obvious, and so is the need to treat with only those who'appear 
t 
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able to fulfil promises. On the other hand, provided that 
t hat need is satisfied, there would seem to remain no practical 
need that could compel governments to deal only with authorities 
who satisfy all constitutional rules. To the extent that consti-
tutional provisions indicate the authorities able to bring 
about fulfilment of promises, and limitations upon the actual 
power of these authorities, the provisions obviously become of 
interest to foreign states as evidence of the only quality to 
which they attach importance. However, the strict observance 
of the constitutional provisions - in most cases an undoubted 
municipal interest - is not, in itself an international interest. 
Under such circumstances the conclusion that international law 
does not delegate to constitutional law the determination of 
competent treaty-making organs should not cause surprise. Instead, 
there is merit in the view that the constitutional law of 
states is merely rebuttable evidence of the apparent actual 
ability of the authorities to secure performance of obligations 
- a condition which alone seems to constitute the criterion 
of competence under international law to assume treaty obligations 
on behalf of a state. 
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49. Apparently not appreciating the dominating position of agreements in simplified form, Fenwick could state, as late as 1951 : " • • • In the old days when plenipoten-tiaries signed in the name of a monarch, i t 1•was of the greatest importance to determine whether the documentary evidence of their authority was in good and due form. Today that question has ceased to be of importance; and its place has been taken by the question whether the treaty has been negotiated within the limitations of the national constitution ••• ": "The Progress of Interna-tional Law in the Past Forty Years" in Recueil des Cours, 1951, vol.2, pp.49-50. 
50. Basdevant, p.549. 
51. Below, pp. 58 ff. 
52. McNair in Arnold, Treaty-Making Procedure (Oxford, 1933), p.1. 
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Bittner, PPo39 fr..; Chailley, La Nature Juridigue des Traites Internationaux selon le Droit Contemporain (th~se, Paris, 1932), pp.207 ff.; Basdevant, pp.617 ff.; Dehqusse, La Ratification des Traites (Paris, 1935), ~p.97 ff.; Vitta, La Validit~ des Traites Internationaux {Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol.XIV, Leyden, 1940), pp.74 ff. 
See Pallieri (p.492), who implies that municipal con-struction is irrelevant internationally. 
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73. 1:e!g., p.215. 
74. !12.!g., p. 212, note 319 bis. 
75. Bittner, pp.54-55. 
76. See Jones, pp.58 ff. 
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80. 
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85. 
For Swedish practice in this regard, see Sundberg, Lag och Traktat (2d ed., Stockholm, 1942), pp. 22-23. See the provisions of the Austrian constitution in United Nations, Compilation, p.9; and the provisions of the Cambodian constitution, !e!g., p.23; see also Jones, p.56. 
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See Pallieri, p.492; Ross, p.213; see also Chailley, p.212 note 319 bis; contra: Vitta, p.78. See also Jones, p.59, and see below note223. 
Above, p. 21 • 
Chailley, pp.209-210. 
~ •• p.209. 
Ross (pp.212-213), who distinguishes between treaties concluded directly between competent organs and those for which intermediaries are used, puts agreements between "ministers of the various state departments or military commanders" in the first category. There would seem to be good reasons for such classification. But seep. 19, note 1""51below, on the power of some accredited diplomats to conclude treaties subject to ratification in case of an emergency • 
Bittner contended that no constitution in the world con-templated the activities of these agents, (op,cit., p.39). Chailley's (op,cit., p.208, note 307 bis? and de Visscher'a {op.cito, pp. 128-129) reference to the Austrian constitution as evidence of the contrary does not seem pertinent. The Austrian constitution - then and now - contemplated a delegation to ministers of departments and similar officers, not to diplomatic agents. (See United Nations, Compilation, p.9). But see the very general provision contained in article 46 of the constitution of Cambodia(~., p.24), and see article 53 of the constitution of India (~., p.63) • 
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Chailley, p.213. 
s-ee Ross, p.213 point 2. 
Chailley, p.210. 
See also Pallieri, p.475. 
See also Ross, p.207. 
Of' course, one and the same state represents the interest of' a principal on one occasion and that of' the third party on another. 
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It was such unwillingness coupled with the contradictory unwillingness of the principals to carry the same risk that in the 18th century made ratification required and yet voluntary. See above, pate 12. 
93. And to guard themselves against it by disciplinary actions against deviations. See below, p. 103. 94 • 
95 • 
State of' Russia v. The National City Bank et al., 69 F. (2d) (c.c.A. 2d 1934). The quotation is f'rom the report in the Annual Digest 1933-34, p.64. 
United Nations, Compilation, p.78. 
96. See also Jones, p.31o 
97. See the following statement in an official Belgian memorandum submitted to the United Nations: 
"Le Ministre qualif'i~ pour contresigner lea' actes du Roi en matibre de conclusion de conventions internationales est le Min-istre des Aff'airea Etrang~res. Il est admis, en outre, que ce Ministre a une d~l~gation permanente du Chef' de 1 1Etat pour agir en ce domaine dans les limites de ea comp~tence administrative. C'est Ace titre que le Ministre des Aff'aires Et~ang~res, de m8me que les chef's de poste diplomatique, engagent l'Etat envers d'autres Etats ~trangers, sous forme de lettres, d',change de notes et mSme de conventions qui ne portent que leur signature ••• ": United Nations, Compilation, p.16 (emphasis supplied). 
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980 S_atow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (3rd. ed.), vol.1 p.20. See also McNair, The Law of Treaties (1938~, p.61; United Nations, Compilation, p.120 • 
99. See Department of State, Department Circular No.175, December 13, 1955, see. 5.1 of which provides: 
"Negotiations of new treaties, or new execu-tive agreements on matters of substance, are not to be entered into until authorized in writing by the Secretary of' the Under Secretary." 
And sec. 5.5: 
" ••• Except as otherwise specifically authorized by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary, a complete text of a treaty or other international agreement shall be del-ivered to the Secretary or the Acting Secre-tary, or other person authorized to approve the text, before any such text is agreed upon as final or any date is agreed upon for its signature." 
In a letter of March 25, 1944 to the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs regarding procedure for sign-ing supplemental health and sanitation agreements with certain Latin American Republics, the Department of' State wrote as f'ollows: 
"As you are aware, international agree-ments can be concluded in the name of the United States Government only by persons who are duly authorized to do so. Such persons must have received :full powers from the President in the case of treaties and conventions, or specific authorization from the Secretary of State in the case of informal agreements such as exchange of notes ••• ". The Law of Treaties as applied by the Govern-ment of the United States of America (Depart-ment of State, Washington, D.C. March 31, 1950, mineographed), pp.37-38; emphasis supplied. 
The memoirs of President Truman provide some instruct-ive reading concerning the relation in practice between the Secretary of State and the President. According to the memoirs, Secretary of State Byrnes, attending the Moscow 
10 
conference of the foreign ministers of the Great Powers at the end of December 1945, made important foreign policy decisions and signed a protocol without inform-ing, much less consul ting the President. Mr Truman resente4 such behaviour. The gist of his views on the relation between himself and his Secretary of State would seem to have been that he, the President, remained at all times responsible for all acts of the Secretary, that he should take all basic decisions, and that he should be kept informed of all significant developments. The following excerpts from the memoirs are illustrative: 
"Our government is fixed on the basis that the President is the only person in the execu-tive branch who has the final authority. Everyone else in the executive branch is an agent of the President. 
"More and more during the fall of 1945 I came to feel that in his role as Secretary of State Byrnes was beginning to think of him-self' as an Assistant President in full charge of foreign policy. Apparently he failed to realize that, under the Constitution, the President is required to assume all respons-ibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. The President cannot abdicate that responsibil-ity, and he cannot turn it over to anyone else. 
"The primary function of the Secretary of' . State is to be the President's personal adviser on f'oreign af'f'airs ••• The Secretary of State obtains ••• the very best advice ••• so that he · may present it to the President. The President then must make the basic decisions, but he must be kept constantly informed of all major develop-ments. A President cannot tolerate a Secretary of State who keeps important matters away from him 
When Byrnes returned from the Moscow conference, Truman wrote down his complaints in a letter which, he 
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states, he read to Byrnes. The following are excerpts f'rom it: 
" • • • As you know., I would like to pursue a policy of delegating authority to the members of' the Cabinet in their various f'ields and then back them up in the results. But ••• I do. not intend to turn over the complete authority of the President nor to f'orgo the President's prerogative to make the f'inal decision. 
"Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the President should be kept fully informed on what is taking place. This is vitally necessary when negotiations are taking place in a :foreign capital ••• At San Francisco no agreements or comprom-ises were ever agreed to without my approval 
"I received no communication :from you directly while you were in Moscow ••• " 
"The protocol was not submitted to me, nor was the communiqu~. I was completely in the dark on the whole conference until I requested you to come ••• and inform me: 11 Truman, Memoirs (New York, 1955) vol.1, pp.545-551, passim. 
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Mr Byrnes has denied that this letter was ever read to him. See his statement in The New York Times, 4 Nov-ember 1955, in which Byrnes contends that he 
"certainly e~deavoured to consult him [the President] on problems likely to confront us [the United States] in international conferences and to keep him informed of the progress of negotia-tions, so far as the difficulties of communications from distant points like Moscow permitted." 
100. See Parry, p.150 and note 3 therein. 
101. See .the memorandum submitted by the Philippine Government to the United Nations, quoting its constitution to the effect that "the President shall have the power, w1 th the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members o:f the Senate, to make treaties ••• ", and citing an Executive Order providing that 11 the Secretary o:f Foreign Affairs shall be responsible to the President :for ••• the negotiation of trea ti ea · .-•• ": United Nations, Compilation, p. 94. · Under Swedish constitutional law and practice the :foreign minister is not entitled to bind the state to an agreement without being so authorized by a decision o:f the King in Council. 
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s ·ee the quotation from the case of State of Russia v. National City Bank of New York et al., above, p. See also Oppenheim (p.764), who states with reference to the foreign minister that "his position at home is regulated by Municipal Law. But International Law defines his position regarding international inter-course with other States". But see Fairman citing Satow, who says that the foreign minister is "the regular intermediary between the state and foreign countries. Hie functions are regulated by domestic legislation and tradition". Fairman commen ta: "So he does not have a competence fixed directly by the jus gentium". Op,cito, p.457. 
12 
United Nations, Compilation, Po 78. See also Guggenheim's opinion, quoted below, p.48, , and see the state-ment made in the International Law Commission on 22 June 1950 by Mr Fran9ois. U,N.Doc. A/CN.4/SR.52, p.21. 104. Where the agreement is subject to ratification, a full power may or may not be issued for the foreign minister. In the practice of the United States, it seems a f'ull power is always issued in these cases. See Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, p.39. A convention on poor relief between Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, ang Norway was si~ned at Stockholm on 9 January 1951. (s,o.F. 1951, p.67). It was in the form of a treaty between the heads of states and the persons signing described themselves as "plenipotentiaries". It was signed by the Swedish Foreign Minister on the part of Sweden. The file at the foreign office in Stock-holm reveals that all the agents except the Swedish Foreign Minister deposited formal instruments of f'ull powers • In order to sign at Copenhagen a convention of 18 November 1946 between Denmark and Sweden on the transfer of labour (U.N.T.s., vol.7 (1947), p.251) the Danish Foreign Minister was supplied with a :full power to sign (but not to negotiate), subject to ratification. The :full power pledged such ratification with regard to all that the plenipotentiary agreed to in conf'ormi ty with his instructions. 
105. See the Belgian memorandum submitted to the United Nations, stating that in Belgian practice a Full Power rrom the King is made out for the conclusion of treaties in solemn form - here referring to treaties in which the parties are described as heads of states - but which makes the following reservation: "Toutefois, 11 est de r~gle de ne pas exiger de plein pouvoir pour le Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res." United Nations, Compilation, p.16. 
• , , I' 
{!. 
j 
, .~ 
Hackworth cites the instance of a treaty of esta-blishment of 21 November 1936 between Greece and the United States, reciting that the United States Minister to Greece, and the Greek Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had communicated their f'ull powers, while, in fact, the Greek plenipotentiary had not presented any :t'u.11 power, and informed the American Minister that "he had f'ull power by virtue of his posi-tion as Permanent Under Secretary and that no document was customary under the circumstances". Quotation from Hackworth's Digest, vol.5. p.40. Jones states that "the practice of negotiating without Full Powers is also g_uite common where a Foreign Secre-tary, acting in his own capital (in London usually under a General Full Power), negotiates with a foreign envoy": op.cito, Po25. 
Exceptions to the practice can no doubt be found. See, for instance, the full power issued for an undersecretary of state for foreign affairs cited below p.21 , note 172 And see Meissner, Vollmacht und Ratifikation bei v5lkerrechtlichen Vertr!gen nach deutschem Recht (Goettingen 1934), p.23. , 
106. The only pertinent case found concerning the possibility of inquiring into the competence of a foreign minister gives a negative answer to the question. That case is related below, Po246. It may nevertheless be convenient to quote in this context, as well, the relevant passage of Moore's account of a report, connected with the case, and given in 1892 by Mr Foster, Secretary of State of the United States. Single quotation marks signify quotations from the original source: 
"Into the authority of the Secretary of State either to give or to withdraw the notice, the British government was 'incompetent to inquire'; it 'could only accept and respect the withdrawal as a fact~ ' The question of competency, 'being a matter of domestic administration, affecting the internal relations of the executive and legisla-tive· powers: ' in no wise concerned Great Britain. The raising by her of a question aa to 'the authority of the executive power' t in the matter, would have constituted 'an unprecedented and inadmiss-ible step in the international relations of govern-ments. "t: Moore's Digest, vol.5, p.170; and cf. 
~o, p.323. 
·s .ee also Fairman (Po444), who cites the incident and maintains that "certainly no [such] inquiry would be tolerated". 
14 
107. It is doubtful whether the United States Circuit Court of Appeals which decided the case of State of Russia v. National City Bank of New York et al., had the typical formalities in yiew when it stated: 
"If the [foreign] minister is commissioned to undertake special negotiations c;,f a public character which require his presence in a foreign jurisdiction, he must and usually is furnished with powers to negotiate. The powers may be embodied either in an ordinary letter of credence or in special letters patent. These powers within reasonable limits define the authority for his acts, which acts will be bind-ing upon his government ••• ": Annual Digest, 1933-1934, p.64. 
Jones demonstrates tha.t, as early as the middle of the 19th century, foreign ministers were regarded as having diplomatic status, and therefore, did not need letters of credence when on a mission to a foreign country, though they did require f'ull powers for the conclusion of treaties. Op.cit9 , p.36. 
From the Philippine case cited below (p.40), it will appear that the Philippine Foreign Minister signing an agreement in Washington held a formal full power from the President, although the treaty was an informal one. And see the full power for Ribbentrop quoted below, p.37 mote 277. But the Belgian memorandum cited above, p.12 , note 1 2, indi ea ting that no full powers are used for a foreign minister, does not restrict this statement to refer to his acting in his own capital. 
108. See the letter from the State Department to the Coordin-ator of Inter-American Affairs quoted above, p. 9 note 99 See also the following passage on the American practice: 
"Informal authorization from the Depart-ment of State is regarded as sufficient authority for the head of a delegation to an international conference or an Ambassador to sign an international agreement for which a full power is not to be issued. Thus, the authority of the United States representatives 
. \ \' 
) t 
to sign the agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis was contained in a telegram to London on June 30, 1945, signed by the Acting Secretary of State": United States, Treaty Practice, p.33o 
In Swedish practice, telegraphic full powers signed by the foreign minister are a perfectly normal form of evidence· of autlmrity to sign agreements which are not concluded solemnly (between heads of states and calling for the procedure of ratification). For the type of telegrams used, see below, PoQ1, and see Blix, pp.376-377 and notes therein. . 
· Meissner (pp.25 ff.) gives an interesting account of a controversy between the German 'Rebhspr§sident' 
15 
. and the German foreign office concerning the right of the foreign minister to issue full powers, a controversy which led to rather precise directives establishing the extent of the minister's competence to issue :f'u.11 powers. 
It is well known among writers that foreign ministers issue :full powers. See, for instance, Bittner, p.117 and Jones, PPo53 ff. 
109. Hackworth states that it would be useless to request full powers where the President is to sign an agree-ment with a foreign head of state. Digest of Interna-tional Law, vol.5, p.40. See also Jones commenting upon the curious practice at Geneva, where delegations sometimes issued ':full powers' for themselves. Op.cito,, p.25. 
110. Annual Digest, 1933-1934, pp.63-65. Original source cited above, p. 8 , note 94 • Report of the case also in Zeitschrift :f'C1r ausl§ndisches 6ffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht, ~01.4, (1934), p.696; comment in American Journal of International Law, vol.28 (1934), pp.545-546. 111. Part of the letter is reproduced in the report of the case in the Annual Digest. Original publication in Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (United States, Department of State, Eastern European Series, No.1 (1933), p.13). 112. The assignment came to be recognized as an executive agreement in the United States. See the Congressional Record, vol.78 (11 January 1934), p.440 (Quoted from the Annual Digest, loc.cit.) 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117 0 
Quoted from the Annual Digest, loc,cit. 
Philippines, Court of First Instance of Manila. Civil Case No.24277. Judgment of 5 January 1956. Report in A,J.I,L. vol.50 (1956), pp.686-689. 
See United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, volo1 {1950), p.765 {TIAS 2151). 
Report in loc,cit., p.688. 
16 
Moran, Comments on the Ru.les of Court, vol. III (2d rev. ed., Manila, 1949). 
118c This would seem to be the stand taken by Guggenheim, who states: "Eine widerlegbare Vermutung :f'C1r die Kompetenz zum Abschluss v5lkerrechtlicher Vertrlge besteht zugunsten des Staatsoberhauptes und des Ministers des Aeussern ••• ": Lehrbuch des V5lkerrechts, vol.I, p.61. See also Rousseau who expains the binding force of agreements in simplified form by "la prl!somption de l~galit~ qui s'attache aux actes accomplis par un organe ~tatique - ici l'organe ex~cutif - dans les limi tes de sa comp~tence fonctionel le". ( emphasis supplied) Princi es eneraux du droit international ,, 1 public, (Paris, 19 , vol.I, Po25 • 
119. P.C 1 I 1J., Ser.A/B, No.53, Judgment of 5 April 1933. 120. le.!.9:o, pp.56 ff. Q!. !bido, Ser. C, No.62, pp.40 ff. 121 • .Ie!g., Ser.A/B, No.53, p.57. Q!. ibid., p.70o 
I \' 122 • .!R.i.g. 
123. ~., Sero C, Noo62, pp.566-568 (Norwegian counter-memorial). 
124 • .!12.!g., Ser. C, No.66, pp.2761-2762. (Danish oral , 1· \ statement). 
. l r 
125. ll2.i.g., Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.71. 
126. llai!!·, p.91. 
127. See Han bro, "Gj ensyn med Ihlen Erklaeringen tt in Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret, volo26 (1956), pp.36-47. 
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126. 
127. 
Quoted from the Annual Digest, loc,cit. 
Philippines, Court of First Instance of Manila. Civil Case No.24277. Judgment of 5 January 1956. Report in A,J.I,L. vol.50 (1956), pp.686-689. 
See United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, volo1 {1950), p.765 {TIAS 2151). 
Report in loc,cit., p.688. 
16 
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, vol. III (2d rev. ed., Manila, 1949). 
This would seem to be the stand taken by Guggenheim, who states: "Eine widerlegbare Vermutung f'Clr die Kompetenz zum Abscbluss v6lkerrechtlicher Vertrlge besteht zugunsten des Staatsoberhauptes und des Mini at ers des Aeussern ••• 11 : Lehrbuch des V5lkerrech ts, vol.I, p.61. See also Rousseau who expains the binding force of agreements in simplified form by "la presomption de l~galit~ qui s'attache aux actes accomplis par un organe ~tatique - ici l'organe ex&cutif - dans les limi tea de sa comp~tence fonctionel le". ( emphasis supplied) Princi ea eneraux du droit international public, (Paris, 19 , vol.I, Po25. 
P.C,I 1J., Ser.A/B, No.53, Judgment of 5 April 1933. 
.!12!9.o, pp.56 ff. Q!. IR!go, Ser. C, No.62, pp.40 ff. 
.!R!g., Ser.A/B, Noo53, p.57. Q!. ibid., p.70. 
Ibid. 
-
.!!2!g., Sero C, Noo62, pp.566-568 '(Norwegian counter-memorial). 
112!g., Ser. C, No.66, pp.2761-2762. (Danish oral statement) • 
~., Ser. A/B, No. 53, p.71. 
~., p.91. 
See Hanbro, "Gjensyn med Ihlen Erklaeringen" in Nordisk Tidskrift for International Ret, volo26 (1956), pp.36-47. 
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128. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (3rd ed., 1952), p.39. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132 • 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
Jones, p.148. This view has been criticized by Cheng, General principles of law. (London, 1953), p.199, note 24. 
Jones, p.148. 
Q!. Hambro, op. ci t., p.44. 
P 1 c1 I 1J. Ser. c, I.lo. 63, p.877. 
lli,g.' p.880. 
~., ·pp.878-889. At Po880, the following state-ment is found: 
"Il n 'y a aucun doute que, d' apr~s la conception du droit international exietante, le ministre des Affaires ttrang~res d'un pays est l&gitime pour exprimer _d'une mani~re obligatoire la volont~ de son gouverne-ment _A l'&gard d'autres pays et attester avec force _obligatoire qu'une d~claration de volont& valable a et~ donn~e par son gouverne-ment • . L'autre Partie contractante ne saurait etre tenue ~ rechercher si certaines pratiques de pure for~e d'une esp~ce ou d'une autre, mais appartenant au droit interne, ont et, ObServeeS OU non. 11 
Fairman, p.458. 
But see the following statement made in the comment to article 21 of the Harvard Draft on the Law of Treaties: "apparently, if the Court had been convinced that the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs had not been compet-ent to make the declaration of July 22, it would not have held the declaration to the binding on Norway": A.J. I.Le, volo29 (1935), Suppl., p.1007. The statement is cited by Hyde, International Law (2d rev.ed., Boston, 1945), vol.2, p.1385, note 5. Hambro, as well, does not exclude the possibility of this interpretation. Op.cit., p.46. 
See Fairman's conclusion on the competence of foreign ministers quoted below, Po48 o Though the first im;>ress-ion gained from Hambro s article cited above, (p. 1b , note 127) is that he criticizes the court, a more care:f'ul reading reveals that hie criticism is directed primarily to various interpretations which he finds unwarranted. 
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Professor Hambro himself reaches the conclusion that presumably the import of the declaration is that a state may be bound by oral agreemen~ provided that there is no obstacle to this in the constitution of the state. That interpretation leaves open the question concerning the relevance under international law of standing instructions, regulations etc. 
Jones, p.53. 
nis·, p.157. 
ll2,!£o I p.65. 
~., p.135. 
GUggenheim, Lehrbuch des V6lkerrechts, vol.1, p.61. See also p.16 note 118above. 
Fairman, p.459. 
18 
Cohn, "La thtSorie de la responsabili tc§ interna tionale 11 , Recueil des Cours, 1939, vol.2, pp.286-287. 
See above, Po 9 , note 99 , and p. 1 ;3 , note 105. 
See above, p. 22. 
Stewart (p.231) reports that the amount of discretion entrusted to a United Kingdom plenipotentiary may vary in each case. 
· 
A memorandum of 10 October 1947 by the Assistant for Treaty Affairs in the United States St~te Department, Mr Barron, reads in part: 
"Authority to negotiate an agreement is not per se authority to sign the agreement which is negotiated. Thus, the agreement on petroleum with the United Kingdom was signed for the United States on August 8, 1944 by Mr Edward R.Stettinius, Acting Secretary of State, rather than by the Secretary of the · Interior, Acting Chairman of the Cabinet comm-ittee appointed by the President to negotiate the agreement": United States.: Treaty Practice, pp.37-38. 
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See also a memorandum submitted to the United Nations by the Government of Luxemburg and stating i.ao that "le simple mandat de n~~ocier (qui ne comporte pas le pouvoir de signer) est d~livr& dans 
19 
une forme quelconque ••• n: United Nations, Compilation, p.80 • . 
149. See below ,pp. 82 ff. 
1 
150. On this requirement in American practice, seep. note 99 above. As to the practice of the United Kingdom: 
"His Majesty's representatives abroad receive a separate full power for each treaty to be signed in respect of the United Kingdom except where a subsidiary instrument on the same subject is 'to be signed at or about the same time, in lhich case the one full power suffices for the signature of both instruments." Stewart, pp.230-231. 
151. Crandell quotes Sec. 243 of the standing instructions of 1897 to diplomatic officers of the United States. It reads: 
152. 
ttrn case of urgent need a writ ten inter-national compact between a diplomatic representative of the United States and a foreign government may be made in the absence of specific instructions or powers~ In such cases it is preferable to give the instrument the form of a simple protocol, and it should be expressly stated in the instrument that it is signed subject to the approval or the signer's Government." Tr.e.aties, Their Making and Enforcement {2d ed., Washington, 1916), p.93. gt·. Moore's Digest, vol. 5. p.179. 
Such discussion is outside the scope of the present inquiry. For some remarks on the subject, see above, p. 24. 
153. This distinction is made, with respect to constitu-tional competence, by Ross, p.204. See also Harvard Research, p.992. 
I 
I 
' ..__ l' 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
See Bittner, p.48; Jones, p.54, Basdevant, Po618 and Blix, p.376. 
See Bittner, PPo41 and 42 and notes therein. 
But Genet considers absence of a reference _to the authority by which the agents have bee~ acting as a 'veritable vice de forme', curable only by ratification. See Trait~ de Diplomatie (Paris, 1932), vol.3, p.413. 
Bittner, Po72. 
Basdevant, pp.618-620. 
20 
Vitta, p.79. Exceptionally the practice of inserting a reference to an authorization may be constitutionally required. To this effect, see the memorandum sub-mitted by Thailand to the United Nations, in United Nations, Compilation, pp.102-103. 
Bittner, p. 72. 
161. Bittner would object to the use of the term full power in connexion with agreements binding upon signature. 
'Letters of authorization' might be a suitable English expression for the evid~nce issued of what Bittner terms a 'Beurkundungsauftrag'. While it might be possible as a matter of form to distinguish between the two types of instruments, they appear to be used interchangeably in the conclusion of treaties subject to ratification and agreements entering into force upon signature. See the references given i n °·:. note 154 above, and see below, p. 61 • See also Blix, PPo 376-377. 
162. Bittner, p.48. 
163. ~., p.72. 
164. 
165. 
Dunn, The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences {1929), PPo90, 105, 205-206, Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (2d ed., 1922), vol.2, pp.149, 153, 163. 
Apparently this is a consistent practice in the United States: "It is the invariable practice, in the case of an international agreement of the United States deemed to be a treaty in the constitutional 
\' 
\' 
166. 
sense, to issue a Full Power authorizing the United States Plenipotentiary to sign". Memorandum approved by the State Depirtment and included in United Nations, Compilation, Po126. To the same effect, see Hackworth 1s Digest, vol.5, p.39. 
With res~ct to the practice of the United Nations, see Leriche, "L'~volution r~cente de la socit!t~ internationale et lea trait~s multilateraux 11 in Revue de droit international, de sciences diplomatigues et politigues, vol. 29 (1951), p.35. And see p.33 note 231 below. 
167. In the case of many other treaties, ratification is admittedly not only a question of confirmation, but a ~atter subjected to comprehensive consideration, notably when politically important treaties are sub-mitted to legislatures, or a convention signed by technical experts is submitted for approval of political authorities. See Dunn, op,cit., p.172. 
168. Jones, p.54. 
169. Read, "International Agreements" in Canadian Bar Review, vol. 26 (1948), p.524. 
170. Leriche, p.26. 
171. ~., p.35. 
172. An air transport agreement between the Swedish Govern-ment and the Provisional Government of France was signed at Paris on 2 August 1946 (U,N.T.s., vol.27 (1949), p.251). It stipulated expressly that it was to enter into force upon signature, and the agents signing referred to themselves as being "duly authorized''. A formal French full power was issued on 26 July 1946 by the President of the Provisional French Go-vernmen t, Georges Bidaul t, to an under-secretary of state for foreign affairs to "negocier, conclure et signer avec le ou les Plenipotentiaires . lgalement munis de pleins pouvoirs de la part de leur Gouvernement, tels convention, d~claration, ou acte quelquonque qui seront juges necessaires dans l' inter!t des deux Pays 11 • (From the file in the Swedish foreign office) Another air transport agreement was concluded between the Governments of Sweden and Portugal and 
' I' 
' t-
\ r-
\ I' 
signed at Lisbon on 6 March 1947. (U,N,T.s., vol.35 (1949), p.245). It contained an express clause making it enter into force by signature, and the agents signing referred to themselves as being ''duly authorized". The Portuguese agent 
22 
was provided with a formal f'ull power signed by the Portuguese President on 5 March 1947. (From the file in the Swedish foreign office) As a third instance may be mentioned a protocol between the Swedish and Soviet Governments concerning the exchange of goods, signed on 20 April 1951 (s.0,F., 1951, p.237). Without any express clause to this effect, it entered into force by the signatures of the agents who expressly referred to their possession of full powers from their governments. The Soviet f'ull power was signed on 31 March 1951 by Stalin, as the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the u.s.s.R., and countersigned by V. z·orin, Vice Minister for External Affairs. The Swedish f'ull power was signed by the King of Sweden on 23 February 1951. (From the file in the Swedish foreign office) 
173. See also Blix, p.376, note 3. 
174. United States, Treaty Practice, p.33. Q!. Memorandum approved by the State Department in United Nations, Compilation, p.126; and see Po 14, note 108 above. 1 7 5 • U • N • T • S • VO 1. 8 2 ( 1 9 51 ) , p • 279. 
1-76. The Philippine case cited above, (p • .39 ) reveals that a telegraphic full power had been sent from the President to the foreign minister who was negotiating at Washington. Meissner states that in German practice f'ull powers were issued usually by the foreign minister - for agreements in simplified form. He adds that these full powers often reserved not ratification, but an informal approval by the gover~ment. Op.cit., pp.19-20. 
177. Bittner, p.120; Jones p.33; Basdevant, p.609; Moore's Digest, vol. 5, p.207; Meissner, p.33. 
178. See a number of instances o:f treaties subject to rati.f'ica.-tion, for the signing of' which the United States State Department sent telegraphic :full powers to be used until the arrival of a formal full power. Hackworth' s Digest, vol. 5, pp.40 ff. This writer was told by a diplomat accredited in London that the British foreign office declined to accept 
\ t' 
\ t' 
179. 
180. 
evidence of authorization in the form of a tele-type message, presumably because that method was not regarded as offering sufficient security. 
Crandall, Treaties, Their Making, and Enforcement, p.93; Jones, pp.61-62 and references therein. 
Without a doubt this is now a settled practice. See Jones, pp.61-62, 33; Meissner, Pa30; Bittner, p.268; Pol en ts Ra ti fika.tsi a mehz . roiBn x do ovorov, Pa 18. Satow's Guide to Diplomatic ·ractice th ed. by Bland, 1957), Pa358. That the Government of the United States conforms to this practice is seen from an instruction of 10 December 1944 from the Department of State to the American ambassador to France, reading as follows: 
"Ordinarily the Department considers that it is not necessary to furnish a Full Power for the purpose of effecting an exchange of ratification. Possession of the instrument of ratification is regarded as sufficient evidence of authority in this respect. This is understood to be the general international practice ••• "United Nations, Compilation, pp.126-127. 
For earlier American practice along the same line, see Hackworth's Digest vol.5, pp.69-70. 
181. See below, pp. 89 ff. 
182. See Blix, pp.363-364. 
183. The procedure established for the bringing into force of the Versailles treaty was not dissimilar: by an express clause of the treaty (article 438) the ambassadors to Paris of certain powers signing were allowed to issue instrll:ffients of ratification upon the receipt of telegraphic authorizations from their governmED.t. In this case, how-ever, the procedure was only designed to achieve a provi-sional entry into force of the treaty, pending the arrival of formal instruments of ratification. In modern practice, on the other hand, there is nothing provisional about the entry into force achieved through the deposit of notes of acceptance, signed by diplomats. An instance from the practice of the United States illustrates this point: When the Government of Brazil, having previously deposited with the United States a diplomatic note 
, 1-
{ J ~ 
_, \' 
constituting an instrument of acceptance,proceeded to deposit a formal instrument of ratification, the United States Government stated that this action would not effect the date of entry into force of the agreement with respect to Brazil. Presumably the Brazilian action constitutes an exception. See United States, Treaty Practice, p.134; Q!.. Pallieri, p.509. 
24 
184. But see a thought provoking discussion of some aspects of the procedure by Pallieri, PPo509-512, and see the article by Leriche, cited above, p .. 21 , n. 166 ; and Blix, PPo363-364. 
1e,5. One instance in which a Swedish ambassador was author-ized to issue a note of approval and was supplied with a telegraphic full power is cited in Blix, p.377, note 1. ·186. Leriche, p.26. 
18 7 o The Legal Adv-i sor of the Department of State (Fisher) to the Administrator of General Services (Larson), 24 January 1950. Quoted from United States, Treaty Practice. 
188. 
til Folketin et af ivet af den af 
189. 
190. 
191. 
192 • 
193. 
• Januar 1 nedsatte Kommission i Henhold til Grundlovens , Part V: Udenrigsministeriet under Besaettelsen, r s ykker Stenografiske Referater 
· 
(J.H.Schultz A/S, Copenhagen 1948), p.195. This volume will be cited as "Bilag" below. See also Briggs, "The Validity of the Greenland Agreement" in A.J .I,L., vol. 35 (1941), p.508, and notes therein. 
Bilag, pp. 196-208, at p.204. 
,!ill., p. 11 • 
.I12..!,g. , p. 2.27. 
.ill.£!., p.229. 
For the text of the agreement, see the United States, Executive Agreement Series, No.204. The text is also found in the A.J,I.L. vol. 35 (1941), Suppl., pp.129 ff. and in Zeitschrift fur ausllhldisches 5ffenti iches Recht und V51kerrecht, vol.11 19 2, pp.107-112. 
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1·94. See cable of 14 April f'rom Mr Kauffmann to Copenhagen, Bilag, p.212. 
195. The cable - in Danish - is found in Bilag, p.209. 
196. ~., pp.210-211. 
197. lJ2.!go, p.211. 
198. ~., p.230. The contents of this note were given in a message to the press; see~., p.221. At p.230, the Bilag actually speaks of "internal" law, but it is clear from the Danish translation at p.231 and from the message to the press at p.221, that this is merely a misprint, and that "international" law is meant. 
199. Ibid., pp.212 ff. 
200 • ..!12..!g., p.222. 
201. See. !!!!9:,o, pp.233 ff. 
202. See Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1 - December 7, 1944 {u.s. Government Printing Office 1948. Publ. 2820),esp. p.119. And see the United States, Executive Agreement Series, Nr. 430 for an exchange of notes effected at Washington on 16 December 1944, concerning air transport services and stipulating that they 
203. 
204. 
205. 
206. 
should enter into force provisionally on 1 January 1945 and "definitely upon confirmation by a Free Danish Government when such a Government shall have been esta-blished following the liberation of Denmark". It should be noted that in his note of reply, Mr Kauffmann nowhere pretended to act as an agent of any organ in Denmark. The notes are found also in U,N.T.s., vol.10 (1947), p.213 • Ri sda stidende 
ordinary session. 
~., cols. 31 ff. 
i Folketin et. 96th 
~L;.;;:;;o~v..;t~i;.;;d-e_n-d~e~f~o-r ___ K_o_n~e_r--:i~e-:-t~D~a_nm=a.;.r~k~f;.;:;o~r_.,~~~:::..:.;;~, Afdeling c, Danmarks Traktater, Nr. 2 
Conceivably, one might try to see it as an agreement between the Government of the United States, and a de f'acto authority governing Greenland. 
I' 
' 
. ' 
201. 
208. 
209. 
It is succinctly stated in a passage of a note of 26 April 1941 from the Danish Foreign Minister to the United States Secretary of State: 
. 26 
"In 1939 Mr Henrik Kauffmann was accredited with the President of· the United States of America as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for Denmark, and it goes without saying that in this capacity he was only warranted to act on theba.sis of and in conformity with the general au thorizat:ion or spec,ial instructions given him by the Danish Government. By signing on his own account against the will and know-ledge of His Majesty the King, the Cabinet and the Danish Rigsdag an,:: agreement of the 9th of April 1941 on the defence of Greenland, he has exceeded his authority as Accredited Minister and acted against the Constitution, as such an agreement according to Danish constitutional law can only be made with Royal full powers and with the consent of the Rigsdag. As Mr Kauffmann refused to comply with the order of recall the Danish Government, therefore, to its great grief, had at once to dismiss him and to take extra-ordinary measures against him." Bilag, p.235. A passage from a note of 5 May 1941 sent by Mr Hull to the Danish Foreign Minister may perhaps support this int erpre ta ti on: 
" ••• my Government is confident that in their hearts the people of Denmark fully understand my Government's action ••• and that when they are once again free to express their true feelings they will give public approval of the measures which have been taken ••• for the protection of Danish sovereignty over Greenland", Bilag, pp.240-241. 
The conclusion, cited above, p. 25 , note 202, of an agreement subject to the confirmation of a Free Danish Government may possibly also be seen as supporting the interpretation suggested in the text. 
This writer is indebted to the Legal Adviser of the Danish Foreign Office, Professor Max S~rensen, for the information that the Free Danish Government communicated to the United States Government the fact that the agree-ment had been approved by the "Rigsdag". 
210. 
211, 
2120 
213. 
214. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
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G-rewe, "Der Gr5nland-'Vertrag' von Washingtontt in Monatshefte ffir ausw!rtige Politik, Heft 5, Mai 1941, p.431. 
Briggs, "The Validity of the Greenland Agreement" in A.J,I,L., vol. 35 (1941), pp.506-513; Ross (po204), likewise, comes to the conclusion that the agreement was invalid because Mr Kauffmann lacked competence. Hyde, International Law (2d ed. 1945), vol. 2, p.1386. Jones, p.64. 
Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (4th ed. by Bland, 1957), § 128, p.82. 
Oppenheim, p.780. 
Meissner, p.23. 
See above, pp. 20 ff. 
2180 ~ather than speaking of a rebuttable presumption under international law, some may prefer the view that the competence of the agent is always the same under inter-national law as under his municipal law, but that the effects of such a principle are tempered by the protection offered under international law by the principles of good faith. See Pallieri, p.508. The determination of circumstances under which a party may reasonably have been in good faith does not seem to differ, however, from the determination of circumstances under which a presumption of authority may arise. g,!. Po 38 , note 281 below. 219. See above, Po 21. 
220, Basdevant, pp.619-620. Chailley, p,210. Q!.. Vitta, p.79. 
221, Chailley~ p.210. 
222. See above, p. "'18 , note 148 • 
223, The matter of . delegation has already been discussed in a preliminary fashion above, Po 25 • It has been shown that Basdevant - and to some extent Bittner, too - drew conclu-sions regarding the authority of agents from a verbal analysis of expressions used in treaties, which seems to offer a rather unreliable method. 
1- ' 
1· •. 
I l , 
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'' ' . ~ . ' 
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Ross (po213) states that the difficulty in con-stitutional states of delegating treaty-making power largely excludes a conclusion of treaties betweeen authorized intermediaries. But see Vitta (p.78) stating that "une d~legation de facultes de la part du chef de l'Etat aux fonctionnaires subordonn&es est g~neralement admise sans difficulte. 11 And see Dehousse (po98): " ••• dans l'&laboration des accords passes en forme simplifiee, la fonction de l'organe n'est pas toUD,ours reduite ••• Aune simple attestation du consentement du Gouvernement, mais ••• pour divers accords, il s'agit bien de la stipulation d'obligations par 1 • organe." In affirming that agents sometimes exercise real treaty-making power, some authorities have expressed concern over this method. Thus, spea~ing in the Interna-tional Law Commission, Mr Scelle appears to have said that ''It was quite inadmissible for the State to be committed by the mere will of plenipotentiaries and for such plenipo-tentiaries to declare that to expedite procedure they would sign the instrument there and then. u ( Summary Record of the 86th meeting, held 22 May 1951. U.N oDoc. A/CN4/SR 86, p.10). Cavaglieri has also warned against the abandoning of the procedure of ratification: " ••• il y aurait un r~el danger A. en abandonner irre-vocablement la sauvegarde A des d~legues qui peuvent avoir mal interpret& les instrue~ions recues, ou n'avoir pas d~fendu efficacement les int~r~ts Ae l'Etat qu'ils representeI).t". See "R~gles generales du droi t de la paix", ~n Recueil des Cours, 1929, volo1, p.519. Similarly Genet: . "Il est juste, il est necessaire que ce controle [de ratif'icationj existe, ca.r sans cela le pl~nipoten-tiaire pourrait, en yertu de pouvoirs trop lib~raux, engager l'Etat et son constituant dans des liens inadmiss-ibles." See "La clause tacite de ratification" in R.G,D 1 I 1 P., volo 38 (1931), p. 758. To the same effect, see Baty, cited by Vitta, p.77 note 3; article entitled "The Ratif'ication of Treatiesn in The Law Times, 24 April 1953, 215:209. But see Pallieri, who, discussing the procedure of notes of approval finds it a great advantage that the notes emanate f'rom a responsible officer able to make sure that each and every internal requirement is satisfied before he issues the note, rather than f'rom "un organe tr~s el~v&, comme le chef de l'Etat, souvent irresponsable et vers lequel. il n'y a pas · de controle." Op.cit., PPo511-512. 
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224. Sec. 5.5. of Department of State, Department Circular No.175 issued 13 December 1955. Cited above, p. 9 , note 99 • 
225. Stewart, p. 231. 
2260 United Nations, Compilation, Po12. A similar procedure is described in a memorandum from the Government of South Africa, .!:!2.!!!·, p.106. See also statement by a Former Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr Koo, cited below, p.86 . 227. Ed. by Bland,§ 651. 
228. A. memorandum submitted by the Finnish Government reads in part: 
"The usual procedure is that the treaties and other international agreements are sub-mitted to the approval o:f the Government, for which reason the signing takes place only after a preliminary approval bas been obtained. After a treaty has been concluded it must be ratified by the President ••• 11 : United Nati ons , Compilation, Po45. 
See also the following passage from a memorandum by the Iranian Government: 
"Une fois 1 1 approbation du Conseil des Ministres obtenue, le Minist~re des Affaires Etrang~res priera sa Majest~ _Imp~riale de vouloi~ bien daigner d'accorder un Ferman autorisant la signature du trait~ ou de la convention par le Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res ou par son remplaqant ou par un representant . dtlmen t au tori setS 11 : United Nati ons, Compilation, p.66. 
It appeared that in Swedish practice authorization to negotiate and to sign subject to ratification - and a :full power as evidence of that authority - was given before the beginning of negotiations only when this was considered indispensable, e.g. sometimes for a delegate to an interna-tional conf'erence convoked to draw up a convention. To the same effect, see also the passage of the Austrian memorandum quoted below, p. 31 , note 231, and the reference to British practice in the same note. In Swedish practice signature was nevertheless con-sistently appended to one type of treaties without any previous approval by the government of a draft, namely to 
30 
bilateral commercial agreements drafted by mixed commissions. The formulations used in these reveal clearly that the signatures have not been appended upon government approval of the drafts, and they are expressly made to become binding by a subsequent exchange of notes of approval. As an example may be mentioned a protocol signed at Warsaw on 27 April 1951 by the heads of Swedish and Polish delegations concerning the exchange of goods. The preamble of the protocol reads in part: "La comrni as ion mixte ••• a convenu de soumettre lea propositions suivantes aux deux Gouvernements ••• " One clause of the protocol provided furthermore: "Ce protocole entrera en vigueur apr~s l'echange de notes, qui aura.lieu a Stockholm." On 11 May 1951 the protocol was submitted to the Swedish King in Council, and received his approval. At the same time the King authorized the Foreign Minister to effect the exchange of notes bringing the draft protocol into force. The exchange of notes took place the same day at Stockholm, the note of the Swedish Foreign Minister reading in part: "J'ai l'honneur de vous :faire connattre que le Gouvernement Su~dois a approuve~ •••• u The exchange of notes is formally considered as the agreement between the two states and its date is the •. date of the agree-ment (The agreement is noted in s,o.F., 1951, f.212; the quotations are :from the original documents The procedure is described in Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1950:9, Utredning angaende de handelspolitiska arbetsformerna m1 m8 , part II (Stockholm 1950), p.11. 229. See Jones (p.29) who reports that the practice o:f states since 1815 shows that it tends to be the exception rather than the rule that full powers are issued at the beginning of negotiations. Referring to the practice of the United Kingdom, Stewart states: 
the "Al though by the terms of existing form of full power issued from the Foreign Office, the person therein named is authorized both to negotiate and conclude the treaty, in actual practice the treaty negotiations may be virtually completed, or in certain cases the treaty may, indeed, be in f'inal form before the full power is issued": Op.cit 0 , p.231. 
Bittner holds the same opinion: 
'\ ' 
·~ 
230. 
231. 
"Sehr o:ft werden die Vollmachten erst ausgestellt, wenn bereits der letzte, zur Unterzeichnung :fertige Entwurf der Unterhandlerurkunde vorliegt": Op.cito, Po119o Q! • .!l?.!.g., p.137. 
31 
Having noted this circumstance, Bittner suggests logically, and with great foresight that a :further develop-ment along the same line might make the procedure of ratification redundant in many cases: 
"Falls die eben angedeutete Entwicklung weiterschreitet, musste sie zu einer wesentlichen Vere.infachung, zu einer fortschreitenden Verdr!ngung der zusammengesetze.n Beurkundung f'Clhren. Denn in vielen FUllen, in denen die Vollmachten nach Abschluea der Verhandlu:I:!B'e.n ausgestell t werden, wtlrde ein Beurkundungsauftrag zum unmittelb~ren Vollzug genugen und die 
'Ratifikation kl:Snnte entfallen." Op,cit., PPo13e-139. 
On the late issuing of full powers, see also Meissner, ~p.32-33 and Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, p.26~ But McNair (p.1) states the conventional view: 
''The first step taken upon the meeting of persons designated as representatives of States for the negotiation and conclusion o:f a treaty is the mutual verificatt:>n of powers, :for it would clearly be idle to embark upon negotiations with a person who was not properly accredited." 
See BasdetVant, pp.594-595; Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, p.47, citing Report o:f the Committee :for the Progressive Codification of International Law to the Council of the League of Nations, League o:f Nations Doc. c. 357. M. 130. 1927. V (1927. v. 16), 24 March 1927. 
See, for instance, the :following passage :from the Austrian memorandum sent to the United Nations: 
"In the case of-negotiations with a State on other matters (than economic], and when representatives are to be sent to a diplo-matic conference of States :for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty, the competent Federal Minister, before the beginning of the treaty 
. ~ 
negotiations, submits a proposal to the Council of Ministers to the effect that it shall resolve to send representatives to attend the negotiations. At the sane time, the Federal Minister applies for authoriza-
32 
tion from the person competent in the particular case to obtain full powers for the representatives to participate in the negotiations, and, if necessary, to sign the treaty'': United Nations, Compilation, pp.12-13. 
Stewart reports similarly: 
"At conferences where the delegates are required to produce full powers before taking part in the discussions, the United Kingdom delegates are provided with full powers at the outset. Ordinarily, however, full powers are required only when the time comes for signature'': Op,cit., p.231. 
In this connexion it may be of interest also to note the result of an inquiry made by this writer into the 'credentials' carried for the negotiation of a convention - selected at random - concluded under the auspices of the United Nations. An international conference on maintenance obligations was .-mld at the United Nations headquarters in New York 29 May - 20 June 1956, and drafted a convention on the recovery abroad of maintenance payments. The con-vention was open for signature until 31 December 1956, and all signatures were subject to ratification. The rules of procedure of the conference laid down that within 24 hours of the opening of the conference a delegate should deliver "credentials" issued either by the head of his state, the foreign minister or the prime minister. (U,N.Doc. E/Conf. 21/2 of 2 May 1956). The first meeting of the credentials committee was held by the middle of the conferenqe. Of documents submitted, some were letters from permanent representatives to the United Nations. The committee proposed to the conference that it should accept these letters as evidence of authority to participate in the deliberations of the conference, and, f'urther, that cables containing evidence of authority to sign should be accepted. These suggestions were adopted bf the confer-ence (U 9 N.Doc. E/Conf 21/L 15; 13 June 1956). At a second meeting the committee examined credentials and drew up a list of the representatives it considered as having produced credentials satisfactory for participation in the conference. At this stage no decision was taken, however, 
by the credentials committee, nor by the confer-ence as to whether the credentials were satisfactory for the purpose of signing the convention. Such examination is undertaken, with respect to the credentials of each delegate who proceeds to sign, by the Secretariat of the United Nations, upon signature. On this point, see Leriche, p.35. The following statement is also of great interest in this connexion: 
" ••• all delegates who claim to represent a political entity 0£ organization should be equipped with evidence of their authority to do so, and this authority should be sufficiently extensive to permit them to carry out the pur-pose of calling the conference. But under present conditions it is not essential that such authority should include the specific power to sign conventions. In recognition of this fact, the term 'full powers' is now being supplanted in some conferences by the word 'credentials', which carries no implications as to the specific character of the powers granted to representatives." Dunn, The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences {.1929), p.206. 
For the gradual establishment of a separation be-tween the authority to negotiate and the authority to sign treaties subject to approval, see a French memorandum submitted to the United Nations, printed in United Nations, Compilation, p.47. See also Bittner, (pp.119-120), who pertinently points out that the full powers authorizing signature issued after the end of negotiations normally inadvertently empowered the agent also to negotiate. To the sane effect, see Stewart, p.231. 
232. It is submitted that the French term "parapher" and the English "initial" are equivalent. See, to this effect, Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des V5lkerrechts, vol.I, p.70, and Freymond, La ratification des trait~s et le prob1~me des ra orts entre le droit international et le droit interne 1947, p.3. But see Mr Barth lemy, pleading for the Hungarian petitioners in the case of Emeric Kulin et al. v. the State of Roumania before the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Judgment of 10 January 1927 (Jurisdiction) in de Lapradelle, Recueil de la Juris rudence des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes cr~es r les Traits de Faix, vol. Comp tence , pp. 1 -415. 
34 
Signature ad referendum is sometimes used with the same purpose as initialling before the treaty-making authority has been enabled to approve of the draft. See, for instance, the instructions of 28 November 1905 issued to the American representatives at the conference of Algeciras, ending: 
"If' an international convention should be required to formulate the results, you will, unless otherwise instructed, subscribe ad referendum merely, reserving formal pleni-potentiary signature until you shall be duly empowered": For,Rel.U.S. 1905, 
The expression "ad referendum" may also be used, however, to indicate merely that a signature is subjected to the procedure of ratification. See memorandum of the Government of Luxemburg in United Nations, Compilation, p.80. And see an instruction by the United States Department of State concerning the validity of an agree-ment of 21 August 1909 with Venezuela, quoted in Hack-worth's Digest, volo5, PPo156-157. To sign ad referendum 
- meaning subject to ratification - a treaty which already expressly provides for ratification is meaning-less, of course. See Hudson, International Legislation, volo1 (1931), p.xlvi. 
233. See the Austrian memorandum quoted above, Po83, and see the Luxemburgian memorandum reading in part: 
"Le simple mandat de negocier (qui ne comporte pas le pouvoir de signer) est d~livr& dans une forme quelconque, par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. En general, il est r~dig~ comme lettre _patente. Le mandat de negocier doit @tre considere comme comprenant le pouvoir de parapher; en effet, le paraphe sert A documenter simplement l'accord personnel des n~gociateurs sans engager. la d~cision du Gouvernement." United Nations, Compilation, p.80. 
To the same effect, see the French memorandum and the Iranian memorandum in~., pp.47, 66. 
234. For a remarkable case in which the initialling was expressly given the most important binding effects, see the memorandum of understanding reached in London on 5 October 1954 between the governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia 
regarding the Free Territory of Trieste. (Reprinted in The New York Times, 6 October 1954). It is poss-ible that in this case the inconspicuous form of 0 practical arrangements 11 (article 1 uses that express-ion), merely initialled, was used to cloud somewhat the impression that, by the arrangement, the parties 
35 
to it really proceeded to modify the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, without the consent of all . the parties to that treaty. Agreements entering into force upon initialling are also cited by Brandon, "Analysis of' the 'ferms 'Treaty' and 'International Agreement' for the Purposes of Registration under Article 102 of' the United Nations Charter" in A.J ,I ,L., volo47 (1953), p.65, note 67. See also Parry, p.173. 235. See the Luxemburg statement quoted above, p 0 37, note 233 See further Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts, vol. 1, p.70; Freymond, op,cito, Po38; .Camera,~ Ratification of International Treaties (Toronto, 1949), Po57. But see the Roumanian-Hungarian incident reported below, p 0 103. 
236. China Yearbook, 1924, p.864. 
237. Il!.9:,., pp. 876 ff. 
238. Two Chinese writers, Ken Shen Weigh and A.K.Wu, cited below, have described Dr Wang's act as one of initialling, but most documents refer to it as one of signature. 239. Letter of 16 March f'rom Mr Karahan to Dr Wang, reproduced in China Yearbook, 1924, Po879. Note from the Chinese Government to Mr Karahan, ~o, p.885. 
240. ~., p.879. 
241. ~., The note is also found in Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. 1, p.435. 
242. Ken Shen Weigp., Russo-Chinese Diplomacy (Shanghai, 1928), p.296. 
. 243. A.K.Wu, China and the Soviet Union (New York, 1950), p.150. 244. ~., Po155. And see the China Yearbook, 1924, p.886. 245. Weigh, ( op. ci t., p. 296) states: "As experienced a diplomat as Dr Wang naturally would not fix a final signature to a preliminary agreement until he was sure that it would be indorsed by his Government; hence hia transmission of it to the Cabinet for action." 
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246. Wu, op.cit., p.152. 
247. China Yearbook, 1924, pp.882-883. 
248. ~OJ Po879. 
249. This incident is cited by Jones, pp.39-40. For the text of the treaty, see League o~ Nations, Official Journal, 16th year (1935), pp.225-226. 
250. ~., p.217. Text of the note at pp.199-200. 
251 • .!£!.g., p.233. 
252 • .!£!.g., p.114. 
2530 ~-, p.196. 
254. ~., p.217. 
255. ~-, p.115. 
256. The diplomatic correspondence from which the facts above are taken is found in Manning, Diplomatic Corres~ondBnce of the United States, Inter-Ameriean Affairs 1831-1 60, Vol
0
IX -Mexico (Washington, 1937), pp.11-37; 306-343. 
257. .ill.g., p.319 • 
258. .ill.g., p.11 • 
259. ~.,p.311. 
260. 
~OJ p.312. 
261. 
~OJ p. 315. 
262. Ibid~: 
263. Ibid., pp.314-315. 
264. ~., p.317. 
265. ~., pp.20-21. 
266. ~., p.17. 
2670 
~-
268. Il!g., Po 22. 
269. ~ •• p.24. 
210 • .Ieig., p.22. 
271. Ibid., p.37. 
272. ll.!.!!11 
273. All the facts related are taken from For.Rel, u,s., 
1896, PPo929 ff. 
2:74. lli£., p.934. 
275. League of Nations, Official Journal, 16th year (1935), 
p.115. 
276. Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, PPo93 ff. See also Ross, 
p.215, and£!:. Po 40, note 311 below. 
277. See, for instance, the following instrument issued by 
Hitler: 
"Full Powers 
"To the Reich Foreign Minister , Herr 
Joachim von Ribbentrop 
"I hereby grant full power to negotiate, in 
the name of the German Reich; with authorized 
representatives of the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, regar.ding a non-
aggression treaty, as well as all related 
questions, and if occasion arises, to sign both 
the non-aggression treaty and other agreements 
resulting from the negotiations, with the proviso 
that this treaty and these agreements shall enter 
into force as soon as they are signed. 
Adolf Hitler 
_ 
Ribbentrop· 
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"Obersalzberg, August 22, 1939. u Nazi-Soviet Rela-
tions 1939-1941,(ed.1948 by Sontag and Beddie, 
Department of State Publication 3023), p.69. 
,.. See also Vitta, p.76, note 1, and Ross, p.21::3. 
'- ' 
278. United States, Treaty Practice, p.33 (cited above, p.62 ). 
279. The text of the treaty is found in U.N.T.8 0 , vol.82 
(1951), p.229. 
..-.... . ·. 
J\ . 
280. Jones (p038) states that full powers which do not give authority to negotiate and sign are open to objection, while it is no objection to f'ull powers that they pres-cribe "conformity with instructions" as a condition of the binding effect of the agent's acts. Such full powers would keep the legal possibility of a disavowal open until some time after signature. 
281. It is then assumed that a full power only constitutes evidence of authority (.Qf. Jones, p.33): it raises a presumption of the existence of authority. This pre-sumption may be relied upon unless rebutted by other evidence. When it can be shown that the other party knew the presumption to be wrong, principles of good faith preclude him from relying upon it. When it is manifestly wrong, there is, by definition, evidence rebutting the presumption. 
282. Jones, p.157. 
283. Fitzmaurice, "Do Treaties Need Ratification'?" B,Y,I . L., vol. 15 (1934), p.137, note 1. 
2840 Vattel, having in mind the possibility that the signature of an agent might be disavowed on the ground that he had violated his instructions, stated: " ••• as sovereigns cannot be constrained, otherwise than by force of arms, to fulfil their engagements, it is usual not to consider their treaties final until approved and ratified by the sovere:igns themselves." The Law of Nations, bk. 2, eh. XII,§ 156. Classics ed., p. 161. Quoted above, p.2 note 12 • 
2850 It is reported that, when during the Washington conference of 1921-1922, a deadlock had been reached in the Sino-Japan-ese negotiations over the problem of the Shantung railway, Mr Obata, the Japanese Minister at Peking called on Dr Yen, the Chinese Foreign Minister, on 27 December 1921, three days a~er the appointment of a new Chinese cabinet, in~uir-ing whether the Chinese delegates might perhaps be acting in excess of their official authority, and receiving the reply that the stand taken by the delegates was fully in accord with the attitude of the Government. See Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (N.Y., 1933), p.245, n. 132. 
286. The Swedish provision is found in chapter 8, article 2 of the Penal Code of 16 February 1864 as modif.i.ed on 30 June 1948; the corresponding Norwegian stipulation is found in chapter 8, article 89 of the Penal Code of 22 May 1902. 
) ' 
J • 
- J ' 
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287. League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th year (1923), pp. 611, 1011. Of the rather voluminous doctrinal treatment of the dispute, see De~k, The Hungarian-Rumanian Land Dispute (N.Y. 1928), and Petrasco, La r~forme agraire roumaine et les rt!clamations hongroi§€(Par1s, 1931). 
288. 
289. 
290. 
2910 
292. 
293. 
294. 
295. 
League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th year (1923), p.899. 
I!?.1£., pp.901, 1009. 
~ .. Po 1012. 
IQ!£., p.901. 
I!2.!.£ •• p.1011. 
De,k, op.ci t., p.39. 
The following account is from Dettk, op.cito, pp.170-171. The original publication appears to have been in Recueil des Actes et Documents rela.tifs ~ l'affairede l'expropriation ar le Ro aume de Roumanie des biens immobiliers des O tants Hofilirois published by the Hungarian foreign office, Budapest, 192 ) , pp.62-63. 
De~k, o_p,cito, pp.173-175. 
296. League of Nations, Official Journal, 4th year (1923), pp.1009-1014. · 
297. n.!.g., p.896. 
298. 
299. 
300. 
301. 
302. 
~ •• pp.904-905. 
~-
See de Lapradelle, Recueil de la Jurisprudence des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes cr~es ar les Trait~s de Paix, vol. 4 Comp tence, Paris, 1927, p.135. 
Case of Emeric Kulin et autres c. Etat Roumain, judgment of 10 January 1927. See de Lapradelle, loc,cit., pp .. 428-430. 
De~k, op.cit., pp.75-77, 88. 
303. League of ~ations, Official Journal, 8th year (1927), pp0 350-372. 
) ) . 
) ., 
304. 
3050 
306. 
40 
Basdevant, p.602. But see the same writer's comment to the Politis incident ~~~~-ed-~~-Po---1 in .!:£!.g.., p.617, note 2, and see~., p.575, where the same writer states that the question what a plenipotentiary is empowered to do by his f'ull power is difficult. 
McNair, pp.2-3. 
For some quotations, see Fitzmaurice, pp.122-123. See also Jones, Po30. 
Such seems to be the practice of the Soviet Union. See Folents, Ratifikatsia mezhdunarodnyx dogovorov (Moscow 1950), Po52. See also Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (N.Y., 1935), pp.240-241. 308. Fitzmaurice, p.12.1. 
309. See Blix, p.376, espo note 4. 
310. See~., Po377, note 2. 
311. See above, p.97. But see Ross, who suggests that agents may make minor additions, and gives the example of a separate protocol concerning the coming into operation of a treaty. Op.cito, p.215. 
312. From the existence of this competence alone, there does not, 
r ~-~ however, follow as a logical corollary any presumption that the treaty is made to enter into force upon signature: the agent might have stipulated or by some means implied that 
\. ' it should be ratified. Q!. Blix, Po377, note 2. In case of doubt, it has been suggested that the treaty enters o~ ~ into force upon signature. See ..!121g., Po380. 
\' 
313. 
3140 
· See above, p. 99. 
Fitzmauric~, pp.121-125, 129. p.2150 To the same effect, see Ross, 
315. Leriche, pp.26, 35. A verbatim quotation is found above, p.61. 
316. See Statement of treaties and international agreements registered or riled and recorded with the Secretariat during January 1954. U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER A/83, p.8. 317. The ~acts presented in the text have been related byres-ponsible sources to this writer personally. It has not been possible to obtain any of'ficial confirmation o~ them. 
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r· 
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~ I 
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3180 See the statement cited above. 
319. Bittner, PPo48, 56-579 Qf. above, p.21. 
320. No principle of international law limits a state in its choice of agent to sign a treaty. In the case of the USAFFE Veterans Association Inc. v. The Treasurer of the Philippines et al. (cited above, Po 39), the Court of first instance of Manila stated without ma.king any 
·qualification: 
" ••• Anyone, in fact, may be appointed agent of a State for the purpose of negotiating or sign-ing an international agreement." A,J.I,L., vol.50 (1956) Po688. 
To the same effect, see Hyde, International Law (2d.ed. Boston, 1945) vol. 2, p.1419; and Jones, p.47. The choice of agents is not even limited to nationals of the state issuing the authorization: 
"There is no rule of international law which requires that one State issue a full power to sign an international agreement only to its own officials and nationals. The President of Haiti issued his f'u.11 power authorizing the American Ambassador at London to sign in the name of the Government of the Republic of Haiti the protocol to prolong after August 31~ 1944 the Internatioral Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar, signed at London on May 6, 1937, as enforced an~ prolonged by the protocol of July 22, 1942 ••• 11 United States, Treaty Practice, p.33. 
It is clear, on the other hand, that states normally prefer to have diplomatic agents sign treaties, even in situations when persons who have not diplomatic status have negotiated the drafts. To this effect, see memoranda on the practice of the United Kingdom in United Nations, Compilation, p.121 and of the practice ot: Luxemburg in ~., p.80, and of Austria in ~o, p.12. See also the quotation above, Po18, note148 o 
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FOOTNOTES 
Part II 
Chailley, p.180. 
S~e Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (French ed. by Gidel, Paris, 1929), p.362. 
3. Chailley, p.217. See also below, p.172. 
4. For references and further discussion, see below, pp. 190 f'f. 
5. See Blix, p.354. See also treatment in Wohlmann, Die Kom tenz zum Abschlusee von Staatsvertr! en nach V6lkerrecht Zurich, 1931 , p.21. 
6. For references, see below, p. 187. 
7. See below,pp. 187 and 193 f'f. 
8. For references to writers holding similar views, see below, Po 363. 
9. Potter, "Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States" in A.J.I.L,, vol. 28 (1934), p.465. Jones asserts that where a revolution has destroyed the constitution of a state, it is permissible to rely upon "the traditional rule" to indicate the competent treaty-making power. In his opinion, it would be safe to make .treaties with the head of state or the de facto government of the day. _op.cit., p.155. ~ 
10. Potter, op,cito, p.469. Scelle asserts in this connexion that "l'on peut constater que les nations ne peuvent se donner ia constitution qui leur plaft que dans lea limi tes ou le Droi t international le concede". See Pr~cis de droit des gene (Paris, 1934), part two, p.439. See also Wohlmann, op.cit., pp. 36 and 81. The following statement by de Visscher may also be noted: 11 ••• on ne peut consid~rer comme satisfaisants les divers syst~mes qui consacrent la primaut~ absolue de l'~l~ment pop~laire en confiant directement aux assemblees le droit de 
11. 
12. 
13. 
15. 
conclure lea trait~s ou en faisant meme appel A la procedure du r~ferendum. Ces systemes constituent le triomphe d'une fausse id~ologie d~~ocratique et sont condamnables par cela m8me qu'ils sont incapables de garantir efficac.emen t les inter8ts de l 'Eta t." Op. ci t., p.122. 
See The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done 
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in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, prepared by the Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, A,J 2 I,L., vol. 23 (1929) Spee. Supp., pp. 146-t47. 
See below, p.177. 
Gemma expresses himself as follows: " ••• si l' on estime a priori qu'un ~tat ne voudra ou ne pourra pas tenir ses obligations, il est inutile dans ce cas de traiter avec un gouvernement de fait, comme il serait inutile de traiter avec un gouvernement de jure. Pareillement, si on n'a point de confiance dans un gouvernement de fait, si l'on doute de sa continuit~,ou de sa capacit~ A executer ce qu'il a promis pour l'Etat, il vaut mieux .attendre une co.nsolidation ou un changemen t": "Les gouvernements de· fait" in Recueil des Cours 1924, vol.3, p.355. 
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), p.93, no 3. 
Manning, Di lomatic Correa ndence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs, 1 31-1 o, vol.IX 1937, Mexico, pp.1093-1094. The hesitation voiced by Mr McLane had a parallel in the attitude of Mr Forsy!h, minister of the United States to the revolutionary government res.iding in the capital of Mexico and recognized by the Unit4d States during the first half of 1858. On 22 March of that year, he proposed to the administration of President Zuluaga in . Mexico City the conclusion of a treaty providing i a. for the cession of Lower California. He ad.mi ttedThat his propos·a1, coming as it did immediately upon the formal inauguration of the President, and at a time when the condi-tions of the Republic were "disturbed" might "under ordinary circumstances be regarded as premature" (emphasis supplied). In his opinion, haste was justified, nevertheless, by the circumstance that the proposed treaty, if it were to be promptly approved by the Uni t .ed States Senate, must be concluded speedily. (Ibid8 , p.971) It should be noted, in this connexion, that the expressions of hesitation cited were not typical of the 
attitude of the United States Government at the time, nor, indeed, were they typical of the views either of Mr Forsyth or of Mr McLane. On the contrary, all the officers of the United States Government seem to have acted upon the assumption that a Mexican Government 
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de facto, if only possessing a very limited degree of authority and stability was CO!Dlpetent to bind the state -at least under international law. A passage of a report of 18 March 1858 from Mr Forsyth to the Secretary of State is enlightening: 
ur am still of the belief that the Govt. only lacks the moral courage to sell Territory. If it can be brought to that point - and nothing but stern financial necessity will do it - and the price is not an insurmountable barrier, the Treaty will be made. The favour-able moment has just arrived, and I shall use every effort to take advantage of it. That moment is the period intervening between the flush of success, and the incipiency of new revolutionary movements." (~., p.971) 
Mr McLane, despite the misgivings he expressed in the passage quoted above in the text, had urged the Constitu-tionalist Government, even before he expressed the United States recognition of that government, to cede the territory of Lower California to the United Stateso (~o, pp.1039, 1055). It may also be noted that when the treaties were eventually concluded, Mr McLane was eager to have them speedily ratified before any Mexican Congress came into existence. (~., pp. 1055, 1120, 1121, 1140 and 1224). Evidently, his aim was to obviate opposition or defeat which might threaten the treaties in a Mexican legislature. This attitude must have reflected a view on his part to the effect that legislative approval is irrelevant - at least under international law - if the legislature is in abeyance. The President of the United States, finally, appears to have been eager to acquire the consent of the constitu-tionalist government to the cession of Lower California, and there seems to have been no difference in his attitude before and after Mr McLane expressed his doubt~ as to the prudence of such a treaty clause. (~., PPo263 and 269) There is no evidence that the United States Government was in any way deterred by a protest of 14 April 1859 in which the revolutionary government in the capital of Mexico warned that "any treaties, conventions, agreements, or contracts which may have been or may hereafter be concluded between the Government of Washington and the so-called con-stitutionalist government, are null and of no force or effect ••• " (.~o, :p.1047) 
· · 
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The treaties which were eventually signed on 14 December 1859 between the United States minister and the constitutiona .l 1ist government did not include the provision on the cession of Lower California, not because of legal considerations, but because the Mexican constitutionalist government did not feel sufficiently powerful to take that step. (See~., pp.1093 and 1118; for the treaties, see~., pp.1137-1141). Immediately af'~er the signing of the treaties which implicitly dispensed with legislative approval on the part of Mexico, the revolutionary government in Mexico City voiced its protest. Contending that the actual authority exercised by .the Constitutionalist Government was very limited, the foreign minister of the revolutionary govern-ment asserted that "no foreign government can enter into treaties like that which is proposed or has been adjusted at Vera. Cruz". (~., p.1148) He further invoked article 72 of the constitution of 1857 which required the approval of Congress to treaties, and added, in a sentence that merits consideration: 
"What would become of a country which would have to abide by what was done by a few men representing a faction or party under circum-stances similar to those in which the Govern-ment at Vera Cruz is found? A short period of civil war might finish or put in the greatest danger its territory or its independence. The Goven1ment, therefore, of Vera Cruz, in approv-ing of the treaty, has arrogated to itself titles and powers which it does not possess even by the charter which it invokes ••• " (ill,g. ) 
The validity of the treaties signed never came to be tested for the reason that, due to the failure of the United States Senate to approve them, they were never ratified. 
16. See For. Rel, U.S. 1926, volo 1, p. 746. It is noted by Vi tta that after the French defeat at Sedan on 2 September 1870, Bismarck would not negotiate with the provisional govern-ment for the defence of the nation, until that government had been upheld by a vote of the national assembly. See op.cito, p.65, n.1. See also the statement recorded below of an American Minister to Chile. Below, p. 138. 
17. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk.II, Ch.XV, Sec.3, § 1. (The Classics of International Law ed. by J.B 0 Scott, vol. 2, bko 2 (1925), Po392) 
..... 
--
19. 
20. 
See Atherley-Jones, "The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown" 
in Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol.IV (1918), 
p.102. 
Jones, p.152, in note. 
Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, voloI, part I 
(by Ahnlund), (Stockholm, 1956), PPo75-76. Translation 
by this writer. 
21. See Larnaude, p.462; Gemma, p.343; Bittner, p.17. 
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23. 
But see the arbitration between France and Chile in 1901, 
Descamps et Renault, Recueil International des Traites du 
.X:Xe Si~cle, 1901, p.395. Even in ·modern times feeble echoes of this old doctrine 
may be distinguished, though they are hardly audible in the 
general acclaim of the principle of continuity. Thus, the 
view is occasionally voiced that an American Executive Agree-
ment should be binding only upon the Chief Executive conclud-
ing it. With reference at least to one agreement, President 
Theodore Roosevelt adhered to this theory. See quotation in 
Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, pp.402-403. Q.!. Wilcox, 
The Ratification of International Conventions (1935, thesis), 
PPo230-231. In the case USAFFE Veteran Ass, Inc. v. 
The Treasurer of the Philippines et al., the plaintiffs 
argued that an executive agreement relevant to the case bound 
only the administration that had concluded it. Though the 
Court of Manila rejected the argument that the agreement in 
question was not valid, it seemed indeed to admit by implica-
tion that an .American Executive might "elect" not to honour 
an executive agreement concluded by the preceding administra-
tion~ See report in A-2 J .I 2 Lo, vol.50 ( 1956), p.686 at p.688. 
There is overwhelming authority, however, in favour of the view 
that an executive agreement binds successive administrations. 
See, for instance, Harvard Research, Po667; McDougal and Lana, 
"Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
me.nts: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy" in 
Yale Law Journal, volo 54 (1945) at p.318. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. 11, cho16, § 16. 
(Classics ed., 1~25, volo2, bk.2, p.418) For a short 
discussion of that view, see Gemma, Po343. Larnaude, p.487. 
i- 24. 1.E!.!1:·, pp .. 472 ff. 
25. For a discussion of the apparent deviation from this practice 
by the Soviet government, see Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.75 and 
Marek, Po34• 
26. Marek, Po51; Gemma, Po320, n.1. 
19. 
20. 
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See Atherley-Jones, "The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown" in Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol.IV (1918), p.102. 
Jones, p.152, in note. 
Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, voloI, part I (by Ahnlund), (Stockholm, 1956), PPo75-76. Translation by this writer. 
21. See Larnaude, p.462; Gemma, p.343; Bittner, p.17. 
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But see the arbitration between France and Chile in 1901, Descamps et Renault, Recueil International des Traites du XXe Si~cle, 1901, p.395. 
Even in modern times feeble echoes of this old doctrine may be distinguished, though they are hardly audible in the general acclaim of the principle of continuity. Thus, the view is occasionally voiced that an American Executive Agree-ment should be binding only upon the Chief Executive conclud-ing it. With reference at least to one agreement, President Theodore Roosevelt adhered to this theory. See quotation in Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, pp.402-403. Q!o Wilcox, The Ratification of International Conventions (1935, thesis), pp.230-231. In the case USAFFE Veteran Ass, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the Philippines et al., the plaintiffs argued that an executive agreement relevant to the case bound only the administration that had concluded it. Though the Court of Manila rejected the argument that the agreement in question was not valid, it seemed indeed to admit by implica-tion that an American Executive might "elect" not to honour an executive agreement concluded by the preceding administra-tion. See report in A-2 J ,I,Lo, vol.50 ( 1956), p.686 at p.688. There is overwhelming authority, however, in favour of the view that an executive agreement binds successive administrations. See, for instance, Harvard Research, p.667; McDougal and Lana, 
"Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-me.nts: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy" in Yale Law Journal, volo 54 (1945) at p.318. 
Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. iif ch.16, § 16. (Classics ed., 1~25, volo2, bk.2, p.418) For a short discussion of that view, see Gemma, Po343. 
Larnaude, p.487. 
25. For a discussion of the apparent deviation from this practice by the Soviet government, see Mirkine-Guetz~vi tch, p. 75 and Marek, p.34. 
26. Marek, p.51; Gemma, Po320, n.1. 
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27. See Larnaude, p. 465. That writer also q_uotes Chateau-briand who, speaking about the Bourbon house, is said to have put the idea of monarchic legitimacy concisely as follows: "Tout deviendra l~gitime avec ewe, tout est ill~gitime sans eux ••• " Loc.cit. 
28. Marek, Po53. 
29. Larnaude, p. 468. 
30. See Gemma, Po 335; Marek, p.54; Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.68. 
31. See Hackworth's Digest, vol.I, p.186. It may be noted that a new General Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed by the same states at Washington on 7 February 1923, reiterating and strengthening the clause cited in the text. See loc.cit., p.188. 
32. See Hackworth's Digest, vol.I, p.181. 
33. See Sander, "Das Faktum der Revolution und die Kontinuitat der Rechtsordnung" in Zeitschri:ft :f'C1r 5ffentliches Recht, vol.1 (1919), p.153; Marek, p.25. 
34. Marek, p.563; Gemma, Po316; Vitta, p.66. This hypothesis must necessarily be true for international law itself. The validity of norms of international law is determined only by reference to what, as a matter of fact, functions as international law. 
35. Marek, p.56; Gemma, p.353. Both writers q_uote point 1 of the famous communique of 6 January 1922, adopted by the five allied powers: 
"Les nations ne peuvent pas revendiquer le droit de se dieter mutuellement les principes suivant lesq_uels elles entendent organiser A 
· l'int~rieur, leur r~gime de propriet~, leur . ea>no:aie et leur gouvernement. Il appe.rtient A chaq_ue pays de choisir pour lui-m8me le systeme g_u'il pref~re A cet egard." Cit. from Gemma 0 
36. Marek, p.55. 
37. See Vitta, p.65. A passage from a dispatch sent from Mexico 
. J~ by Mr R.McLane to the United States Secretary of State on 7 April 1859 is enlightening in this conne~ion. Mexico was then torn by civil war, and in spite of the circumstance that a revolutionary government ruled from Mexic~ City, Mr 
• V-
. ...., 
. \ 
McLane, on 6 April 1859 accorded his government's 
recognition of the constitutionalist government 
reaiding at Vera Cruz. ffe stated in part: 
"I have had to consider ••• only the question, whether any government existed in Mexico, that offered a sufficient and satis-factory prospect of stability, to justi:fy me, 
under my instructions, in opening political 
relations with it. - In any other country 
than Mexico, I should have had grave doubts in 
coming to the conclusion at which I have 
arrived, but in view of the very large interest, political and commercial,.already involved••• I felt it to be my duty to act promptly in 
opening political relations with some power, if such could be found ••• " Manning, Diploma tic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, vol.IX (1937), Mexico, p.1042. See also, n . t15 above. 
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38. See Marek, PPo54-55. 
39. See~. 
40. Chailley, p.217; Gemma, p.370; Marek, p.143. 
41. Vitta, among other writers, states that de facto recogni-tion is accorded by the conclusion of a treaty, op,ci t 0 , p.64, no6• Cfo Oppenheim (p.137), who teaches that by 
recognition a government acquires the competence to make treaties. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
See, generally, Oppenheim, p.137. 
Marek, p.143; Gemma, p.3740 China Yearbook 1924, p.866. 
Gemma, p.371. 
See above, Wo9-10, and statement by Gemma, quoted above, 
n.13. 
Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, vol.V, Chile-Colombia (1935), p.45 • 
~-, pp.51-64. 
~o , PP·o 78-80 o 
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490 IElJ!o, pp.80•81. But£!: • .!.Bi!!•, Po63 where a dispatch of the minister of 12 May 1835 is recorded in which the minister states that the United States minister to Peru had officially recognized the Salaverry government. 
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~., p.83. 
Quotation found below, p.169. 
Manning, loc,cit., p.85. 
See below, p.167. 
Manning, loc,cit., pp.96-97. 
Miller, Treaties and other International Acts of the United States of America, vol.4 (1931), pp.329-345. 
~., pp.335-337. 
~o, Po337. 
llli·, p.338. 
n..!.g., p.339. 
Dispatch of 24 July 1843. See~., p.338. 
~., p.340. 
~., pp.340, 343. 
.ill,s!., p.345. 
See Jones, pp.139-140. 
Miller, Treaties and 6ther International Acts of the United States of America, v:ol.4 (1931), pp.102-106. 
llli·, p.104. 
~. 
The source from which description of this incident is drawn is Manning, Diplomatic Corresat;ndence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs 1831-1 O, vol.VI {1935), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, pp.427 ff. See also Jones, p.140. 
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70. For the text of this note, see Fontes Juris Gentium, Sero B, Seco 1, Tomus 1, Pars 1, Po725. 
71. ~. (Emphasis supplied). 
72. 
73. 
7L't. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
The text of the whole award is found in Descamps et Renault, Recueil International des Traites du .XXe siecle, 1901, p.393 • 
.!.1ti.$!., Po394. 
ill.g,. 
Ibid. 
-
11 
••• en dehors des cas d'anarchie pure, la permanence de 1 1 existence de l'Etat suppose necessairement la pr~sence dtun pouvoir qui agit en. ::c. son nom et qui le repr&sente; ••• " Ibid., p.395. 
-
II pendant un laps de temps prolonge ••• II • • • • • 1.E!.g. 
78. ~-
79. II • • • d'une facon incontestable 
' 
". • • • • n.!g., Po396. 
80. ~., p.396. 
8t. I!2.!9,., p.3.97. 
82. The Court described as follows the factual situation which had existed in Peru. When, in 1879, the Chilean army had invaded Peru and the constitutional Peruvian president had fled :from the capital, Pierola had seized the power. He had issued "Provisional Statu-tes'' on the basis of which he had governed. From December 1879 to July 1881 he had exercised the legislative, the executive, and, in part, the judicial power; he had imposed taxes, received revenues; he had been recognized as head of state of Peru by foreign powers, notably by the governments of France and Great Britain • If' he had come to power by a military revolt, the resistance of the constitutional government did not seem to have lasted long. It seemed, furthermore, that he had ruled with the assent of the nation, if not recorded formally in a plebiscite, at least manifested either expressly by popular assemblies ih all parts of the country, or implicitly by the f'act that the rest of the population had submitted without opposition to the dictatorial government • .I!2.!!!•, p.397. 
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For the text of the award, see Scott, Hague Court Reports (2d series, 1932), pp.32 ff. The French text of the award is also found in United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. 1 (1948), pp.218 ff. 
For the text of the award, see A.J.I,L., vol.18 (1924), pp.1.47 ff. The text is also found in Briggs, The Law of Nations (2d ed. 1953), PPo197 ff. 
Briggs, op,cit., p.200. 
.!2!.Q..., p.201. 
lli:go 
See the statement by the American minister to Mexico, quoted above in note 37. 
See the expression of the Peruvian minister e,i->t:ed above, p;147and see the statement by the foreign minister of the government in Mexico City, quoted above, note 15 . 
See references given by Gemma, p.310, note 1. 
Above, Po H+7. 
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102 0 See the statement by the foreign minister of the Mexican government res,iding in the capital in 1859, above, note 15. See also below, Po 17J-4-. 
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108. Marek, p.59. The opinions of one writer cited by Marek may also be noted. Spiropoulos is reported to express himself as follows: 
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116. 
"The manner in which the de facto government maintains itself in power - whether it be through terror or by peaceful means - is irrelevant f'rom the point or view of international lawo" (Marek, loc,cit.) Original - in German - is found · in Spiropoulos, Die de facto - Regierung !:... · 1 im V8lkerrecht (Beitr§ge zur Reform und Xodifikation des V8lkerrechts, 2.Heft, Kiel, 1926) p.26. 
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Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, pp.,126-128. Cit. from Marek, p.66. 
The preamble of this treaty reads as follows: 
''The Pres-idium of the Supreme-.; Soviet of' the USSR on the one side, and the Government of' the Democratic Republic on the other, being convinced that now, when the heroic struggle of' the Finnish people and the eff'orta. of the Red Army of the USSR are eliminating the extremely dangerous seat of war created on the f'rontier of the Soviet Union by the f'ormer pluto-cratic Government in Finland to please the imperialist Powers, and when the Finnish people has f'ormed its democratic republic, based on the f'ull support of' the people, the time has come to establish lasting friendly relations between our countries and ensure by joint efforts the security and inviolability of our States; ••• 
" ••• have appointed for this purpose as their plenipotentiaries: 
''The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: V.M. Molotov. 
"The People's Government of Finland: Otto Kuusinen, Chairman of the People's Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, who, having presented their credentials, which were 
) : ~ 
. '· 
found to be drawn up in due form and good order, agreed on the following ••• " Degras, Soviet Documents on foreign policy, vol. 3, pp.406 ff. 
131. See Marek, p.67. 
132 • .I!21:.g., p.68. 
133. Ibido, p.70. 
134. Gemma, p.316. 
135. See Larnaude, p.474; Vitta, p.65; Gemma, PPo 404-405. 
136. Gemma, p.318. 
137. See Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, p~93, and see Gemma, p.366. 
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FOOTNOTES 
Part III 
Above, PPo. 125 ff. 
Above, ~P· 120. It may be noted that Pallieri argues similarly that the alleged principle that municipal 
55 
law determines the authority competent under international law was valid in absolute monarchies. Op.cito, Po470. To the same effect, see de Visscher, p.253. 
AbCN e, pp 0 1 2) f 1 24. 
Above, Po166 • 
Constitutional law or practice cannot very well indicate the internationally competent treaty-making authority in new states ·Which have adopted no constitutional regulation of their treaty-making power, and have not yet developed a constitutional practice in this regard. A preliminary examination of the treaty-making activities exerted by the states of Israel and Pakistan immediately upon their emergence as states, revealed to this writer that although neither state could be said to possess constitutional regulation or settled practice as to the competence to make treaties, foreign states concluded treaties with the executive governments of these states. It may be ass,umed that they would have refrained from doing so, had they not felt confident that, these governments holding them-selves out as competent to bind their states, and there apparently being nothing to throw serious doubt upon their ability to :f'ulfil the obligations they undertook, interna-tional law ·imputed the treaties to the states of Israel and Pakistan. 
6. Many treaties have been made with governments-in-exile, al though these, for obvious reasons, have frequently been obliged to disregard constitutional provisions, e 0 g. requirements for parliamentary approval. It seems probable that the competence under international law of these govern-ments, to undertake treaty obligations on behalf of the states they purport to represent, de~nds upon their being expected to wield or to acquire in the future the autho:r-tty necessary to fulfil their pledges. er. Kelsen, Principlea, of International Law ( 1952T, p.290. 
-
-· 
A 
.-
7. Above,pp.117 • ff. 
8. The following statement by Rousseau may be guoted: 
"L'exercice ext~rieur de la puissance ne convient point au peuple; ••• Ce qui importe easentiellement ~ chaque citoyen, c'est l'observation des lois au dedans, la propri~t~ des biens, la sftret~ des particuliers. Tant 
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1- que tout ira bien sur ces trois points, laissez les cons eil s nt§go cier et trai ter avec 1' ~tranger." Rousseau, Lettres. ~cri tea de la Montagne ( ed. Paris, 1912), partie II, choVII, p.147. ~uoted from Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.98. Q!. de 
. ' 
I 
. '--
Visscher, pp.120-121. 
9. s .tatement in the Constituent Assembly, 17 May 1790. Quoted from Mirkine-Guetz&vitch, p.100. 
10. See the provisions quoted by Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, pp.101-103. 
11. See Jones, PPo12 ff.; de Visscher, pp.120 ff. It may be remarked that while the constitutions of the French Revolution aimed directly at a democratic control of the treaty-making power, the purpose of the requirement of the consent of the United. S,tates Senate was to establish a safeguard against a very wide federal prerogative rather than to effect a democratization of the conclusion of treaties. See · P. de Visscher, "Les tendences internationales des constitutions modernes" in Recueil des Cours, 1952, vol.I, at p.538. 
It may also be noted that a Soviet writer has main-tained that the turning point in the history of the institution of ratification is not the French Revolution, as contended by writers he terms "bourgeois", but the October Revolution in Russia, when, in his opinion, ratifica-tion became a truly "democratic progressive procedure 0 • Polents, Ratifikatsia mezh~narodat;vx dogavorov (Moscow, 1950), Po 11. 
· ~· 12. Th.at the difficulties encountered upon the road towards a democratisation of the treaty-making of states has not been viewed only with complaint may be gleaned from the following statement, made in 1924 by Dupuis: 
, r-
• t-
13. 
"La souverainet~ a chang~ de mains. Elle 
est paas~e du monarque A la nation, du moins 
en theorie, et la theorle voudrait que le peuple souverain donne ses instructions, suive les n&gociations ou du moins s'en fasse rendre compte et se prononce sur leur resultat. L'infortune peuple souverain est parfaitement incapable d' exercer ainsi sa souveraine·te et tout essai de plier la pratique ~ la th~orie pure se tournerait contre ses int~r!ts. C'est une faiblesse des principes d~mocratiques de se heurter sans cease A la nature des choses - et des hommes, - de ne _pouvoi1• etre sui vis en 
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leurs exigences logiques, sans m~connattre les exigences imp~rieuses de la vie ·, et du gouvernemen t de toute societe humaine. 11 Dupui s, "Libert~ des voies de communication relations internationales" in Recueil des Cours 1924, vol.I, p.323. 
See also Genet, who observes that the democratic form of government ent ils less perfection in the external representation of a state than the monarchic form. Traite de Bi}lomatie et de Droit Diplomatigue, vol.3 (Paris, 1932, p.360 . 
The complaint voiced by a speaker in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1921, when the French Government was about to open certain international negott&tions, may be noted: 
11 
• • • et quand vi endra 1 'heure d' approiNer, 
mesaieurs, nous aurons la main forcee parce qµe vous ne pourrez pas desavouer les accords qui auront et~ pass~s entre les Gouvernements Quoted from Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.115. " ... 
14. See Moore's Digest, vol.5, p.197; Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, pp.58-59; and see Jones, p.14. 
15. See articles 12 and 54 of' the Swedish Instrument of Government of 6 June 1809, as amended in 1921 • For a doctrinal treatment of the function of' the commission established under these articles, see Olsson, H.A., Utrikesnttmnden 1937-1953 (Lund, 1957); £,!. article 19, paragrapt 3 of' the Danish constitution of 5 June 1953. 
"La souverainet~ a change de mainso Elle est paaa~e du monarque A la nation, du moins en theorie, et la theorie voudrait que le peuple souverain donne ses instructions, suive lee negociations ou du moins s'en fasse rendre compte et se prononce sur leur resultat. llinfortune peuple souverain est parfaitement incapable d' exercer ainsi sa souveraine·te et tout essai de plier la pratique A la theorie pure se tournerait contre ses int~r@ts. C'est une faiblesse des principes d~mocratiques de se heurter sans cease A la nature des choses - et des hommes, - de ne _pouvoir etre suivis en leurs exigences logiques, sans m~connattre les exigences imperieuses de la vie ·· et du gouvernemen t de toute societe humaine .. " Dupuis, "Libert~ des voies de communication relations internationales" in Recueil des Cours 1924, vol.I, p.323. 
See also Genet, who observes that the democratic form of government ent ils less perfection in the external representation of a state than the monarchic form. Traite de Di}lomatie et de Droit Diplomatigue, vol.3 (Paris, 1932, p.360. 
13. The complaint voiced by a speaker in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1921, when the French Government was about to open certain international negoti&tions, may be noted: 
" ••• et g_uand viendra 1 'heure d' app:rouver, mesaieurs, nous aurons la main forcee parce que vous ne pourrez pas desavouer les accords qui auront ~te pass~s entre lea Gouvernements Quoted from Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.115. ... 
14. See Moore's Digest, vol.5, p.197; Hackworth's Digest, vol. 5, pp.58-59; and see Jones, p.14. 
15. S.ee artic le-s 12 and 54 of the Swedish Instrument of Government of 6 June 1809, as amended in 1921. For a doctrinal treatment of the function of the commission established under these articles, see Olsson, H.A., Utrikesn!mnden 1937-1953 (Lund, 1957); .£!. article 19, paragraph., 3 of the Danish constitution of 5 June 1953. 
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16. See ~irkine-Guetz~vitch, pp.121 and 123, on such 
arrangements in the United States. See also the proposals de lege ferenda made in Peffer, America's Flace in the World (New York, 1945), PPo 199-219. 
170 With regard to the United States, see Hackworth's Digest, 
vol.5, p.59. 
18. Mention should be made of the important mode of exercising democratic control o~ the conclusion of treaties which is found in many states in the circumstance that the government 
may be driven out of office by a vote of non-confidence. Though this form of democratic control over the making of treaties does not raise difficult problems in the interna-
190 
200 
21. 
22. 
. tional sphere, and will not, therefore, be commented upon 
at length, it appears to be leas than satisfactory from the municipal point of view. Once a treaty is irrevocably 
concluded by a government in a state practising this system, it is cold comfort to a majority in the legislature to which the treaty is repugnant that it is able to drive the govern-
ment out of office. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in states where this is the only form of democratic control 
of the makihg of treaties, there are tendencies to require that the government should submit drafts of treaties for the 
approval of the legislature prior to committing the state. See, for instance, the data noted in the section on treaties in Mr EoLauterpacht's fourth survey and comment on "The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law", covering the . period 1 January - 1 June 11957, I .c,L.Q., July 1957, pp. 528-529. 
See Jones, pp.16, 78. 
Op,cit., p.138. 
For the view that treaties made with democratic sanction 
offer betler guarantees of f'ulfilment than do those made by heads of states , see Wohlmann, Die Kompetenz zum Abschlusse 
von Staatsvertrlgen nach V5lkerrecht (Zurich, 1931), p.101 ~ See quotation below, n. 28 • . 
On this development, see the very interesting lectures by Professor Paul de Visscher on "Les tendances internationales des constitutions modernes" printed in Recueil des Cours, 1952, vol.I, PPo534 ff. 
Professor Scelle is reported to have declared in the International Law Commission, on 22 May 1951, that "there 
was a veritable spate of simplified treaties ••• " In his 
opinion, "such a system was anarchical and anti-democratic. 
·~ 
23. 
24. 
25. 
2.6. 
27. 
28. 
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Someone might commit the State without having consulted the nation". See U.N., Doc. A/CN. 4/SR 86 (27 June 1921), Po10. Professor Pintor states that 
"la pratique internationale adme.t cette proc~dure simplifiee - par laquelle lea prescriptions les plus solennell.es du droi t interne sont souven t d~jou~es ••• ": "Trai tes internationaux et droi t interne" in R,G.D.I 1 Po., volo 42 (1935), p.529. 
Undoubtedly it is still a general rule that all communica-tio~s and inquiries between state organs shall be made through the channels of the departments of extemal affairs O See, for instance, Hackworth's Digest, vol.4, PPo604 ff. And see below, p.245. It is·no doubt customary, too, that legislatures, as organs of states, do not address themselves to foreign governments, or to foreign legislatures . It may be noted, however, that, when the legislature of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet, adopted, on 21 December 1957, a resolution setting out seven points for the preservation of peace, the speakers of the Swedish legislature were informed of the r ~solution through the channels of' the executive bran-ches of the two governments, such communication hav~ng been requested by the Supreme Soviet. 
See Bittner, pp.81, 95. 
The following statement by de Visscher may be noted: 
"Les Etats d~mocratiques sont en r~alit4 ~ la recherche du point id~al d'&quilibre qui . permettra un contrSle s&rieux et efficace dee relations ext~ieures par les assembl~es, sans devoir pour cela livrer a l'~tranger cette part de s~cret ins~parable de toute politique ext&rieure. Ge point id~al est atteint, croyons-nous, dans le syst~me du partage de la comp,tence international e." Op,cito, p.278. 
See Anzilotti, Cours de droit international (French ed. by Gidel, Paris 19~), p.366; Ross, p.207; Vitta, p.69. 
See Dupuis, loc.cit., Po326. 
In this connexion, the following statements mar be noted: 
"International law might be regarded as stultify-ing itself if it insisted on the validity of treaties, which, being constitutionally void, would in most cases become admittedly ineffective and perhaps incapable of execution.tt Jones, p.151. 
11 
••• die Rechtssicherhei t, den Vertrag zu halten, viel gr5sser ist, wenn das Parlament oder das Volk ihm zugestimmt haben, als wenn das Staatsoberhaupt allein das Versprechen abgibt." Wohlmann, op.cit., p.101. 
"Du point de vue pratique, la th~orie de la 
validit~, en assurant l'application des trait~s, permet une plus grande stabilite des relations internationales ••• " Georgopoulos, La ratification des trait~s et la collaboration du Parlement (Paris, 1939), p.26. 
The same point is made by Ross, p.203 and by Kopelmanas L'Organisation des Nations Unies (Paris, 1947), p.111 0 ' 
290 See the description given of the theory in Lauterpacht's First Report, p.160, and in Basdevant, Po580. 
30. SchUcking, "La port~e des r~gles de droit constitutionnel pou~ la conclusion et la ratification des trait~s interna-1 ~ tionaux" in Annuaire de l'Institut International de Droit Public, 1930, p.225. 
. \ 
' 
. ; ' 
31. See Laband, Deutsches Reichsstaa.tsrecht (7th ed.), p.172; i!1 Fauchille, Droit International Public, ,;cl.I, 3 partie (1926), Po6j Dehousse, p.149; Kelsen, Principles of Interna-tional Law \New York, 1952), p.324. 
3·2. Op.cito, p.188. 
33. It may also be pointed out, in this connexion, that great difficulties would arise if the task of interpreting consti-tutional provisions, when controversial, were always referred to international tribunals. See Pallieri, p.483. His view is cited below, p. 197 • 
34. Op.cito, p.475. 
35. lE..!g,., p.486. 
The following opinion expressed in a recent American monograph may also be quoted: 
. - -
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"Cons ti tu ti onal requirements, no matter how clear and obvious on their f'ace, are invariably open to interpretation by the municipal judiciary, and are open to being declared unconstitutional by that body. If a state were permitted to use such a defense, in answer to the international validity of an agreement, the law of' treaties is on very uncertain ground. It might take years before the constitutionality of a treaty is finally decided, and confusion would result from lack of finality. Further, non-compliance with constitutional limita-tions could conceivably become a device for political manipulation, malfeasance, and bad faith in interna-tional affairs. Constitutional limitations are of no concern to other states ••• " Hendry, Treaties and Federal Constitutions (Washington, 1955), p.154. 
See also Lauterpacht's First Report, p.159; Basdevant, p.581; Ross, p.207; Vitta, p.69; Scelle, Pr~cis de droit des gens, voloII, p.441; and Anzilotti, op.cit., p.365. 
3:6. See Bittner,p.95; Jones, p.154; and Scelle, op.cit., 
37. 
vol. II, p.441. And see below, p. -243. 
See, for instance, Lauterpacht, loc,cit.; Ross, p.207§ Vitta, p .. 68; and de Visscher, p.245; Kelsen, op.cit., p.3240 And see below, p • . 244. 
38. See above, note 2J;and see de Visscher, pp.70 and 271; and see below, p. f45. 
. 
39. See Fitzmaurice, p.134; and de Visscher, p.245. 
40. Bittner, p.82; see also Basdevant, p.579. 
41. The well-known statement by Anzilotti in his dissenting opinion in the Eastern Greenland Case may be noted in this connexion: 
"As regards the question whether Norwegian con-stitutional law authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make the declaration, that is a point which, in my opinion, does not concern the Danish Government: it was M.Ihlen's duty to refrain from giving his reply until he had obtained any assent that might be reg_ui site under the Norwegian laws." P.C.IoJ., Sero A/B, No.53, pp.91-92. . 
) ,; 
62 
See also the view expressed by the same authority in his Cours de d.roit international (French ed., 1929), p.366. · 
. 
In the opinion of Bittner, a person encroaching upon the municmpal law in this regard at the same time commits an infraction of international law. Op,cit., p.100; 
£!. Scelle, Precis de droit des gens, vol.II, p.439. 42. In this connexion, the following statement by Vitta is of interest: 
"Les raisons ci-dessus [ to the effect that con-stitutional law and international law are absolutely distinct systems, and that the validity of treaties is determined by international law alone] suffisent par elles-m~mes A d~montrer la these que j'adopte; mais je tiens _A ajouter, A so~ appui, que des grosses difficultes d'ordr~ pratique se presentent lors de l'application de la theorie contraire. Je sais bien adducere inconveniens non est solvere argumentum; mais le juriste peut @tre ~ouss~ ! choisir une solution donnee loreqµ'oa . lui d~montre l'existence d'obstacles tellement graves, que i'application pratique du principe contraire en devient presque impossible." Op.ci t .. , Po 69. 
43. See Willoughby, The fundamental concepts of public law (New York, 1924), p.315• Vitta, p.64; and Fitzmaurice, pp.135-136. Sir Gerald(s opinion is cited below, note 48. 44. Bittner, p.16. 
45. mg., PPo87-99. 
46. Above, p. 117. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
See Jones, p.150; de Visscher, p.253. 
This is the stand taken by Fitzmaurice, p.135. It must also be noted here that Bittner uses the word "head of state" in a broad sense, comprising both the . formal head of state, and the executive government, which, in map.y states, acts in the name of the head of state. See op 2 cito, PPo68-69. 
The notion is sometimes termed the principle of "estoppel" or presented as a special case of acquiescence. See Jones: pp. 112 and 155; and see Lauterpacht's First Report, p.164. 
. ' 
• \ , I 
1 
. .) . 
It seems less f'ortunate to use the term "tacit ratif'ication" in this connexion as some writers do. See Halleck, International Law (3rd ed. London, 1893), vol.1, p.277; Hall, International Law (8th ed. Oxford, 1924), p. 385; and Fairman, p. 449. In modern interna ti. onal law, the term "ratif'ica.tion" does not usually convey the idea of' an adoption of an unauthorized act, but suggests merely consent or confirmation. 
50. The following authorities adhere to the theory in some way or other: Lauterpacht, First Report, p.160; Halleck, loc,cito; Hall, loc;.cit.; Fenwick, "The Progress of Interna-tional Law During the Past Forty Years" in Recueil des Cours 1951, vol.II, p.49; Vitta, p.222; Ro~s, p.216; Jones, p.155; Fitzmaurice, p.137, note 1; and Fairman, PPo447-448. 
51. See below, p. 361 
52. That repudiation'3on the ground of unconstitutionality have been attempted even in such situations has already been seen in the case of a G-3.'!a-i-!ft.& Convention of 1896 between Peru and the United State.s. See above, p. 146. 
53. Above, p. 1~8. 
540 McNair, Po6. 
55. Basdevant, p.581. 
56. See de Visscher, pp.270-272; Fairman, p.453; and Devaux, "La conclusion des trait~s internationaux en forme s'ecartant des regles consti tllltionnelles et dite 'conclusion en forrne simplifi~e'" in Revue Internationale Francaise du Droit des ~' vol.1 (1936), pp.306-308; von Szas~y, "Die parlamen-tarische Mitwirkung beim Abschluss v5lkerrechtlicher Vertra'.ge" in Zeitschrift fur 5ffentliches Recht, vol.14 ( 1934), PPa1'6A65 and 478-480. 
57. Fitzmaurice, p.131; .£!. Pintor, "Trait~s internationaux et droit interne" in R.G.D.I.P., vol.42 (1935), pp.533 ff. 
58. Jones, pp.154-155; . .£!. Ross, p.208. 
59. Pallieri, pp.483 and 476. 
600 See McNair, p.6. 
61. Pallieri, p.470. 
62. 
63. 
64 • 
65. 
c 
66. 
67~ 
68. 
t'c 
69. 
IE.i.g., PPo478-479, 482. 
~ .. , p.479. 
~o, p.476. 
64 
.!.:!2l4., p.483. Q!. Sundberg who suggests such a theori as a ppssibility: Lag och Traktat (2d ed., Stockholm 1942), Po33; see also Wohlmann, Die Kompetenz zum Abschlusse von Staatsvertr~gen nach Volkerrecht, p.82. 
Pallieri, p.484. 
~., pp.485-486. 
~., p.472. 
See above, p.133. 
~c 
10. It may be recalled that, in the past, negotiations were sometimes refused with agents whose full powers were not thought satisfactory. See Jones, pp. 7 ff • 
. (~ 71. Article 21 of this Draft reads: 
• . ,2 
"A State is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by an organ or authority not competent . ~-:. under its law to conclude the treaty; however, a State may be responsible for an injury resulting , uc. to another State from reasonable reliance by the latter upon a representation that such organ or authority was competent to conclude the treaty." 
.A.J.I 8 Lo, vol. 29 {1935), ~o, Po992. 
72.. Sir Hersch had suggested the following clause: 
"In cases in which a treaty is held to be invalid on account of disregard of the constitutional .\ i limitations imposed by the law or practice of a contracting party that party is responsible for any resulting damage to the other contractt!lg party . ci ~ which cannot properly be held to have been affected with knowledge of the constitutional limitations in . ~ question": First Report, p.157. 
0 The following statement by Verdross may also be quoted: 
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73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
"Hat • • • ein S.taa t bona f'ide einen Vertrag abgeschloasen, ohne die Beschrinkung der Zustlndigkei t der (treaty..;;'aaking power )des Partners zu kennen, dann ist dieser Staat schaden-ersatzpf'lichtig, wenn er die Verbindlichkeit des Vertrages nicht nachtrlglich anerkenntrt: Valkerrecht (2d ed., Vienna, 1950), p.128; see also Hall, International Law (8th ed., Oxf'ord, 1924), p.381; Freymond, La ratification des trait~s et le robl~me des ra orts entre le droit interna-tional et le droit interne Paris-Lausanne, 19 7, p.105; Chailley, p.169, note. 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice makes this point. Op.cit., p.1,35. 
See Wohlmann, op.cite, p.82, Fairman, p.462. Q!. Scelle, Pr~cis de droit des gens, vol.II, Po455. 
For c:r.4'..l.lc.is · of the 0 damages theory 0 , see further Fitzmaurice, loc,cit. and Fairman, p.462. 
See also Lauterpacht, First Report, p.160; and see Roes, p.207. 
65 
78. See above, p. 120. 
79. See below, p. 362. 
80. See notably Chailley, pp.170-180; that writer's discuss-ion of' the matter .is examined in some detail below; see also Dehousse, pp.124-138. Most writers who discusa the conclusion of treaties in detail, and who treat the problem of competence under , international law, consider the various types of consti-tutional provisions regulating the municipal competence. Not all writers, however, examine the texts of' constitu-tions with a view to finding evidence of the rule of' international law on competence. See, f'or instance, Freymond, La ratification des trait~s et le probleme des rapsorts entre le droit international et le droit interne, Po5; Georgopoulos, La ratification des trait&s et la collaboration du Parlement, pp. 6 ff'.; veiler, De 1 1obliga-tion de ratif'ier les trait~s reguli~rement conclus (Paris, 1921), pp.62 ff. 
81. Op.cit., p.207. 
66 
82. See the Havana convention cited below, p.320. 
83. Op 1 cit., p.148; see also Wohlmann, op.cito, Po26. 
84. However, not even by express provisions inserted into treaties does it appear possible to make parliamentary approval unconditionally indispensable internationally. See the instruction issued in January 1843 by the United States Secretary of State, quoted above, p.141. 85. See Anzilotti, Cours, p.363. 
86. Vitta, p.82; see also Pintor, "Trait~s internationaux et droit interne" in R.G.D.I.P., vol. 42 (1935), p.522. 87. Jones, p.154. Emphasis supplied. 
88. Chailley, p.170. Emphasis supplied. 
89. See Bittner, p.16. The relevant statement i s ~ .i:•'ti.P.::d above, p.20; Dehousae, p.138; Chailley, pp . 175. The latter writer sees support in constitutions for his view that there exists no rule of international law on the competence to conclude treaties. 
90. U.N. Publication, Sales No.: 1952. v. 4. 
91. Reference may be made to two older compilations of \ constitutional provisions regarding the conclusion of treaties: The Treaty-Making Power in Various Countries. 
• r-
A collection of memoranda concerning the negotiation, conclusion, and ratification of treaties and conventions, with excerpts from the f'undamental laws of various countries. {Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919); and Arnold, Treaty-making procedure (London, 1933). The two following collections of constitutions may also be cited: Dareste, Delpech and Laferri~re, Constitutions modernes (6 vols. Paris, 1928-32); and Peaslee ~ Constitutions of nations ( London 1 950) • 
92. See a.ls@ below, p. 228. 
93. Motions of non-confidence are such sanctions. See memorandum of 11 March 1951 submitted by the Government of Israel to the United Nations in U.N., Compilation, p.72; see also below, P•213 • 
J 
J 
' l 
. ' -
, . .) 
.. -
67 
94. See, for instance, Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Relation of Inter-national law to internal law in Austria'' in A.J. I,L., vol. 49 (1955), p.474; and see below, p.213 on the provision in the new Danish constitution; see also Chailley, p.171. 95. See the quotation from Chailley, above, p.208. 
96. Chailley, p.171. 
97. The provision is too new to have been included in the United Nations compilation cited above. The text above is this writer's translation of the Danish original. 
98. It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that no such check exists as regards the King. This circumstance must no doubt make the international relevance of counter-signature all the more desirable, at least from the national point of view. 
99. See Betaenkni af ivet af Forfatnin skommissionen af 1 6 (Copenhagen, 1953 , .p.29. The memorandum by Professor S5rensen is found in an appendix to the report of the commission; see ibid., pp •. 113-127. 
100. See~., p.126. 
1'01. ~., p.114. Translation supplied. 
102. Chailley, p.172. 
103. See U.N., Compilation, p.72. 
104. ~., p.14. Emphasis added. 
105. ~., p.16. For earlier Belgian doctrinal controversy over the right interpretation, see Dehousse, pp.134-136. 
106. Article 37 of the constitution. See U.N., Compilation, 76. Emphasis supplied. 
107. 112.!.g., p.78. 
108. Chailley, p.173. 
109 • .!.E1g., p.174. 
110. U.N., Compilation, p.135. 
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111. It is not known to this writer if the constitution of Venezuela cited in the text is again operative after the overthrow in February 1958 of the regime of President Jimenez. 
112. Chailley, p.17~, .£!9 ~o pp.176-177. 
113. U.N., Compilation, p.7. 
114. International Law Reports, 1952, p.459. 
115. The passage quoted in the text is not included in the International Law Reports, but is found in an article published in 1955. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, 11Relation 
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of International Law to Internal Law in Austria", in A.J.I.L., vol. 49 (1955), p.473, note 158. The conclusion reached in the text has authoritative support in the cited article. 
116. U.N., Compilation, p.46. 
117. · Il.!g., p.74. 
1180 .Il21g., p.102. 
1200 Preuss, "The Relation of International Law to Internal Law in the French Constitutional System", in A,J. I.L,, Tol. 44 (1950), p.648, note 18. 
121. See Basdevant, p.578; de Visscher, p.56. 
122. Malek, "L'Organisation des pouvoirs publics en Syrie", in Revue de Droit International pour le Moyen Orient, 1 9 54, p. 190 • 
123. Tarari, "La sup&riorit(§ du traittS sur la loi dans la nouvelle Constitution Syrienne*', in Revue de Droit Interna-tional pour le Moyen Orient, vol. 3 (1954), p.183. 1~4. Chailley, p.174. 
125. U.N., Compilation, p.75. 
126. Chailley, p.173. 
127. U.N., Compilation, Po60. Georgopoulos asserts that the parliamentary and diplomatic practice of Greece is in favour 
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of the internati~nal relevance of parliamentary approval. He admits, however, that this view is not unanimously taken in Greece: La ratification des trait~a et la collabora-tion du parlement {Paris, 1939), pp.31-32. 
128. 84th Cong. 2d Sess. Senate Report No. 1716. Calendar No • 164 9, p. 1 • 
129. l.E..!Q.., p.11 • 
130. Admittedly the unconstitutionality to which the committee referred related to the substance of a treaty, rather than to the authority concluding the treaty. The example never-theiess well serves to show the need for cautious interpre-tation. 
131. Chailley, p.173. 
132. U.N. Compilation, p.38. 
133. See Re lies from Governments to International Law Commission, March 1950, p.25. 
1134. U .N., Compilation, p.41. 
13, • .!!U:.g., p.95. 
136. u.N., Compilation, p.67. 
of the 
19, 23 
137 • .Il219.., p.91. See article 26 of the constitution. 
138. ~ •• 
139. .See .!J2.!g,., p. 93. 
140 • .!2.!.g., pp.96-97. 
141. Pintor, op.cit., pp.525-526; Sundberg, Lag och Traktat ( ed. ed., Stockholm, 1942), pp. 30-35, esp. pp.30 and 34. 142. But see Chailley, who tries . to explain this provision as evidence only of a spirit of political caution, rather than of juridical conviction. Op.cit., p.179. 1!~3. See above, p. 186~ 
• '\ i- 141+. Q!. note 130 above. 
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145. To the same effect, see Harvard Research, p.1005. The following diplomatic exchange may also be noted. In 1899, it was suggested to the Chinese minister to Washington that certain alleged treaty rights of Chinese citizens might be submitted for determination by the United States courts. In a reply of 25 January 1899, directed to the Secretary of State, the Chinese minister stated .!.c.!.· that he could not, by any action on his part, "recognize the competency of a domestic tribunal of one of the parties to take such action as would irrevocably bind the other party to the conven-tion." He concluded by saying: "··· I apprehend you will not contend that adverse legislation or the judgment of a domestic tribunal can release a government :from its solemn treaty obligations." Moore's Digest, vol. 5, p. 241. 
1l+6. International Law Reports, 1950, pp. 276-278; .g!. below, p. 235. 
1'47. As an additional example might be mentioned the case or Benzoni v. David:ovici, decided in 1950 by the Tribunal de Bonneville. See International Law Reports, 1951, p.392. 
148. See, for instance, The United States v. Capps, 348 U.S. 196 (1955), where the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, but expressly refrained from ruling upon the holding below that an executive agreement was uncon-stitutional. 204 F. 2d 655 (1953). 
. 
. 149. See, for instance, In Re Dillon, decided in 1854 by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Moore's Digest, volo5, PPo78-79. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
Above, p. 2 33. 
International Law Reports, 1951, p.395. 
Judgment No. L - 1891 of 31 March 1949. Quoted t'rom Re lies from Governments to uestionnaires of the Interna-tional Law Commission, U.N. ~., A CN·. 19 of 23 March 1950, p.64. The quotation is also found in Briggs, The Law of Nations (2d ed. London, 1953), p.59. 
153. USAFFE Veterans Ass. Inc. v. The Treasurer of .the Philippines. Judgment of 5 January 1956, Court of First Instance of Manila, 1· Branch VII. Report in A.J,I.L. volo 50 (1956), p.686. 
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154. See above, Eart I, note 320. 
155. Loc,ci t. 
156. 341 u.s. 22 (1951). 
157. ~. 
158. Above, Po 195. 
159. Above, p. 219. 
160. Annual Digest 1929-1930, p.338. In 1914, the same Co1ombian court had re:fused to examine the constitution-ality of a law approving a treaty, but there is no report in the digest either of the grounds for that decision, or of the manner in which the constitution was alleged to have been violated. It is stated, however, that two judges dissented strongly against the decision • .I.£!.!!. 1 61 • Above , p. 1 8 9 • 
162. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
169. 
Kelsen seems isolated in taking the following extreme position: 
". • • when a state through its government concludes a treaty with another state, the government of the latter has no reason and is not entitled to question the constitutionality of the act of the former. But this does not prevent the government of a state after having concluded a treaty with another state, from declaring the treaty null and void because con-cluded in violation of its own constitution." Principles of International Law, p.324. 
Wohlmann, Die Komfetenz zum Abschlusse von Staatsvertrlgen nach V6lkerrecht Zurich 1931), p.57, and references _ therein. 
Jones, p.153. 
See above, p. 188. 
J"ones, p.155. 
Ibid. 
Ie.!,g.' p.154. 
Basdevant, p.581. 
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1'70. Fi tzmauriQe, p.135. See also Vi tta, pp.69 and 79; Fairman, p.444; and Hendrf, Treaties and Federal Consti-tutions (Washington, 1955), p.155. 
171. Moore's Digest, voi.4, p.680; £.! • .!J2.!2:.., pp.781-782. 
172. The quotations are from Moore's Digest, vol.5, pp.169-170; the case is cited by Fairman, p.444 and by Hendry, op.cit., p.155. 
173. See Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, p.391. 
174. United States, Treaty Practice, p.53. Emphasis supplied. 
175. Above, p. 237. . 
176. See Pallieri, p.476. 
177 0 "Les gouvernements ont confiance les uns dans les autres; si un gouvernement se d~clare pret A ratifier et A faire executer la convention, l'autre ne recherche pas s'il en a le pouvoir, d'apr~s sa constitution interne": Cottez, De l'intervention du ouvoir ex~cutif et du arlement dans la conclusion et la ratification des traits thesis, Les Echelles, 19!0), p.138. See also Anzilotti, op.cit., Po364. But Mr Alfaro, speaking in the International Law Commission in 1950 seems to have asserted that "states invariably a.eked for information as to the capacity of the other party to make the treaty under negotiation": u,N,Doc., A/CN.4/SR.52, 22 June 1950, p.23 • 
. 178. See McDougal and Lans, "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy" in Yale Law Journal, 
· vol. 54 (1945), pp.181 ff. 
179. Dehaussy 1 "Le d~posi taire de trai ttSs" in R.G.D, I .P., vol. 56 ~1952), ~.506. 
180. See Oppenheim, p.904, note 1. 
181 • . Support for the view advanced is found in a communication of' 26 August 1930 from the United States Secretary of State to the Danish Minister to Washington. The Danish Government, having offered to issue a Royal full power to its minister to Washington to adhere on behalf' of' Iceland to a multilateral convention, for which the United States Government was the depositar;, the Secretary of' State replied: . 
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••• the Department, which, af'ter all, as the depository of' the convention, is but the mouth-piece of all the contracting Governments, does not insist upon having such f'ull power in the absence of any comment having been received f'rom any Government as to the sufficiency of the notice of adherence." See Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, p.80. Leriche, "L'~volution r~cente de la soci~te interna-tionale et les trait~s multilat~raux" in Revue de droit international de sciences di lomati uea et oliti ues, vol. 29 1951 , p.35 • 
Dehausay, o~.cit., p.506; £!. Baadevant, p.582; and see above, p.96 • 
See Backworth's Digest, vol.5, _pp.83-84. The incident is cited in Lauterpacht's Fir t Report, p.164. 185. Hackworth,~. Emphasis added. 
186. Quotation :from Hackworth, not :from the original source, Emphasis added. 
1:87. Quotation by Hackworth :from the original. ill.!,a;., p.84. 
188. This seems to be the interpretation given to the answer in Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des V5lkerrechts (Basle, 1948), volo1, Po64, note 52. 
189. 
190. 
191. 
192. 
193. 
194. 
Above, pote 181. 
Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, p.80. 
The memorandum does not, unfortunately, reveal how the Government of the United States and other parties to the treaty reacted to the notice that the adherence had not been definitive under the internal law of the state concerned • Kopelmanas, L'Organisation des Nations Unies (Paris, 1947), vol.1, pp.121 f'f' • 
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London, 1950), p.58. Kopelmanas, op.cit., p.123; see also Parry, p.167, note 52. 195. 11 • •• UD droi t de regard absolu Bur la fa9on dont ont ete acquises les ratifications de la Charte par les autres Etats signa tairea ••• 11 Op, ci t., p.123. 
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The facts related in the text are taken from Chailley, pp.224-225; de Visscher, pp.154-157; Mirking-Guetz&vitch, pp.105-106; McNair, pp.7-8; and Jones, pp.144-145. 
See Chailley, p.225; and de Visscher, p.156. 
For a discussion of the principle, see below, pp . 348 ff. 
The facts are found in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs (1831-60), vol.8 (1937), p.22. 
Jones, p.137. 
Manning, loc.cit. 
The material used is found in Manning, op.cito, vol 0 9, Mexico, (1937), pp.11-41 and 309-332. 
Jones, p.140. 
Manning, loc,cit., p.331. 
!E..!.Q;. , pp. 26-27 • 
Report in · de La p:radelle · et Poli tie, · Recueil des Arbitrages Internationaux, vol. 2 (1856-1872), pp.676-705. The incid-ent is cited by Chailley, pp.220-221; de Visscher, pp.174-176; Jones, pp.145-146; and the Harvard Research, p.1003. 
See de Visscher, p.176. 
Se.e Jones, p.146; and th~ _Harvard Research, p.1003. 
Westlake expressed himself as follows: 
1181 l'interpr~tation. donn~e par le pr~si-dent Erasmus A la Constitution transvaali.enne 
~tait exacte, il en serait, croyons - nous, r~sult~ que lea compromis et, partant, la sentence ~taient frapp~s de nullitt§. Le pouvoir d'un agent public, quel que soit son rang, d'engager le pays qu'il repr~sente, depend uniquement de la Constitution. Peu importe sa bonne foi. Peu importe aussi la croyance que les ~trangers peuvent avoir de son autorit~." D.eLapradelle et Politis, op.cit., p.703 • 
11 
Westlake suggested, however, that there are exceptions I to the relevance of constitutional provisions. Thus, in 
1-
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his opinion, the treaty-making organ may validly con-tract in excess of constitutional limitations, when justified by a force majeure. He did not find any such exception applicable to the present case, and concluded: 
"En signant seul lee compromis, le Prt!sident P~~torius avait d~pass~ ea comp~tence. 11 avait fait un acte nul. D~s lors, la sentence n'avait pas de force obligatoire pour son pays." 
D'el!mpradelle et Politis, op.cit., p. 705. 
210. Westlake denied that the relations to the natives were governed by international law, but found the agreements nevertheless valid: " ••• on ne saurait, il est vrai, invoquer un droit object1,, national ou international, lorsque lea parties n'en reconnaissent aucun. Mais il y a au-dessus d'elles la justice, dont tous lea hommes ont le sentiment ••• '' de Lapradelle et Politis, op,cit., p.701; see also Chailley, p.221 and de Visscber, p.176. 211 • .Q!. McNair, p.11. 
212. Material from McNair, The Law of Treaties (1938), PPo38 and 506. 
213. For the text of the convention, see Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, vol.12 (1905), p.955. 
214. This is the view of de Visscher, p.158. 
215. lE..14. 
216. The facts are taken from Basdevant, p.582, note 1. 217. For the text of the convention, see de Martens, Nouveau Recueil General de Traites, 2 ser., vol.10, p.133. 218. La Propriete Industrielle, 1886, p.24. de Visscher, p.159). (Citation from 
219. It is not known whether any case of application of the convention arose in E·cuador in the relevant period. 220. Basdevant, p.582, note 1. 
221. Vitta, p.92, note 2. 
222. Cbailley, p.222. 
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223. Cottez, De l'intervention du pouvoir ex~cutif et du rlement dans la conclusion et la ratification des Paris, 1920, pp.13 -139. Cottez cites the ----==-=--O_f_f_i_c_i_e=l of 5 November 1890. 
224. Ibid. 
76 
225. Reference may here also be made to an occasion in 1eo1, when the President of the French Chamber of Deputies declined to put to the vote of the Chamber a motion inviting the government to submit a treaty already ratified by it for the approval of the Chamber, apparently in order to avoid any possible conflict between the parliament and the executive, and between France and the other party. See Cottez, op,cit., pp.139-140. 
226. Jones, p.142. 
227. Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, p.165. 
228. The text of the treaty is found in Pribram, Les traites Politiques secrets de l'Autr.tt:he- Hongrie, 1879-1914, vol. I (Paris, 1923), pp.41 ffo 
. 
229. Bourgeois, Manuel histori ue de oliti ue etran ~re, vol.4 (Paris, 192 , p. 42· Renouvin in Hauser, _ Histoire Diplomati6ue de 1 1Europe (1871-1914), vol.2 (Paris, 1929), p.3 3. 
· 
230. See Shuhsi Hsu, "The Treaties and Notes of 1915" in Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol.16 (1932-1933), pp.57 ff.; Ling, La position et lea droits du Japan en Mandchourie (Paris, 1933), pp.258 ff.; Wou Histoire di lomati ue de la Chine de uis 1 1 (Paris, 1932, pp.254 ff. But the following writers assert, or admit the international legal validity of the treaties: Young, c.w., The International Legal Status of the Kwantung Leased Territory, vol.2 (Baltimore, 1931), pp.163 ff, Michael, F., Der Streit um die Mandschurei (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 57 ff.; Willoughby, W.W., The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1935), p.23.; Tulli&, La Mandchourie et le conflit Sino-Japonais devant la Societe des Nations, ~p.179 ff.; Jones, F.C., Manchuria since 1931 (London, 1949), p.84. While not committing hims~lf on the - issue of international law, Korovin states tbat the treaties were invalid under Chinese law, see_Japonia i mezh!Jynarodnoe pravo (1936), p.68. 
·-" ' 
U• 
\ ' ' 
• c. 
231. 
232. 
233. 
Godshall, The International Aspects of the Shantung Question (Philadelphia, 1923), p.91. 
.!J2.!.g. 
For the texts o:f these instruments, see MacMurra:.Y. ·, I.V.A. 1 Treaties and A reements with and concernin vol.2 t1912-1919, pp.121 , ff. 
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China, 
234. See For, Rel, u,s., 1915, p.159. 
235. Chapter IV, article lS of that Constitution provided: 
236. 
237. 
"The Provisional President shall have power, with the concurrence of the National Assembly, to declare war and conclude treaties. 11 
For the text of the constitution, see For4 Rel 8 U.S., 1914, pp. 38 ff.; or China Yearbook, 1914, pp. 60 ff. 
For. Rel, u.s., 1914, p.42; Pan Wei-Tung, The Chinese Constitution (Washington, 1945), p.a4. 
Of this o~inion are: Willoughby, Constitutional Government in China (Washington, 1922), p.16; and Hai-Chao Chiang, Die Wandlun en im Chinesischen Verfassun srecht seit dem Zusammenbruch der Mandschu-Dynastie Berlin, 1937, p.41; Contra, see: Wood, The Chino-Ja anese Treaties of Ma 2, .1212 (New York, 1921 , p.1 , but £.f..~., p.25. 
238. For, Rel. u,s., 1914, p.57. 
239. See Hai-Chao Chiang, op.cit., p.50; Wood, op.cit., p.27. 
240. For. Rel, U_,So, 1914, Po6o·. For a comment on the article, see Chen Wan Li, Les d~veloppements des institutions politiguea de la Chine (Paris, 1916), Po98. 
241. Wood, The Twenty-one Demands, pp~89-90; and Wood, The Chino-Japanese Treaties of May 25 1 1915, p.27. 
242. See Young, op.cit., p.170. See also the following state-ment by another writer: 
"Yuan Shih-kai was virtually supreme in the Chinese government and had exercised so much personal control and oversigh·t that it was unnecessary to engage in indirect discourse through the Foreign Office': Godshal 1, :a'singtau under three Flags (Shanghai, 1929), p.'2i:J7. 
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243. 
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245. 
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In the same vein, see Hai-Chao Chiang, op.cit., p.50; Chen Wan Li, op,cit., pp.94 and 97; and Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and after, (1928), p.303. 
For, Rel. u.s., 1916, pp.86 and 98; Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden City, N.Y., 1922), pp.193, 199 and 201; and see Hai-Chao Chiang, op.cit., p.51. 
See dispatch from the United States Minister to Peking, For. Rel. u.s., 1916, pp.85-86. The expression "dissolution of Parliament" presumably refers to the abolition by Yuan Shih Kai on 26 May 1914 of an extra-constitutional body of supporters called by himself in December 1913 to share the responsibility of dissolving the National Assembly and to amend the provisional constitution of 1912. See Pan Wei Tung, op.cito, p.24; and For, Rel, u.s., 1914, p.61~ 
See Shubshi Han, op.cit., p.50; but see Wood, The Chino-Japanese Treaties of May 25 1 1915, Po28. 
The text of the agreements embodied in the notes may be found in an appendix to Gallagher, America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations PPo463-464. 
247. See Quigley, ttLegal Phases of the Shantung Question" in Minnesota Law Review, vol. 6 (1922), p.392; Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, pp. 337-338; Gallagher, op, ci t .1J, pp. 247, 256, 272, 296-297, and 343; Reinsch, op, ci to, p.340; Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, (1921), p.251; MacMurray, opv?it., p.1445; Godshall, The International Aspects of the Shantung -Question, p.109; and Temperly, A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, vol.b (London, 1920-1924), pp.375-376. 
248~ See an offictal memorandum submitted by the Chinese delegation to the Council of Ten, reproduced in Miller, D.H~J Mk Diary at the Conference of Paris, (1924), vol. 6, pp.240-2 7. 
249. Ibid., p.241. 
--250. It might also be noted that a pamphlet entitled "China's Claims at the Peace Tablett, published in New York by the "Chinese Patriotic Committee" urged the Peace Conference to nullify the treaties of 1915, without, however, citing unconstitutionality as~ ground. 
251. See Temperly, op.cit., p.386. 
252. 
253. 
254. 
See Baker, R.s., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol. 2 (1922), p.264. 
Gallagher, op,cito, Po298. 
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Young prefers the admittedly more logical conclusion that the plea for abrogation implied admission that the com-pacts were binding: op,cit., pp.156 and 165. It is submitted, however, that the conclusion drawn above is a truer interpre-tation of the Chinese position. See the following note. 255. It must be noted in this connexion, however, that Mr Wang, the Chinese delegate, declared that "the mere fact that the Chinese asked for an abrogation of the Treaties would [not] imply that they recognized their validity ••• The Chinese Government and people had always considered the state of things arising under these Treaties as a de facto situation, without any legal recognition on the part of China." See Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922 (Washington, Government ,v Printing Office, 1922), p.1512. 
256. !12.!.g., p.15.60. 
· \ · 257. Wood, ,.T,_h.,.,e_,,..C ... h_.in__..o ... - ..,.J_a_..pa__....n .... e.... s.... e~---~~~-~~~-~-Hoshien Tcheu, 
•. 
r- ' 
la Chine et le Japon 
258. See conference report cited above, note255 , at p.1508. 259. ~., p.1560. 
2600 For the text of one of these resolutions, see Shuhsi HsU, op,cit., pp.55-56. A French translation of the same resolution is found in Ling, op.cit., pp.253-254. For the original text of the resolution, Shuhsi Hsu refers to The Journal of the c.llamber of Deputies, Third Session, No.12, Documents, p.1. 261. See Shuhsi HsU, loc.cito Qr. Young, op.cit., p.159, n.B; and see Document No.4 of Memoranda presented to the Lytton Commission by V.K.Wellington Koo, Assessor: "Memorandum on the Twenty-One Demands and the agreements of May 25th, 1915", vol.I, p.148. 262. Young, op.cit., pp.159, note 8. 
263. The quoted passage is found at p.148 of the memorandum cited in note 261 above. 
264. Yen Liu, one of the sponsors of the resolution writes as follows: 
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265. 
266. 
267. 
268. 
269. 
270. 
~ 271 0 
ttAccording to international law, in concluding a treaty, both parties have the obligation to recognize the constitutional requirements of the other party of the ratification of the treaty. The provisional constitution [sic] of the Republic 
Bo 
of China stipulates that the President in concluding treaties shall obtain the consent and approval of Parliament. The Sino-Japanese treaty covering the twenty-one demands was concluded under duress from Japan and at a time when the Parliament was dissolved, and to this day it has not obtained the consent and approval of the Parliament. This means that it has not f'ulfilled the requirement of ratification of treaties in our country. Without such requirement being fulfilled, this treaty is not finally con-cluded, and therefore certainly cannot have any effect. It is therefore proposed that the Parliament shall resolve to request the Government to declare the treaty null and void." 
The same writer continues to state that the resolution having been passed unanimously by both the Senate and the House, the Assembly "requested the Government to act accord-ingly o" See Yen Liu, Thirty Years of Chinese Diploma tic History (2d ed. in Chinese, Shanghai, 1931), p~.150-151 • For the ~bove translation, this writer is indebted to Mr James Wang, formerly of Columbia University. 
See Young, op,cit., pp.158-159. 
The text of the Chinese note and of the Japanese reply is found in an appendix to Young, op.cito, pp.22.8-233. 
~-
Above, p. 275. 
The Present Condition of China. Document prepared by the Japanese Government and communicated to the Commission of enquiry appointed by the Council of the League of Nations in pursuance of its resolution of December 10, 1931, Document A, Appendix No.4: "Present condition and validity of the so-called Twenty-One De.Dl9.Iids" (1932). 
~o, p.6. 
See the argument cited in the incident of 183·2 between the United Sta.tes and France, above, Po 257 • 
272. ~., Po7. 
273. League of Nations, !2.2£.., Co 663. M.320 (VII. Political, 1932, VII, 12), PPo37-38. 
274 • .!!!.i£l., Po49. 
275. See League of Nations, Official Journal, Spee. Suppl. 1933, No.111, p.99. 
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276. Willoughby, The Sino-Ja nese Controvers and the Lea e of Nations (Baltimore, 1935. 
277. See below, p. 364. 
278. See above, }lote 235 
279. See Shuhsi Hs'Cl, China and her Political Entity (New York, 1926), pp.353 ff.; Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New York, 1942), p.242; Weigh, Russo-Chinese Diplomacy, p.166. For the Russo-Mongolian agreement, see MacMurray, Treaties and A eements with and concernin China, VOlo 2 (1912-1919, pp.992 ffo 
280. Hst1, China and her Political Entity, p.356; Shih-Min Kang, The International Relations of the Re ublic of China subse uent to the Revolution of 1 11 L.L.M. thesis at Columbia Univ., 1919, p. ; For. Rel, U.S., 1913, p.120; and North China . ~ ~ ~ Herald, - hereinafter cited as N.C.H. - vol. 107 (1913), 7 June, p. 741 and .!!!14., 14. June, p.819. 
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281. 
282. 
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IE..!..!!•, 21 June, p.902; Hst1, China and her Political Entity, p.356; Shih-Min Kang, op.cito, p.86. 
Shih-Min Kang, op.cit., pp.89-90; N.C.H., vol.108 (1913), pp.135-136; Weigh, op.cito, p.178; and HsU,China and her Political Entity, p.357. 
Hsn, loc 1 cit. 
Pavlovsky, Chinese Russian Relations (New York, 1949), p.56; Hst1, China and her Political Entity, p.358. 
285. Pav.lovsky, loc.cito 
286. See N.C.H., vol.109 (1913), p.447; For, Rel, u.s., 1913, p.139. The Russian minister to Peking carefully reported these events to his government, see The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vo1.16; p.656. 
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See Weigh, op,cito, p.179; N.C,H., vol. 109 (1913), p.445; Shih-Min Kang, op.cit., p.91; for the texts of the instru-ments, see MacMurray, op1 cit., pp.1066-1067. 
HsU, China and her Political Entity, p.358; Pinghou C.Liu, Chinese Forei n Affairs - Or anization and Control (type-written dissertation at New York University, 193 , p.191. 
Chung-tau Chen~, Contemporary Outer Mongolia (in Chinese, Shanghai, 1922), book 2, pp.14-17. For translations this writer is indebted to Mr James Wang, formerly of Columbia University. 
By way of comparison it may be mentioned that paragraph 1 . of the same article laid down that States which were men-tioned in the Annex were to become members by the deposition with the Secretariat of declarations of accession. The text of the Covenant may be found in many publications, eogo Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations (2d ed., 1949), pp.555 ff. 
291. B,F.S.P., vol.57 p.32. 
292. The text of the letter is found in vVehrer, "Le Statut International du Luxembourg et 1 a Societ& des. Nations" in Revue nerale de Droit International Public, volo 31 
293. 
294. 
2950 
296. 
297. 
298. 
2990 
192 , PPo1 9-202, at p.179. 
~., pp.181-184, in footnotes. 
1.1ti:,g,. , pp.187-190, in note.a. 
Ie..!,g., p.190, note. 
~., p.188. 
~., p.191, note. 
~., p.194. 
Article 37 of the Constitution of Luxemburg then, as now, provided that no treaty would have "any effect" until ,,_ having received the assent of the Chamber. See above, p. 210. 
300. lB.!.g., p.197, note. 
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~-
!Bll·, p.198. 
de Visscher, pp.170-171. 
See Wehrer, op,cit., p.197; see also Fairman (p.449), who stresses that the Luxemburg delegation had made it clear that its action needed parliamentary assent, and that such could not very well have been given in advance, since the delegation went to Geneva to bargain for a special status. He concludes, however, that the subsequent conduct of Luxemburg constituted a tacit ratification. de Visscher asserts that when, as in the present instance, a state organ points to a constitutional prov-ision limiting its competence, that clause comes to consti-tute a suspensive condition for the binding effect of the obligation undertaken by that organ. He concludes, however, that Luxemburg became irrevocably bound by the vote of the Assembly because the Luxemburg parliament had earlier expressed the desire that the Grand Duchy should become a member (see above, p.285), and the League, thus being assured of the position of the parliament, was not concerned with the form which the approval of the parliament ought to take under the law of Luxemburg. The reference made by the Luxemburg delegation to the need for parliamentary action had had regard to approval of a modification of the status of neutrality, not to the act of accession. Op.cito, pp.171-172. 
By the two governments, according to the Austrians, and by the two parliaments, according to the Rumanians. See Wohlmann, Die Korn etenz zum Abschlusse von Staatsvertr! en nach V6lkerrecht Zurich, 1931 , pp.91 ff. 
ll.!g. 
Bundesgesetzblatt :fttr die Republik Osterreich, No.40 (1920) Jnd Monitorul Official of 19 October 1920, No.157. See Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Relation of International Law to Internal Law in Austria" in A.J,I,L-o, vol. 49 (1955), p.473, note 156. 
McNair states that the Rumanian Government argued that the agreement was not binding because not approved by the Ruman-ian Government. All other writers, however, cite the Rumanians as arguing the lack of validity as a consequence 8f absence of parliamentary approval. See McNair p.12; _f. Chailley, p.223; de Visscher, p.160; Seidl-Hohenveldern loc.cit.; and Wohlrnann, loc.cit. 
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311. Wohl.mann, lg;cit. 
312. ~.; and de Visscher, p.160. 
3130 Wohlmann, loc 2 cit.; Seidl-Hohenveldern states that the 
convention was "'duly ratified by the King of Rumania": loc;c1 t. 
314. League of Nations, Official Journal, 5th Year (1934), No.10, pp.1349 ff and 1599 ff. 
315. The facts related in the text are based upon a speech by Mr Venizelos in the Council, on 14 March 1925. See League 
of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Year (1925), pp.480-482. de Visscher states (p.172) that the Greek Government had strongly recommended that the National Assembly approve the protocol, but the authority for the statement does not 
appear from his avcount. References to the debates in the Assembly are given by Georgopoulos, La ratification des trait~s et la collaboration du .Parlement (Paris, 1939), p.32. 
316. League of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Year (1925), pp.478-479. 
317. Paraphrase by Chailley. Op.cit., pp.232 ff. Original formulation found in League of Nations, Official Journal, 6th Year (1925), p.482. 
318. 
319. 
320. 
321. 
322. 
323. 
3240 
de Visscher, p.174. 
fairman, p.450. 
Jones~ pp.142-143. 
Vitta, p.93 and note therein. 
g!. Pal1:ieri, p.485. 
For the article, see Goodrich and Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations (2d ed., 1949), p.555. 
Hudson, "The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations" 
· in A.J.I.L., vol. 28 (1934), p.131. 
325. Ibid., p.126. 
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326. 
327. 
~-; and League of Nations, Official Journal, Nr.1 l1920), p.13. 
IiUdson, op.cit., p.126. 
85 
328. Git. from Hudson, op.cito, pp.126-127. Original in League of Nations, Official Journal, Nr.1 (1920), p.14. 
329. Op,cito, p.127. 
330. de Visscher, p.162. 
331. That view has support also in Schficking and Wehbergt Die Satzung des Volkerbundes, I Band (3tn ed., 1931), p.292. 
332. Hudson, op.ci to, p.128. 
333. Cited from Hudson, op.cito, p.126. Original in League of Nations, Official Journal, Nr.1 (1920), p.14. 
334. Hudson, op.cit., p.127. 
335. .!121g. , p. 128. 
336. 1J2..!s!., p.129. 
337. 112!9:., pp.128-129. 
338. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of Nations (1930), p.47 ff. Cit. from the Harvard Research, p.1004. 
J39o The New York Times, 29 September 1932, p.1 as cited by Hudson, op. ci t •. , p.129. 
,3ijO. de Visscher, p.163 • 
, 'f._ 341. League of Nations, ;QQ£. A. 30. 1933. Git. from Hudson, op.cito Po129. 
342. The same conclusion is drawn by Fairman (p.447), who remarks, 
I 
I 
11 
I 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
however, that the Covenant was not included among the 
. 1 Tratados y Convenciones Vigentes en la Naci6n Argentina, published by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Y Cul to in 1926 • 
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Both Hudson (Op.cit., pp.127 and 131) and de Visscher (Op,cit., p.164) deny the possibility of accession being effected by the letter of 18 July 1919, and consider the cable of 16 January as the effective instrument 0 The discussion in the text shows why this writer has reached a different conclusion. 
de Visscher, p.164. 
ng., p.165. 
Having reached the conclusion that it did not appear that both parties to this controversy regarded principles of international law as applicable even by analogy, Dr Mervyn Jones refrains from using the case as evidence. Op.cit 0 , ~.148 note 6. The case is cited, however, by McNair (p.13~, and in the Harvard Research, p.1004. Though Sir Ivor Jennings has discussed the agreements in question and their relation to the public law of the British Commonwealth and to international law, it is not entirely clear to what extent he considered rules of international law relevant. He states that with some modifications caused by the common allegiance to the Crown, the relations between the nations of the Empire "sont essentiellement cei.µ du droit interna-tional", adding: "c'est pourquoi le droit interne de l'Empire Britannique doit contenir les principes du droit international~ A moins que lea rapports . speciaux dont il vient d '@tre question ne sty opposent". See article entitled 11Le Traite Anglo-Irlandais de 1921 et son interpretation" in Revue de Droit International et de L&gislation Comparee, vol. 13 {1932), pp.473-523, at p.495. Sir Ivor Jennings maintains that the treaties here under discussion were binding upon the Irish Free State "non a raison de son propre droit public, mais a raison du droit ,public general de la Communaute britannique des Nations, droit qui est fonde sur les conventions constitu-tionnelles gen&rales qui r~glent les rapports entre les membres 4e cette communaute. 11 ~., Po510. While it cannot be inferred from this statement that its author thought rules of international law relevant, other state-ments by the same writer seem to imply this. See 1J2..!g., pp.512, 514 and 517, and see the quotation below, note 364. In the opinion of this writer, the statements of the parties to the dispute leave little doubt that their positions were taken on the basis of international lawo The same conclusion is reached by Hollis, The International Effect of ''Unconstitutional Treaties" (S:pecial Report, Columbia University, School of Law, 1936), note 142. . 
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347. The discussion whether this agreement implied the recognition of an existing international personality, or that personality came into existence only through the adoption by the British parliament of the "Irish Free State (Agreement) Act of 1922" is not of relevance in this connexion. See Jennings, op9 cit., PPo482-484. For the agreement, see L.N.T,So, vol. 17. 
348. 
349. 
350. 
351. 
352. 
353. 
354. 
355. 
356. 
357. 
358. 
359. 
360. 
361. 
362. 
363. 
364. 
Jennings, op, ci t.,, Po 481 • 
For the text of the constitution, see B.F.S.P,, vol. 116 (1922), pp.260 ff. . 
.Q.mg. 4061 (1932); Jennings, op.cit 0 , p.506. 
~. 2757 (1932); Jennings, op,cit., pp.507-508. 
Jennings, op,cit., p.512. 
Q!a.g. 4056 (1932), p.8; Jennings, op.cit., p.508. 
Jennings, op,cit., p.508. 
~. 4056 (1932), p.3. 
!Q.1g,., Po5. 
Ibid., pp.7 and 8. 
Communication of 16 June 1932, ~. 4116 (1932), p.2. 
Cpmmunication of 22 June 1932, .Q.mg,. 4116 (1932), p.3. 
Memorandum forwarded by Mr de Valera under date of 12 October 1932 • .Q.mg,. 4184 (1932), p.3. 
Memorandum forwarded to the Irish Free State Representatives on 15 October 1932, Qm9;. 4184 (1932), p.7. 
Ie!g. 
Memorandum forwarded by Mr de Valera under date of 26 October 1932; in Cmd. 4184 (1932), p.16. 
Assuming apparently that constitutional conventions of the British Commonwealth were relevant to. the Irish Free State, Sir Ivor Jennings finds the agreement valid because "lea trait~s n'ont pas besoin d'!tre ratifi~s par le Parlement ou par les Oireachtas [the Parliament of the Irish 
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Free State], except~ lorsqu'ils affectent des droits particuliers 11 , which was not here the case. Op.cit., p.507. Commenting upon a contention made by Mr de Valera to the effect that the agreement of 1923 had been concluded behind the backs of the people and could, therefore, be repudiated by him, Sir Ivor Jennings states, however, that "c'~tait lA une nouvelle doctrine de droit international (et peut-!tre une doctrine tres dt!sirable) •••• " ~., p.512 (emphasis supplied) • Having examined, further, the manner in which the Government of the Irish Free State had accepted and effected the agreements, the same writer concluded: 
"Au point de vue constitutionnel, toute cette mani~re de proc~der ~tait parfaitement r~guli~re. Et puiaqu'elle etait constitu-tionnellement reguli~re, lea regles du droit international ont ete observees dans la mesure ou elles &taient appiicables. 'une violation des accords par le Gouvernement de l'Etat Libre d'Irlande serait une violation des obligations qu' il a en tant que membre de la Communau te britannique des Nations. Et si le droit inter-nationa:11.:. itait pleinement applicable entre deux membres de cette Communaute, l'attitude du Gouvernment irlandais conatituerait t!galement une violation du droit international." !l?.!£!o, PPo514-515 • 
See the statement quoted in the text, p. 309. 
Letter of 29 November 1934. See League of Nations, Official Journal, 16th Year (1935), pp.196-197. 
367. See letter of 8 January 1935, in~., pp.216 ff. 
368. 
3690 
370. 
Above, p.,90 • 
League of Nations, Official Journal, 16th Year (1935), p.217. 
The relevant articles invoked were the following: 
Constitution of 5 August 19o6: 
"Article XXII: The sale or cession of any part of the revenue or property of the State, and any alteration or rectification 
of the frontiers of the State, may only take place with the sanction of the Mejlis." 
371. 
372. 
"Article XXIV. The.conclusion of treaties and agreements and the grant of commercial industrial, or agricultural concessions (monopolies) - whether the beneficiaries be Persians or foreigners - must be ratified by the Mejlis, except in the case of treaties which must remain secret in the interests of the State and Nation." 
Addition to the Cons.ti tut ional Laws (October 7, 1907): 
"Article III: The frontiers of the state, provinces, and communes may only be modified in virtue of a law." Ibi.d 9 , p.234 • 
.illQ;., p.220. 
Article 7 of the Ottoman constitution of 22 December 1909, read in part as follows: "The sanction o:f Parliament is required for the conclusion of treaties relating to peace, commerce, or the cession or annex~ ation of territory." Ibid., p.235. 
ill.9:., p.116. 
89 
37,3 • 
374. .!!2,!Q., p.121. Dr Mervyn Jones, nevertheless, cites the Persian representative in extenso on this point. See Jones, pp.143-144. 
3.75. 1.12.!.s,., pp.121-122. 
• l,L 376. ~-, p.1204. 
377. Hackworth's Digest, vol.5, pp.156-157 • 
• ~ o~ 3780 ~o, Po393. Emphasis supplied • 
• i e,~ 379. See de Visscher, p.211. 
380. ~. 
3810 .JJ2.!£., p.212. 
3820 .Il2.!.g., pp.212, 215. 
3830 ~., p.211. 
~\ : 
\ I 
\ 
t' ,, 
384. Laws and Practices concerning the Conclusion of Treaties. United Nations Legislative Series. U2N. Doc., ST/LEG/SER.B/3, December 1952. 385. Report of the International Law Commission covering its second session, 5 June - 29 July 1950. U.N, Doc. A/1316, p.10. 
· 
See Summary Record of the Fifty-Second Meeting o~ the Second Session, 22 June 1950, lJ;,N,Doc. A/CN.4/S.R.52. Hudson, International Legislation, vol.4, p.2380. See Jones, p.149; and de Visscher, p.218. 
90 
Jones misg_uotes the article to include a "shall" instead of the "will". See op,ci t •. , p.149. 
Hudson, loc,cit. 
By 1951, seven states appear to have been bound by the convention. See Hudson, Cases on International Law (1951), p.448; .£!. Blix, p.368. 
392. Jones, p.141. 
393. League of Nations, Official Journal, Spee. Supp. No.133 (1935), Po43. 
394. The award and the report may. be fouhd in several publica-tions. The source consulted by this writer is For. Rel. U.So, 1 888, vol. 1 , pp. 456 f. Apparently, the award and the report are also included in Moore, Histor~ and Digest of Interna-tional Arbitrations, vol.2, pp.194 ff.; and in LaFontaine, Pasicrisie interna tionale, p.298. All the facts related below are extracted :f'rom Rives' report, hereinafter cited as Rives. 
395. Rives, p.463. 
396. For the treaty, see B.F.S.P-., vol.48 (1857-58), pp.1049-1052. 
397. Rives, p.464. 
398. Rives,~. Emphasis supplied. 
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4000 The same conclusion is drawn by Jones, p.1l4.1. 
401. Rives, p.464. 
402. ~ •• p.465. 
403 • .!£.!.g. 
404. l12.!.Q;. 
405. ~ •• p.467. 
406. Ibido 
-
407. It does not seem justifiable to conclude, as does Chailley (pp.227-228), merely from the broad terminology used on this point by Mr Rives, that Costa Rica would have been entitled to challenge the validity of the treaty on the ground that it violated the constitution of Nicaragua. 
4080 The report of the case is found in For. Rel, u.s., 1901, pp.262 ff. 
409. Ibid., p.271. The case is cited also in Fairman, p.458. 
410. For a report of the judgment, with a note by Anzilotti setting out the arguments of the parties and a comment to 
411. 
412. 
413. 
414 • 
415. 
416. 
417. 
the case, see Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, vol.7 (1913), pp.518-523. (Thie source is cited below as Rivista). The case is also reported in A.J.I.L., vol. 6 (1912), pp.995-1002. 
de Martens, Nouveau Recueil G~neral de Trait~s, 3 ser., vol.1, pp.509-523. 
See Rivista, Po520; the protocol is not reproduced in de Martens collection. 
Rivista; p.521 • 
A.J.I.L., vol.6 (1912), p.998. 
Rivista, p.522 • 
A.J,I,L., vol.6 (1912), p. 1000. 
Anzilotti, in Rivista, p.518; Verdross, Volkerrecht (2d ed., 1950), p.127; Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des V5lkerrechts, vol.1, p.63; 8iotto-Pintor, "Traites internationaux et droit 
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interne" in R.G.D.I.P. vol.42 (1935), pp.531-532; Vitta, p.96, n.1. 
418. Chailley, pp.230-231. 
4190 Woblmann, Die Kompetenz zum Abscblusse von Staatsvertr!gen nacb V5lkerrecht, pp.89-90. 
420. Jones, p.146. For a discussion of that case, see above, p. 256. 
421. The case is digested in Annual Digest, 1923-1924, p.19. 
422. Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, vol.1 (1840), pp.110 ff. 
423. Quoted from the original report that was printed under the title Reclamations Bri tannigues dans la z_one Espagnol du Maroc I Rapports (The Ha_gue, May 1925), p.178. 
424. 
425. 
426. 
427. 
It does not, however, seem warranted to impute to the judge the opinion that the head of state possesses a jus representationis omnimodae. This is done by de Visscher, p.177. Another comment upon the case is found in Jones, p.146 • 
See above, p~. 41-47. 
See above, p.255. 
See the incident of 1875 concerning the denunciation by Ecuador of the Industrial Property Convention of 1883., above, pp., 264-266 ; two treaties discussed in the French Chamber of Deputies, above, pp.266-26 7; the case of the Chinese-Russian treaty of 1913, above, pp.280-284; and the case relating to the admission of Argentina to the League of Nations, above, pp. 297-305 •• 
4280 Chailley's interpretation of the Politis incident may be taken as an example; see above, p. 296. 
429. See the discussion ·of the Western Gri ualand Diamond De osits ~ of 1871, above, pp. 21:,· -2 , the incident concerning the Irish Free State anniii ties, above, pp. 306-311; and the incident settled by the Cleveland award, above, pp. 322-330. 
430. Above, pp. 322-330 • 
431. Above, pp • . 21,4, 227. 
432. Above, pp. 332-339. 
433. 
434. 
435. 
436. 
437. 
438. 
439. 
440. 
441. 
442. 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
Above, 
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PPo 331-332. 
pp. 339-341. 
pp. 41-47, 341. 
pp. 284-291. 
pp. 293-297. 
pp. 297 ... 305. 
pp. 317-318. 
p. 217. 
pp. 315-316. 
pp. 240-241. 
443. See de Visscher, p.268; Dehousse, pp.143-144; Jones, p.151; Pallieri, pp.479-480; contra: Harvard Research, p.992; Chailley, pp.243 ff. 
444. See the position taken by the United States Government vis-a-vis France in 1832 above, pp.256-258; the views of some Senators of the United States cited above, p. 224 ; the attitude taken by the Council of the League of Nations in the case of the admission of Luxemburg, above, pp.284-291; but cf. Rives' report to President Cleveland, above, pp. 326-330. 
445. See, for instance, Jones, p.152. 
446. de Visscher, p.270. 
447. Discussing the case of the admission of Luxemburg into the League of Nations, Professor de Visscher has pointed to the fact that, before any formal application for membership had been submitted by the executive branch of the government of Luxernburg, the Chamber of Deputies of the state had expressed the desire to see Luxemburg admitted. In his opinion, this action sufficed, in the international sphere, to register the approval of the legislature of the ultimate adherence of the state, regardless of the fact that this parliamentary action did not satisfy the constitutional require-ment of approval of treaties; op.cit 0 , pp.171-172. 
4480 In this connexion a motion tabled in the British House of Commons on 5 December 1957 by eighteen opposition MePoe (members of the Labour Party) may be noted. The background of the motion was that the Heads of Government of N.A.T.Oo Powers were about to meet at Paris, and it appeared possible that important agree-ments might be entered into at the conference. The motion read in part as follows: 
"This House ••• solemnly declares that it will not indorse, ratify, or implement any agreement which has, in theory or practice, the result of divesting the House of Commons of its control of foreign or defense policies or its democratic right and duty to determine for this country the ultimate issues of war and peace." (The Times, 6 December 1957) 
On 11 December 1957, the matter was discussed in the House. Mr James Griffiths (Labour M.P.) urged the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Macmillan, not to enter into highly important commitments without the prior approval of Parliament. The latter replied in part as follows: 
"The making of agreements, or modifications to existing agreements, is historically and constitutionally a duty laid on the Executive. The Government's authority depends on their ability to command the confidence of Parliament." (House of Commons Debates, volo579, col.1262) The motion was not adopted, since the government had the confidence of the House. It may be concluded 
94 
that the government was internationally - as well as municipally - competent to commit the state on issues that might come up for settlement at the conferenceo Had the motion been passed, the government would, in this case, have resigned. However, in a state where the adoption of a resolution of this kind might not cause the government to resign, its_international legal competence to commit the state would seem to become affected by it. 
449. Jones, p.154; and see the Danish argument in the Eastern Greenland Case, above, Po45o 
450. See the Rio Martin Case, cited above, pp.339-341; the Eastern Greenland Case, cited above, PPo45, 341. Q!.. Rives' report in the Cleveland Award, above, p.328. 
451. 
452. 
453. 
454. 
See the Danish constitutional provisions cited above, Po 212. 
95 
See, f'or instance, the case of the Russo-Chinese conven-tion described above, pp. 280-284. 
But Mervyn Jones seeks to argue that a revolutionary government cannot be unconstitutional because "the con-stitution is destroyed by revolution, and is no longer operative". Op.cit., p.155. However, if' the argument were accepted, it might equally be used to prove that no successful violation of a constitution is really a violation, since, on the relevant point, the constitution is no longer operative. 
On this point, see Siotto-Pintor, "Traites internationaux et droit interne" in R.G.D.I,P., vol.42 (1935), p.536. 
455.Cf.Pallieri, p. 483. 
456. 
457. 
458. 
459. 
4600 
461. 
462. 
46,3. 
4640 
See the Franco-Swiss arbitration cited above, pp.332-339; the Rio Martin Case, above, pp.339-341; but cf'. Rives' report to President Cleveland, above, yp,329. 
Pallieri,pp.485-486. 
See the evidence cited in note 429 of this part. 
Above, pp.193 ff. 
See, for example, the report by Rives to President Cleve-land, above, pp.. 327 ; The Rio Martin Case, above :-iP. 341 • 
U.N. Doc., A/CN.4/SR.52 (22 June 1950), p.24. 
Pallieri, p. 490 
Vitta, pp.7~-79. 
Siotto-Pintor, "Traites internationaux et droit interne" in R.G.D.I.Po, volo 42 (1935), p.540. 
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THE REQUIR.EMENT OF RATIFICATION 1 
By H. BLIX 
Jur. Kand. (Uppsala) 
Introduction 
THE purpose of this article is to consider the function of ratification in the 
modern practice of States, in particular by reference to the question when 
and whether ratification is required in order to bring a treaty into force. 
This second question requires some preliminary explanation. States are 
free to choose for themselves the procedure for the entry into force of a com-
pact between them. 2 Thus, there is no doubt that if an international agree-
ment expressly stipulates for entry into force by signature or ratification 
or some other manner, the prescribed procedure must be complied with. 
Nor, again, is there any doubt that in cases where it is clearly implied that 
the parties intended to use some particular procedure to bring a treaty into 
force, such implication is no less decisive than an express provision. In 
most modern treaties it is either expressly stated or clearly implied by what 
procedure they arc to come into force. 3 However, a relatively small number 
of treaties do not contain such express provisions or clear implications.~ 
What is the rule to be applied in these residuary cases? Is it the rule that 
all treaties require ratification unless this is expressly or impliedly dispensed 
with? Or that treaties enter into force upon signature unless ratification or 
some other procedure is expressly or impliedly provided for? An attempt 
will l:ie made to answer these questions in the following pages. 
By ratification is here meant the procedure whereby the executive power 
of a State- traditionally the Head of State- signifies its final consent to an 
agreement. This act is sometimes called ratification in the 'internation:il 
sense', as contrasted with ratification in the 'constitutional sense' which is 
usually approval of a treaty by the legislative body of a State. 5 In the pre-
11ent article the more convenient terms 'international ratification' and 
'constitutional ratification' will be used. 
The definition of international ratification \'aries slightly from authority 
to authority, but on the whole it seems to be agreed that ratification 
normally is a written document, expressing a State's final consent6 to J 
I This n1icle wu preporeJ hy th< writer \\hilr e.n1111ged in r<1e.arch in the Uni,·enit v oi 
Cambndgc undu a Human 1Um• n Tru1t Studentship. TI,!' writer w1'hes to< pre hi~ gra teful 
aclmowlcdgemcnt tot.he Tru tee · of the I lununitarian Trust Fund. 
• Stt ;,,jra, p. 359. ' Sec i"fra, pp. 359 and JOO . 
• SN illfra, p. 300. 
• This dasuncuon ll made by Sar Gera lJ Fitzmaurice in h is a_nic.le · Do Trc•tics :-:acd lu11· 
ficmtaoni', m th .. }' ,m Doolt , 15 (IOJJ4), pp . 113 - ••· 
• Some \\nl'tn charactcn1.c r1 nfication u a 'confi.nnation' rathtr than a consent ; K<' , f o r 
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treaty, signed by the authority designated thereto by the internal ord r of 
the State, usually the Head of State, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, or possibh· some other high State official. 1 It often contains the 
text of the compact which is ratified . It is generally agreed that the instru-
ments of ratification hq\"e a formal character, and that there is usually a 
certain solemnity about the instruments and about the exchange of 
instruments . 2 
I . The character and p11rpose of the procedure of ratification 
Jn order to create a binding agreement, co11se11msJ between parties is 
necessary. Two questions immediately arise:• who is, according to inter-
national law, competent to express the consent of a State to a treaty; and, having found the competent organ, in what way is it to express the consent 
of the State to a treaty? In short, what are demanded or accepted by inter-
national law as the criteria of consensus? To clarify both questions a brief historical outline may be useful. 5 
It is not surprising that States, in dealing with each other, have sought 
to negotiate with and to obtain the promise of the organ which was in fact 
example, Oppenheim, Int,rnational Lat<•, vol. i (7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1948), pp. 813- 14 nn<l foo tnotes therein. Anzi lotti, however, stresses that ratification ia not 'un acte conflrmutif, mois la veri table declaration de vo lont~ de atipu lcr; ii ne valide pat un acte d~ji existnnt, mais ii donno cxutcnce i un octc nouveau' (Cours de droit i11ttrnational ( 19a9), p . 370). Dr. Mervyn Jonea explain• that ratification is now regarded aa the formal acceptance of I trcoty: 'It moun1 the ratifica tion of the treaty itself. Formerly it meant the ratification of the act of an a11ent in 1i11nin11 it' (Full Powers and Ratification (1946), p. 87). 
I A, in the cue of the Soviet Union and Switzerland, a collective or11on may be vc1te<l with the trcaty-makin11 power of the State, and therefore be the competent authority to ratify. How-ever, the instrumcnta of ratification wi ll be oiiincd on behalf of auch authority by 1ome purticu lur peraon(a) . Sec Rouucau, Priru:ipts glnl raux du droit int,rnational public, vol. i ( 19-H), p. 1<)7; Bittner, Di, uhre von den vtJ/lcn-rechtlichnr V,rtra,tMrlcu11d•n (19a4), pp. a3-a4; Depui1, 'Libert~ d voic1 de communication et lea rclationa intemationalc1', in Haiiue Academy, R,cruil d,s Cours , 19a4 (i), p. a88. 
No inatance ia known where an international or11anization hu deai11natcd ill final approval of a treaty u a ratification: ace i,ifra, p . 364. 
I The Tur of Ruaaia, for instance, u1cd to present to the fortiiin rcprc1cntative who hundcd over the instrument of ratification a snuff box, the material of which varied in value in rc lntion to the di11nity of the forciiin representative. See Moore, A Dig11t of Int,rnatiom,I l.mu, vol. v (1 go6) , § 741, p. 18:i. A aomewhat more rcatrictcd aolcmnity may be •ccr, ir. the beautifu l louthe1· covcra which often cncloee the inatrumenll of ratification. I Strictly 1pcakin11 it ii, of counc, an upr,uion of conunaua that i1 ncceaury . Oppenheim (op. ciL, p. 813) 1pcalu of the mutual conacnt beinii 'manifcat', See al10 the Di11entin11 Opinion of Judie Budevant in the Amba1i1/u1 Gas, Uuriadiction): J.C.J. Rfi>orts, 1951, p. 69; 11nd ice Anzilotti, op. ciL, pp. 3.µ-3. 
It ia impractical to bue a rule on the 'will' of a State unleu there i1 a corollary rule, c1tabli1hin11 the objective criteria which shall be deemed to exprca1 or imply thil will. Consequently, a con-ua capab~ of juridi.cal effccta ii created not by any intan11ible will1 of State• , but by some f , aome criteria which are not infallible but iicnerally are durn d to nprc11 the wi ll, of Stata. 
• Sec Bittner, op. cit . , p. 7. 
, I For a more cxtenaive account of the hiatorical upcct 1ee Jone1, op. cit.; Camar•, T/11 Ratiji.cahml of J,.t1r11aJi01U1I Tr,ati11 (1949); Dt:houue, La Ratification d,s 1,aitl1 (IQH), pp. 83 ff.; Bin:na, op. cit., Introduction. 
I U 04 A a 
LAW QUARTERLY 
July 1956 
,I 
:i 
354 THE REQUIREMENT OF RATIFICATION 
capable of carrying out the obligations which it has undertaken. In States 
ruled by a sovereign monarch, this organ was undoubtedly the monarch 
himself, and we find accordingly that the whole treaty-making power lay 
in his hands. 1 After the French revolution, in a great number of States the 
sovereigns or the Executives had to yield some of their powers to a Legis-
lature or Parliament. In such States it might happen that one obligation 
undertaken by that State towards another State could only be carried out 
with the consent of the Legislature, while a different obligation might well 
be within the sole power of the Executive. Decisive in this regard, of 
course, is the division of powers within the State.' While a division of 
powers became typical of constitutional law in modern States, international 
law was not easily adapted to this new structure. Possibly this was so partly 
because of the difficulty of finding a uniform rule of international law suited 
to the division of powers in all States; partly because the old rule that the 
supreme power over the international relations of a State is vested in the 
Head of State - and in him alone- was a very simple and clear one, 3 even 
if it no longer corresponded with the political and constitutional realities 
in many States. 
It is only during the twentieth century that it has been more widely 
acknowledged• that under international law the approval of a treaty by the 
Legislature of a St:ite may be required to render the treaty valid, and even 
today this is doubted by some. 5 Similarly, it is only during the present 
century that the conclusion of treaties directly between government depart-
ments has become a common and accepted practice.6 There has thus been 
a decentralization of the treaty-making power in many States. This de-
centralization has also, broadly speaking, been recognized in international 
law, and various organs of States are consequently considered as com-
petent to express the consent of their States. 
An historical survey of the procedure whereby the competent organ of 
a State expresses the State's consent to treaties reveals that this procedure 
has undergone considerable modifications from Grotius's time to ours. 
For the purpose of conclusion of treaties through agents, the sovereigns 
of the seventeenth century issued Full Powers conferring upon these pleni-
potentiaries the 1:ompetcnce to act as if they had been sovereigns themselves. 
It is true that the treaties had to be ratified subsequently by the sovereigns, 
' Scc Binncr, c,p . e ll . , pp. 16- 10. 
• Stt the discuuion in 1hc lntcm11iorrnl I .a\\ Commiu ,on o n 11 June 1950 : L'.:\. Doc . 
A/CN.4/!';R.52, p. 24. Sec alsu Jo11<1, op . ci t ., p . ,11. 
• See Gc:nct, • I.a C lou•c toci1e Jc ra11tica11011 ', 111 Rrt1u g_t"lrr,Jr dr d,011 i"trrnationnl pub/,.· , 
311 (1931), p. 764 , and the u mc , Traiti Jr d,plomalu rt dt droit d,plomatiqut, \'OI. 11i (19]2 ), 
p. 3bo. 
• Stt, for in1Lanct:, Arllclt' .i I of the I lan ·arJ Uraft C on\'cnuon on thr- Law of 'frt-atlc.!t, 
printed m ,f..,,rim11 Jountnl of /11/rrtatio""' l .mc, lQ ( 1935) , Suppl., p. 992. 
• S«, for uamplc, Fitunauncc, loc. c.11 . , p . 1 H · • Sec Jones , op. ell., p. 6 1. 
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THE REQUIREMENT OF RATIFICATION 355 but regularly the Full Powers contained promises to ratify, and a sovereign was considered to be under an obligation to proceed to ratification except when his plenipotentiary had e,xceeded the authority in the Full Power. Thus, if a plenipotentiary had acted withi11 the authority conferred upon him by the terms of his Full Pm,ver, his St.!.te 's consent to the treaty he had negotiated was deemed to be expressed by his signature, and the sub-sequent ratification regarded only as a confim1ation of the fact that he had not exceeded the authority of his Full Power. It followed that the ratifica-tion had retroactive effect: once it had been ratified the treaty became binding as from the date of signature.' When ratifications were refused, disputes frequentl y arose whether the agent had exceeded his authority or not. By the end of the eighteenth century this pattern was modified. Full Powers were still issued by Heads of States, often including the traditional promises concerning subsequent ratification: but these promises were little more than empty phrases . Ir: practice, Heads of States felt at liberty to refuse rat ification, even if their agents had not exceeded their Full Powers or instructions. Definite expressions of consent were consequently not given before ratification . A State became bound by a treaty only when the Head of State had ratified it and after the exchange of instrument~ of ratificat ion had taken place. It is now generally accepted (a) that if a compact requires ratification, this implies (in the absence of any provision to the contrary) that the States become bound by that compact at the moment when the exchange of the instruments of ratification takes place, and (b) that there is no duty to ratify a signed treaty, even if a Full Power has heen issued which seems to create such an obligation, or a treaty expressly pro-vides tha t it 'shall be ratified'. " 
What particular purposes docs the procedure of ratification fulfil today? One of the arguments for the 'right to ratify' has often been that the concl usion of a treaty is a matter so important that a State should not he exposed to possible errors of its plenipotentiaries. 3 The procedure of rati-fication offered an adequate safeguard against this. 4 This argument waR rw dou bt of great importance at a time when the negotiating agentll of a State 
I For a detailed account on thia po int •cc Jone• , op. cit., p p. 65-<,H . 
.1 The evo lut ion leading to the now c~tubliahc<l rul e tha t rutiticotion J ocH 111,t opcrut c rclro -acti vel y is describc,d by J ones, op. c1 t., pp . <J2 - 106. And oee Hurvurd Hc•cu rch in I 11tcr11111 io1111I Low, in A merican Journal of lntnnational I.mu, 2<) ( 1935), Suppl., pp. 7•)•1- H 12. J Sec, for cxan1plc, Rou.u cau, op. ci t. , p . 1,JO. . 
• Dr. Jo ne:3 point.I o ut that 'at a time when the di.t crction to ratify wu1 not yet catuh li tt hcd 111t I rule of Law, the a.rgumcnt that 1n age nt had cx~edcd hia in11 tructimu w1.11 o co n vcnitn l one·. It wu a recognised grounJ for rdwing to ratify .. . . When it came to be rccown iacJ thut r1111fic11 -t1 on was di1crctionary ... the importance of cxcc11 o f in at ruction1,-fron1 a lcg11 I roint uf view, correspondingly diminis hed' (op. cit. , p. 39). Cf. Ua•d evan t 'a view that it wua difficult, und e r th e •~nt thwry , to establis h wh•t an •went was empowe red to by hia Full Power, und thut th11 difliculty hu bc,en avo1deJ by th e rul e which lay, J m,n the nccr.11 1t y r,f ru11ticutwn. (' f .u Co 11 -clu., ion et la r~dacuon dca tnut~1 et dc1 in1trumc11t1 <l1rl o m ut ique1 autrc1 quc lta tru11 C11 ', i11 ll ague Academy, R,nml d,i Court , 5 (1926), p. 575.) 
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were not in a position to receive continuous instructions by code telegrams. 
When their drafting power had to be fairly large, it was reasonable that 
they should not have competence to bind the State. 1 
However, for most modern compacts the argument is probably of small 
importance. It is believed that negotiators are nowadays frequently very 
restricted in their liberty to draft. An important question which comes up 
during the negotiations may not be settled until the plenipotentiaries have 
received precise instructions from their Governments, despite the fact that 
their Full Powers may seem to enable them to decide the question them-
selves. It might perhaps sometimes even be said that the plenipotentiaries 
are merely 'voicing' the instructions they receive continuously from their 
Foreign Offices. 2 The risk to which a State exposes itself of errors by its 
agents can be almost, though not completely, neglected when these agents 
are acting upon frequent and precise instructions. It is not surprising, in the 
circumstances, to find that most contemporary writers do not emphasize, 
as an important purpose of the procedure of ratification, its function of safe-
guarding against errors of the negotiators .3 In contemporary international 
relations the following are believed to be the main purposes of ratification. 
( 1) Parties to international compacts must know when they become 
irrevocably bound by the compacts. The acts which are deemed to express 
t he consensus between the parties shou ld, for this reason, be in a form 
which is very easily apprehended by all concerned. This object is well 
served by the formal character of the instruments of ratification, by the 
solemnity (and sometimes publicity) of the exchange of the instruments, 
and by the possibility of fixing the very moment when this exchange takes 
place. 
(2) There is nothing to prevent States from ratifying a treaty on the clay 
on which it is signed. However, usually there is a certain interval between 
the !lignature of the treaty and the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion. It is this interval which is often referred to as the primary purpose of 
the procedure of ratification. It enables the competent executive authorities 
of the States to undertake a 'fresh examination'• of a treaty, to receive the 
advice of government departments and others concerned, and, what is most 
important, to suhmit the treaty to the Legislature for appro\·al, if this be 
required under the constitutional law or practice of the State. 
• See Bittner, op. cit., p . 47. ' Ibid., p . , 38. 
• Genet maini.ina that a p lenipotentiary now•d•r• is in all respects quulificd 10 conclude a 
treaty which become• bindin11 upon his signature, bur still exp lain s the purpose of the pr.ocedure 
of nllification to be a 'contr61• de confom,jt/', i.e . • co ntrol that • negotiator has not deviated 
. from h11 Full Powcn ,rnd inllruct,ono: 'I.a Clause tac itc de rutoticatoon ·, in Rrr:ur ginhalt J, 
dmil '"''""'ti'o,w/ f>Ubli< , 38 ( 1 QJ 1 ), p . 7~8. This , ·ocw ha Ix-en c ritoc izcd hy Jone , op. cir. , p . 32 . 
• Stt \\1ork of the Conunintt 1pJ>0in t.:J to co rnnJcr the qur.s tio n o f rat1fi cu 11o n and signature 
of con,,en11on1 concluded und~r the •uapia,1 o f thr Lca11ue of .\; a toons : League of 1'at,ons, 
Offirial J owrna/, 1 QJO, p . ~\IQ . 
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J) The ve~ solemnity of the pro~edure of r~tification is an end in itsel~. 
,ast centunes, when the conclus10n of treaties was not so common as 1t 
idav, such solemnity was particularly conspicuous. The preambles of 
ie; no longer inrnke 'The Holy and Indi\·isible Trinity' or 'Almighty 
•., however, they still often serve to express the awareness of the par-
~at a treaty is a ;olemn undertaking which is to be honoured. The same 
:s even ~ore strongly to the instruments of ratification and the ex-
·e of these instruments. Though cases may be found where these 
ments are \·ery simple in form,' and though the practice seems to he 
, spreading of exchanging simple notes of approvaJJ instead of in-
'11tS of ratification, a certain solemnity is still very common in the 
ure of ratification and may be intended to reflect the serious intcn-
. the part ies to honour the agreement.• 
II. The various modes of bringing treaties into force 
we been concerned so far with the traditional procedure for hring-
ies into force, namely, ratification following signature . l lowcvcr, 
turn to the actual practice of Sta,tes we find that the procedures 
bringing them into force are extremely varied .5 Thus, in bilateral 
,esides the traditional procedure where both parties sign and ratify 
here are also numerous cases of treaties being validly conch1dcd 
h parties sign and neither ratifies, or where one party sign!! and the 
signs and ratifies. 6 The consensus between the parties to a draft 
may also be established and evidenced by prodamations, ·1 hy 
tc rcsting his to rical occount of the flolcrnnity u<loptcd in th e conclui.ion o f trcntit•,t 
. c it . , pp. 26cJ ff. J For cxumplcl'I sec Cu nrnrn, up . d t ., p . 14.1 . 
pp. 363 ff. • I biJ. 
Junt of various procedures used in rnodcrn prnc ti t;c to hrinl,( trcnti(· .~ i11tn force 
tipa rtitc Treaties', in Tranwctiuns of Iii• C,'ro tius S11rifly , .111 ( 1<1 .10), pp. r H If. ; 
•'inal Claum , U.N. Doc. ST/LEG. r. 
c.s sec J o n es , o p . cit. 1 p . 119, ond Harva rd Hc11cu rch in l11t c r11111iw1ul I .nw, i11 
ul of lnt<rnational Law , 29 (1 1135), Suppl., p. 7.1'1· Nu rn crn u• trcu tic• cx 1irc•• ly 
·.s man ner of entry into force ilrc reproduced in the U 11itt d N atimu 'J'r,·t1ty ,"i'rrir r. 
cnt of 29 Junt 1948 between Dcnmork und the U nited StutcK of 1\r11 c r1 i..: 11 co11-
c Co-o peratio n pro\'ide• in Article X 11 that : 
e nt ah a ll be , ubject to ratiti cation in Dcnmurk. It shull corne i11111 f11r~c 1111 tlir 
n otice of auch ratification i.1 gi\'cn to the ~ovcrnrncot of th e l J11i1 cd StntcK rd 
.T.S. u (1 948) , p. 217.) 
ncca ace Agreement o f 17 April 1947 bctwctu th e Nc th c rl111 1d N 1111d ( ;rccu· 
a port (ibid . 32 ( 1949) , p . 11 5); anJ Financial A11reerne111 111 •1 Aprrl 1 •1-111 
d France (ibid. 43 ( 19-49), p . 43 ). 
ent of 4 July 19-41> between the Philippines and the lJ 11ited Stut eo 1of i\n1encu 
nd rtlatcd matters durin.w a transition.al period follow111ij th e 11 u, t1tuti o 11 of 
en~. A rticle X provide. : 
1nent aha ll then be proc la ime d by the Prcaident of th e Un rt cd Stur ro um! l, y 
the Philippinr.1, and sha ll enter into for ce rn 1 t.hc Juy follow1nw the Jut e ( 11 
01, o r, if they a rc iu ucd o n diffe rent <lay s , o n th e Jw y followink th e lnllcr 111 
i4 3 ( 1949 ), p . I 56.) 
ton ace Arti cle X\'111 of th e Ag reement of 23 Dcccmher 1114 2 between the 
lerica and Mexrco concerning reciproca l trad e (ib rd . r 3 ( 1114M), p . 2~K) . 
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publication,• by an exchange of telegrams,2 or of notes;J while a mere 
exchange of notes which are not even signed may be intended to consti-
tute a treaty, the very exchange of the notes establishing and evidencing 
the consensus between the parties.• 
In multilateral treaties, the consensus between the parties may be estab-
lished and expressed by the traditional procedure of deposits of instruments 
of ratification following signature. But it may equally well be evidenced 
simply by deposits of instruments of ratification5 (without preceding signa-
tures), or merely by signatures6 (without subsequent ratification), or merely 
by signatures for some parties and ratifications following signatures for 
others' (each according to his choice). The procedures of accessions and 
acceptance,8 which are outside the province of this article, may also be 
mentioned. Finally, a small number of treaties expressly provide for entry 
into force by signature and for subsequent ratification. 9 
There is no doubt that the many varying procedures used with the in-
tention of bringing treaties into force, when provided for and complied 
' In the Arranaement of 25 February 1949 between Belgium and Luxembourg concerning the 
reciprocal communication free of charge of copies of civil status c,,rtificatea and nationality 
record, , Article 5 provides: 
'Thia Arranaement ii not 1ubject to ratification. It shall come into force when each of the two 
Partie1 hu approved and publi1hed it in accordanc,, with its domestic law ... .' (U.N.T.S. 
47 (1950), p. 7.) 
Similar, but more ambifuoua, proviaion1 are to be found in an exchange of notes between Bel-
eium and Spain con1titutin11 an Agreement modifyine Article 15 of the Convention of 17 June 
1870 between l:lelaium and Spain to en1ure the puniahment of crimes and offenc,,s. The eJ1change 
of notes took place on a4 January 1947 (ibid . 19 (1948), p. 6). 
• In the Proviaional Agreement between the Governments of Pakistan and Ethiopia relating 
to Air Servic:ea, 1i,ned on 1 Decanber 19<4B, the Preamble provides that: 
'Thia provi1ional airreement too, ia 1ubject to ratification by both the Governments which 
will be effected by exchanac of telearama.' (U.N . T .S. 35 (1949), p. +l 
An Agreement of a November 1939 between the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa 
and the Govemor-Ge_neral of the An11lo·E1D1>tian Sudan concemina Radioteleeraphic Com-
munication contain, the followina proviaion (Article 6) reearding ita entry into forcte: 
'The praent aereement will come into forcte Crom the fiftetenth of October, 1939, after 
accord ettabliahed by radioaram between th.e two Contractine Parties, which will sien and 
affix their 11eab, 1ubaequently, on the aaretement written in Eneliah and French retp,ectively .... ' 
11 
(Ibid. 2 (19-47), p. au.) ' Stee i,ij,a, PP· 363 ff. 
• E.11., Ellchan,e of Letten of 17 October and 18 November 1947 between Paki1tan and Burma, 
con1titutin& an 111reem<ent reprdina the op,eration of air 1ervic,,a (U.N.T.S. 35 (1949), p . 323). 
See Wein1t in, 'Exchu, of Noia', in thi1 Y,a, Boo/,., 29 (1952), p. 2o6. 
I E.11., convention, concluded under the auapic,,a of the lntemational Labour Orpnization. 
• For cxunplee of IIC)ffle importance of thi1 kind of treaty ace Wteinattein, loc,cit. , p. 225 . 
' E.e., Protocol to prolona the lntr.m.ational anitary Convention for Aerial Naviption, 194<4, 
modifyine the lntem.ational Sanitary Conw.ntion of u April 1933, op,ened for aijrnatutt at 
Wuhin non 113 April 1946. Article IV of thia Protocol providet that: 
'The prwent Protoeol ahaU come into force when it hu bttn 1iened without reKrvation in 
reprd to nti6c:ation, or in1tnunen1:1 of ntification haw been dqx»ited or noti6cationa of-
-ion have been recxived on behalf of at leut ten Go,·ernmenta ... .' (U.N.T.S. 16 (1948), 
p. 179.) 
I Liana, ' Not on !Apl Queationa concr_mina the United Nationa', in A~ Jo,,ntal 
.t 1,,,,_,-..11-, .. (1950), PP· 342-9; Saba in R.u.. ,n1rau t'6 "'°'' t1tknlatio,iaJ ,..Mic, 
54 (1950), pp. 417-31; and Pan,, loc . ciL, pp. 167 ff. 
' ... p. 363. 
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"th establish compacts which are juridically binding. In consequence, a 
rrst ~le can be deduced regarding the entry into force of treaties, namely, 
that the parties to a treaty are free to agree on any manner in which the 
nsensus between them may be established and expressed. This rule, it 
~o belie\'ed, is universally recognized. 1 However, the question arises what is 
: be deemed sufficient evi~ence of a~eement between the parties on the 
manner in w~ich the treaty 1s to enter mto fo~ce? It c_annot be ~oubted _tl_1at 
clearly implied agreement between the part.tes m this respect 1s as dec1s1ve 
~ an express clause to the same effect. Thus, for example, if a signed treaty 
contains no clause as to its entry into force, but one party has communi-
cated a Full Power in which subsequent ratification is reserved ( or pro-
1tised), it must be deemed to be clearly implied that this party intended to 
!le bound only by ratification. It may also be arguable that it is implied 
:hat a treaty shall enter into force by signature-or at least not by ratification 
-if its final clauses provide for entry into force on some specified date, 
rithout mentioning by what means the consensus between the parties sha ll 
ie expressed. 2 
It is convenient at this stage to examine representative examples of 
iodem treaties in order to ascertain how common llre such express clauses 
clear implications in the texts of treaties. An analysis of some 1,300 
,truments reproduced in the United Nations Treaty Series (vol. 1 ( 1946)-
•· 79 ( 195 I)) provides instructive material on the subject. Out of some 
to<> instruments: 
(a) some 300 expressly or by clear implication provide for ratification; 
(b) some 425 expressly or by clear implication provide for entry into 
Mr. Parry, recognizina the importance of aome uniformity in the practice of trcoty -makin1,1, 
,what rearetfully find, that the partiea may 'within very wide limiu . . . atipu lote exactly 
I they wiah', and that 'the reault ia that anarchy may eui ly prevai l' (loc. cit ., p. 1113). Genet, 
other hand, find, the poaaibility of variety an advantaae ( Trait , d• diplomati• , 1 d, droit 
.,atiq,,,, vol. iii (193:1.), p. 477). 
parqnph 2. (a) of Article 6 in Profeuor Lautefl)acht 'a Rtporl on th• Law of 1'r,ati11 
litted to the International Law Commiuion on :1.4 March 1953 : U.N. Doc. A/ "N,4/63, 
• ie T echnical Agrremcnt of :1.4 March 1947 between Belaium u1d Poland on co-operation 
1tn aocial iruurance oraan izationa provide. in iu final clauae: 'The preocnt 011recment a ha ll 
into force on I April 1947.' (U.N.1'.S . 18 (1948), p. 2.95.) Nothina in the A(ireemcnt 1u1,1· 
t Blification or any other procedure of approval ia required. It 1eem1 rc11on1ble to 
that !he phrue 'enter into force' ia here actually intended to 1i11nify that the A11r em nt 
Df>nabV• on the apecified date, and that it ia implied that the A11re men! b cornea 
r,b/1 by aijinature. Numeroua treatia have clauaea of thia type. A Financia l A11r m III of 
ry 1946 between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Neth rlanda 
the followina final cl.iuae, which miaht alao be deemed to imply clearly that the A11r • 
tered into force by 1i11J1.1ture: 
I The a,reement dated ut May, 1\)45, between the paniea hereto ia hereby cancel! d u 
date of thia aareement and ,hall be deemed to be replaced by thia aarcemcnt.' (U.N.1'.S . 
), p. JO.) 
ote to the tnt of the Treaty ttproduud in the U,nud Nation, Trtaty Sirri11 informa w that 
mcnt came into force by aisn-ture . . 
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. force by signature. A very small number of these-5 treaties-ex-
pressly dispense with ratification in terms such as 'the present agree-
ment is not subject to ratification and shall come into force imme-
diately upon being signed'; 1 
(c) some 250 exchanges of notes (out of some 375) expressly or by clear 
implication state the manner in which they are to come into force, 
normally by the very exchange of signed notes; only a very small 
number of exchanges of notes provide for ratification (these are in-
cluded above, under (a) ); 1 
(d) some <)O expressly provide for entry into force upon 'approval', 
evidenced, for instance, by an exchange of notes ;3 
(e) some 6o contain express provisions or clear implications with regard 
to the manner in which they are to come into force, but cannot easily 
be classified within any of the above groups. 
Thus in at least 1,125 treaties (out of 11300) the manner by which they 
were to come into force was expressly laid down or clearly implied in the 
texts of the treaties. There remain some 125 exchanges of notes and some 
50 other instruments in which neither express clauses nor clear implications 
indicate the procedures whereby these instruments were to enter into force. 
4 
I See, for example, Article XII of the General Arrni1tice Agreement of 24 F
ebruary 1949 
between hrael and Egypt ( U.N. T .S. 4:1 ( 1949)1 p. a68). 
• See Wein1tein, loc. cit., p. :124. 
I See i'lfra, pp. 363 ff. 
• Of the1e 175 treatie1 all but one actually came into force otherwi1e than by r
atification : see 
i,ifra, pp . 366 ff. 
It i.1 aometime1 difficult to di1tingui1h between 'express provision' and 'clear 
implicationa' . 
Throu11hout thi1 article both re(er to the unambiguou1 intention of the parties concerning the 
mode of entry into force of a treaty. Thu.a an expreu provision for ratificatio
n may read: 'The 
preKnt treaty enten into force upon the exchan11e of in1trument1 of ratifi.ca
tion .. . .' A .clear 
implication may be: 'The preKnt Convention .. • may be denounad from ye
ar to year u from 
the date of the exchan11e of ratification,' (Co.nvcntion of 9 January 1947 between Bel11ium and 
France, concernin11 the nationality of married women: U.N. T.S. 36 (1949), p. 145). Similarly, 
there i1 a clear implication that ratification i1 required in the Belaian declaration
 of 10 June 1948, 
recoanixin11 u compulaory the juriadiction of the Court, in conformity with Article 36, ~ph 
2, of the Statute of the International Court of Ju.atice. The declaration appli.e1 to
 any lepl diapute 
'which may ariae after the ratification of thia Declantion concerning any situa
tion or fact a.riling 
after 1uch ratification .. .' (ibid. 16 (1948), p. :103). Entry into force by 1ignature i, frequently 
implied by a claUK layina down that a treaty ahall be operari\'e 11 a certain d
ate. With the u-
ception of thi1 caN implicationo are rare, thouah they do occur, u , for eumpl
e, in a number of 
trcatiea concluded by the United Smtes. of America concerning milimry mi
a,ioru . Thu.a, the 
A,rttment of 10 December 1945 between the United Smtes of America and Co
am Rica relatin11 
to a miHlllry m.iuion to Coalll Rica, la)'ll down that 'th.i1 Miuion lhal! oontinue for a period of 
four yean from the date of •icnin11 of thi, Agrttmcnt by .. .' (ibid. 3 (1947), p. 157). Probably 
a 1ubaidiary -.=cnt (e.11. a protocol or a declaration), ,..hich both in form and content con-
1tiNt an annex t.o a IJU\ior aareement , cornea into fo~ 1imul1aneou.aly ... ;th
 the major aa,ee-
fflft\t, •t any nte in the al>Knce of upreaa pro,uion to the contrary. For 
an accompanying 
inltnunent of thi• type 1« the Protocol of 14 No,-an!:lcr 1935, bef,o,een Eat
onia and Latvia II 
....-,dine the inte'1)ttllltion .of the Com=tion or 14 No,'etllber 1935 between Eatona, Latvia, 
and Lithuania concernina the reciprocal recoanition and enforcement of judirmenb in civil 
J 
marten (L.N . T.S. 166 (1936), p. 83). And 1ee i'lfra, p. 372. J 
1
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It is Possible that a closer analysis of these treaties and the circumstances 
. which they were concluded• would in some or many cases reveal some 
~ausibie inferences as to the manner by which the parties had intended to 
~ring them into force . However that may be, some cases would probably 
main-at least outside the group of exchanges of notes- in which the 
~\ention of the parties cannot be deduced from any available evidence, 
~en if a very liberal method of interpretation is adopted. In any event 
:onsideration must be given to the hypothetical case where the parties 
actUally had no common intention in this respect. For such situations, there 
must be a residuary rule of international law. This much is generally 
agreed, but-at least on the face of it-there is less agreement as to the 
content of this rule. Since very few treaties do not expressly lay down the 
manner in which they are to enter into force, it may of course be argued 
that the scope of the residuary rule is so small that the direction it takes 
baa hardly any practical significance. This view cannot be accepted .L 
The residuary rule must in fact settle two questions: (i) What is deemed 
decisively to express or imply the intentions of the parties with regard to 
the manner in which a treaty is to enter into force? (ii) If the intention of 
the parties has not thus been decisively expressed or implied, shall the act 
of signature of a treaty be deemed to express the intention of the parties to 
be irrevocably bound by the treaty, or is ratification necessary? There now 
follows an attempt to answer these two questions by an examination of the 
practice of States, decided cases, and the opinions of writers . 
III. The practice of States 
It is sometimes asserted that the procedure of ratification is the regular 
manner for bringing treaties into force and that other procedures arc in the 
Dature of exceptions. That this view is no longer correct is clear from the 
,gures given above. This is shown, in addition, by the following analysis 
1f some 1,300 treaties1-the same as those referred to above on page 359 -
lleproduced in the United Nations Treaty Series (hereinafter referred to as 
he United Nations treaties') and some 1, 76o treaties reproduced in the 
Ltague of Nations Treaty Serier (hereinafter referred to as 'the League 
' The Full Powen which may have been uud at the concluaion of 1ome of the1e tre•tie1 ue 
Ill reproduce( in the United Nation, Tr,aty Se,u, and have not, therefore, bee.n examined. 
• ProfCNOr Lautupacht poinll out that: 'Whatever may be their de1cription, 1reatic1 either 
IDvide that the in1trum£n! 1hall be ratified or, by layina down that it 1ha.ll enter into force on 
,..ru,e or on a 1pecified date or event, di1penu with ratification. Thi, i•. the rc11ular practice. 
lrnce on the 1ubject ii exceptional. ' (R.po,1011111• Law of 1'rtalu1 ( IIHJ), p . 71 ). But the R•po,t 
tinues : ' However, it ii one of the purpo9e1 of codification to provide for ca1e1- even if rare-
·hich tlw, 1ubject ii not e11preuly regul•ted by the partie1.' (Ibid .) 
I Procedu,es like exchanges of notes of approval ha ve not been counted u ratification in thia 
llllin.tion. Only thoee proudu,es which the parties have called ratification have been counted 
IIUch . 
I VolJ. 130-zoz (Nos. zC)llo-4745). 
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treaties'). Since the League treaties consist of treaties which were registered 
with the League of Nations between 1932 and 1940, and the United Nations 
treaties consist of those which were registered with the United Nations 
between 1946 and 1951, the differences between corresponding figures 
gives a rough indication of the direction of State practice. 
While of the League treaties 53 per cent. were ratified, this was the case 
with only 23 per cent. of the United Nations treaties.' Instruments called 
'treaties' constituted 12 per cent. of the League treaties. Only one of these 
instruments was not ratified.2 Of the United Nations treaties instruments 
called 'treaties' constituted only 5 per cent. All of these inst:Uments were 
ratified. Instruments described as 'conventions' constituted 27 per cent. of 
the League treaties; 90 per cent. of these instruments were ratified. Of the 
United Nations treaties, instruments called 'conventions' constituted only 
11 per cent.; of these instruments 86 per cent. were ratified. Instruments 
termed 'agreements' constituted 28 per cent. of the League treaties; 40 per 
cent. of these instruments were ratified. Of the United Nations treaties, 
instruments termed 'agreements ' constituted as much as 45 per cent.; of 
these instruments only 16 per cent. were ratified. Instruments in the form 
of exchanges of 'notes' constituted 24 per cent. of the League treaties; 6 per 
cent . of these instruments were ratified. Of the United Nations treaties, 
instruments in the form of exchanges of 'notes' constituted 30 per cent. ; 
of these instruments only 2 per cent. were ratified. 
Thus, while a little more than one-half of the League treaties were 
ratified, this was the case in relation to a little less than one-fourth of the 
I Similar estimate, ha ve been made by severa l authors : Professor Eagleton has stated, with 
reference to the inatrumenu in the four volumes of Hudson"• lnurnational ugi.slation (1931): 
• Proviaion• within the trcatiea requiring ratification are more frequent than provision, requiring 
aignature . Jndcrd, they are so frequent that they raise a question as to whethe r ratification is 
required if the treaty itaelf fail s to demand it.' (Sec Eagleton, 'Problems of International Legis-
1.tion', in 1,mfurly Law Quarterly, 8 (1934), pp. 378--9-quoted by the Harvard Research in 
lntcrnatiPnal Law in American Journal of International Law, 29 (1935), Suppl., p. 759.) The 
inatNmenta in the four volumes of H udaon '• International ugislation are , however, hardly 
repreacntativc H a baaia for an catimate of thia kind. 
According to Wi lcox (Th• Ratification of lntwnational Co'"'entions (1935) , p . 232), about 35-
40 per cent . of 111 treatic1 (excluding exchange of notca) reproduced in the lint thirty-nine 
volume• of the I.AQJIM• of Natioru Treaty Serus foiled to contain any provi, ion for ratification. 
He 6nd1 it 'evident that• very lar(le percentage of the intemational aarccment• concluded to-day 
bcc,ome bindina by aignaturc, which, in thi1 cue create• or ancsta the will of the state' . Profcu or 
Lauterpacht hu 1tated (Rrport on th• Law of Treatin ( 1953), p. 71) that : 'an incrcuing numlxr of 
trcatica provide, without reference to ratification, that they ahall enter into force on aianaturc 
or on a 1pec:ified date or e,-e_nt thereafter . Nearly one-third of th.c bilateral innrumenta lxtwecn 
S tatea or orwaniutiona of Statca contain provilion1 to that effect. ' According to WeiMtein (Joe . 
cir., p . u4) 'out of the lint 1,000 innrumenta rcgiatered with the Secretariat of the United 
Nation,, approximately 77 pu cent. contained no pro,•iaion for ratification', and O\'er 85 per cent. 
of all in1trument1 publiahed in the Briti.sJ, Tr,aty S,rus in the yean 1946-sa incluai,·e contained 
no pnwi1ion for ratification . 
• Trcaty of Non-Aareuion of a I Auauat 1937 lxtwecn the Republic of China and the Union 
of So,~el Sociali11 Republia , Aniclc 4 of which provid .. - that the Treaty shall enter inro force 
on th<" day of 1isnaturc (L .N . T .S . 181 (1937-8), p. 101) . 
_.....;;.-~ rr-------------------- - --- - --- - ·---~---n-----·----------~ 1, 
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United Nations treaties. Furthermore, instruments described either as a 
'treaty' or as a 'convention' constituted 39 per cent. of the League treaties, 
while instruments with these denominations constituted only 16 per cent. 
of the U nited Nations treaties. There has thus been a marked decline in the 
use of the names 'treaty' and 'convention', while there has heen an increase 
in the use of the name 'agreement' and in the use of the form of exchange 
of notes. When it is said that the tendency is away from ratification, this is 
believed to be quite correct, although it is perhaps only the symptom of a 
defi nite tendency towards expedition and informality in general in the 
conclusion of treaties .' 
A large number of modern instruments referred to by the parties as 
treaties are described as devoted to 'friendship', 'co-operation ' , 'mutual 
assistance', 'amity', 'general relations', 'establishment', or 'intellectual co-
operation' . It is possible that for these types of treaties a desire for solemnity 
rather than any other reason may have induced the parties to make use of 
the procedure of ratification. 2 It is difficult to avoid this conclusion, at least 
for a few unusual instruments which, though they have a ratification claw,c, 
also provide for entry into force by signature. There is no indication that 
the entry into force by signature was of a provisional character; ncvert he-
less, these instruments actually were ratified. 3 
The common practice of exchanging notes of approval- which must be 
distinguished from exchanges of notes in general- for the purpose of 
bringing treaties into force offers a contrast to the traditionally solemn 
I M r. Parry asserts that one of the principal changes in the practice of concludin11 mult i-
partite treaties is ' the re-emergence of bare signature u u mean• of the final conclu1io11 of 1111rco-
ments of first importance, (loc . cit., p. 182). Professor Luuterpacht pointa out that • taternent• 'to 
the effect that modem practice haa tended to reduce the importance of aignoture . .. muat ho 
received with no lesa caution than the view that recent practice ohowa u tendency to diapcnoe with 
ratifica tion in favour either of aignature or of new mcthoda auch II acceptance. The fuct i• thut. 
both signature and ratification arc-apart from acce11ion-thc typical mun• of 11u umin11 treuty 
obligations .' (Report on th, Law of Tr.atiu ( 1953), p. 71.) 
• The following Treaty may be mentioned aa a contr11t: the exchange of note• of 4 Moy 11J46 
between the United Statca of America and Yemen, conatituting an Agreement relating to friend-
ship and commerce (U.N.T.S. 4 (1 947) , p . 165). ' 
' Sec Article V of the Treaty of Friendahip and Mutual Auiatance of 18 March 1114(1 between 
Yugoslavia and Poland (U.N.T.S. 1 (1946-7), p . 62); Article-VI of the Treaty of Friend1hip, 
Mutual Aid and Pcauful Co-operation of 9 May 1946 between Yugo1 lavia and C1.echo1lovuki11 
(ibid., p. 76) ; Article VI of the Treaty of Friend1hip and Mutual Au iatance of 9 July 1946 between 
Yugos lavia and Alban ia (ibid., p. 92); Article 9 of the Agreement of 12 February 11146 concernin11 
the mutual return of property removed after the outbreak of war, between Po land and Czecho-
1lovalua (ibid. 25 ( 1949), p. u6); Article 5 of the Treaty of Friendahip and Mutual Aid of 10 March 
1~ 7 between Poland and Czecho1lovalcia (ibid., p . 242); Article 14 of the A11rcernent on Cultunl 
Relations of 6 March 1947 between Belgium and Czechos lo vakia (ibid. H ( 1949) , p . 91); Article 6 
of the Treaty of Fricnd1hip, Co-operation anrl Mutual A11i1tance of 18 March 1948 bctwecrrthe 
Union of Soviet Socialiat Rrpuhlica and Bulgaria (ibid . 48 (1950), p. 144); Article 6 of the Treaty 
of Friendahip, Co-opcntion and Mutual Auistance of 4 February 1948 between the Union of 
Soviet Socialiat Rq,ublica and Rowmnia (ibid., p. 200); and lutly, Article 4 of the A11recment 
of 11 October 1940 concerning the Aaland h land• bctwrrn the Union of Soviet Socialiat Repub-
lica and Finland (ibid. 67 (1950), p. 150). 
1.----------------------·-~- ~~ 
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procedure of ratification. The United Nations Treaty Series' includes some 
ninety instruments which were brought into force by exchange of notes of 
this kind. A large proportion of these treaties-some forty in number-
consists ~f agreements between international organizations or between inter-
national organizations and States. 2 However, this practice is by no means 
restricted to treaties to which international organizations are parties. 
Furthermore, these treaties reveal no particular tendency to cover one 
subject-matter rather than another; nor can they all be said to be of minor 
importance. It is obvious that the procedure of an exchange of notes of 
approval fulfils practically all the functions of the procedure of ratification. 
While ratifications are normally documents couched in solemn form and 
usually signed by Heads of States and exchanged with a certain degree of 
ceremony, the notes of approval are simple and direct in their wording; 
they are signed by Foreign Ministers or diplomatic officials and exchanged 
without ceremony. This is in line with the general tendency already noted 
towards expedition and informality. Furthermote, whereas instruments of 
ratification are exchanged in one act, it is not necessary that an exchange of 
notes of approval be made in that way. If, in a particular case, there is an 
interval between the note proposing the entry into force of a treaty and that 
accepting the proposal, it is believed that-in the absence of any express 
provisions-the treaty enters into force on the date of the second note. 3 
Although it is possible to distinguish between the procedure of ratifica-
and that of exchanging notes of approval, the two procedures are closely 
related.4 Indeed, in several cases the parties do not seem to have been 
aware of any difference between 'approval' and 'ratification'.5 
I See ,up,a, p. 359. 
• E.a., lnllteeahip agreement,. Referring to the mode of conchuion of tttatiea to which inter-
national orpniutiona are partiea, Profeuor Jcaaup atatu: 'It would be convenient to develop a 
pnctice of reciprocal confirmation that approval hu been given-the equivalent of the exchange 
of ntificationa.' (A Mod#rn Law of Natioru (195a), p. 130.) 
• Cf. Wein1tein, loc. ci1., p. a10. For an exprcaa provi1ion to thia effect ltt the Agreement of 
4 April 1947 between the United Statea of America and France concerning the reatoration of 
ccruin induatrial property righta affected by the Second World War. Article IX of thia Agreement 
pro~dea : . 
• ... Each Government ahall deliver to the other Govrrnment a notice that it haa accepted the 
preacnt qrecQlent . .. . The preaent Aarcement ahall come into force on the day the u id 
notice. art1 delivered by each Government to the other. If the oaid noticca are delivered on 
diff rent day. the Aareement ahaU come into force on the day of the delivery of the notice 
lalrl' in time.' (U.N.T.S. a4 (1949), p. 133.) 
• Mr. PJllT}' poeca the queation: ' . .. why ao many of the principal inat.rumfflta drafted in 
reoe_nt yean are called by any other name than that of a "treaty"", and why, whffl auch inatru-
mentl ·provide for a proccu in the nature of Rtification, that term ia u oftffl u not avoided ... ' 
(loc. cit., p. 166). 
• Thua, in an A,trrcanfflt of 15 July 1949 bctweffl Auatralia and the Philippina conccmina 
Parc,e_l p 1, Anicle XXIV provida for entry into force 'upon ratification or approval by pro~r 
wthorit' '(U.N. T.S. 46 (1950). p . a15). . 
In che Enaliah text of the Fi.nal Protocol of 18 Dconnbcr 1947 of the Mixed Sovict-Norwepn 
Commlaaion, lh.<'re ia a pro,,iaion for entry in.10 force "immrdiatdy after ntification by the Govern-
-,111 of the n,-o countries, auch ratifianion to be ~ed by ac:hana<' of notca'. Howevr1', 
----~-----.--,ri-,r-- -----~ ~·--------- ·-~ 
LAW QUARTERLY 
July 1956 
:a..1'.&..&. l"'1:.a:l..ra.::a.-i .-..:.,--------
·I 
=------- -
THE REQUIREMENT OF RATIFIC:\TIO~ 
One conclusion emerges from the abow examination of the practice: 
ratification is no lon°er the nom1al procedure for bringing treaties into 
force; it is only one procedure among others fulfilling the same function. 
Now that the traditional procedure of ratification is used for only about 
one-fourt h of treaties, it cannot be accurately maintained that this pro-
cedure is to be applied as the residuary ru le on the ground that it is the 
normal procedure . 
The fact that most treaties expressly lay down the manner in which they 
are to come into force cannot indicate the content of a residuary ruk. If 
ratification were the resid uary procedure, it might be asked with Sir Gerald 
Fitzmau rice: 'Why do States invariab ly stick to the long-standing practice 
of specificall y providing for ratification in all cases where they want 
ratification-if this is not necessary ?' 1 Assuming, on the other hand, that 
the residuary rule provides for entry into force by signature, it might 
similarly be asked why so many treaties expressly provide fur entry into 
force by signature. 2 The only- somewhat unhelpful- conclusion which 
can be drawn from the practice of laying down expressly the manner in 
which treaties are to come into force is probably that the residuary rule 
is not very well established. 3 
this seems to be a mistranslation of the Norwegian and Ruasim texts. The French tran•
l11tion 
UICI the word 'approbation' and is more in accordance with the original texll. (Sec ibiu. sa 
(,950), p. 213.) Professor Lauterpacht points out a simi lar diacrepanc
y between different tcxll 
of one and the same treaty (Report on tit, Lmv of Trtali11 (1953), p. 74, n. 1). 
Jn a Protocol of 9 February 1948 between Belgium and Italy concerning the rccruitin11 
of 
Italian workent and their settlement in Belgium, Article ::a I providea for entry into forco 
upon 
'ratification by each Government concerned, 1uch ratifications to be effected u 10011 111 po
••iblc 
~ugh the regular diplomatic channel'. According to a footnote by the United Notion• S
ccre-
~at, the Protocol was brought into force by an exchange of notes (U.N . T.S. 71 ( 1950), p. 143). 
On the other hand, the Agreement of 23 January 1940 between Brazil and Ar11entina cone rnin
11 
!he lep lization of cargo manifeats providea, in Article IV, that the Agreement 1hall be ap
pli d 
following its approval by both Government• '· A footnote by the United Nation, Secre
tariat 
IIJltH that the Agreement 'came into force 011 8 April 1941 by the exchange of the in1trum
cnt1 
If ratification at Rio de Janeiro' (ibid. 51 (1950), p. a81). 
' Loe. cit., p. 123. Dr. Vina, admittin11 that Sir Gerald'• concluaion a cont,ario i1 a meth
od 
Jhich ii permissible in general, rejecll it in thi1 connexion for the rcuon that he find , th11 intcr-
tional practice and juri•prudence almoat unanimou1ly are againat it (' La Valiuitc deo trait~• 
ternationaux', in Bibliothua Viu,riana, 14 (1940), pp. a30-1). 
• See Camara, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
1 Sec Fitzmaurice', view, loc. cit., p. 124. An extreme example may be mentio11ed of the
 
certainty which may exi1t os to the qu«tion what act1 ,hall con1titwte a fina l and binding c
on-
t of a State. An Interna tional Plant Protection Convention wu opened for 1i11nature at Ho
me 
6 December 1951. It remained open for 1ignaturc: lo I May 195a. It expre11ly provide1 for 
!lification at the earlieat pou ible date (Article XII) and for er,try into force 'a• IOOn a, thi1 
~nvention hu been ratified by three •i110atory Governmrnt1' (Article XIV). llowcver, the 
llowin111 urpruing facu appear from a letter of 17 June 111s;i from the Di.rector General o
f the 
[led and Agriculture Organization : 22 Stata 1i11ned nprea1ly ad r,fun,dum; repreaentative1 of 
I Government, 1i11ned the Convention without indicatin;r expreuly that their 1i11nalurea were
 
I rt/" nuium, but their Governmenu informed the Director 0,'fleral officially that ratification 
~d be neuuary; repreacntati vea of four other Statea •lao 1i11ned without the indic11
ion 
f rt/~rntdum', but the Governmenll concerned adviud th~ Director General officially 1h1t 
~ 1i1101turea of their repreacntative1 w~re not 1ubject to rMification ar,d that their adherence 
!I therefore fully effective. The letter 1tatea , furthermore , that 'the Convention came into force 
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However, if we look to the practice of States for the content of the resi-
duary rule, the correct approach would seem to be to look not primarily 
at those treaties which expressly lay down the manner in which they are to 
enter into force, but at those which do not contain provisions bearing on 
the matter. Admittedly, these treaties are not very numerous. 1 How 
variously the practice on the subject has been interpreted may be gauged 
by comparing the views of writers who have devoted special attention to 
the subject. Basdevant, writing in 1926, says: 
' ... lcs traites contiennent d'ordinaire une clause en vertu de laquelle ils seront ratifies 
dana un delai detennine. En outre ii arrive qu'on procede a la ratification pour des 
traites ne contenant paa de semblable clause. '2 
He gives three examples, the most recent being an arrangement concluded 
in 1915. Lauterpacht, on the other hand, writing in 1953, states: 
' ... in those rare cases in which a treaty has been silent on the matter [of ratification] 
there has been a tendency to assume that no requirement of ratification was intended. '3 
He gives two instances: one from 1933, the other from 1935. 
An examination of the modern practice of States4 gives convincing sup-
port to Professor Lauterpacht's view. Exchanges of notes frequently lack 
provisions concerning the mode of entry into force; in such cases they are 
not, as a rule, ratified. Of the League treaties, some seventy-five such ex-
changes of notes were found, and none of them was ratified. Of the United 
Nations treaties, some 125 such exchanges of notes were found, and only 
one of them was ratified. 5 Treaties in forms other than exchanges of notes 
fail less fr~quently to contain express provisions as to the mode of entry 
into force . Nevertheless, when they do not contain express provisions, the 
tendency is clearly towards entry into force by signature. In the League 
practice that tendency was less conspicuous than in the practice of the 
United Nations. Some five treaties of the League period were brought into 
force by ratification without this beinr expressly provided for or clearly 
in accordance with the provis ions of Article XIV, between Ceylon, Spain and Chile on 3 April 
1952, date of aiiinature [sic] by the representative of Chile'. Two similar examples ore mentioned 
by Bri111P, Th• Law of Nations (2nd ed., 1953), pp. 862 and 863. 
• Parry uaerta that before the time of the LCJlgue of Nations 'it was, curiously, uncommon 
to atipulatc exprcaaly in treaties aa to the date of their entry into force' (Joe. cit. , p. 153). 
I 1...oc, Clt., p, 576, 
• Rlpo,1 011 w Law of. Trtati,s, p. 78. 
• See ,vp,a, pp. 361 ff . 
• Eschanp of notea betw~n the United Stat.es of America and Turkey, relating to the 
application of moat-favoured-nation treatment to the merchandise trade of cutain areu under 
occupation or control. The not.ea were exchan~ at Ankara on 4 July 1948. The fifth Article 
o( these notca la)'I down the duration of the Agt'ttfflent, but providca nothing u to the manner 
in which it wu to enter into force. A footnote in the U,tiud NatiOIIJ Tru,ty Srru.s states that the 
Aan,cment 'came inl'o fol"Cl' on the 13 Ju.ly 1948, by notice of ratification thereof gi\'rn 10 the 
GoYV1U1lent of the United Statn of America by the Government of Turkey ( U.N. T .S. J~ 
(a'HQ), p. 185). 
______ .,....,.. ,1----------- - - -~----,~---~ -~-·· 
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·rnplied; 1 one treaty was brought into force by an exchange of notes .~ It is 
~ssible that in all SL'< cases the subsequent approval might have been 
reserved in Full Powers issued before the conclusion of the treaties. How-
ever, the instances were much more frequent of treaties entering into 
force by signature without any clear indication to this effect in the text of 
the treaties.3 An examination of the United Nations practice gives even 
clearer results . Nearly all the fifty treaties~ther than exchanges of notes 
-the texts of which contain no express provisions or clear implications as 
to the mode of entry into force, actually entered into force by signature.• 
A few treaties were brought into force by acts subsequent to signature-
but not in the form of ratification-though this was neither provided for 
nor implied in the texts of these treaties. 5 Although a closer examination 
of the texts of all the treaties mentioned and the relevant Full Powers might 
reveal some facts from which the mode of entry into force could be inferred,6 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there exists a belief among those 
who conclude treaties on behalf of States that treaties enter into force by 
signatu re if no other mode is expressly provided for or clearly implied. 
, E.g., Agreement of 20 November 1931 between Belgium and France rcgttrding the reparution 
for wn r damage suffered by inhabitants or caused to territories of the regions unncxed to thr 
two countries in virtue of the Treaty of Versai lles of 28 June 1919 (L.N. T.S. 15a ( 1 934), p. 1 a 1); 
Conven tion of 21 March 1930 between the Republic of C03ta Rica and Spain for the settlement 
of difficulties resulting from the military obligations of person, po•1e11ing Sponi1h nutionality 
under Spanish law and Costa Rican nationality under Costa Rican law (ibid. 168 ( 1936), p. 6 1) ; 
Agreement of 9 June 19D between France and Switzerland concerning reciprocity in the relief 
of unemployed persons (ibid. 181 (1937-8), p. 275). 
' Arrangement of 28 January 1935 hetv.•ccn Denmark and France for facilitatin1,1 the 11d111i11ion 
of student employees into the two countries. A note by the League of Notion• Secreturiat 1tatc1 
thit ' th is Arrangement wus put into force as from February 11t, 1935 , by on Exchun1,1e of Note• ' 
(L.N.T.S. 158 (1935-6), p. 11). 
• E.g., Convention of 21 April 1938 between Fin land and Norway regarding new re11ulation• 
for fishing in the River Pasvik (L.N. T.S. 188 (1938), p. 214); Protoco l of a4 April 1934 between 
the United States of America und Mc.xico rdative to claims preaented to the Genera l C luimo 
Commias ion estobli,hed by the Convention of 8 September 1923 (ibid. 149 ( I IJJ4), p. 49); 
Declaration of 2 January 1937 between Hi, Majeaty'a Government in the United Kinwdom a11d 
the Italian Government concerning auurance1 with regard to the Mediterranean (ibid. 177 
(1937), p . 2,p ). 
• E.11. , two Fi11ancial Agreementa of 14 June 1940 between the Netherland, and the United 
Kingdom (U.N.T.S. 2 (1947), pp. 251 and 275); F inancial Agreement of 14 June 1940 between 
the Netherland• and France (ibid., p. 263); Cultura l A11recmcnt of aa February 1946 between 
Belgium and France (ibid . 68 (1950), p. 157); Agreement of 30 October 11>47 between 1he 
Governments of the United State, of America and Canada aupplementary to the Gener1 l A11ree-
ment on Tariff, and Trade (ibid . 27 (19-49), p. 19) ; Air Tranaport A1,1reement of 10 May 1948 
between Ireland and lhe Netherlanda (ibid. 28 (1949), p. 1a1). See i'lf,a, p. 378, n. 5. 
• A11reement of 12 October 194-4 between the Government of the United Stateo of Brozi l and 
the United Nation, Relief and Rehabilitation Admini1tration (U.N .R.R.A .) for the con1titu1ion i'1 Rio de Janeiro of a mixed commiu ion for U.N.R.R.A. procurement in Brazil. A footnote hy 
the Un ited Nation, Secretariat atatco : 'Came into force on 25 October 1<>44, by the npprovul 
or 1he Government of Brazil' (U.N. T .S. 67 (1950), p. 321); Agreement of 14 April 1949 between 
the Belgian and Britiah fromier control authoritico re1pectin1,1 the iuue of frontier pu1e1 for the 
crou in11 of the frontier between the territory wider Belgian occupation and the German frontier 
ione under Britiab occupation . A footnote by the United Nation, Secretariat atatea : 'Came inln 
or~ on 23 April 1949, by mulual a11reement between the competent 1uthoritiea' (ibid. 65 (1950), 
. 117). ' • See ,up,a, p. 361. 
~~--~ -..iiii'iil r------------ - - --- -----~-·---a.~---,- ~~0~~- CFJ.T.c.&: n:1Tl"l."'"I"I:,,-.,,._~---~--.J-...._. 
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It i.a impossible, on such limited material as that used above, to ascertain 
any variations in the practice of individual States. A certain amount of 
information in this respect can, however, be gained from other sources. 1 
Thua the Pan-American Convention on Treaties, adopted at Havan~. on 
20 February 1928, has often been referred to as evidence of a regional 
practice. Article 5 provides: 
'Trcatica arc obligatory only after ratification by the contracting States, even though 
thiA condition is not stipulated in the full powers of the negotiators or does not appear 
in the treaty itself. •z 
The language of the Article is categorical enough. However, its value should 
not be over-estimated. The Convention, which was signed in 1928 by 
twenty-one States, had, up to I July 1931, been ratified by only three 
States, 3 and, up to I January 1951, by seven States altogether.4 Moreover, 
though the Article provides for no exceptions, it cannot well be assumed 
that in Pan-American practice treaties in the form of exchanges of notes 
should be subject to ratification unless they dispense expressly with this 
procedure. The most reasonable interpretation of the Article seems to be 
that the word 'treaty' has been used in a specific and not in a generic sense. 
The intention may have been to exclude from the scope of the Article all 
treaties which are not called 'treaties' by the parties, or to exclude 'executive 
agreements' or some other category of compacts. There is nothing in the 
Convention, however, to suggest which categories the parties intended to 
exclude. As long as the scope of the Article remains undefined its value 
as evidence of a regional practice is limited . 
The United Kingdom is probably the only State which prefers to avoid 
the proce~ure of ratification whenever possible. 5 There is evidence that 
treaties which contain no reference to ratification are regarded by the 
United Kingdom as not being subject to ratification. 6 This seems also to 
be the practice of the French Government. In a memorandum of 10 January 
1953 submitted to the United Nations, it stated as follows : 
I Mr. Parry aucru that '1ome State,, and notably China, the U.S.S.R. and the Latin-American 
Rcpublica remain faithful to the traditional u1age [of the procedure of ratification]' (op . cit., 
p. 171 ). That 1tatement ii not, however, 11ermane to the problem here at iuue. It ii concerned 
with u.da in 11eneral and not 1pccifically with thoac which lack expreu provisions•• to the mode 
of their entry into force . The 1ame appliea to the following sentence in the Protocol of the Berlin 
Coner- of 18711: 'Le Congrca conaidcre en effet que ce aont lea ratification, et non pas 1eule-
mcnt la aifnature qui donnent aux traitb leur valeur Mfinitive.' 
• See Hudaon, Jnlnwalio,ia/ Lqislation, vol. iv, p. 2380; ArnrruanJoumal of lntn711Jtional Law, 
19&8, Suppl., p. 139. 
• See Hudaon, op. cit., p. 2378. 
• See H\Mlaon,, Casts °" /111Ln1atio,ia/ Law ( 195 1 ), p . ._.s. 
• See Parry, op. cit., p. 156. . . 
• In ad bate in the Ho..- of Lordia on 11 March 1953 Viacount Swinton, Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relation,, 1tatNI that 'intrmationally there i1 ne,·rr any necasit)• for ratifica-
tion uni en qtten)Cnt ao providra' (Ho..- of Lord, IVtt/tJy Hatuard, No. 18o, 9 March 1953, 
or TIN Ti- npW11paper, u March 1953). A clrarer formulation could hardly have bttn ch~n. 
alto ilf/,., p. 37a. 
'-' J.T.L.C- n.:1.\.!1.. .1. .1. \' C, 
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•eertains traitcs ne prevoient pas qu 'une ratification devra suivre la signature. Dana 
et cas la signature, si elle est donnce sans condition (une signature ad rtfertnd.imt est une lignature sous condition), engage definitivement l'Etat.' 1 
'fbe new Constitution of the Netherlands, which entered into force on 
zz June 1953, provides in Article 6o: 
•Agreements with other Powers and with organizations based on international law 
,hall be concluded by or by authority of the King. If req11ired by such agrttments they 
,hall be ratified by the King .... •a 
'fhe Dutch Constitution seems to be the only one which, implicitly, deals 
with treaties which do not expressly provide the mode of their entry into 
force. As this modern Constitution contains detailed and elaborate pro-
visions concerning the treaty-making power, its formulation of Article 60 
deserves attention. It would seem, a co11tran'o, that there is no duty for the 
King of the Netherlands to bring a treaty into force by ratification if the 
treaty does not expressly so provide. 
Thus, in so far as it can conveniently be ascertained, the practice of 
individual States seems to confirm- or at least not to contradict- the con-
clusion reached above, namely, that treaties are intended to enter into force by signature if no other mode is expressly prescribed or otherwise clearly 
indicated. 
IV. Decided cases 
There appears to be no case concerned with the mode of entry into 
force of a treaty which fai led to contain an express provision with re-
gard to the requirement of ratification. It is therefore necessary to look for 
possible guidance from cases in which courts have pronounced on treaties 
containing express provisions as to the mode of coming into force. 
The case of Tlze Eliza A11n is often referred to as evidence of the so-called 
'necessity of ratification'. In this case, which was decided in 1813, Sir 
William Scott stated that 
'according to the practice now prevailing a subsequent ratification is essentially 
aeceuary . . .'.• 
The Treaty to which this statement referred expressly provided for ratifica-
tion. Although it is now generally agreed that a treaty which provides for 
ratification becomes binding only through ratification (unlcss"the contrary is 
expressly laid down), this was by no means self-evident in 1813, and the great 
value of the case, therefore, lies in its clear pronouncement on this point. 
1 
~ e ' Lawa and Practices concemin11 the Conclw ion ofTreatica ', in Unit,d Nation, Ulli1lati1J1 mtl (1 953), p . ,..s. 
I See van Panhuya in Amm canJournal of lnt,rnatinnal Law, 47 (1953), p . 337, at p. 338 (itu lica l<ldod). 
I S upra, p. 367. 
• 1 Dcxuon a+4, at p . a41!. 
Bu°' B b 
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A.a late aa 18g3, the French COUT de Cassation pronounced in the opposite 
aenae. In the case of The lie d' Anjouan, this Court stated as follows: 
'La ratification par le aouverain d'un traite pa.sse parses representants n'est neces-
uire que pour l.e rcndre definitif, non pour lui donner force obligatoire.' ' 
This judgrnent was criticized by several writers, 2 and it has not been 
followed by other courts. On the contrary, in the twentieth century courts 
have repeatedly acted upon the principle expressed in The Eliza Ann. 
A statement by Judge Bassett Moore in his Dissenting Opinion in the case 
of the Mavrommatis PakstiM Concessions-decided by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in 1924-is frequently quoted in this connexion: 
'The doctrine that governments are bound to ratify whatever their plenipotentiaries, 
acting within the limits of their instructions, may sign, and that trtatus may therefore 
ht regartkd a, :.tgally operative and enforceabk btfort they have bun ratifad, is obsoktt 
and lingen only aa an echo from the past.'l 
Even more authoritative is a statement by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in its Judgment given in 1929 in the case concerning 
the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder. 
The Court said that amongst the ordinary rules of international law 'is the 
rule that conventions, save in certain exceptional cases, are binding only by 
virtue of their ratification'.• It would seem that Dehousse, writing in 1935, 
was justified in saying: 
' .. . pha on sc rapprochc de l'epoque contemporaine, plua !'opinion intemationale au 
1ujet de la regle qui noua intercaac gagne en energie et precision'. 5 
However, what the courts have established with increasing clarity is merely 
that in law the procedure of ratification is not a ceremonial formality but 
an act by which a State becomes bound by a treaty. As a corollary, it follows 
that a State docs not become bound by a treaty by its signature, if that 
treaty is to be ratified. This, and nothing else, seems to be the conclusion 
to be drawn from the cases mentioned above, in all of which the treaties 
concerned have expressly provided for ratification. 
In the case of the River Oder Commission, the phrase 'certain exceptional 
cues' can hardly, at the time when this case was decided, have referred to 
the then already large category of treaties which, by virtue of an express 
provision, entered into force by signaturc.6 It seems more reasonable to 
uaume that the phrase refers to the admittedly small number of treaties 
which provide for ratification but also expressly lay down that they are to 
become binding by signature. 7 Thus Professor Lautcrpacht, who gives a 
restricted interpretation to the case, has expressed doubts whether the 
• Quot9d Crom DehouaK, op. cit. , p . CH· 
I P.C.I.J., S.rial A, No. ll, at p. S7 (illllica added). 
I Op. cit ., p. 9S· 
' See-,.,., p. 36o, n. I; d. p. 363, n. 3. 
• Ibid ., n. 2. 
• Ibid., No. 23, at p. 20. 
• But att ibid., pp. 95-<t,. 
I 
C,"J.T..L:I: n::n;n,-..11,-y-~,--------;;_;.l ,.;J 
LAW QUARTERLY 
July 1956 
THE REQUIREMENT OF RATIFICATION 371 
Judgment of the ~ourt c~ prop~rly ~e cited as an authority for the pro-
pasitio~ t~at treat1~ require ra~\:~tlo~. 1 Regardless of whether such a 
restrictive mtepretatlon of the dec1s1on 1s adopted or not, the case cannot 
possibly be held to be indicative of when ratification is required. The Court 
appears to have used the term 'convention' in a specific and not in a generic 
sense. However, as in the Havana Convention,2 this use of the terms 'treaty' 
and 'convention' in a specific sense does not solve the problem unless it is 
made clear what that specific sense is . This was not done in the River Oder 
Commission case. Nor has this been attempted in the cases in which courts 
have recognized as valid treaties- in the generic sense of the term- which 
were not ratified. Thus, in the Paris Agrem1ent case decided in 1922 by the 
German Reichsgericht in Civil Matters, the Court upheld the validity of an 
Agreement between Poland and Germany concluded on 9 January 19201 an 
Agreement which was neither published in the Journal of the Laws of the 
Reich nor ratified. With reference to this Agreement the Court saiJ: 
'It was concluded by the representatives of the German and Polish Governments. 
It contained no provision for ratification, and no ratification was necessary. 'J 
It added: 
' ... there exists, in addition to the solemn form of treaties, en informal type of agree-
ment .. . . In regard to the second the representatives of the State are authorized to 
conclude a final agreement which comes into being by the signature of n common 
document or the exchange of separate documents. '4 
This and similar cases5 confirm what has never been questioned in the 
practice of States, namely, that a treaty may enter into force without being 
ratified; but it does not bring us closer to answering the question when 
treaties may enter into force otherwise than by ratification. Indeed, before 
195 2 no court seems to have concerned itself with the problem of deciding 
when, in the light of the common modern practice of bringing treaties into 
force by signature, international ratification is necessary to make a treaty 
binding in the international sphere.6 In that year some light was thrown 
upon the problem by the Judgment of the International Court of Justil:e 
in the Amhatiews case (Jurisdiction).' The Court in that case founJ itself 
' luport on ,Ju Law of Trtatiu (1953), p . 81. 
' See 111p,a, p. 368. 
I See Amn,aJ Di{l~•t and Report, of Public lnt•rnational Law Cau, , 1919-u, Cue No. u5. 
The origin.I German Report 1tate1 that 'cine beaondere Ratifikation de, Vcrtru111 ill nicht 
vorbehalten, war aber auch nicht erforderlich ': ice Ent,chlidu"l•1f cu, Rmh111•richt, in Zivilwch,n, 
vol. 105, p. 159. 
' A lfflVQl Di{lt1t, 1919-22, C..c No. u5. 
I See the judgment of the German Staat,1/nicht,hof irivcn in 1930 in the coao nf /Jad, n, 
Bavaria, Saxo,ry muJ WIJrttnnbng v. German Reich (Annual Di{l<1t, 1929-30, Cue No. 217). 
Weinauin (loc. cit., pp. 215-23) cites a number of caae1 where couru have upheld the va lidity 
of a,rennc:nta in the fonn of nchanaet of notes, lieapite the fact that they were not ratified. 
6 It wu not until 1924 that thi.a problem wu treated exun1ivc ly by a writer, n•mcly, Uit111 cr 
(op. cit. ). 
' I.C.J. Rq,ort1, 195,, p. 28. 
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competent to interpret a Declaration of 16 July 1926 between the United 
Kingdom and Greece, on the ground that the provisions of this Declaration 
constituted provisions of a Treaty of the same date between the same 
parties, a Treaty which contained an express provision making the Court 
competent to interpret it. While the Declaration did not expressly lay down 
the procedure by which it was to come into force,' the Treaty expressly 
provided for ratification. 2 The Declaration began with an express reference 
to the Treaty: 
'It ia well understood that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great 
Brita in and Greece of to-day's date does not prejudice claims on behalf .of private 
persons based on the provisions of the Anglo-Greek Commercial Treaty of 1886 ... . '3 
The Treaty of 1926, on the other hand, contained no reference to the 
Declaration. In the instruments by which the Treaty of 1926 was ratified, 
the Declaration was also included. Judge McNair, in his Dissenting 
Opinion, while accepting the view that the Declaration was in fact ratified 
by the United Kingdom, stated that 'according to the practice of the United 
Kingdom, the Declaration did not require ratification'.• It is no doubt cor-
rect that, according to British practice, a declaration does not require 
ratification unless this is expressly laid down in the declaration. 5 But 
it would seem that in the case of this particular Declaration it must be 
deemed to have been clearly implied that it should not ente r into force by 
signature alone. It may be doubted whether the material contents of the 
Declaration were germane to the Treaty of the same date .6 However, the 
authors of the Declaration seem to have thought so, judging by the wording 
they used; for it seems to have had the effect of limiting the scope ?f the 
Treaty of the same date. If, therefore, the Declaration was thought to limit 
the effects of the Treaty of 1926, it would also seem to follow that it must 
have been thought to enter into force either simultaneously with or after 
the Treaty the effects of which it was thought to limit. Before the Treaty of 
1926was ratified, there was nothing to limit. The Court found unanimously 
that the Treaty and the Declaration were brought into force by the same 
instruments of ratification. The majority of the Court attached importance 
to the wording of the British instrument of ratification. This instrument, 
before reproducing the text of the Treaty of 1926, used the words 'which 
Treaty is, word for word as follows ... '. 7 After that phrase, however, not 
only was the Treaty itself reproduced, but also the Declaration and a 
schedule. This formal arrangement of the British instrument of ratification, 
1 /.c.,. R,t,o,~. 195a, p. 36. ' Ibid., p . 40. 
• Ibid ., p . 36. • Ibid., p. 6o. 
• See McNair, Tit• um o/ TrttalUS (1938), pp. 85-87; and Professor Lautrrpacht'1 R,porl on 
UN 1..- of Tr.otv_, (1953), p. 76. See al.., ,vp,a, p. 368. 
• See the Diuentina Opinion of Judae Mc.Nair : l .C.J. futo•IJ, 195 2, p . 63. 
' Ibid., p. 43. 
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perhaps more than anything else, seems to have led the majority of the 
Court to the conclusion that t he Declaration was a part of the Treaty. In 
this connexion the Court made a statement which is of particular interest 
in relation to the present inquiry. The Court said: 
'The ratification of a treaty which pr0t,,'du for ratification, as does the Treaty of 
1926, is an indispensable condition for bringing it into operation. It is not, therefore, 
a mere formal act, but an act of vital importance.'' 
What the Court intended, in the first place, to express was its opinion that 
instruments of ratification should not be regarded as stereotyped formalities 
the wo rding of which does not lightly permit of conclusions regarding the 
intent ions of the parties.' The Court seems to have come to this opinion 
in view of the great juridical importance it attaches to the act of ratification . 
So far the Court only continued on the lines laid down by Judge Bassett 
Moore i11 his statement, quoted above, 3 in the Mavrommatis Palestine Con-
cessions Case and by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its 
statement, also quoted above, 4 in the River Oder Commissio11 Case. I low-
ever, whi le neither of those two statements was qualified by any reference 
to the many treaties which enter into force otherwise than by ratification, 
the statement quoted from the Ambatielos ~ase is qualified, and, therefore, 
indicative of when the procedure of ratification is necessary. 
T he Cou rt laid down that ratification is indispensable for a 'treaty which 
provides for ratification'. It seems significant that the Court did not say 
that the ratification of a treaty which does not dispense with it is a necessary 
condition for bringing the treaty into operation. One may not, perhaps, be justified in concluding a contrario that it is the Court's view that ratification 
can neve r be required if a treaty docs not provide for it. Nevertheless, it is 
importa nt to keep in mind that this, the most recent and only authoritative 
statement of a court which touches pertinently on our problem, gives at 
least no support to the view that ratifir;ation is required where the treaty 
is silent on the matter. 
V. Opinions of writers 
T he majority of modern writers hold that in case of doubt ratification is 
required. 5 This is now the 'traditional' view. Only a relatively small number 
of writers have been of the view that, in case of doubt, a treaty enters into 
force by signature.6 Writers who adhere to the 'traditional ' view usually 
take as the starting-point the rule that in principle ratification is required. 
' I.C.J. R.rpo,t,, 195:1, p. 43 (italica added). 
1 Judae McNair in his Diaaentin11 Opinion expr-d-with better reaaon, it ill believed- the C!J)p(»ite v'iew : 1tt ibid., pp. 61-{)z, 
' See Ill/WO, p. 370. 4 Ibid. I For a numbu of quotation. 1tt Fitzmaurice, loc. cit., pp. ua.lf. 
• Stt ir,/ra, p. 379. 
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Having satisfied themselves as to the existence of this principle, they pro-
ceed to enumerate a smaller or larger number of exceptions, one of which 
always includes the treaties which expressly provide for entry into force 
by some other method than ratification . 
The fact that this traditional formulation of the rule begins with the need 
for ratification would seem to indicate that this is the normal procedure 
for bringing treaties into force. We have already seen, 1 however, that no 
more than one-quarter of all modern treaties are actually ratified, whereas 
the rest enter into force otherwise. It would perhaps seem that the more 
accurate course would be one beginning with the case which is the most 
common in the practice of States, namely, entry into force by signature. 
Several modern writers• make a distinction between 'treaties proper' and 
'agreements in simplified form'. It is asserted that the former, but not the 
latter, must be ratified. This theory is descriptive of practice but does not 
answer the question when treaties must be ratified. 3 It may be begging the 
question to say that 'treaties proper' require ratification, while defining 
'treaties proper' as compacts concluded with the intervention of the organ 
vested with the treaty-making power. 4 Of course, 'treaties proper' might 
indirectly become a distinct group if all the compacts which are not regarded 
as 'treaties proper' were given a precise definition . However, when we 
examine Basdevant's description of these compacts, the only way in which 
they seem to differ substantially from treaties is, again, in that they are not 
ratified. Speaking of bilateral or collective diplomatic instruments, other 
than treat ies, Basdevant says: 
'Ccux-ci sont etablis de concert par Jes agents de deux ou de plusieurs Etats. Ces 
instruments portent des norm tres divers: proces-vcrbal, protocole, declarations, 
arrangement , accord, acte final, etc. Leur objet est tres varie. Parfois l'instrument vise 
a co1U1tater un simple fait: le fait d 'un cchangc de ratification, Jes faits qui sc sont paases, 
lea paroles qui ont ctc prononceea au co11rs d 'une conference diplomatique; parfois ii a 
pour objet de conatater un accord crcateur d'obligationa rcciproques: ii est alors ana-
logue a un traitc, maia avec une forme moina aolennelle, l 'accord etant conclu sans 
l'itttff'Vfflti<>N des d14s d'Etat. •s 
I $ee fN/Wd, p, 362, 
• See Bud vant, op. ci1.; Rouaaeau, op. cit., pp. 190 and ~9-50; Fran~ia. 'Realcs ~fralcs 
du droil de la paix', in Hlll!Ue Academy, RfflU'il d.ts Cmm, 1938 (iv), pp. 16o and 168; Anzilotti, 
op. cit., pp. 368, 370, and 373: Dehouue, op. ci1.. , pp. 96 ff. 
• Budevant a«m1 to have beeu the 6ra1 writu to have presented thu di tinction in its pure 
form. Debo- (op. cit., p . 96) uaeru that 'C'ea1 i Bittn.er que revien1 le muite d'avoir, fe 
premier, jeu I i.e. de cette diacrimination, qui a ru un ~o conaidlnible daru la doctrine du 
droit dee pna'. Howcttr, allhouch Budevant mual have bttn irupired by Bittner', ideu, the two 
theoria a.re very different and cannot very well be tttated ~· See Ulfra, p. 375. 
• Dr. J-. CWICI.INU'II the dininction made in the United State. between 'tfflltics' and 'exe-
cutive .,,-nenta', 6nda aimilarly: 'Tberr appears to be a vicioua circle : tratics muat be ratified 
i,, P1Wident by and with the conMnt of the Senate. If we u.k what ii a treaty, for thu pur-
i-, the an,,. r la : any a,rttmcnt which h.aa beffl ao ratified' (op. ci1. , p. 57). 
t Op. cit., p. 610 (italic:a added). 
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T his appears to amount not to the formulation of a rule which telis us w~n 
ratification is necessary, but only to a description of current practice. The 
teamed writer has simply found that the most easilv ascertainable c1'iteria 
for a classification of compacts is the presence or ab~ence of rJtifica6on . 
Bittner makes a distinction between treaties which are concluded in 
accordance with a 'complex procedure' and those which are concluded 
'immediately' . ' Had the writer distinguished between these two types of 
treaties only on the ground that the first is to be ratified whereas the second 
is not, it would have been unnecessary to consider this theory separately . 
However, Bittner asserts that the essential difference between the two types 
of conclusion of treaties lies in the competence of the agents signing the 
treaties. Whereas in the procedure of complex conclusion the agent is said 
always to have a formal instrument of Full Power enabling him to negotiate 
and sign a treaty subject to ratification, 2 the agent concluding a treaty which 
is binding immediately is said to have a Beurk1md1mgsauftrag-'- an instruc-
tion to sign, with immediately binding effect, an agreement which hns 
already been approved by the treaty-making power of his State. 
According to Bittner, the text of a treaty which is concluded in accor-
dance with the complex procedure-and must therefore be ratified - always 
contains a reference to the Full Powers of the agents who signed it,• while 
treaties concluded with immediately binding effect- which need not be 
ratified-normally contain references to Beurkundungsauftriige, for instance 
in phrases like 'the undersigned being duly authorised ... ' .5 If the alleged 
distinction between Beurkundungsauftriige and Full Powers is consistently · 
maintained, and if evidence can always be found indicating which of the two 
kinds of authorizations had been given, this evidence might, for any treaty 
lacki ng an express clause concerning its entry into force, provide the answer 
whether the treaty must be ratified or whether it enters into force upon 
signature. 6 It is admittedly true that treaties which are ratified frequently 
contain references to Full Powers and that final clauses or preambles of 
treaties entering into force by signature often refer to the agents signing as 
being authorized, i.e. as agents who have received Beurkundungsauftrage. 
However, this common and traditional phraseology is by no means so con-
sistent as to permit of any definite conclusions concerning the mode of 
' Op. cit., p. 5. ' Op. cit ., pp. -47- -48 . 
I A penon who receive, a B11U1turuJ .. ,.,,t1J41,,a,, accordin11 to Bittner, hu no dlacretion. lie 
doea not form the will of the State; he doea not exerclae the treaty-makin11 power. The 8,ur-
laauJimt,aJift,Q// la both an authorization and an inatruction to 1i1n u a proxy: aee ibid., pp. -40 ff. 
• l b~ .• p. ,.S. See abo ibid. , p. 139, n. -499. • Ibid., pp. -41 ff. 
• Thi, concluaion la not uprealy dnwn by Bittner, but-althouah he rnaintaina that 1hould 
Full Powen apraaly dlapmae with ntilication, 1uch would not be required (op. cit., pp. 
1-41-2}-1h.e implication of hla theory la that th& i11tntw,u of the partie1 u to the mode of entry 
into force of the traty can be found in the exlatcnce of Full Powen and B,..,ftMruJv,.,,a,q1,46c 
respectively. 
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entry into force of any given treaty.' Even though the phraseology of 
modern treaties is found to be inconsistent on this point it would, of course, 
be conceivable that Full Powers might always be issued for the conclusion 
of treaties which are intended to be ratified, but for no others. However, 
an examination of treaties which were signed on behalf of Sweden in 1951 2 
showed that in practice, and regardless of inconsistencies in the texts of 
treaties, a distinction between Full Powers and Beurkundungsauftriige is not 
consistently upheld. For treaties which were to be ratified, a Full Power 
was occasionally sent by telegram ;1 on occasions no Full Power was issued 
at all. The instrume11ts issued sometimes-though not as a rule-reserved 
ratification. 4 For treaties concluded with immediately binding effect, on the 
other hand, an instrument providing evidence of a Beurkundungsauftrag 
was normally not issued. It appeared, however, that even in this procedure 
formal instruments called Full Powers were at times issued,s and that 
' Thus, for instance, an Agreement of 6 December 1945 between the United Kingdom and 
Portu11al concerning air services refers to the representatives signing as 'duly authorised' while 
at the ••me time providing for ratification (U.N.T .S. 6 (1947), p. 3). For an example ofa treaty 
which refcn to the representatives signing as both having 'exchanged their crcd~ntials' and 
being 'duly authorised', while npreaaly providing for entry into force by signature, sec the Agree-
ment of 24 May 1946 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republica concerning the organization · of commercial radio tcletype communication channels 
(ibid. 4 (1947), p. 201). That the word 'credentials' here is equivalent to Full Powers is evidenced 
by the word used in the Ruuian text . 
• Practically nil the trcatica examined arc reproduced or mentioned in the official Swedish 
Treaty Series, Sverige, tiveremltom=lit:r med Jrlimmandt makter, 1951 (published in 1953), abbre-
viated S.0. 
In order to aacertain whether, in the case of each particular treaty, Full Powers had been iaaued, 
thia examination wu carried out in the Swedish Foreign Office. The writer of this article wu 
kindly given acceas to all the nccc11ary documenta, for which permission he cxpreaacs hia thanka. 
He ia particul1rly indebted to Dr. lvar Bealrnw, without whose assistance the examination would 
have been impo11ible, and whoac advice wu invaluable. 
I E.g., at the concluaion of the Agreement of 6 April 1951 between Sweden and Canada for the 
avoidance of double taxation (S.0 . 1951, p. 383). The cable was addreaaed to • Envoym Wijk-
man Svenak Ottawa', and read u follow•: 'The King in Council have authorised You to ai111 the 
agreement for avoidance of double taxation on behalf of Sweden.' It wu signed 'Cabinet'. There 
ia no doubt that thia tcle11ram, and othen aimilar to it, were intended to serve u Full Powen. 
Teleg111ma aent merely for the purpoac of instruction were not addreaaed to the per.on, but to 
'1ven1k '; thry were wrinrn in Swcdiah and alwaya aigned 'Cabinrt'. The cablca comtitutinc Full 
Powen were often- but, aa appcan from the c.xamplc quoted, not conaiatently-.ijrned with the 
name of the Swediah Foreign Miniatcr. The Agreement for the concluaion of which the tcleanun 
above quoted wu acnt, expreaaly provided for entry into force by 111tification. The penon who 
aigncd on be-half of Canada communicated a formal Full Powrr. 
• Bittnrr atatca that 'Nach den Beatinunun~ al/er Vollmacht.en habcn die Unterhindler ... 
du E....,bni1 dcr Vrrhandlungen untrr Vorbch&lt der Gcnehmiauna der Auftnapber zu 
beurkundrn' (op. cir . . p. 140). In the aame acnac aee the atatcrnent by Fitzmaurice, loc. ciL, p. 
125, but cf. p. 129. That not all Full Powrn contain rese.rv11tjoru u to 111tification ia, however, 
wrll kno"'n, Sec,, for inatancc, Jonca, op. cit., p. 30. Cf. i'1fra, p. Jn, n. :a. 
• E.1., at the concluaion of a Prot.ocol of 2-4 January 1951 bc!'11·cen Swederl and Spain concem-
lnc tlM exchanae of aood• and pa)'fflrnta (S.0. 1951, p. 18). Both the Spaniah and the Swediah 
rep-tative aicnina the ProlOCOI wrre provided with formal Full Powcn. The text of the 
PnMOCOI docs not reftt ro the Full Po ... •en or to the oompetl'nce of the repraentativrs •lll"ffill· 
It may br noted, in thia connexion, that Dr. Jonea wu aware of the fact that Full Powrn may br 
iaued before the concluaion of a treaty which ia to rnter into force by ai,naturr : ICl' op. ciL, p. 53. 
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occasionally telegrams of the aboYe-mcntioned type \\Trt' srnt.' None of 
these formal instruments and telegrams rt'sen·ed ratification. It thus seems 
clear that the fact that an agent possesses ;1 Full Power does not necessarily 
imply that he has not been authorized to conclude a treaty to be binding 
immediately and that, therefore, ratification should he required; nor docs 
the fact that an agent has not been pro\·ided with a formal Full Power 
necessarily imply that he is authorized to conclude a treaty to be binding 
immediately upon his signature.' 
Article i of the Harvard Draft on Treaties offers a carefully drafted 
formulation of the rule concerning ratification . It 'arnids the distinctilln 
between 'treaties proper' and 'agreements in simplified form'. Nor docs it 
make direct reference to treaties of specified content or to the competence 
of the agents signing. Yet all these elements may be considered umlcr the 
Harvard rule. The last paragraph of Article 7 maintains the necessity for 
ratification : . 
' . . . when the form or nature of the treaty or the attendant circumstances do not indi -
cate an intention to dispense with the necessity for ratification. 'J 
According to this formulation, what is relevant is the intention of the 
parties and whether the.se intentions are somehow expressed or can possibly 
be inferred. It is interesting to note, in the Comment to this formulation, 
what facts may be regarded as inferring the intention to dispense with the 
procedure of ratification. Among these is the fact that a compact has been 
concluded by certain subordinate officials of a State, such as military 
officers, postal authorities, &c. ;4 and posaibly also 'the fact that the treaty is 
' See supra, p. 376, n. 3. For the brin1in1 into force, by way of an exchange of note•, or o 
· prods-verbal drawn up by a mixed Swedi1h-Frcnch Conuni11ion and 1i1ned in Pui1 on 3 1 
March 
195 1, a tele1111phic Full Power wu 1ent on 7 April 1951, rcadin1 u follow, : 
'Monaieur Weitman Arnba11adeur S~de Pari1 
'Voua ftet autoriu echan1er notet rniae en vi,ueur p~1 verbal de la commi11ion mixtc 
1~0-fnn?iae du :u man 1951 Oaten Unden, 
Miniatre Affairca Etran~reo. · 
The nota were exchan1ed on II April 1951, which wu reprded u the date of the Tr
eaty 
(S.(}. 1951, p. 303). 
• The only - where Full Powen arc uaeful u clearly implyin1 the intention, of the partie
a 
with reprd to the mode of entry into force of rrcatiea aeem to be when they expre11ly reaerve 
(or promue) ntification, or-which ii lea, likely-preealy diapenae with ratification. Thu,, ir 
- often happena-e Full Power ii 1ilent u rcprda ratification, no concluaion concernin11 the
 
mode of entry into force of the treaty can, in cue of doubt, be drawn from thil fact. Thi, matt
er 
hu been diacuNed by Jonet, op. cir., p. 3"0; Fitzmaurice, loc. cit., pp. 135 and 139; and by the
 
Huvard Raearch, in Aonmca11J"""'6/ of J,ct,nwtioNu Law, 39 (1935), Suppl., p. 766. 
1 6ff ibid., p. 756. See alao Article 5 of the second Report o,i tlu Law of Tr,ati11, submitted by 
Profeuor Brierly to the International Law Commi11ion, 10 April 1951 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/43); 
Article 6 of the third Rq,ort °" tlu Lato of T,1atil1, bcina Articlet tentatively adopted by the 
International Law Commiuion at its third Seuion, with comment, 10 Ar,ril 1953 (U .N. Doc . 
A/CN.4/54, p. 10); and, finally, Article 6 of ProfCNOr Leutcrpacht'• Report on tlu Law of Trta-
tiL,, 1ubmitted to the lntenutional Law Commi.aaion on :14 March 1953 (U.N. Doc. A/CN .4/63, 
p. (>?). 
• Stt Awieri&011Jovnt.al of J,ctrn1atio,ia/ Law, 29 (11JJ5), Suppl., p . 768 . 
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recorded in a certain form'.• However, the authors of the Comment use 
guarded language on this point: 
' ... it seems impossible to lay down any definite and universally applicable rule that 
treaties in certain forms or designated by certain names arc ... to be presumed not 
to be subject to ratification. It is possible, however, that in the practice 6T certain States.-
a particular form or name will regularly be given to instruments which they do not 
consider as requiring ratification. If, then, these States record an agreement in an 
instrument having Ruch form and name, the inference will be that ratification is in-
tended to he dispensed with.' · ' · 
And further: 
'It is obviously impossible to be exhaustive or dogmatic in the matter; the circum-
stances in each partit:ular case must be taken into account in applying the rule . .. 
and what may indicate an intention' to dispense with ratification in one case may not in 
another. All that can he said definitely is that, 1/ there be any doubt, it is to be resolved 
in Javor of a necessity for ratification.'' 
With regard to a great many treaties which have manifestly entered into 
force hy signature, without this being expressly provided for, this was prob-
ably because of some of the facts which were stated above sometimes to 
indicate an ·intention to dispense with ratification .3 If these facts were to 
be interpreted in a very liberal.fashion it is not improbable that something 
which the parties· have done or said without any particular consideration 
in mind might be regarded as evidence of an intention to dispense with 
ratification .4 Furthermore, there will probably remain some treaties where 
doubts as to the mode of entry into force will arise for the reason that the 
facts which possibly constitute evidence of the intentions of the parties are 
inconclusive or arc contradictory. These treaties, according to the Harvard 
rule, would be subject to ratification, w_hereas the modern practice of 
States tends to show that they would more likely be in~ended to come into 
force by signature. s • 
' American Journal of International l.aw, a9 (1935), Suppl., p . 76g. ' Ibid . (italics added) 
' Thua, for i1111ancc,, the A11rccment of ao June 1950 of the Netherlands with the International 
Rcfu11ee Organization rclatina to the cue to be aiven to forty rcfuaea resident in the Neth.cr-
land1 ( U.N. T.S . 76 ( 11J50), p . 56) has been included amona those imtnli'iicnu which were 1tated 
above (pp. 36o and 367) to contain no cxprcu cl1uae nor any clear implication as to the mode by 
which they wen, to enter into force,. Profeuor Lauterpacht finds that in this Agreement the 
poeition as to ratification remained partly unJetennincd, for this Aarc_cment, in view of the 
uraency of it:1 execution, probably falls within the cateaory of aarccmenu not rcquirina ratifica-
tion havina rceaard to 'attendant circunutanccs' (Rt'f,Orl oN tJw Law of Trtalu1 ( 1953), p. 7a, n. 1 ). 
• Fiumauricc, in hit article 'The Law and Procedure of the lntemotional Court of Juaticc, : 
Treaty lm.crprctation and Certain Treaty Points', in thil Ytar Boo.It, 18 (19~1), stat , with rcprd 
to the intcrprc,tation of trcatie1 : 'There arc so many casca in which the dilpute hu arisen pre-
ciacly bccauac the partica had no intentiona on the point, or none that were acouinc.ly common. 
To make the iuue dependent on them im-olvu either an abortive search or an artificial coo· 
al:Nction that doea "°' in fact rc,pl"ft4."nt their intentions' (at p. :a, n. 1). 
• See n;pra, pp. 366 ff. To the example there ai\-= of trcatie1 wruch, "'~thout expnmly or by 
c:lear imi,lir.ation diapenaina with rabfication, entered into fora by aicnaturc, the .followin, may 
Ix, added : ~nl of 19 July 1941 be"'"ttn the United Kma,:lom and Trana-Jordan rapectin11 
the .,.r, of the Haifa-Bqhdad Road ,.,hich puaa ch.rouah Trana-Jordan (U.N.T.S. 9 (1947), 
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The ru le fomrnlateJ by the Han·ard Resean:h- -and other similar rules' 
..-undoubtedly represent the most successful attempt to maintain ratifica-
tion as th~ main rule while. at the same time, b~· reference to wide excep-
tions, 'taKing into account the fact that a n1st number of modern treaties 
enter into force otherwise than by ratific.ition, notably b~· signature. Y t.~ 
it may be doubted whether the rule thus formulated is satisfactory . It would 
seem, therefore, that no satisfactory rule can be formulated unless the idea 
that ratification is the rule and signature the exception be abandoned . 
Mr. (now Sir Gerald) Fitzmaurice, writing in 1934, came to the same con-
clusion in suggesting that 
'the necessity for ratification is not inherent and depends in the last resort, not on any 
general ryle, but on the intention of the parties; and that where no intention to ratify is 
apparent it may be assumed that none exists. '2 
Dr. Mervyn Jones, who cites Sir G~rald Fitzmaurice on this point, seems 
to take a more guarded position. 3 However, the same approach as that of 
Sir Gerald was adopted by Professor Brierly in his first Report on the Laru 
of Treaties to the International Law Commission in 1950,• and later--
though only in an alternative version of the rule on ratification- by Pro-
fesso.r Lauterpacht in his Report submitted to the International Law Com-
mission in I,953. 5 This alternative version re_ads: 
'Confirmation of the trel!ty by way of ratification is required only whon the treaty so 
provides. '6 
Professor Lauterpacht, in commenting upon the rule, which he formulates 
on t'he traditional pattern, asks, pertinen~ly: 
' .. • if there must be a rule, if ahe cues it1 whi~h the partiea in effect fail fo rcgul11te 
the matter are conspicuous for their rarity, and if the rule aa stated above provide& 
for so many exceptions as almost t? be tr11n1formed into II principle oppo1cd to th11t 
which aeemingly underlies it, ia it not preferable to lay down, u expreaaing either the 
existing or the deairabl~ law, that no ratification ia required unle11 the.parties provide 
for it exprcaaly ?'7 
p. 381). Thia Treaty too.k the form of an A1recment between Hia Britannic Majeaty and Ilia 
HiaJmeaa the Amir of Trana-Jordan; Aareement of 19 July 1941 between the United Kinadom 
and Trana-Jordan concemin11 the Trana-Jordan Oil Minin11 Law (ibid., p . 389). Thia Treuty, 
too, took the form of an A,rrttment between Hia Britannic Majaty and Hia Hi11hne11 the Amir 
of Tru,,. Jordan; Aareement of ao December 1951 between Norway, Denmark and Sweden con-
cemin1 economic euarantea for certain airlina (S.0. 195 r, p. 471). Thia Treaty took the form 
of an Aar'ttment between Hia Majaty the Kini of Norway, Hia Majhty the Kin11 of Dcn1n11rk, 
and Hia Majeary the Kini of Sweden. See alto the A1reement of ao December I Q5 1 between the 
ume pan.ia in the ume form- but by an apreaa clauae made aubject to ratiflC11tion-conccrnin11 
~tion in air traffic (ibid. 195a, No. 4-4). 1 See ,upra, p. 377, n. 3. 
' Fitzmauria, 'Do Tratia Need Ratification 1' in thia Y,a, Boole, 15 ( 1 ()34), p. u9. Cf. the 
foUowin1 atalal'lftlt by Baadevant : ·~ aont des conaidtrationa d 'ordre pratique qui ont conduit 
i voir dana la ratification un element de validite .-Ju traiu!. Maia ii n'y a pu Ii une ntceuiti! 
iuridiq~· (op. cit., p. 576). 
' Op. cit., pp. 13a and 133. 
I U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63. 
• U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/a3, p. a7. 
• Ibid ., p. 67. 
' R,po,,1 °" tlu Lau, of T,,atia (1953), p. 77. 
·~~&--.c.-u,.-.-,,. i ~iu1-.-,n:, ,uy OMPKRA1TVE 
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He then comes to the conclusion that: 
' ..• • it d~ ~ matter very much w~ch solution is accepted-although purely prac-
ucal cona1der1t1ona counael the adopbon of a rule which is precise and clear.'' 
It is obvious that Professor Lauterpacht's alternative formulation of the 
rul't does not lack clarity: However, Professor Lauterpacht seems to have 
hesjtated whether his formulation expressed the existing or the desirable 
law. Considering that among modern treaties some may still be found in 
which the parties have only implied-though clearly implied-their inten-
tions to become bound by ratification, it would seem that Mr. Fitzmaurice's 
formulation-quoted above-approximates more closely to the practice of 
' States. This formulation takes into account the fact that in the present 
practice of States the treaties in which there is no clear evidence, express 
or implied, of the parties' intentions as to the mode of entry into force, 
almost without exception enter into force by signature. • 
VI. Conclusion 
All formulations of the rule of the mode of entry into force of treaties 
make the issue depenaent in the first place upon evidence of the intentions 
of the parties. The examination of the present practice of States has shown 
that whenever States intend to bring treaties into force by some procedure 
other than signature, their intention is evidenced by express provisions or 
by cogent implication. The same applies usually to cases where States 
intend to bring treaties into force by signature. The treaties in which the 
intentions of the parties as to the mode of entry into force are not thus 
evidenced are not numerous; but they cannot all be said to be of 'minor 
importance'. They are not all in the form of exchanges ofhotes, nor do they 
all go under the names of 'modus vivendi', 'arrangement', or 'additional 
protocol'. Neither are they all concluded without the use of formal Full · 
Powers. What is common to these treaties is that-almost without ex-
ception- the parties intended to become bound by signature. The fact that 
that intention has not been expressed in any way can only be explained by 
the existence of a general belief among those who concluded these treaties 
that, in the absence of express or clearly implied intentions to the contrary, 
treaties- by virtue of a rule of international law-enter into force by signa-
ture. Courts have not denied the existence of such a rule even if they have 
not clearly confirmed it. It would appear therefore that, as the final con-
clusion of the present article concerning the mode of entry into force of 
treaties, the following rule emerges, namely, that treaties enter into force in 
accordance with the parties' express or clearly implied intentions, or, in 
cue of doubt, by signature. 
I R,porl °" tlu Laa, of Tw,tw (1953), p . 8o. 
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THE RULE OF UNANIMITY IN THE REVISION OF 
TREATIES: A STUDY OF THE TREATIES 
GOVERNING TANGIER 
By 
HANS Bux, JUR, KAND (UPPSALA) 
THE traditional rule of customary international law governing the 
revision of multilateral treaties is clear: if the treaty contains no 
express clauses on the matter, the consent of each party to the 
treaty is necessary to effect valid modifications. This may sound 
simple, but in fact a number of questions arise to which the answers 
are neither simple nor clear. Let us suppose. that ten States are 
parties to a treaty and nine of them hold a conference in the absence 
of the tenth party, at which conference they agree to modify the 
treaty in a manner unacceptable to the tenth State. Are those 
modifications void ab initio, or do they become void only if pro-
tested against by the tenth State? Should the tenth State lodge a 
protest as soon as the modifications have been agreed upon by the 
others, or only when they attempt to put them into operation? 
If the modifications do not in fact touch directly upon the rights 
and duties of the tenth State, do they become binding between the 
nine States? Did the tenth State have a right to participate in 
the conference? And when these and similar questions are 
answered it may well be found that the simple rule of unanimity 
has suffered some erosion in the practice of States, so th~t the 
further question arises whether new customary rules qualifying 
the traditional rule have developed . 
Tangier, having been the subject of so many treaties, provides 
apt material for a case study .1 Of course no safe answer to the 
problem of treaty revision can be reached without a wider examina-
tion of State practice; but the present investigation of a com-
paratively narrow field may assist towards a solution. It must be 
emphasised at the outset that this is not a study of Tangier or even 
of the treaties governing Tangier from time to time; but only of 
the processes by which certain clauses of those treaties have been 
modified or abrogated without the consent of all parties. 
1 See Stuart , The International City of Tangier ·(Znd ed., 1955) , (hereinafter 
referred to as Stuart, Tangier) . 
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The Act of Algeciras 
The beginning of this century saw a number of treaties reflecting 
the competition among the great powers for political influence in 
Morocco. 2 Agreements which brought about a delimitation of 
interests between France and Great Britain, France and Italy, and 
France and Spain, tended towards giving France a free hand in 
one zone of Morocco, and Spain a somewhat less free hand in 
another zone. Germany seemingly accepted these agreements and 
declared that she had no interests in territorial acquisitions in the 
Moroccan area 3 ; but in 1905, when an agreement between France 
and Spain wa~ about to be implemented, she appeared to feel 
slighted at having been left out of the settlement,4 and in the 
diplomatic controversy which followed she maintained that the 
Franco-Spanish agreement could not legally be put into operation 
without the consent of all States which had been parties to the 
Madrid conventioii. of 1880.5 When, however, the French Govern-
men~ eventually conceded the German demand for an international 
conference on Morocco, this did not imply the acceptance of the 
German arguments but was rather a retreat in face of German 
political pressure. 6 
The international conference thus forced upon France was con-
vened at Algeciras on January 16, 1906, with representatives of all 
the States which had participated in tht:; Madrid conference of 1880 
except Denmark 7 and Norway,8 viz., Austria-Hungary, Belgium, 
e.g., Declaration of March 21, 1899, between France and Great Britain, see 
Stuart, French Foreign Policy, 1898- 1914 (New York, 1921), p. 81; secret 
exchange of notes of November 1, 1902, between France and Italy, St_uart, 
Tangier, p. 41; declaration of April 8, 1904, between France and Great Bntam, 
Stuart, ibid., p. 43; convention of October 3, 1904, between France and 
Spain, Stuart, ibid., p. 44. 
3 See statement by the Kaiser in Stuart, ibid., p . 45. 
4 See Stuart, ibid., p. 45. 
A number of diplomatic documents bearing on the German-French controversy 
are reproduced in Archives Diplomatiques, 1906, Vol. 97. 
s See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. 4, p. 132; but c/ . 
ibid., Vol. 13, p. 293. . 
1 Denmark was an original party to the convent.ion of 1880 and :"as. apparently 
invited by Morocco to the conference. Accordm~ to a communicat10n of. July 
22 1905 from the American minister at Tangier, ten of the s1gnatones to 
th~ conv~ntion of Madrid, including Denmark, had officially anno1;1nced their 
acceptance of the Sultan's invitation (Foreign Relations of the United S tate s, 
1905 , p. 670). It woulcl also seem .that Denmark was invited by Spain to 
Algeciras. It appears from the Swedish foreign. office files t~at,. on. N~vember 
25 1905-the Swedish government having received an official mv1tat10n one 
w~ek earlier-the Swedish legation in Copenhagen cabled to the Swedish 
foreign office that Denmark would not participate in the ccm!ference on Morocco. 
Denmark was not represented at Algec1ras, nor did she sign the Act (Tardieu, 
La conference d'Algeciras, pp. 502 and 503). 
s The convention of 1880 was concluded on behalf of Sweden and Norway-
which at that time were joined in a perscmal union-by the King of Sweden 
and Norway. The convention was not s.1gn.ed .separately .by any Norwegian 
plenipotentiary. . At the tiID;e when the mv1tat10ns were .issued for the con-
ference at Tangier-for which Algecuas was later substituted-Sweden . and 
I 
~ 
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France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States. Russia also was 
represented." The conference produced the well-known Act of 
Al~ec_iras, which was signed on April 7, 1906. 10 The guiding 
prmc1ples of the Act were the maintenance of the Sultan's indepen-
dence and the integrity of his dominions, 11 and the establishment 
of economic liberty and equality for all. 12 It also provided for the 
organisation of police and the setting up of a financial system; and 
France and Spain were given important responsibilities in the 
carrying out of these reforms. The Act also gave certain functions 
to the Sanitary Council at Tangier 13 and to the diplomatic corps 
at Tangier. 14 
Norway w.ere still united. It appears from the minutes kept at the meeting of 
the Swedish Kmg and Council on November 17, 1905, that the invitation 
from the Sultan to the conference at Tangier was extended on May 30, 1905. 
On that day, the .government of the Sultan suggested that the "consul-
~eneral should obtam for hrmsel!, an author_isation to participate in this con-
ference on behalf of the Union. The Union was dissolved on October 26, 
1905, more than two months before the conference convened at Algeciras but 
Norway wa~ not represen~ed. However, it is clear that Norway-even 'after 
the dissolut10n of the Unicm--:-was regarded as a party to the convention of 
1880 and that she was mvited to the con'.ference at Algeciras. Norway 
regarded herself. as a party to the convention of 1880, even after the dissolution 
of ~he Union with ,Sweden: ~ the Recueil des t-raites de la N orvege " pub lie 
a .1 usage de~ r~presentants diplomatiques et consulaires de Norvege par les 
soms du Mmistere des affaires etrangeres 1907 " the convention is listed and 
reproduced. Th~ " Recueil " purports to' conta'in " les traites de la N orvege 
avec Jes etats etrangers actuellement en vigueur." This opinion seems to 
have been shared by Spam, for it appears from the Swedish foreign office 
file-that on November 19, 1905, the Swedish legation in Madrid reported 
that the Spanish Under-Secretary of State had state~ that " Spain, France , 
Germany. and England had agreed definitely to ... mvite the signatories of 
the Madnd conference (1880) to participate .. . . The Under-Secretary of State 
further rem'.1rked th~t also Norway, as a co-signatory to the above-mentioned 
~onference m Madr~d-at . that time within the Union-would receive an 
mvitat10n,. now that its posit10n as an independent State had been recognised." 
An mvitatwn seems to have .been received before December 11, for on the 
16th of t~at mon~h the Norweg1~n legat10n in Stockholm by a note informed 
the Swedish fo_reign . o!fice that ' by a letter of the llth of this month the 
Norwe!l'ian ~oreign mmister has made it known to the German charge d'affaires 
at Knstiania, through w_hom notice about an official invitation h-ad been 
received, that the Norwegian government regretted that it felt unable to send 
any delegate to the conference under present circumstances. 
." At the s.ame time Mr. Lovland expressed the hope that those countries 
which have signed the Madrid convention of the 3rd of July, 1880, among 
others Norway, .would .be given the opportunity to adhere to the agreement or 
agreements which might· be signed as a result of the conference at 
Algeciras . 
However, the Act oil' Algeciras contained no provision for accession and 
Norway never acceded to it. 
~ Russia was not an original party to the convention of 1880, but acceded to it. 
See Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions between Great Britain and Foreign 
Powers, Vol. 15, p. 247. . 
1° For the text of the Act, see Great Britain, Trnaty Se1ies, No. 4 (1907). 
11 See the preamble of the Act. 
12 See ibid. and article 105. 
13 See article 61. 
14 See, for instance, articles 66 and 96. 
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The Act of Algeciras had no general revision clause, but two of 
the seven chapters of the Act had specific p~ovisions in this regard. 
Article 75, in chapter IV of the Act, which dealt with taxes and 
revenue, provided: 
" Should occasion arise to modify any of the provisions of the 
present Declaration, an understanding on the subject must be 
arrived at between the Makhzen and the Diplomatic Body at 
Tangier." 
From Article 76 it can safely be inferred that to reach such under-
standing a majority vote in the diplomatic body was insufficient 
and a unanimous dec_ision was required. 1 5 Again, Article 104, in 
Chapter V of the Act, which provided customs regulations, allowed 
revision under certain conditions by a unanimous decision of the 
diplomatic corps at Tangier acting in agreement with the Makhzen. 
Thus, revision of chapters IV and V wa~ possible by agreement 
between the Makhzen and a unanimous diplomatic body at Tangier. 
The four remaining chapters of the Act, however, had no pro-
visions for revision, and it must therefore fall to a residuary rule of 
international law. 
From Algeciras to the 19:23 negotiations 
The Act of Algeciras did not provide an enduring solution of 
the rivalries between foreign interests in Morocco, and France con-
tinued to strive for exclusive control. To that end she concluded 
a number of treaties which must now be mentioned. 
In a convention with Germany of November 4, 1911,16 France 
bought freedom of action in Morocco as far as Germany was con-
cerned. Although the convention did not specifically mention 
Tangier, the British Government refused to adhere until it had 
received assurance 1 7 from the French that the convention was not 
to be construed as superseding the Franco-Spanish convention of 
1904, article IX of which provided that Tangier should retain the 
special character which it possessed through the residence of the 
diplomatic corps and its municipal and sanitary institutions. 18 By 
a declaration of October 28, 1912, France achieved freedom of 
i s Ar ticle 76 reads : " In all t he cases dealt with by the present Declarat ion in 
which the intervention of the Diplomatic Body is required, decisions shall be 
t aken by a majority of votes , except in resl?ect o~ Artic)es 64, 70 an_d 75." It 
is difficult to avoid the impression that this article ~omts to _unamm1tt as a 
self-evident requirement of the residuary rule _.concernmg rev1~1on._ Cf . Cas~ 
concernin cr ri rrhts of nationals of the United States of Amenca m Morocco ,_ 
Dissenting opinion of Judges H ackworth, Badawi, L evi Carneiro and Sir 
Benegal Rau, I .C.J. Reports 1952, p. 224. 
1• See de Martens Nouv eau Recueil General de Traites , 3 ser. , Vol. 5, p . 643. 
11 See Toynbee, Survey of Internationaf A ffair s, 19,25 , Vol. i , p . 166 , n . 1 ; 
cf . de Martens, Nouv eau Recueil General de Traites, 3 ser ., Vol. 7, p. 125. 
is See British and Foreign State Pa.pers , Vol. 102 (1908- 1909) , p . 432. 
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action in Morocco as far ·as Italy was concerned, though it was not 
clear from the wording whether Tangier was intended to be included 
under Morocco. 19 Similarly with Spain by a. convention · of 
November 27, 1912; however, with regard to the city of Tangier 
Article 7 of this convention provided that " the city of Tangier and 
its neighbourhood shall be endowed with a special regime which 
shall be determined subsequently," and the boundaries of the 
Tangier zone were indicated for the first time. . 
The treaty of Fez, dated March 30, 1912, between France and 
Morocco, established a French protectorate in Morocco. Without 
going into the question whether this treaty infringed upon any 
treaty rights, it may suffice in this connection to note that the 
first article of the treaty stipulated: 
" The city of Tangier will retain the special character which 
has already been recognised and which will determine its 
· municipal organisation." 20 
Negotiations for a treaty for the establishment of the contem-
plated special municipal regime in Tangier began in 1912 between 
representatives of the British, French and Spanish Governments. 1 
The three powers reached agreement on a final draft convention, z 
but the outbreak of the world war prevented this draft from 
becoming a treaty. Presumably because Tangier was the subject 
of certain articles of the Act of Algeciras, Great Britain thought that 
the draft on Tangier should · be submitted to the parties to that 
Act befo,re it was finally accepted. France, on .the other hand, 
took the view that since most of the parties to the Act had 
accepted the Franco-German agreement of "desinteressement " of 
1911, it was enough simply to notify them of the new treaty. 
However, when Germany herself raised the question France con-
ceded that Germany, by the convention of 1911, had not renounced 
her rights in Tangier, which was outside the French zone of 
influence, and agreed that Germany's assent to the new settlement. 
would be required. It would seem to follow that assent was also 
required from each of ~he other States parties to the Act of Algeciras 
which had adhered to the Franco-German convention, unless they 
had separately renounced their treaty rights in Morocco. 
19 The relevant clause in this reg~rd reads : [the two governments] " confirment 
leur_ mutuelle mtent1on de n apporter reciproquement aucun obstacle a la 
reahsat10n de toutes Jes mesures qu'ils jugeront opportun d'edicter l'Italie 
en L yb1~ et la France au Maroc." See de Martens, Nouveau R ecued Genera./: 
de Traites, 3 ser. , Vol. 8, p . 144 . . 
2 0 Ibid. , Vol. 6, p. 332. 
1 This account of events is taken from Stuart, Tangier, pp. 61 et seq. 
2 It is reproduced in the first edition of Stuart 's Tangier (1931) , appendix III. I 
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The 1923 conference 
In 1923, representatives of Great Britain, France and Spain met 
to discuss the internationalisation of Tangier. It was stated in 
the House of Commons that the object of the conference was to 
revise the tripartite agreements the final conclusion of which had 
been postponed owing to the war, and that it was therefore proposed 
to limit the conference to the representatives of the three countries.
3 
It was to be expected that other States, parties to the Act of 
Algeciras, and having knowledge of the tripartite draft, would be 
aware that the new negotiations might lead to a treaty which would 
touch upon their rights under the Act of Algeciras. Only Italy, 
however, insisted that she ought to be allowed to participate. She 
argued that she had a right to participate both as a party to the 
Act of Algeciras and as a highly interested Mediterranean power.
4 
Nevertheless, the negotiating States refused to permit It'aly to 
attend the conference, the French Government reminding Mussolini 
of the Italo-French declaration of 1912 by which Italy had dis-
interested herself in Morocco: a doubtful argument since France 
in the earlier negotiations had conceded that German consent to 
a settlement of Tangier would be required despite the convention 
of 1911 between France and Germany. 
5 
The United States, also a party to the Act of Algeciras, did not 
ask to participate, but repeatedly took occasion, through the 
regular diplomatic channels, to remind the negotiating States of 
its treaty rights in Morocco, which it expected the negotiating 
States to respect. 6 
The new convention was signed on behalf of France, Great 
a Mr. Harmsworth, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a
nswering a 
question in the House of Commons on June 22, 1922; see Parliam
entary 
Debates, Commons, Vol. 115 (1922), p, 1495. 
4 See Graevenitz, Die Tang er-Frage (Berlin, 1925), p. 71. 
s See above, p. 451. , . 
• The United States Government sent Notes to the negotiatmg go
vernments, 
stating: , . . . 
. . 
" While this Government has no political mterests m Morocco, it
 is a 
party to the . Act _of ~lgeciras und,er_ whic~ Act m ,tionals ,of the U
mted 
States enjoy certam rights and privileges m Tangie! .. This ~overnment 
takes this occasion to remind the Governments participatmg m the
 Con-
ference regarding Tangier that its fundamental interest in Tangier
 is to 
maintain the principle of the Op~n Door . . . It presumes that 
at t_he 
forthcoming conference nothmg will be done to i~terfere ~ 1th the 
mam-
tenance of the principle above mentioned or the rights or mterests 
of the 
United States." . 
To this note the French Foreign Ministry replied with written assur
ances. 
Commenting upon these, the United States' charge d'affaires in Paris
 reported 
to the State Department : . 
. 
" It will be seen that the French Government gives assurances that 
it 
will maintain in Tangier the principle of the Open Do?r, and tha
t the 
results of the Conference will be submitted to all the signatories o
f the 
Act of Algeciras with the exception of Germany and Austria." 
See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Vol. 2 , pp. 580 , 583. 
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Britain and Spain on December 18, 1923. The three signatory 
States deposited their ratifications on May 14, 1924, and the con-
vention became binding on that date, though not yet operative. 
As will be shown, the convention has some provisions which 
undoubtedly encroach upon rights under the Act of Algeciras. As 
the convention, furthermore, laid down that " all clauses of pre-
vious treaties, conventions or agreements which may be contrary 
to the provisions of the present Statute are abrogated," 
7 the 
question arises of the legal position of non-signatory States parties 
to the Act of Algeciras. The three signatories of the convention 
were not unaware of this problem, for Article 56 of the convention 
provided: 
" The present Convention shall be communicated .to the 
powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras and the three con-
tracting Governments undertake to lend each other mutual 
support in obtaining the accession of those powers." 
It seems, however, that it was not the original intention of the 
signatories to await the accession of the other Algeciras powers 
before putting the new convention into operation. It is true that 
the statute governing Tangier was not put into operation until 
June 1, 1925, but the long delay between the entry into force and 
the entry into operation was apparently caused mainly by the need 
to work out laws and regulations for the zone. 
8 The signatory 
States did try to secure the accession of the signatories of the Act 
of Algeciras before bringing the Statute into operation, but these 
States were in no hurry to accede. 9 
The consent of some of the States once parties to .the Act of 
Algeciras it was unnecessary to secure. , Article 141 of .the Treaty 
of Versailles abrogated all treaties between Germany and the 
Shereefian Empire, and Article 142 suppressed the regime of 
German capitulations. 10 The Treaties of St. Germain and of 
7 Articl,e 55 of the COll;vention. For the text of the whole convention, se
e Great 
Bntam, Treaty Series , No. 23 (1924) or League of Nations Treaty Series 
Vol. 28 (1924), p. 541. ' ' 
8 
~rticle 32, paragraph 4 ?f the c_onvention of 1923 laid down that t
he codes 
must be completed w1tbm a period of three months dating from the si<
Ynature 
of_ the present Convention." That condition was far from fufi.l
led. See 
Fitzgerald, " L'organisation judiciaire de Tanger " in Revue Generale de 
Droit International Public, Vol. 34 (1927), p. 148. 
9 Ruze spe~~s, sc~~-nf~lly of. tbi~ '' attitude expectante-nous ne vondrions
 pas dire 
boudeu~e m ~ orgamsat10n du statut de la zone de Tanger " in Revue 
O 
de proit Internatwnal et de Legislation Compade, 3 ser. , Vol. 5 (1924), p. 628. 1 Durmg the Pans peace conference language was sometimes used which mi<Ybt 
have given the ~mpression that the Ac~ of Algeciras was to be repea
led b; a 
blanket clause m the peac~ treaty, w_ith effects not. only upon the 
defeated 
States but. also upon the ngbts of allied and neutral States. Howe
ver, this 
rn contradie:ted by unambiguous statements. Mr. Balfour said he " would 
like. to mqmre- whether the Peace Conference bad any right without c
onsulting 
Spam to remove or abrogate a Treaty in which Spanish interests app
eared to 
v 
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Trianon imposed similar conditions upon Austria and Hungary. 
The Convention of 1923 confirmed the articles of the peace treaties 
and laid down that German, Austrian and Hungarian nationals 
could not invoke the Statute (Articles 8 and 9). 
Russia had been a party to the Act of Algeciras, but she never 
became a party to the Convention of 1923. Professor Hudson has 
remarked that the position of the Soviet Government in regard to 
this convention seemed uncertain, 11 and there does not appear to 
be much published which throws light upon it. 12 
Sweden acceded to the Statute on December 5, 1924.13 The 
Belgian Government, having obtained by negotiations with the 
signatory States some privileges not included in the signed draft, 
acceded on December 6, 1924.14 These were the only two States 
parties to the Act of Algeciras which had acceded to the statute 
when it was put into operation on June 1, 1925. Accessions by 
Portugal and the Netherlands were not delayed primarily by objec-
tions to the Statute. Although Portugal was not entirely satisfied 
with the Statute, 15 it seems rather to have been the instability of 
the Portuguese governments which delayed the accession until 
January 28, 1926.16 The delay in the Netherlands accession seems 
to have been because the prior assent of the Dutch parliament was 
required.1 7 The Government of the Netherlands also contemplated 
making a reservation to Article 9 of the Statute which prevented 
German, Austrian and Hungarian nationals from invoking the 
Statute; the reason being that the Netherlands was not a party to 
be very intimately concerned." And further : " The five Great Powers were 
there as guardians of the Treaty rights of the world. Therefore he would 
deeply regre.t if anything were done which might have the appearance of an 
attempt to impose conditions on neutrals, apparently depriving them of their 
rights" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. 4, pp. 128-129). 
To this the French delegate, M. de Peretti , answered that " there was no 
question of imposing anything on any country not represented at the Con-
ference. All that France asked was that the powers represented at the 
Conference should voluntarily renounce the privileges which they had 
acquired by the Act of Algeciras ... " (ibid). The commission which drafted 
the articles on Morocco, which-with few modifications-were inserted in 
the peace treaty , when su bmitting its draft to the Council of Foreign Ministers , 
specifically pointed out that " it should be noted that none of the accompanying 
clauses modiJfy in the slightest degree the treaties between France or Morocco 
on the one hand and the Allied or Neutral Powers on the other " (Miller, My 
diary at the conference of Paris, Vol. 10, p. 315). 
11 See Hudson, " The international mixed court of Tangier " in A nierican 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (1927), p. 233. 
12 In Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (1929, p. 189) it is indicated that 
Russia did not recognise the 1923 regime. 
1a See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, Vol. 2, p. 597. 
14 See Stuart, Tangier, p. 83, i;,ee also Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1924, Vol. 2, p. 457. 
1 5 Ibid., p. 458 . . 
16 See Stuart, Tangier, p. 82; to the same effect, Toynbee, Sttrvey of International 
Affairs, 1925, Vol. 1, p. 174. 
' 11 See Stuart, Tangier, p. 82. 
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the peace treaties. 18 It does not appear, however, that the 
Netherlands actually made such a reservation when it acceded to 
the Statute on October 5, 1925. 
Even if it is assumed that none of the States which acceded to 
the Statute of 1923, whether before it was brought into operation 
or after,_ suffered any infringement of their rights under the Act 
of Algec1ras, t~ere remained two States 19 parties to that Act (and 
to the Convention of 1880) which did not accede to the Statute of 
1923, namely Italy and the United States. The French Govern-
ment,. ':hich had refused to allow Italian participation in the 
negotiat10n of .the Statute, had not gone so far as to contend that 
Italy ~ad renounced her rights under the Act of Algeciras; Italian 
access10n to the Statute of 1923 was undoubtedly desired. As 
regards ~he Un~ted States, its accession, too, was very much wanted 
by the signatories of the 1923 convention, 20 but though the Govern-
ment of the United States was by no means adverse to a settlement 
of the Tangier problem, it raised conditions for its accession. Some 
of these were not fulfilled when the Statute was put into operation 
and as a result of this the United States did not accede. ' 
The question, therefore, arises how far the provisions of the 
Statut~ affected the pre:7ious t~eaty rights of these non-acceding 
States, and to answer this quest10n it will be necessary to examine 
some of the provisions of the 1923 Statute in detail. 
The Provisions of the 19fJ3 Convention 
It should first be observed that the Statute of 1923 in several 
instance~ confirms the Act of Algeciras. Rights are granted to 
:he p~rhes to the Act of Algeciras in Article 12 of the Statute, deal-
mg :"1th the maintenance of schools. Several other articles make 
special reference to the continued relevance of the Act Th 
A · 1 . us, rhc e 22 lays down: 
~' I~asmuch as the autonomy of the Tangier Zone cannot pre-
3ud1ce the rights and privileges granted, in conformity with 
the Act of Algecir~s, .to the State Bank of Morocco in respect 
of t~e whole territory of the Empire, the State Bank shall 
contmue to enjoy in the Zone all the rights which it derives 
from its charter .... " 
It shou!d further be observed that the Statute confers rights 
upon non-signatory States who were parties to the Act of Algeciras, 
18 See. Foreign Relations of the United States 1924 Vo! 2 p 459 Th. · 
an mteresting p bi a· h ff ' ' · , · · is raises 
' d 1 .1 ro em regar mg t e e ect of a renunciation 
of rights enjoyed 
}1~t e[h \ ~ t~ a;eralc1trSeaty. Apparently, the Government of the Netherlands 
e a e_ e eate tates, by the peace treaties, had not renounced their 
rights as agamst th_e Net~erlands under the Act of Algeciras. 
19 Apart from the Soviet U rnon. 
20 See Stuart, Tangier, pp. 83 et seq. 
• J 
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in obvious anticipation of their accession to the _Statute. Thus, 
Article 30 provides for the creation of a Committe~ of C?ntrol 
to " consist of consuls de carriere of the Powers ~i~natories of 
the Act of Algeciras." Similarly, Article 34, pro-~idmg for the 
creation of an international legislative assembly, gives two s~ats 
to Italian members and one seat each for an American, a Belgian, 
a Dutch . and a Portuguese member. . . 
In contrast to these ~rticles, however, the Statute contamed 
several others which infringed upon rights deriving from the Act 
of Algeciras and other previous treaties. T~ese arti:les c?ncerned 
the Sanitary Council, diplomatic representat10n,. capitulat10n~ ~nd 
anchorage dues. It will be convenient to deal with them seriatim. 
The Sanitary Council 
Article 50 of the Statute of 1923 laid down: 
" the existing commissions and committees at Tangier shall 
be abolished." 
One important commission to which this article ~e:am_e re!evant 
was the Sanitary Council of Tangier, a body origmatmg m the 
efforts of the diplomatic corps to cope with epidemics spread by 
pilgrims, but which had acquired authority in various m~tters 
by decrees of the Sultan until it began to look very hke a 
municipal government. . . . 
The Act of Algeciras had given one funct10n to t~is Council .. 
Article 61 of the Act had permitted a tax to be impo.sed o,n 
town buildings all over Morocco and regardless of ownership, and 
laid down that regulations governing :the rate of the tax should 
be drawn up by common agreement betwe~n the Shereefian . 
Government and the diplomatic corps at Tangier. These regula-
tions should furthermore, determine what proportion of the moneys 
raised by the tax should be devoted :to the cost of improve_men~s 
and of conservancy in the towns. With regard to Tangier,_ it 
was laid down in the same article, that the proper pr_oport~on 
should be handed over to the International Sanitary Council, ':~ich 
would determine the manner of its application "until a municipal 
organisation shall have been created " (italic~ added). 
Thus the existence of the Sanitary Council was presupposed, 
though only this one function was given_ to it by the Act; . but 
it would · seem that the Sultan could umlaterally have. deprived 
this organ of all the other functions which he had, by his decrees 
from time to time, conferred upon it. Article 61 could hav~ 
been revised, in accordance with Articles 75 and 76 of the Act, 
but such a revision did not take place. 
1 See above, p. 450. 
JULY 1956) Unanimity in the Revision of Treaties 457 
How did the Statute of 1923 affect :the Sanitary Council? In · 
a communication of February 4, 1925, the United States Secretary 
of State informed the United States charge d'affaires in Morocco 
of the United States attitude to the new convention: 
"It is the understanding of the Department that the application 
of the Statute of Tangier would abolish certain commissions 
of which you are ex officio a member ... It is not the 
purpose of the United States to pursue a policy of obstruction 
in the face of the effort made by the signatory powers of 
the Tangier Convention to provide the Tangier Zone with a 
satisfactory form of government, an effort which will of 
necessity alter in some degree the previously existing admini-
strative machinery. 
" A distinction therefore must be made between those acts 
of the authorities of Tangier which adversely affect substantial 
American rights and interests and those which merely involve 
unimportant departures from or non-observance of practices 
established under the Act of Algeciras and other international 
agreements, and which do not materially affect this Govern-
ment's interests. 
" Incidents of the latter sort need not be made the subject 
of formal complaint, but should be reported to the Department 
from time to time for its information. However, in cases 
which may be regarded as innovations upon this Government's 
established rights, you should take such immediate action as 
the exigency of the situation may seem to demand and report 
the facts :to the Department for instructions." 2 
From the further United States correspondence the following 
facts appear: On the morning of May 30, 1925, the Italian minister 
at Tangier, then President of the Sanitary Council, was notified 
that the Dahir (decree) of 1879 which created the Council would 
be rescinded and the Council abolished simultaneously with the 
formal introduction of the Tangier Statute on the lst of June. 
The minister was further requested to surrender the funds of the 
Council to the new administration. The Italian minister im-
mediately called a meeting of the Council for June 4. 3 
In the afternoon of May 31, the United States charge d'affaires 
was notified that the Tangier convention would be applied on the 
2 
Forei[Jn Relations of the United _States , 1925, vol. 2, p . 590. 3 
In h1s report of May 31, wh1ch concerned the calling of the meeting, the 
cha.rge d 'affaires of the United States wrote: 
" Principles of economic equality apparently unaffected and surrender of 
one source of revenue specifically contemplated in article 61 of Act of 
Algeciras . Sultan's right to rescind admitted "; ibid. , p. 592. 
. I 
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lst of June, and on that date the United States Secretary of State 
dispatched an instruction to him: 
" to attend the meeting of the Sanitary Council but to take 
no active part in its proceedings beyond entering fullest 
reservation of the rights of the United States pending receipt 
of further instructions. . . . " 4 
The meeting of the Council was held on June 4 and all the 
foreign representatives at Tangier were present. The United 
States representative reported: 
" The first impression gained from the comments of my 
Colleagues was to the effect that none of them questioned ~he 
right, in principle, of the Sultan to withdraw the powers which 
had been delegated by His Majesty's predecessors to the 
Sanitary Council, but my Italian Colleague at once questioned 
the legality of the Maghzen's action, in the premises, since. it 
was stated to be based upon the introduction of a. new Tangier 
regime, which has not been accepted by all the powers 
accredited to Morocco." 5 
Despite this impression of assent, there was no clear expression 
to that effect at the meeting. The representative of the United 
States confined himself to expressing the fullest reservation of the 
rights of the United States. The representative of Portugal, which 
State had not yet acceded to the convention, also expressed fullest 
reservation. The Italian representative read a message from his 
government: . 
" The Italian Government not considering legal the Shereefian 
Dahir mentioned in the letter of His Excellency (the Mendoob) 
Sid Hadj Mohammed Buasherin, and while formulating there-
fore all reservations in respect of any eventual impairment of 
the Italian Government's rights and interests, refuses to 
recognise the abolition of the Sanitary Council, so long as an 
agreement shall not have been reached among the Powers 
signatory of the Act of Algeciras." 6 
The Belgian and Dutch representatives stated that they had 
not yet received instructions from their governments, and therefore 
desired to abstain from making any declarations. The French 
consul-general stated that he had received peremptory instructions 
from his government not to assist at any meeting of the Sanitary 
Council, which his government considered to have been abolished 
on May 31, and that the only reason for his presence at the 
assembly was to witness the transfer of the archives, accounts and 
4 Ibid., p. 593. 
s Ibid., p. 595. 
s Ibid. 
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funds of the Sanitary Council to the new administration. His 
British and Spanish colleagues concurred in this attitude. The 
Italian diplomatic agent replied that, in view of the position he had 
e~pressed, he could not, as President of the Council, take upon 
himself the responsibility of divesting himself of the charge of the 
archives and funds of the Council. 
Professor Stuart, in the monograph on Tangier, characterising 
~he attempt to suppress the Council as a "complete failure," 
mforms us, however, that after the meeting in 1925: 
"representatives of Italy and .the United States, the only active 
members, alternately assumed the presidency for quarterly 
periods. When in January, 1929, Italy adhered to the Statute, 
her withdrawal from the Council was automatically entailed. 
The archives, funds, and effects were thereupon transferred 
to the American Legation, which continued to exercise certain 
functions, such as the payment of widows' pensions, the issuing 
of bills of health when required for vessels of the Powers not 
adhering, and other sanitary measures pertaining to ships 
within its jurisdiction ..•. " 
Professor Stuart states f~rther that these activities ceased in 
1942 when the funds were exhausted, and that all the functions 
now have been assumed by the International Administration. 7 
The unusual haste with which the signatories of the 1923 conven-
tion acted, and their stiff opposition to a discussion of .the legality 
of the abolition of the Sanitary Council, would seem to indicate that 
they themselves had doubts about its legality. Furthermore, they 
tolerated the continued existence of the Council- albeit a crippled 
one. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any evidence 
that these States regarded the continued existence of the Council 
as lawful; and judging by Professor Stuart's enumeration of the 
Council's tasks after 1925 it seems that the particular function 
assigned to it at Algeciras was discontinued. 
It is conspicuous that the Sultan's right to abolish the Council 
was seriously challenged only by the Italian Government. The 
American charge d'affaires, in one of his communications cited 
above, pointed pertinently, it is submitted, to the fact that Article 
61 of the Act of Algeciras conferred a function upon a Council 
" until a municipal organisation shall have been created." 8 (Italics 
1 See Stuart, Tangier , p. 88. 
8 Th~ followinp; passage 'from a report. frolll: the charge d 'affaires may also be 
of mterest: From the cursory cons1derat10n whrch I have been able to o-ive 
to the q~estion, for _the ~om_ent, it ~ould not seem that the disappearanc: of 
t~e Samtary Council will, m practice, have muc~ ~earing on t~e existing 
rights. of the Um_ted _States, bey?J?-d, of course, depnvmg the American Repre-
senta~rv~, of a v~rce m thi: mumcrpal and port regulations and government in 
Tangier : Foreign Relations of the United States. 1925, Vol. 2, p. 596. 
I.C .I..Q.-5 31 
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bl th t the Convention of 1923 added.) It would seem argua e a 
created such a municipal organisation. . 
The attempted abolition of the ~anitary Council was the mo:~ 
dramatic occasion where the principle of the prevalence of pr 
existing treaty rights was asserted; although, as we_ have see~, 
the existence of those rights was doubtful. Other mstan~es m 
connection with the bringing into operation of the Convent10n of 
· b h not less significant. l 923 were less dramatic ut per aps 
Diplomatic Representation 
Of 1923, in a somewhat odd formula Article 49 of the Statute 
provided: 
" From the date of the entry into force of the new administra-
tion, the diplomatic agencies at Tangier will be replaced by 
consulates." 
Di lomatic agencies, of course, had been esta~lish~d a very l~ng 
. p . d d at 'I'angier and the Act of Algeciras is replete with time 1n ee . . 
references to the diplomatic body at Tangier an~ ~1ves numerous 
functions to that body. When, during the negotiat10n of the 192~ 
St t t the United States Government learned about the_ proposa 
a u e, · ·t t k the view that to abolish diplomatic agencies at Tangier, 1 oo . , 
even after the establishment of the French pr?tectorate m 1912, 
Morocco still possessed international per~onahty: If, theref~~e, 
the protecting State wanted to abolish this mterna~10~al persona it_y 
d d away with the protected State's diplomatic mtercourse, it 
an ° t" however the must annex the territory. Pending annexa wn, . , 
United States felt she had a right to insist on t~e mamtenance of 
. . M . · ht which was based on diplomatic relat10ns with orocco, a rig .  
f S t her 16 1836 on the Convent10n of 1880 an on a treaty o ep em , ' . 
the Act of Algeciras. 9 - • 
Th~ American ambassador to London reported that the British 
. . r d to think that a natural consequence Foreign Office was me me . b d 
of the complete internationalisation of Tangier would e toHen 
. f d' 1 t' envoys to Morocco. ow-the stationing at Tangier o ip oma ic . 
the Foreign Office pointed out to the ambassador. . 
ever, ·- t to the convent10n of 
" that no power that was s1gna ory 
Al . . bound by the decisions of the present conference geciras 1s . v or 
d that they would be given full opportumty to appro e 
an . d ,, 10 disapprove if and when a formula is adopte . 
2 1923 f O the Secretary of State to the 
o See the instruction of October 7d, F' r m Relations of the United States , United States ambassador to Lon on, oreign 
1923, yot. 2, P· 581. b 31 1923 from the ambassador to the Secretary 1 0 
~fst!~;,ai~~~it!tt~z~ti!~/~f th~ Unit~d S tates, 1923, Vol. 2, P· 583. 
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The fact that _the United States did not receive satisfactory 
assurances how the signatories of the 1923 Statute intended diplo-
matic relations to be maintained with Morocco seems to have been 
one of the reasons why the United States refrained from acceding. u 
In the event, the signatories of the Statute did not attempt 
to enforce article 49. - Shortly before the Statute came into opera-
tion Italy demonstrated her dissatisfaction by sending a diplomatic 
agent to Tangier instead of a consul-general, 12 and the minority 
dissident powers continued to be represented by diplomatic agents, 
while the representatives of the adhering States had become 
consuls-general. 1 3 
Capitulatory Rights 
Another provision of the 1923 convention, touching upon pre-
vious treaty rights-especially the Madrid Convention of July 3, 
1880 14-was article 13:-
" As a result of the establishment at Tangier of the Mixed 
Court •. . the capitulations shall be abrogated in the Zone. 
This abrogation shall entail the suppression of the system of 
protection." 
Ever since the protectorate had been established in 1912, France 
had endeavoured by means of bilateral treaties to eliminate this 
system of capitulations and protection in Morocco. Capitulatory 
rights were renounced in many such bilateral treaties before 1923, 
and the peace treaties deprived the vanquished States. Article 13 
of the 1923 Statute was thus in Jine with a deliberate and long-
standing French policy. 
It is doubtful whether the signatories of the Statute had actually 
intended to abrogate the capitulatory rights of all States in Tangier, 
regardless of whether these States had acceded to the Statute. 
Certainly, the signatories went rather far towards giving the assur-
ances which the _ United States made a condition for waiving its 
capitulatory rights ; but the demands were not completely met and 
this appears to have been the chief reason why the United States 
did not accede.15 Ruze, 1 6 writing before the Statute was put into 
11 
See note dated December 20, 1924, from the Secretary of State to the British 
ambassador in Washington, Foreign Relations of the United S tates , 1924, 
Vol. 2, p. 172. _ _ 1 2 See Stuart, Tangi~r , p . 88, note 25 . 13 
See The Times , March 2 and 3, 1926; cited by Stuart , Tangier, p. 89. F rom 
1925 up to th~ present time-1955-the United States was represented at 
Tangier by a diplomatic agent who also acted as consul-general. See United 
States , Foreign Service List (annual edit ions). 14 
See de Martens, Nouveau Recueil General de Traites , 2 ser., Vol. 6, 624. 15 
See note, dated June 18, 1925, from the United States Secretary of State to 
the French ambassador in Washington, Foreign R elations of the United States, 1925, Vol. 2, p. 600. 
1s Ruze, " L'organisation du statut de la zone de Tanger ' • in Rev·u_e de D-roit 
. j 
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operation, was of opinion that non-adhering States would still enjoy 
their capitulatory and protective rights. The signatory States seem 
to have taken the same view. Apparently they made no attempt 
to abrogate the capitulatory rights of non-acceding States. Bot? 
Hudson 11 and Fitzgerald,1 8 writing in 1927, asserted that the cap1-
tulatory regimes of the United States and Italy were maintained. 
In 1954 , the extent of the United States consular jurisdicti?n 
in Tangier was considered in an interesting ca~e before the !ang1er 
international jurisdiction, 19 in which an American corporat10n was 
a defendant to a civil action. The court of first instance, in decid-
ing whether it was competent, considered the de~ision . of the 
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Rights of 
Nationals of the United States in Morocco ,20 where it was held 
that the United States was entitled to jurisdiction in the French 
zone of Morocco first by the treaty between the United States 
. and Morocco of September 16, 1836, and, secondly, by the Act of 
Algeciras. However, the United States had al~o. argued ~h~t it 
could claim con.sular jurisdiction in all cases, civil and cnmmal, 
when American nationals were defendants; and this right was said 
to flow from the operation of a most-favoured-nation clause in the 
United States-Moroccan treaty of 1836, in conjunction with the 
treaty between Great Britain and Morocco of 1856. There was , 
however, the difficulty that Great Britain had renounced her 
capitulatory rights in 1937 as regards the French zone of Morocco, 
and the International Court held that, accordingly, the United 
States could not avail itself of the British-Moroccan treaty of 1856 
in order to claim consular jurisdiction in the French zone. 1 
Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the court of first 
instance of Tangier decided that, while the British renunciation 
of capitulatory rights in 1937 did not extend to Tangier, this was 
so only because the capitulations in Tangier had already been 
abrogated by article 13 of the Statute of 1923, to which Great 
Britain was a party. Since Great Britain could no longer claim 
International et de Legislation Comparee, 3 ser., Vol. 5 (1924), p . 614. See 
also ibid . , p. 628. . . · l 
17 Hudson, "The international mixed court of Tangier" m American Journa 
of International Law , Vol._ 21 (1927), .P· 233. ,, . . 
1s Fitzgerald,. "L'orgamsat10n iudic1a1re de Tanger m Revue Gener.al e de 
Droit International Public, Vol. 34 (1927), p. 149. . . 
19 X. v. Macl.ay Radio Corporation reported in La Revue Marocaine. de Droi t, 
Vol. 6 (1954), p. 229 and briefly in American Journal of International ~aw ,. 
Vol. 49 (1955) , p. 267. For a comment .on the case and on t~~ top1~ of 
American consular jurisdiction in Tangier, .see. Nadel~ann,. .AJ?e~ica~ 
consular jurisdiction in Morocco _and the T angier mtern3:.t10nal i:nsdict1on 
in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 49 (1950) , pp. 006-517. 
2 0 I. C.J. Reports, 1952, p. 176. 
1 Ibid. , p. 201. 
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consular jurisdiction in Tangier, the United States also could no 
longer avail itself ill this respect of its most-favoured-nation clause. 
·Consequently, the matter not falling under the United States ' 
consular jurisdiction as a result of the treaty of 1836 or the Act 
of Algeciras the court of first instance declared itself competent. 
The court of appeal of the Tangier international jurisdiction, 
reversing the decision of the court of first instance, stated accord-
ing to Professor Lissitzyn's report that the judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice was not decisive: 
" since its application ~as expressly limited to the French Zone 
of Morocco; moreover, the judgments of the International 
Court of Justice do not have binding force on individuals in 
litigation before domestic courts, but are binding only on the 
contending States. . . . The purported abrogation of the capi-
tulatory regime in · Tangier by the Convention of Paris ( of 
1923) was binding only on the parties thereto, and not on a · 
non-adhering Power such as the United States. (The court 
cited the example of Italy, which continued to exercise consular 
jurisdiction until the protocol of 1928 2 was signed.) " 3 
The court further " inclined to the view that privileges acquired 
through the operation of the most-favoured-nations clause did not 
automatically lapse when the most favoured nation renounced its 
privileges." 4 Finally, the court found that in the absence of a 
renunciation, the United States enjoyed consular jurisdiction in 
Tangier on the basis of usage. 
Anchorage Dues 
. Another provision of the Statute which infringed upon previous 
rights concerned anchorage dues . Article 70 of the Act of Algeciras 
laid down: 
" The scale of berthage or anchorage dues levied from vessels 
in Moorish harbours being fixed by treaties with certain 
Powers, these Powers are prepared to consent to a revision 
of the said dues." 
Such revision, according to the same article, required an agreement 
betw~en the Sult~n and a unanimous diplomatic corps -at Tangier. 
J udgmg from article 42 of the Statute of 1923, revision of at least 
some of the treaties referred to by the Act of Algeciras was not 
accomplished. Article 42 reads : 
2 See infra . 
3 Mackq,y Radio and Telegraph Company v . El Khadar, Lissitzyn's report in 
:JJ! ~~can Journal of International Law, Vol. 49 (1955), pp. 413-414. Italics 
4 Ibid. 
• J 
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" The anchorage dues existing in virtue of the ancient treaties 
of commerce shall be replaced by the berthage dues provided 
for under the port concession." 
This provision was not enforced against the non-acceding States. 
The Times reported in 1926: 
" American and Italian ships pay anchorage and port dues on 
the old and very much reduced scale, while all the vessels 
of the other powers are liable to the recently introduced 
tariffs." s 
Modifications whic h were Enforced 
More information is available about the prov1S1ons which, in-
fringing upon existing rights, were not wholly enfo:ced, th~n ~bout 
those which perhaps to a rather limited degree modified or mfrm~ed 
upon previous rights and which were actually enforced agam~t 
acceding and non-acceding States alike. However, the commum-
cation of February 4, 1925, from the United States' Secretary of 
State 6 tells us that there were in Tangier, prior to the entry into 
oper:tion of the Statute, other commissi?n~ ~ban th~ Sanitary 
Council. Whatever may have been the 3undical basis of these 
commissions, they would seem to have disappeared quietly and 
peacefully. 7 Furthermore, a communication of ~eptember 5, 1 ~25 , 
from the American diplomatic agent at Tangier to the Umted 
States' Secretary of State reveals that the new authorities in 
Tangier, when they were able to enforce it,8 made tax laws 
applicable to nationals of the United: States and Italy. The agent 
wrote: 
"No endeavour is being made by the Authorities to impose 
the Stamp Tax on the citizens or proteges, of the United States, 
of Italy or Portugal, as it is evident that the enforcement 
of this tax against the ressortissants of these powers, could 
only be obtained through the medium of their respective C?n-
sular Courts, which cannot, in the absence of the adhes10n 
of their Governments to the Tangier Convention, legally subject 
their nationals to the taxation. 
As regards the other taxes . . . the local Administration 
s See The Times of March 2 and 3, 1936; quoted from Stuart, Tangier, P· 89. 
" See supra, p. 457. . 
1 As regards the " Customs Valuation_ Committee," cf. article 96 of the Act 
of Algeciras and paragraph 2 of article 50 _of the Statute of _1923, and see 
Gase concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, 
Judgment of August 27, 1952, I .G.J . R~ports, 1_952, pp. 208-209_. . , 
s " The three Powers took the course of mtroducmg the ne~ regime, _piece b) 
piece, de facto." Quoted from Toynbee , Survey of International Affairs, 1925 , 
Vol. 1, p. 173. 
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is in a position to employ, and apparently intends to avail 
itself of, illegal but effective means of extracting payments." 9 
The agent concluded by requesting authorisation to instruct 
complaining American citizens to pay these taxes under protest. 
The request was made, 
"on the assumption that the Department would not desire 
to pursue a policy of more open resistance to the encroachments 
of the local authorities, on American treaty rights." 
The State Department replied that the United States' govern-
ment did not " assent to the imposition in the Tangier Zone of 
any taxes upon American nationals or proteges through the action 
of the legislative body at Tangier and upon the request of the 
Mendoob," and authorised the agent as requested. 
(To be concluded) 
~ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1925, Vol. 2, p. 601. See also in 
this connect10n 1 the report from the United States' charge d'affaires in 
Morocco re~arding the . Sanita_ry Council, to the effect t_hat " the abolition 
of t~e Samtary Council, as it had been effected, is a symptom that the 
coernive m_ethods_ of France, Great Bntam and Spa.in, in the execution of 
their Tangier policy, have not been abandoned . . . '' : ibid. , pp. 596 et seq. 
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THERE was a great lack of uniformity in the application and 
administration of the Statute of 1923. Many examples, besides 
the ones cited above, could be given. Thus, for example, Article 
52 of the Statute prohibited " games of chance " in the Tangier 
Zone; but, as long as Italy had not acceded, t his Article could 
not be invoked against Italian nationals who opened gambling 
houses, profiting greatly from the closing down of the gambling 
houses owned by nationals of the States parties to the Statute. 1 
These anomalies were detrimental to the authority of the regime. 
The Italian non-accession was particularly troublesome, for the 
Italians in Tangier were much more numerous than the Americans. 
The representatives of the United States and Italy could take 
their seats neither in the Committee of Control nor in the legislative 
assembly , and there were doubtless other disadvantages for 
nationals of these two States; but the situation was far more 
awkward for the administration 2 : so much so that it was con-
sidered necessary to revise the Statute in order to bring about 
Italian adherence. 
But although the Italian non-accession to the Statute of 1923 
was probably the most important reason for a revision, there were 
others. Spain was dissatisfied at being allotted a l_ess important 
role in Tangier than France. 3 On August 25, 1926, the Spanish 
Government addressed a note to the parties to the Act of Algeciras 
demanding that the Tangier Zone should either be incorporated 
in the Spanish Zone or else administered by Spain under a mandate. 4 
Furthermore, the Spanish Government wanted a conference with 
1 See F itzgerald, " L 'organisation judiciaire de Tanger " in R evue Generale 
de Droit International Public, Vol. 34 (1927) , p . 150; and see Toynbee , Survey 
of International Affairs , 1929, p. 200 , note 2. 
2 See Toynbee, Survey of Interna tional Affairs , 1925 , Vol. 2, p. 173. 
3 See quotation of statement of Marquis de E stelle in Toynbee, Surv ey of 
International Affairs, 1929, p. 190, note 3. 
4 Ibid ., p . 190. 
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THE PERIOD 1928-1945 
The convention of 1923 was concluded for a period of twelve years 
from ratification 13 and was subject to automatic renewal for one 
or more equal periods if none of the contracting Powers demanded 
its revision at least six months before its expiry. In such case 
it would remain in force while the revision by common agreement 
was being effected. 14 No change was made in this by the protocol 
of 1928. The Statute remained in force during the nineteen-thirties 
and it was only after the outbreak of the Second World War that 
another change occurred in the international status of Tangier. 
Whilst Great Britain and France were occupied with other matters, 
Spain acted, and under pretext of preserving the neutrality of the 
International Zone of Tangier, Spanish troops entered the zone on 
June 14, 1940. By various measures the international character 
of the regime of Tangier was practically eliminated. It is not 
pertinent to the problem under discussion to go into the details 
of this Spanish action in Tangier during the Second World War. 
It was a breach of the Statute, not a revision. 
15 By 1944 the 
Spanish Government realised that its authority in Tangier could 
not last and, after the German surrender, notified Great Britain 
of its willingness to regularise :the situation in Tangier and partially 
withdrew the Spanish troops from the zone. 
Because of the military situation in Morocco the United States 
had become interested in the problem of Tangier, and it was agreed 
between the United States, Great Britain and France that a con-
ference on Tangier should be held in Paris in July, 1945. The 
Soviet Government made known its wish to participate in the con-
ference and, conceding to :that wish, the three allies postponed the 
conference one month to give the Soviet Government tinie to choose 
delegates. The Spanish Government, too, had demanded to be 
allowed to participate, but this wish was not accommodated. As 
Professor Stuart puts it, "the attendance of the representative 
1a Article 56. 
14 Ibid. 
15 On the Spanish occupation generally, see Delore, " The violation by Spain 
of the Statute of Tangier and its consequences as they affect the .United 
States" in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), p. 140, 
and Stuart, Tangier, pp. 143 et seq. It may be noted that the Spanish 
Government allowed the German· Government to . establish a consulate general 
in the international zone and that the consulate functioned until May, 1944. 
In an attempt to justify this Spanish concession Cristobal de! Castillo writes: 
" Par J'Armistice de Compiegne de l 'annee 1940 entre la France et l 'Allemagne , 
les effets pratiques du Traite de Versailles restaient provisoirement en suspens 
et ii n 'etait pas possible, par consequent cl 'empecher la reinstallation du 
Consul at allemand de Tanger . , . " " L 'experience international de Tanger " 
in Revue I nterna.tiona.l Fran9aise du Droit des Gens, Vol. 20 (1951) , p. 173. 
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of Stalin precluded any possibility of permitting Franco's delegates 
to be present." 16 
The conference met on August 10, 1945, at Paris and resulted 
in a Final Act, the third part of which consisted of an Anglo-French 
agreement for the re-establishment of the international administra-
tion of Tangier. 17 
THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 31, 1945 
The Anglo-French agreement of August 31, 1945, although it pro-
vided for ratification, entered into force upon signature.
18 It was 
to be communicated to the Governments of Belgium, :the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and the United Kingdom and 
France agreed to seek the accession of these States.19 The Italian 
Government was to be invited to accede to .the agreement " at 
such time as the other governments parties thereto shall agree 
and subject to any relevant provisions in the peace treaty with 
Italy." 20 
The substance of the Anglo-French agreement pertinent in this 
connection was the following: on October 11, 1945, the Spanish 
Government was to give up its control of the Tangier Zone and 
the zone to be provisionally administered in accordance with :the 
Statute of 1923 as modified by the protocol of 1928 and by the 
agreement now under discussion. 1 Within six months from the 
establishment of the provisional regime the French Government 
was to convoke a conference at Paris, to which the following States, 
parties to the Act of Algeciras, were to be invited: the United 
States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, the Soviet Union and, subject to :the provision 
cited above, Italy. 2 The conference was to draw up a convention 
providing a permanent international regime for Tangier to replace 
the provisional regime. The United States and the Soviet Union, 
although not parties to the Statute of 1923, were invited to 
collaborate in the provisional regime 3 and were allowed :to be 
represented both in the Committee of Control and :the legislative 
assembly of Tangier. 4 The agreement and the dahirs of 1928 were 
16 Stuart, " The problem of Tangier" in Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 1 
(1947) p. 102. 
11 The Final Act is reproduced in Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Morocco 
No. 1 (1945), Cmd. 6678 and in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (1945), 
pp. 613 et seq. 
1s Article 9. 
19 Article 10. 
20 Article 11 (b). 
1 Articles 4 and 1. 
2 Article 2. 
3 Article 3. 
4 Article 7. 
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to " cease to operate " so far as they altered the previous conditions 
on which Italy was entitled to participate in the international 
administration. It was, furthermore, laid down in the Anglo-French 
agreement that the Committee of Control in Tangier was to . be 
allowed, at any time during the provisional regime, to adopt by 
unanimous vote amendments to the Anglo-French agreement. 5 
Did the manner in which the agreement of 1945 was concluded, 
or the substance of that agreement, amount to a disregard for 
pre-existing treaty rights ? It does not seem necessary to the 
effect of war upon treaties, for there is evidence that the allied 
Powers conferring in Paris regarded the previous treaties governing 
Tangier as still in force: the conference recommended to the 
participating governments the adoption of a resolution which 
reveals that the conference, intended to be held for the establish-
ment of a permanent international administration, was to consider 
" amendments to the Conventions in force " 6 which might be 
proposed by any of the governments participating in that con-
ference. It is reasonable to suppose that "conventions in force" 
referred to the Statute of 1923 and to the Protocol of 1928 amending 
the Statute. Moreover, article 11 of the Anglo-French agreement 
of 1945 laid down that the agreement of 1928 in so far as it altered 
the conditions in which the Italian Government was entitled to 
participate in the administration of the zone should "cease to 
operate " (italics added). It would seem to follow that that part 
of the agreement of 1928 was not abrogated but merely suspended 
and that it still remained in force, at any rate in so far as parties 
other than Italy were concerned. 
The. agreement of 1945 modified the Statute of 1923 on some 
important points. No secret was made of .this. Article 7 reads 
m part: 
" During the period of provisional administration of the Zone, 
the Convention of December 18, 1923 (as amended in 1928) 
shall operate, subject .to the following modifications:" 
Thereafter follows an enumeration from (a) to (f). What was 
the juridical basis of these modifications ? Paragraph 4 of Article 
56 of the Convention of 1923 laid down: 
" It [ the convention] shall be renewed automatically for one 
or more equal periods if at least six months before its expiry 
none of the contracting Power.s has demanded its revision. 
In such case it will remain in force while the revision by 
common agreement is being effected." 
It would be difficult to argue that the phrase " contracting Powers " 
s Article 8. 
• Resolution No. 1 (italics added). 
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referred only to the three original contracting Powers, namely, 
France, Spain and Great Britain; and even more difficult to contend 
that the phrase " common agreement " was intended to exclude 
those States which acceded to the convention. The modifications 
made in 1945 entered into force upon signature of the Anglo~French 
agreement without awaiting the "common agreement" between 
all the States parties to the 1923 Convention and, thus, in disregard 
of article 56 of that convention. However, it must be realised 
that the manner in which the agreement was concluded and the 
modifications it introduced into what the parties to the 1945 
agreement apparently regarded as treaties in force, was to some 
extent necessitated and justified by the circumstances ~xisting in 
1945; circumstances unforeseen in 1923 and 1928 and prejudicial 
to the agreements of those years. The question may, perhaps, 
be raised whether it was not the duty of France and Great Britain 
to depart as little as possible from the pre-war treaties governing 
Tangier. However, a discussion of that problem does not promise 
to be very fruitful. 7 Suffice it to say that France and the United 
Kingdom showed a fair respect for the pre-war treaties governing 
Tangier. They invited the States parties to these treaties-with 
the exception of Italy-immediately to accede to the 1945 Agree-
ment. They, furthermore, invited these States to .submit proposals 
for amendments to the pre-war treaties. They made it plain that 
the regime they were setting up was of a provisional nature, and 
they planned a conference, to which all the Powers parties to the 
Act of Algeciras were to be invited, for the purpose of putting 
the international regime of Tangier on a permanent basis. Finally, 
they granted the States parties to the 1923 regime the power to 
block any further modifications of the treaties of 1923 and 1928. 8 
The conference which, by Article 2 of the Agreement of 1945,. 
the French Government had undertaken to convene within six 
months from October 11, 1945, has not taken place. The reason 
7 Cristobal de! Castillo, challenging the justification for the invitation to the 
Soviet Union to participate in the provisional regime, writes: 
" On a semble-t-il oublie que, le regime international de Tanger trouvant 
son origine dans la seule conference d 'Algeciras, on ne pouvait tenter d 'installer 
l'_U.R.S .S. a Tanger qu'en vertu d'un consentement prealable de to1's Jes 
s1gnataires (a la Conference). Les obligations resultant d 'un traite inter-
national, conjonction de volitions concurrentes, ne se peuvent modifier de· 
maniere autonome, mais de telles modifications requierent un accord generaf 
de toils ses signataires et il n'est pas possible d'arguer qu'il y a la une· 
novation du contrat, car cette construction juridique n'existe pas en Droit 
International ": " L 'experience international de Tanger" in Revue Inter-
national Fran9aise du Droit des Gens, Vol. 20 (1951), p. 176. 
It ·may be argued against this view that although the Soviet Union in 1923 
apparently was not regarded as the legal successor of the Russian Empire-
which was a party to the Act of Algeciras-there was no compelling reason 
why it should not, in 1945, be regarded as such and be invited on this 
ground. s See Article 8 of the Anglo-French Agreement. 
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why the conference was not held within the agreed time limit 
was the continued existence of the Franco government in Spain. 
The Soviet delegation to the Paris conference in 1945 declared 
that Spain could not be allowed to participate in the international 
administration of Tangier until the Franco government had been 
replaced by a democratic regime. The American, British and 
French delegations , on the other hand, declared that while they con-
sidered Spanish participation in the provisional regime necessary," 
and while they considered that the conference for the establishment 
of a permanent international regime should not be held without 
Spain, they did not think it desirable that Spain should be invited 
to the conference as long as the Franco government remained in 
power. 10 However, the Franco regime subsisted and the conference 
has not been held. This may, perhaps, be regarded as a breach 
of the Anglo-French agreement, but not as a revision. Thus, 
up to the present time post-war Tangier has been governed on 
the basis of the " provisional" regime established in 1945. How-
ever, the " provisional " character of the regime has faded with 
the passage of time, the accession of States not parties to the 1945 
Agreement, and with a revision undertaken in 1952. 
Four States acceded to the Anglo-French agreement of 1945 
shortly after it had been concluded : Portugal on September 15, 
1945, Belgium on September 18, 1945, the Netherlands on Septem-
ber 20, 1945, and Sweden on September 28, 1945. 11 On October 11, 
1945, Spain withdrew its occupation of Tangier and also made 
known its adherence 12 to the Anglo-French agreement and its 
will to participate in the provisional regime. The agreement of 
1945 deprived Italy of some of its pre-war treaty rights in Tangier 
and suspended the rest until the peace 'treaty should have been 
concluded. 13 In the peace treaty of February 10, 1947, Italy 
recognised the provisions of the 1945 agreement. 14 With this 
recognition all the States which were parties to the 1923 convention 
had consented to the modifications introduced by the United 
Kingdom and France in 1945. 
THE DEVELOPMENTS OF 1945-1952 
The Italian rights , which were suspended in 1945, were partly 
restored in 1948, when, on March 8, Italy was readmitted to the 
Control Committee of Tangier. 15 
9 A considerable amount of food for the zone came from Spain. 
10 Both the Ru ssian and the Anglo-American-French declarations are included in 
the Final Act of the Paris conference. 
11 See Great Britain, Treaty Series, 1947, General Index 1939-1946 , p. 45. 
12 See Department of S tate Bulletin , Vol. 13 (1945) , p . 613. 1 3 Article 11. 
1 4 See Article 41. United Nations, Treaty S eries , Vol. 49 (1950) at p. 142. 
1s See the Statesman's Yearbook , 1953, p. 1029. 
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As mentioned above, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were invited to collaborate in the provisional regime of the Tangier 
Zone in accordance with the provisions of the 1945 agreement. 
The United States accepted this invitation 16 and availed itself of 
its right to appoint three Americans as members of the legislative 
assembly of Tangier and its Diplomatic Agent and Consul General 
at Tangier as its representative on the Committee of Control. 11 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appointed no representatives 
and remained outside the administration. The American participa-
tion in the administration requires some further comments : The 
agreement of 1945 granted three seats each to the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the legislative assembly, and one seat 
each in the Committee of Control. However, these rights were 
not made conditional upon accession. And, in fact, neither the 
United States nor the Soviet Union did accede to the agreement 
of 1945. But while the Soviet Union took no part in the administra-
tion of Tangier, the United States did and .still does; yet the 
United States was not, and is not, a party to the Statute. According 
to an official American publication, 18 the United States participates 
in the Committee of Control by virtue of its being a party to 
(a) the Act of Algeciras, and (b) the Final Act of the 1945 
conference concerning the re-establishment of the international 
regime in Tangier. To some extent the United States-although 
not a party to the Statute governing Tangier-must be deemed 
to be bound by the Statute of 1923 as amended in 1928 and 1945, 
for article 3 (a) of the agreement of 1945-which forms part of 
the Final Act of the 1945 conference-invites the United States 
to collaborate in the provisional regime of Tangier " in accordance 
with the provisions of this agreement ", and the agreement restores 
the Statute of 1923 as amended in 1928 and 1945. Nevertheless, 
it appears that the United States is not fully bound by the Statute. 
When accepting the invitation to participate in the provisional 
regime of Tangier, the United States made formal reservations to 
the effect that its decision to participate " did not imply adherence 
to the 1923 Statute (as revised in 1928) and should not be deemed 
to modify or abridge in any manner (1) the position of the United 
States, (2) the .status of the . United States representative, (3) the 
establishment, authority, and power of the United States' extra-
territorial jurisdiction, or ( 4) any rights accruing to the United 
1 6 With some reservations. 
17 See Stuart , " The problem of T angier " in The Yearbook of W orld Affairs, 
Vol. 1 (1947) , p. 106. 
1 8 International Organizati.ons in which the United S tates Participates (1949) , 
p. 182 (Department of State, publication 3655) . 
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States and its nationals and ressortissants from treaty, custom and 
usage." 19 
As will be recalled, the Statute of 1923 abrogated the capitula-
tions in the Tangier Zone. The United States not being a party 
to the Statute in 1925, no attempt was then made to abrogate 
its capitulations iri Tangier. In 1954 there was an American judge 
on the Mixed Court of Tangier. However, in spite of this and 
due to the reservation mentioned above the United States' capitula-
tory rights were not abrogated. ~° Furthermore, despite the fact 
that the Statute of 1923 provided that diplomatic agencies at 
Tangier should be replaced by consulates, the United States was 
- in 1955 as before- represented at Tangier by a diplomatic agent 
with the rank of Minister. 1 Thus, although the United States now 
actively participates in the international administration of Tangier, 
nevertheless, as in 1925, some of the provisions of the Statute are 
not enforced in respect of the United States. 
THE REVISION OF 1952 
The Anglo-French Agreement of 1945 gave the Committee of 
Control in Tangier the power to revise that agreement. Article 8 
laid down: 
" The Committee of Control may at any time while the present 
Agreement remains in force adopt by unanimous vote any 
amendments thereto which it considers desirable. Such modi-
fications shall be recorded in protocols signed by the members 
of the Committee of Control, specifying the date as from which 
they shall operate. These modifications shall be immediately 
submitted to His Sherifian Majesty for his approval and for 
the enactment of the necessary dahir." 
In view of this article the Committee of Control, on November 
10, 1952, unanimously decided to amend certain articles of the 
1 9 Although reference is made to these reservations in the Brit ish treaty series 
of 1947 (General Index 1939-1946, p. 45) they do not seem to have been published anywhere . The writer of this ar ticle was informed about the 
contents of the reservations by the courtesy of the State Department of the United States. 
20 See Lagergren , " Sverige och Tanger" in Svensk Juristtidning , Vol. 39 (1954), 
p. 276. Judge L agergren states that, an American judge having been appointed 
to the Mixed Court , the question of possible abrogation of the United States ' 
capitulatory right s in Tangier was said to be under consideration. Cf . 
Gutteridge, " The reform of the Mixed Court at T angier " in British Yearbook 
of International Law , Vol. 30 (1953), p. 503. 
In the case of Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company v. El Khadar , t he 
court of appeal of t he international jurisdiction of T angier declared in its judgment of August 13, 1954 that "the Final Act of 1945 and Unit ed States' par ticipation in cer tain organs of the International Administration in no way 
modified its position or presupposed a renunciation of acquired privileges, the disappearance of which may only come about through an express declaration ": R eport by L issitzyn in American J,ournal of International Law , Vol. 49 (1955), 
p . 414. 1 See United States , Foreign Service L ist. 
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agreement of 1945. The decision was embodied in a protocol 2 
signed by the representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
i.e., all the States parties to the Statute of 1923, with the addition 
of the United States and with the exception of Sweden. However, 
inasmuch as the Swedish Government had acceded to the Anglo-
French agreement of 1945,3 and inasmuch as it had had the 
opportunity-of which . it did not avail itself-to appoint a repre-
sentative on the Committee of Control, 4 it must be deemed to 
have accepted the 1952 revision of the Anglo-French agreement. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Swedish 
Government has in no manner shown any disapproval of the 
revision of 1952. Since, consequently, all the States parties to 
the previous treaties 5 governing Tangier must be considered as 
having consented to the revision of 1952, there is no occasion to 
examine the substantive provisions of the 1952 protocol for the 
purpose of this article. 
There is, further, no reason to examine in detail a convention 
concluded at Tangier on November 10, 1952, relating to the reform 
of the international jurisdiction of the Tangier Zone. 6 To a certain 
extent this convention modified the Statute of 1923, as amended 
in 1928. The signatories of the convention- England, France, 
Italy and Spain- became bound by signature. 7 However, it was 
laid down in the convention that it was not to enter into force 
until it had been adhered to by the United States-as a member 
of the Committee of Control- and by the States which had adhered 
to the convention of 1923. 8 With this procedure there was no 
risk of any infringement upon rights enjoyed under previous treaties. 
The condition of adherence was fulfilled and the convention entered 
into force on July 8, 1953, when the United States adhered to 
it. 9 It is interesting to note that in this convention the orthodox 
method was used and the new treaty not allowed to enter into 
force until all the parties to the amended treaty had adhered to 
2 The protocol is reprinted in United States , Treaties and other internat·ional act 
series , 2752 and in Great Britain , Treaty Series, No . 10 (1955). 
.1 See supra , p. 588. , 
,1 Article 30 of the Statute of 1923 provided that "the Committee of Con trol will 
consist of the consuls de carriere of the Powers sign atories of the Act of Algeciras or of t heir substitutes de carriere. " 
~ Applying the same reasoning a_s is used above with regard to Sweden , the Soviet Union , not having appointed any representative on the Committee of Control, can prob ably be presumed to have consen ted to the r evi sion of 1952 . 
" Great Britain, Treaty Series, No. 48 (1955). F or a comment on the reform, 
see Gutteridge, "The reform of the Mixed Court at Tangier " in British Yearbook of International L aw , Vol. 30 (1953), pp. 498-506. 
This is implicit , but not explici t in the convention ; see Articles 55 and 56. 
s Article 56. 
~ See Great Britain, Treaty S er·ies, No. 48 (1955), p . 30. 
592 International and Comparative Law Quarterly [VoL. 5 
the new treaty; in contrast to the several previ9us treaties already 
discussed, namely those of 1923, 1928 and 1945, which entered 
into. force regardless of whether accession had been obtained from 
all the States, whose rights under a previous treaty were affected. 
It should further be noted that-according to the British Treaty 
Series-" the adherence of the United States to the Convention 
( of 1952) does not modify or abridge in any manner the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of the United States in the Tangier Zone. " 
Nor does it "in any way imply adherence to the Statute of 
Tangier of December 18, 1923, as modified on July 25, 1928, which 
the Convention of November 10, 1952, amends." 1° Finally, it 
should be observed that the convention of 1952 concerning the 
international jurisdiction in Tangier contained no clause which made 
it possible for the Soviet Union to adhere. The · Final Act of 
1945, on the other hand, had provided that all the parties to· 
the Act of Algeciras 11 should be invited to the conference which 
was to give Tangier a permanent international regime and Resolu-
tion No. 4 of the Final Act had laid down: 
" Under the Final Statute of the Tangier Zone the Govern-
ments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics should each be entitled, if the present 
judicial organisation is maintained, to be represented on the 
Mixed Tribunal by a titular judge in the same manner as 
the Governments of France and the United Kingdom." 
However, whereas the convention of 1952 provided that an. 
American judge should sit on the bench of the mixed court, it 
_ did not provide similarly for any Russian judge. The absence of 
any provision in this respect and the absence of any clause for-
Russian adherence may be justified by the fact that the conference 
which drafted the convention of 1952 was not convoked to give 
Tangier a permanent international regime and the convention did. 
not constitute a final statute of the Tangier zone. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Having traced the development of the treaties concerning Tangier 
from the late nineteenth century up to 1952, we can perhaps 
attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the attitude of _the 
interested States to the question of revision of treaties. 
I. The Procedure for Revision 
The question may be asked whether a State party to a multi-
lateral treaty can demand, as a matter of right, to be invited 
10 It may be presumed that these limitations were the result of reservations made· 
by the United States, when it adhered. . 
11 That the Soviet Union, in 1945 , was regarded as a par ty to the Act of Algec1ra& 
is evidenced by Article 2 of the Anglo-French agreement of that year. 
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to a conference which other States, parties to the same treaty, 
are to hold and the outcome of which may have a bearing upon 
the rights that State is enjoying under the treaty. Such right 
would have to be based on a separate rule of customary inter-
national law, for the general rule-whatever may be the exceptions 
to it-that a treaty right cannot be modified or abrogated without 
the consent of the bearer of the right, cannot very well be invoked: 
no right is affected by the mere discussion of it. The rule would 
constitute an extension of the general rule or, to put it differently, 
a rule of procedure to the effect that if there is a conference for 
the modification of a multipartite treaty all the States parties to 
the treaty have a right to express their consent at that conference. 
There is little in the treaty development of Tangier to support 
an affirmative answer to the question posed. When the Italian 
Government contended that it had a right to be invited to the 
conference of 1923, the French Government did · not flatly reply 
that a State has no right to participate in a conference, however 
much its treaty rights are to be discussed at it. The French 
Government chose to remind Italy of the treaty of " desinteresse-
ment" of 1912. However, it does not necessarily follow that the 
French Government was of the opinion that Italy would have had 
a right to participate had there been no treaty of " desinteresse-
ment." In 1926 the Soviet Union contended not only that it had 
a right to participate in a conference which might modify the Act 
of Algeciras but also in deciding where the conference should be 
held. The governments to which the demand was made must 
have rejected it, but their replies apparently not having been 
published it is impossible to discuss the reasons they may have 
put forward. The Spanish Government had certainly shown no 
" desinteressement " in Tangier when it demanded to be allowed 
to participate in the allied conference in Paris in 1945. Yet, as 
we _have seen, the request was not granted. However, as it does 
not appear that Spain and the Allied Powers regarded the request 
as a juridical matter the example is, perhaps, inconclusive. It is 
more difficult to believe that the States most interested in Tangier 
in 1914, 1923, 1928 and 1945 could have neglected to invite to 
their conferences certain other States, possessed of legal rights but 
relatively little interested in -the city, had the conferring States 
been aware of the existence of a right on _ the part of the less 
interested States to participate in the conferences. Moreover, with 
the exception of Italy in 1923, the Soviet Union in 1926 and 
Spain in 1945, it does not appear that any of the States which 
were not invited tried to assert such a right. Thus, if the manner 
in which the treaties governing Tangier have been concluded gives 
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any guidance in the question now under discussion, it would .seem 
that there is no right under customary international law for a 
State to participate in a conference which is expected to suggest 
modifications in its rights under a multipartite treaty. 
If a State's consent to the modification of a treaty is of vital 
importance for the implementation of a modification, it may' of 
course, be futile for a conference to negotiate the modification 
in the absence of representatives of that State. The difficulties 
which arose when the Tangier Statute of 1923 was put into 
operation is a good example of this. It would have been wise 
to invite Italy to the conference of 1923. The Spanish participation 
in the administration of Tangier after .the Second World War is 
another example of the same general proposition. Although Spain 
was not allowed to participate in the 1945 conference, Great Britain, 
France and the United States realised that the administration 
of Tangier would be difficult, if not impossible, without Spanish 
participation, and they consequently refused to accept the Soviet 
proposal to exclude the Franco government from participation in 
the administration of Tangier. 
It is obvious that when States which are closely interested 
in the operation of a multipartite treaty hold a conference-with 
a view to modifying the treaty-in the absence of representatives 
of other parties to the .same treaty, they take a risk. They may 
find that the States which were not represented are reluctant to 
co-operate when it comes to implementing the modifications they 
have agreed upon. Yet, they may be willing to take that risk 
for political or technical reasons. The conferences on Tangier in 
1914, 1923 and 1945 are examples of this. The treaties drafted at 
these conferences touched upon rights of some States which did not 
take part in the negotiations. The conferring governments probably 
thought that the non-participating States did not regard these 
rights as very important and that it ":'as likely that they would 
consent to the modifications even though they were not consulted 
in advance. They might have been expected to consent in order 
t.o achieve advantages not previously enjoyed, or merely in order 
not to obstruct. 
The Government of the United States, which did not participate 
in the conferences of 1923 and 1928, in effect advised the conferring 
governments that it would not be prepared to relinquish certain 
rights in Tangier which · it enjoyed under previous treaties. The 
other States which had treaty rights in Tangier, and which were 
not invited to the conferen.ces, could obviously have taken the. 
same step; although it does not appear that any one of them did. 
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The method of " limited conferences," though it may have 
facilitated agreement between the States most concerned, sometimes 
led to difficulties when non-participating States were not com-
pletely satisfied with the agreements to which they were asked 
to accede. After the conclusion of the convention of 1923, additional 
negotiations had to · be undertaken in order to secure Belgian 
accession; and, although the signatories to that convention went 
rather far in fulfilling the conditions which the United States made 
for its accession, they did not secure it. In such situations the 
signatories may find that they must put a treaty into opera-
tion on an unsound juridical basis or else postpone its operation 
indefinitely. 
II. Affirmation of the Rule of Unanimity 
This article has pointed to many occasions when the rule of 
unanimity for the revision of treaties was invoked or relied upon : 
When the German Government, in 1905, demanded that a con-
ference should be held with all the parties to the convention of 
1880, it invoked-probably inappropriately in that case-the rule 
of unanimity. Article 76 of the Act of Algeciras seems to point 
to unanimity as a self-evident requirement for the revision of a 
treaty, unless something else is expressly provided. At the Paris 
peace conference in 1919, Mr. Balfour expressed his unwillingness 
to modify without their consent the treaty rights of neutrals, and 
the French negotiator concurred with him in this opinion. The 
Italian representative in the Sanitary Council of Tangier relied 
on the rule of unanimity, although its applicability in that situation 
was doubtful. The convention of 1923 provided that it should 
remain in force while revision " by common agreement " was being 
affected. The Anglo-French agreement of 1945 gave the Committee 
of Control in Tangier the power to modify that agreement, but 
required that modifications should be adopted by unanimous vote. 
The convention of 1952 regarding the international jurisdiction of 
Tangier was not to enter into force until all the States which had 
rights under previous treaties had adhered. But perhaps all this 
was lip-service? Perhaps we should look to the deeds rather than 
the words. If so, it . is possi_ble to point .to the non-enforcement 
of some of the articles of the convention of 1923. The capitulations 
of the non-acceding States were not abolished; these States con-
tinued to be represented by diplomatic agents rather than consuls-
general; citizens of these States paid anchorage dues at the old 
rates; Italian citizens opened gambling houses while citizens of 
acceding States closed theirs; when certain measures were enforced 
· upon Americans by the new administration, on the basis of the 
I.C.L.Q.-5 40 
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Statute, the representative of the United States regarded the 
enforcement as illegal; and the Court of Appeal of the International 
Jurisdiction of Tangier declared that the Statute of 1923 could not 
bind a State which had not adhered to it. 
III. Inroads upon the Rule of Unanimity 
While the preceding paragraph shows that the rule of unanimity 
was frequently invoked and frequently respected, it is also possible 
to point to some, although on the whole insignificant, inroads 
upon it. 
It is difficult to avoid the impression that while it seems to 
have been regarded as necessary to obtain .the consent of some 
highly interested States in order- to modify previous treaties, the 
consent of some other States was merely regarded as very desirable. 
When the Statute of 1923 was put into operation on June 1, 1925, 
four States (the Soviet Union not counted), parties to the Act 
of Algeciras, had not acceded, and when the protocol of 1928 was 
brought into operation on December 14 , 1928, three States (the 
Soviet Union not counted) had not acceded, and when the Anglo-
French agreement of 1945 was brought into force upon signature, 
none of the States parties to the previous treaties on Tangier had 
acceded. The original signatories to the treaties of 1923, 1928 
and 1945 appear to have presumed that the less interested States, 
whose consent was desired, would accede, whether it be before or 
after the treaties entered into operation. 12 It is significant that the 
Statute of 1923 granted rights to these States: their adherence 
was obviously anticipated. When, as in the case of the United 
States, accession was not secured, only insignificant encroachments 
were made upon previous treaty rights. 
Professor Hudson wrote in 1927 that, in regard to Italy, the 
United States and Russia, the Statute of 1923 was not so much 
illegal as inoperative. 13 This view fits well with the final observa-
tion that, to the extent to which the Statute remained unenforced 
against these States, it was not regarded as illegal; to the extent 
to which it was enforced on the other hand, it was regarded as 
illegal at least by Italy, the Soviet Union and the United States. 
12 It is of interest to note , on the other hand , that at the revisions undertaken 
in 1952 the " orthodox " rule of unanimity was observed. See supra, p. 591. 
13 See Hudson, "The international Mixed Court of Tangier" in American Journal 
of International Law , Vol. 21 (1927), p . 233. 
Note : Mr. Lauterpacht's survey of the contemporary practice 
of the United Kingdom will be resumed in the January, 1957, issue. 
